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CONFIDENTIAL.

(9165.)

F.O. 413/46.

F.O.

413

PART 34.

# FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

# AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

46

July to September 1907.

F.O. 413 / 46
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE
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ERRATA.

Page 13, No. 30, line 1. For "13th April" read "18th April."
Page 35, No. 76, line 1. For "13th instant" read "13th ultimo."
Page 149, No. 236, line 1. For "15th instant" read "7th instant."
Page 155, No. 253, line 1. For "your telegram No. 82 of yesterday" read "Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 42 of 28th August."
Page 159, No. 260, line 1. For "to-day" read "yesterday."
Page 178, No. 291, last line. For "30th ultimo" read "28th ultimo."
Page 238, No. 382, line 1. For "18th instant" read "15th instant."



*Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. October* 1907.

CONFIDENTIAL.

# Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

## Part 34.

[21629] No. 1.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 1.)

(No. 196.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 21, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 187 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that the German Chargé d'Affaires to-day informed me that his Government had approved the language held by him at the meeting of the Sanitary Council on the 10th instant, as reported in that despatch. The German Government, moreover, was of opinion that the solution of the Board, as far as it had gone, was a judicious one.

Captain Rooke, whose services have courteously been placed at the disposal of the Sanitary Council by the Governor of Gibraltar, is now engaged upon the work of drawing up the drainage scheme, &c.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[21631] No. 2.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 1.)

(No. 198.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 23, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 191 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that the news of the erection of the Sultan's tent outside Fez had momentarily tranquillized the tribes near Marrakesh, but, as was to be feared, the procrastination of the Sultan and his advisers is having a bad effect upon the situation, which is unsettled. The Arabs are pressing on with their harvest, so as to have their supplies safely secured in evident anticipation of eventualities later on.

It is rumoured that Kaïd Aisa, a very powerful Chief, when sounded as to joining Mulai Hafid in the event of the latter being proclaimed Sultan, gave a decided refusal. The general belief however is, that he would join the Viceroy were pressure to be brought upon him by the Rahamna, of whom he is much afraid.

The "Mauchamp" prisoners were removed to Mogador on the 15th instant in charge of the brother of Glawi. The tribes having for the present dispersed, the actual state of affairs in Marrakesh itself is quiet, though the attitude of the natives is very anti-French. Mr. Lennox, the British Consular Agent, is about to return to Marrakesh. Before the tribes left the city, Mulai Hafid presented them with a considerable sum of money, and invited them to return in fifteen days. The money is said to have been obtained from Mosque funds.

Mulai Hafid has undoubtedly been sounding all the tribes, but even in Rahamna it seems that a number of Chiefs, though not hostile to him, declined to commit themselves to take part in any movement for his proclamation as Sultan. Not long ago the Viceroy sent emissaries to the great Southern Governors—Anflus, Giluli, and Mtoogi, but without success. After seeing Anflus the envoys disappeared, and Mulai Hafid feared they had gone to Fez to reveal the plot to the Sultan.

It is not easy to see what the Viceroy could offer to the tribes in return for their support. They are practically independent, and would probably prefer to remain so.

It may be that the Viceroy is in fear of ultimate arrest, and is therefore anxious for tribal support of some kind, especially as it has already been rumoured that the Maghzen have sent orders for his arrest.

It is, of course, the well-known policy of the Maghzen to foment a certain amount of unrest among the tribes, to prevent any one of their number from becoming too strong.

It is reported that the Mehalla of Mulai-el-Anim at Mediuna has been ordered to be ready to move in a fortnight's time, presumably for Rabat, where it may meet the Sultan in due course.

According to the latest news I have received from Fez, the Sultan is really determined to make a move to Rabat within the next two months if the necessary funds are forthcoming, but no doubt His Majesty and his advisers would gladly find an excuse for dispensing with this expedition.

The situation thus seems to be that the Rahamna are not agreed, some wishing to remain loyal, while others support Mulai Hafid; that the latter is unwilling to show his hand until he is certain whether the Sultan is going to move from Fez or not. If he does, Marrakesh will probably remain quiet. If he does not, Mulai Hafid may make a move. In the meantime, he will probably periodically have to pay the tribes to keep them quiet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[20786] No. 3.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 1, 1907.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 184 of the 14th ultimo, inclosing copy of two letters from Messrs. Pariente, in which they request you to take steps to procure the payment of the sums owing to them by the Moorish Government, out of the loan which the latter are endeavouring to obtain from the State Bank.

It is obviously impossible to demand that the Makhzen shall, on obtaining the loan in question, immediately pay off all their liabilities, if they are, as you think probable, in excess of the sum which the State Bank is prepared to grant. The question therefore arises whether claims, such as those of Messrs. Pariente, which His Majesty's Government are prepared to regard as deserving earlier settlement than the public claims put forward by foreign Governments, would by themselves form a class small enough to justify the exercise of pressure with a view to their satisfaction. I presume that it is to such a class of claimants that your French and German colleagues referred in expressing to you their opinion that the "debts of foreign claimants" should be paid by the Makhzen, and I shall be glad to learn, if you are able to ascertain it, what sum would be necessary to pay off this kind of debt.

You will, no doubt, keep me informed as to any action which may be taken by your French and German colleagues with a view to impressing their views in this respect on the Makhzen, and you should yourself take an opportunity of urging upon the latter the necessity of utilizing any funds which they may obtain for the repayment, in part, at any rate, of the sums owing to the British claimants.

As regards Messrs. Pariente's special claim, it would serve no useful purpose to determine how far His Majesty's Government are prepared to exercise diplomatic pressure on behalf of this firm until it is certain that some action on their part is called for. The possibility is so far not entirely excluded that there will be a margin in the loan granted capable of being devoted to the settlement of existing liabilities, while it is more than possible, according to the second paragraph of your despatch, that any pressure which may be necessary may emanate from the State Bank itself.

You should therefore reply to Messrs. Pariente that His Majesty's Government are unable to state what support, if any, they will be prepared to afford them until the amount and the terms of the loan have been settled.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[21955] No. 4.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 3, 1907.*

I HAVE to report with regret that Raisuli, pending acceptance of his terms by Sultan, has secured Kaïd Maclean, who was engaged in negotiations with him. The terms for release will probably be onerous. The Kaïd, who is being kept in mountains about ten hours from Alcazar, informs me by letter that a demand to be made Governor as before will be put forward by Raisuli; the latter will not, however, in my opinion, limit himself to this demand.

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[21955] No. 5.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 3, 1907.*

SIR H. MACLEAN'S capture by Raisuli.

I have received your telegram No. 51 of to-day's date.

Moorish Government should be urged to make every possible effort to secure without delay the release of Sir H. Maclean. If necessary, you should warn them that no measure which might be contemplated, but which you would regard as imperilling his life, should be taken.

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[22015] No. 6.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 4, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Kaïd Maclean.

With reference to your telegram No. 33 of yesterday, I asked Moorish Commissioner in writing yesterday morning to see that, pending conclusion of negotiations, orders were given to Government troops to make no move.

Sid Torres has replied to the effect that the matter has been referred to the Makhzen at Fez.

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[22073] No. 7.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 4, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Kaïd Maclean.

It would, in opinion of Moorish Commissioner, only complicate matters, and cause unnecessary delay in negotiations, were he to take any part. They must, he declares, take place direct between the Government at Fez and Raisuli.

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[22015] No. 8.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 4, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

I approve your action reported in your telegram No. 52 of the 4th instant.

No movement of troops should be allowed until Kaïd has been set free. You should continue to make representations to Moorish Government in this sense.

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[22073] No. 9.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1907.

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean: Your telegram No. 53 of the 4th instant.

Urge Sid Torres to keep you fully informed of the course which the negotiations take, and impress upon him that, the Kaïd being a British subject, his safety is a matter of great interest to His Majesty's Government.

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[22360] No. 10.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 6.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 6, 1907.

IT is advised in letters received from Kaïd Maclean, dated the 4th instant, that there should be no attempt at negotiating with Raisuli, but rather with the tribe inhabiting district in which they are.

This view is strongly supported by Minister of War, who, however, insists that reinforcements should be sent to the small force in the Beni Hassan, so that an attack, involving a possible defeat, may be avoided, which would naturally have disastrous results, and lead other tribes to join Raisuli, and so that the tribes may be convinced that the Moorish Government still possesses authority. Sid Guebbas hopes also that it may be possible to persuade His Majesty to move a day or two's march out of Fez. An aggressive movement would not be entailed by either of these steps.

News has been received by the Consular Agent at Alcazar to the effect that it is possible that the Khamas may capture both Raisuli and Maclean, and then come to terms, as the Notables of the tribe are against the former.

It is strongly maintained by the Minister of War that Kaïd's safety would in no way be endangered by additions to present military forces, and he declares that neither the tribe nor Raisuli would ever harm him. Sid Guebbas is most anxious that His Majesty's Government should support his recommendations. The Sultan will find himself in a most difficult position, in view of the message conveyed to him by me in pursuance of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 34.

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[22354] No. 11.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 6, 1907.

CAN you ascertain what terms are proposed by Raisuli for the surrender of Sir H. Maclean?

A question will be asked on this point on the 9th July in the House of Commons.

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[22361] No. 12.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 6.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 6, 1907.

KAID MACLEAN. Your telegram No. 37 of to-day's date.

Terms depend entirely on attitude taken up by the tribes. They have not yet been formulated, nor, from his letters, does Kaïd appear to have any knowledge of them.

It was only yesterday that news could have arrived at Fez.

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[22484] No. 13.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 8.)

(No. 199.)
Sir, *Tangier, June* 24, 1907.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 27th May, and to your reply of the 28th of that month, I have the honour to report that I addressed a note to Sid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman on the 30th ultimo, calling his Excellency's attention to the condition of affairs in Morocco City and to the inconvenience and loss to which British merchants were exposed, and asking his Excellency whether he was prepared to give an assurance that British subjects could return to Morocco City without danger to their lives and property. A copy of this note is inclosed herewith.

His Excellency Ben Sliman has now replied in very guarded terms in a note of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. As you will perceive, his Excellency does not give any assurance regarding the present, but merely declares that steps are being taken to tranquillize and pacify the district, and concludes with what is, I believe, the first official declaration to the effect that His Majesty has decided to take his forces to Southern Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman.*

YOUR Excellency is aware of the condition of insecurity that has existed in the city of Morocco since the murder by the mob of Dr. Mauchamp, a condition that became so grave that the Governor of the town informed British subjects that he was unable to guarantee their safety. They were consequently compelled to quit the town.

Your Excellency will realize the dangerous condition of the town and the departure therefrom of the agents of commercial houses has entailed upon these latter a very considerable loss of business, a loss for which these merchants will expect to be indemnified by the Moorish Government. It is extremely desirable, both in the interests of British commerce and in those of the Moorish Government, that a state of security should be restored in Marakesh. I understand that in reply to a question recently put to the Viceroy of Marakesh by a foreign Consular Agent, as to whether he was able to protect the lives of foreigners in that city, his Excellency replied in the affirmative, and I should be glad to receive from your Excellency a similar assurance if you are able to give it, and a clear statement that British subjects can now return to Marakesh without danger to their lives and property.

*Tangier, May* 30, 1907.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

*Sid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

I RECEIVED your letter relative to the state of affairs at Morocco City since the Dr. Mauchamp incident, and stating that the merchants had had to leave the town, and trusting that the Makhzen will take measures to restore tranquillity and security there so that the merchants may be enabled to return and reside there and look after their businesses without fear or alarm. I took note of this, and having informed His Majesty thereof, he instructed me to reply that you are not unaware that His Shereefian Majesty is sparing no possible effort to tranquillize that district and pacify it, and remove everything which would cause the slightest alarm for its safety, so that matters may be set in order, and those who are left return to reside there and attend to their businesses, and His Shereefian Majesty is still occupying himself with those measures which will be conducive to that result, and has decided to take his forces to the Houz (Southern Morocco) district at as early a date as possible, please God.

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[22485] No. 14.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 200.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 26, 1907.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 12 of the 19th January, 1906, I venture to submit, for your consideration, whether the captain of the escort who deserted the British officers upon their capture by Valiente in October 1905 may not now be released. He has been confined since December 1905, so it may be presumed that his punishment has now been sufficient to have impressed the soldiers of Tetuan with the inadvisability of giving way to their feelings of timidity on any future occasion of a similar nature, or of lending their assistance to brigands against whom they are intended to afford protection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[22489] No. 15.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 204.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 28, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 198 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report that, according to information which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, the Mauchamp prisoners arrived at Mogador on the 17th instant. The dispatch of these prisoners under escort of forty Glawi horsemen appears to have had a salutary effect upon the population of Marakesh. Great precautions were taken in that city to insure the safety of the escort, as it was feared that an attempt might be made by the tribes to release the prisoners. On the arrival of the prisoners in Mogador, Kaïd Bargash requested the French Consul to see that the exact number had been brought in. The escort left for Marakesh on the 20th, a message from Mulai Hafid having been received by the French Consul placing them at his disposal in the event of his wishing to proceed to that city.

Mr. Madden is informed that the situation in Marakesh is once more normal. In the Province of Rahamna, however, it appears that some of the more turbulent tribes are reassembling with the avowed intention of punishing Kaïd El Glawi for pretending to be on their side and then assisting the Viceroy to dispatch the prisoners from the city. It does not appear that Mulai Hafid is contemplating any decisive move, though, as reported in my above-named despatch, he is supposed to have invited the tribes to reassemble in the course of a fortnight. In any case it seems improbable that they will do so.

From native sources I am informed that the principal movers in the agitation are Kaïd Glawi and Kaïd Metoogi, though this would seem very improbable in view of the assistance rendered by the former to the Viceroy in dispatching the prisoners to Mogador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I have the honour to report that the Mauchamp prisoners have now arrived in Tangier and been placed in the political prison. The French Chargé d'Affaires is in some doubt as to what attitude to adopt in regard to these prisoners, as it is openly stated on all hands that they are mere scapegoats, and are quite innocent of any participation in the murder of Dr. Mauchamp, while the real culprits have been allowed to go free. It would have an equally bad effect if innocent persons were punished for the murder of a Frenchman, or if prisoners declared by the Makhzen authorities to be the criminals were allowed to go free.

G. L.

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[22490] No. 16.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 205.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 30, 1907.*

THE Inspector-General of the new police recently made an application to the foreign Representatives to be allowed to make some modification in the number of police provided for Tangier under Article 5 of the Act of Algeciras, namely, raising the number from 600 to 750 men, by removing 150 men from other less important ports.

The reasons for the alteration and the Table showing the distribution will be found in the annexed pamphlet.*

This change had previously been approved of by the Moorish Minister of War and by the French and Spanish police officers. There seemed, therefore, to be every reason for indorsing the proposal, which my colleagues and I have now done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[22531] No. 17.

*Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 337.)

Sir, *Paris, July 6, 1907.*

A DEBATE took place yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies with reference to the state of affairs in Morocco and the recently signed Agreements between France and Spain relative to the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

Baron Denys Cochin, an Opposition Deputy who sits on the Right of the House, opened the discussion by criticizing the delays that had occurred in obtaining satisfaction for the French demands and in the settlement of various questions left under the Algeciras Act for discussion by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier. He also adverted to the Franco-Spanish Agreement, questioning the necessity for such an arrangement. He pursued his criticism of the Government by asking why semi-official negotiators were called in to the assistance of the proper Representatives of France abroad, and whether M. Étienne, in particular, had recently been given any mission to Berlin. He accused M. Clemenceau of becoming a politician of romance—with his secret diplomacy, his conspiracies, mysterious agents, &c. He ended a speech which amused the House by saying: "Pas de politique romantique, pas de complot, si c'est possible, pendant les vacances. Pas d'Ambassadeurs secrets, pas de petits papiers," the latter having reference to the Montagnini papers.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered the speech at once. His Excellency stated that he would deal first with the insinuations made by M. Denys Cochin in regard to M. Étienne's visit to Germany. M. Étienne had been given no sort of mission whatever. The relations between France and Germany had not ceased to be marked by the greatest courtesy and correctness, and there was nothing in them which could serve as a reason for any mission of such a kind, seeing that the French Ambassador at Berlin enjoyed the full confidence of his own Government and of that to which he was accredited. M. Pichon added, however, that it could not be otherwise than a matter for congratulation that the Frenchmen, including Members of Parliament, who had visited Germany should have received so courteous a reception. This was particularly so in the case of so eminent a public man as M. Étienne. At this point the latter, who was visibly pleased at the tone adopted by M. Pichon, rose in his seat and made a gesture of acknowledgment for the expressions with regard to himself used by his Excellency.

M. Pichon then proceeded to give the Chamber an account of the negotiations with the Makhzen which followed the occupation of Oudja.

The Makhzen had agreed to the following demands, and had begun to put them into execution:—

An exemplary punishment of the assassins of Dr. Mauchamp;
The dismissal of the Basha of Marakesh and his dispatch to Tangier;
An indemnity to the family of Dr. Mauchamp;
The construction and up-keep of a hospital at Marakesh;

* Not printed.

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The punishment of the authors of the attacks on other Frenchmen (MM. Lassallas, de Gironcourt, and Charbonnier);

The organization of the police in the ports in accordance with the Regulation approved by the Shereefian Delegate;

The execution of the Agreements of 1901–1902 as to the frontier of Algeria;

A proper policing of the frontier in agreement with France;

The cessation of a supply of arms to Adrar and the recall of the Chieftain Moulay Idriss, who was fomenting troubles in that region.

M. Pichon alluded to the occupation of Oudja and the measures taken by the French authorities there, which had raised no international question of any kind.

His Excellency then proceeded to give some account of the satisfactory progress made in applying the provisions of the Algeciras Act, and stated that it was largely due to the good dispositions shown by the Representatives of the Powers at Tangier, and in particular to the conciliatory relations, which, after some passing difficulties, had been established between the French and German Legations there. He was happy to be able to draw attention to this state of things from the Tribune of the Chamber.

M. Pichon passed in review what had already been accomplished at Tangier, mentioning the organization of the State Bank with a Frenchman for its President, the appointment of a Frenchman as Engineer in the service of the Moorish Government, and the settlement of the question of the Wireless Telegraphy Concession under French management. He added that if M. Denys Cochin had had any experience of Oriental methods, he would rather have been surprised at the celerity than at the slowness of the negotiations in question. He ended this portion of his statement by declaring that the foreign Representatives at Tangier had been guided solely by the lessons of reality and a sense of practical affairs; the controversial tone of certain earlier discussions had disappeared and "une détente véritable" now existed. The attitude of the Sultan towards France was likewise satisfactory. His Majesty had realized that French policy was one which served his own interests, and the French Government could now hope for the establishment and continuance of a good understanding with the Moorish Government.

This declaration was received with cheers from the Left of the House, which is significant, as on former occasions considerable mistrust of the wisdom of French action in Morocco was exhibited in that quarter, especially on the part of the Socialists, whose spokesman, M. Jaurès, has several times protested against what he considered an adventurous policy in Morocco.

I inclose herein, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of to-day's date, the portion of M. Pichon's speech relating to M. Étienne's visit to Germany,* and to the affairs of Morocco.

I shall have the honour to report in a subsequent despatch the statement made by M. Pichon as to the Franco-Spanish Agreement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

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[22636] No. 18.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 8, 1907.*

NEWS of capture of Sir H. Maclean reached Sultan on evening of 4th instant. The Kaïd has been taken further into the mountains, distant from Alcazar about thirteen hours. It was proposed by him that Shereefs of Wazan, who are at Fez, should be asked to endeavour to induce Raisuli not to make unreasonable demands. I fear that Raisuli must now be negotiated with direct. It is hoped by Sultan that His Majesty's Government will not land troops or dispatch a fleet, as he is of opinion that life of Kaïd, from whom I have received no direct news since his letter of the 4th, would be endangered by such a step. Do you authorize me to reassure the Sultan in this regard?

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* Not printed.





[22637] No. 19.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 8, 1907.*

NOTES have been exchanged between the Administration of the French Loan of 1904 and the Moorish Government, who have agreed formally to control of Customs by former.

The arrangement is to take effect immediately.

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[22348] No. 20.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, July 8, 1907.*

YOUR despatch No. 182 of the 10th ultimo.

You may sign Police Regulations.

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[22360] No. 21.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 8, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

If you are convinced that the movements referred to in your telegram No. 54 will not produce any results which might endanger the Kaïd's safety, we do not think it necessary to object to them. We do not wish to impede the action of the Moorish Government.

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[22636] No. 22.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 8, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

Your telegram No. 56 of the 8th instant.

Tell Sultan His Majesty's Government hope that the Makhzen will be able to effect the release of Sir H. Maclean without it being necessary for them to take any drastic measures, such as the dispatch of a fleet to Tangier.

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[22681] No. 23.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 206.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 3, 1907.*

KAÏD SIR HARRY MACLEAN is, I regret to state, a prisoner in the hands of Raisouli, at a spot called Sidi Yusef-el-Tamas, about ten hours' journey east of Alcazar, and about twenty-four hours from here.

At the request of Raisouli, the negotiations which, as I reported in my despatch No. 171 of the 3rd ultimo, had failed were renewed last week, and it was agreed that a meeting should take place at about four hours from Alcazar, where Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean would have been in safety. On reaching there, however, it appears that Kaïd Maclean, who wished to bring in some leaders of other tribes with promises of pardon, was induced by Raisouli to proceed further until he reached the spot above-named, when Raisouli announced to him that he was his prisoner, and that he would be kept as such until the Sultan had restored him to his former position of Kaïd of this district.

Negotiations will presumably take place direct with Fez, and it may be anticipated that the demands Raisouli will put forward will be such as to materially impair the Sultan's prestige.

I immediately addressed a note to Hadj Mohammed Torres, informing him of the news I had received, and begging that no movement of troops should take place pending negotiations. I transmit herewith a copy of this note, together with the reply.

It is most regrettable that Kaïd Maclean was induced to believe in Raisouli's assurances rather than in the urgent advice he received from many quarters, including myself, not to attempt any further negotiations with Raisouli.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

*Sir G. Lowther to Hadj Mohammed Torres.*

(After compliments.)

I REGRET to have to report to your Excellency that Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean writes to me from Akhmas that, while engaged in negotiations with Raisouli, the latter has taken him prisoner pending the acceptance of his terms by the Makhzen.

I hasten to request your Excellency to see that the necessary orders are given to the Government troops to make no move whatever against Raisouli pending the conclusion of the negotiations for the liberation of Kaïd Maclean.

*Tangier, July* 3, 1907 (21 *Jumad* 1, 1325).

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Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

*Hadj Mohammed Torres to Sir G. Lowther.*

(After compliments.)

I HAVE received your letter of this date, informing me of the Kaïd Maclean–Raisouli affair. This has caused me extreme regret, and I at once referred it to His Shereefian Majesty, and I trust that God will bring the matter to a satisfactory termination.

May you, &c.
(Signed) MOHAMMED BEN EL ARBI TORRES.

*July*, 3, 1907 (21 *Jumad* 1, 1325).

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[22790] No. 24.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 10.)

(No. 208.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 4, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 206 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report that I this morning called on Sid Torres, the Sultan's Commissioner, and conveyed to his Excellency the substance of your telegram No. 33 of yesterday's date. I asked his Excellency what measures it was proposed to adopt to obtain the release of Kaïd Maclean, but his Excellency stated most emphatically that he could do nothing without orders from Court, and he was of opinion that the negotiations must be conducted from Fez only, as matters would merely become more complicated were they to be carried on from two different places.

His Excellency regretted that Kaïd Maclean had placed himself in this position and had refused to pay attention to the many warnings which had been given to him, and he assured me he did not anticipate any danger to the Kaïd's life from Raisouli, who would, however, make the best terms he could before releasing his prisoner.

During our conversation Sid Torres referred to the disturbed state of the country, and said that were it not for the presence of the army here it would not be safe for anyone to go beyond the town walls, and he ascribed this state of affairs to a great extent as due to the dishonesty and peculation of the army officials.

I inclose a copy of a note I have addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Fez, embodying the substance of your despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 24.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sid Ben Sliman.*

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that I reported to my Government the capture of Kaïd Maclean by Raisouli, and I am now instructed by them to urge upon your Excellency and the Moorish Government the necessity of taking every possible measure to obtain the release of Kaïd Maclean without delay, and at the same time to request that no movement be made which in any way might endanger his life, and I shall be glad to hear from your Excellency what measures it is proposed to take to obtain his release.

I feel confident that the Moorish Government will do its utmost in this matter, especially as Kaïd Maclean at the time of his capture was engaged in negotiations to bring to an end the very unsatisfactory state of things which has existed in this district for a long time past.

May you, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

*Tangier, July* 4, 1907 (22 *Jumad* I, 1325).

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[22866] No. 25.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 10.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 10, 1907.

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

I have received letters dated the 7th from Kaïd denying the report as to his having been moved. This news is favourable, in my opinion, as it would appear that Raisuli was not strong enough to enforce his threat. Raisuli is thought by the Kaïd to be afraid of the tribe, and the latter hopes that terms may be made with the El K'mas. I am urging that this may be done. Sir H. Maclean states that the heads of the tribe intended to come and see him to-day, 10th July. His letters are more cheerful in tone.

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[22966] No. 26.

*The Eastern Telegraph Company to Foreign Office.*—(*Received July* 11.)

*Electra House, Finsbury Pavement, London, July* 10, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Memorandum of yesterday's date, in which you state that a communication has been received from the French Embassy to the effect that the German group proposing to participate in the International Company, for Wireless Telegraphy in Morocco has presented to M. Popp a proposal based on the hypothesis that the British and Spanish interests would abstain from entering the scheme, but that these proposals are considered inadmissible by the French Government, who are of opinion that it would be much better to carry out the first proposal without change, and that it would be desirable for the English and Spanish groups to avail themselves of it.

I also beg to acknowledge receipt of a telephonic message stating that telegrams have been sent to Berlin, Paris, and Madrid, suggesting that a meeting of contractors, nominated by the respective Governments, should be held, in order to discuss the details of M. Popp's scheme, and adding that the Foreign Office does not consider it likely that the English Treasury would consent to undertake their proportion of any guarantee of interest on the capital invested.

These communications have been submitted to the Board of Directors to-day, and after giving the whole subject the most careful consideration, I am desired to acquaint you of the decision that has been come to.

The business of wireless inland telegraphy is one which lies rather outside the ordinary work hitherto undertaken by us, viz., submarine telegraphy, and the Board feel that there is little likelihood of the scheme in Morocco providing any return for the financial interest which it is suggested that this Company should take in the Inter-

national Company. If, however, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs considers it essential that British interests should be represented in the telegraphic development of Morocco, and for this reason desires to nominate this Company as contractors in taking a fourth share in the International Company, the Directors will on public grounds do what they can to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government. I have therefore been authorized to meet the contracting representatives of the other nationalities in Paris, and discuss the question with the view of endeavouring to come to an acceptable arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. DENISON PENDER,
*Vice-Chairman and Managing Director.*

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[23262]

No. 27.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 13, 1907.*

KAID MACLEAN sends me letters dated the 11th instant which are very despondent in tone. Letters sent from here to Khamas tribe, requesting them to mediate for reconciliation of Raisuli with Government, have, I fear, been of no avail. Tribes have been written to again from Fez, and warned they will be attacked unless they give up the Kaid.

Compliance with Raisuli's expected terms will be impossible in the opinion of all Makhzen authorities and of the Sultan himself. It is reported that he aspires to the Governorship of the whole of the North-West of Morocco. In that case no foreigner would be safe. Above mentioned authorities declare an advance of troops would not endanger Sir Harry's life, and that only this measure can save the Moorish Government.

In my opinion, the first thing is to await the issue of the negotiations which the Shereef of Wazan is carrying on with the tribes.

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[23350]

No. 28.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 209.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 4, 1907.*

I HAVE but little further news throwing light on Sir Harry Maclean's painful position. There is no indication that he is being treated otherwise than well, but it is obvious that his capture was the result of a carefully laid plan on the part of Raisuli, by the success of which he hopes to satisfy not only his thirst for vengeance, but his overweening ambition as well.

The fact must not be lost sight of that this is no common act of brigandage, but a political blow, which may have far reaching consequences.

Raisuli is fully aware of the diminishing authority of the Sultan, and the weakness of his army. Holding Kaïd Maclean as hostage, he will demand the most exorbitant terms, and it will then remain to be seen whether the Sultan will not find that by complying with them he will lose all his authority. The success of the brigand in these negotiations would win over many of the tribes, most of them merely nominally loyal to the Government, his hatred of Christians, and his declared opposition to all reforms counting also strongly in his favour.

On the other hand, Raisuli is not quite in the advantageous position which he would occupy were he among his own people. The tribes amongst whom he is may well ask themselves what they have to gain by allowing Raisuli to make his own terms without taking them into consideration, and thus incurring the enmity of the Makhzen.

At present there is no indication of what Raisuli's terms are likely to be, that they will be onerous is certain; his reinstatement as Governor of the Tangier district is supposed most probable.

It will be remembered what conditions Raisuli, the cattle-thief, insisted upon and obtained on the occasion of the capture of M. Perdicaris. It is not likely that Raisuli,





the ex-Governor of the Fahs, will be satisfied with similar terms now, and he will probably demand some serious guarantee for all promises given, and it is in the conclusion of that part of the bargain that the great difficulty will lie.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[23351]

No. 29.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 210.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 8, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 209 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit an extract from a private letter I have received from Dr. Verdon, the Sultan's physician, reporting a conversation with His Majesty on the subject of the capture of Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean, and the steps to be taken to obtain his release.

From Alcazar this morning I hear that Raisuli has abandoned the Khmas territory, and has taken Sir Harry to a spot called Ain Olika Boulhashem, some thirteen hours from Alcazar, and about two days' journey from here.

Ain Olika formerly belonged to Khmas, but, as a result of fighting with the Beni Aros, it remained uninhabited, and subsequently both tribes settled some Riffians there, who are now neutral in any quarrels. It is a difficult, mountainous country, with much forest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 29.

*Dr. Verdon to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Private.)
My dear Sir Gerard Lowther,

*Fez, July 4, 1907.*

THE news of the Kaïd's capture reached me about 3·30 this afternoon. I went at once to the Palace and told the Sultan, who was very distressed and greatly concerned for the Kaïd's own sake, and for his girls and father. He told me to write to the Kaïd and his girls to say how grieved he was, and to tell them he would do his utmost to obtain his early release. He instructed me to write to tell you the same. The Sultan proposed several schemes, more or less unworkable, and I suggested that he should first get the Shereefs of Wazan, now at Fez, to go to Raisuli to ascertain what he wanted in return for the Kaïd's release, and to persuade him, if possible, to make reasonable demands. The Sultan said these Shereefs would do much if pressure were brought on them by the French. I proposed that I should see M. Gaillard, to which the Sultan agreed. M. Gaillard thought it a good plan to use the Shereefs of Wazan, and told me to tell the Sultan that he might rest assured that the French Government would do all in its power to assist him, and that he himself was prepared to at once interview the Shereefs of Wazan. The Sultan told me he would see M. Gaillard to-morrow (Friday).

The Sultan fears that the British Government may deem it necessary to send a fleet to Tangier or to land troops there. I told him that I did not think this likely, and that the Kaïd's case was not similar to that of Mr. Perdicaris. The Sultan said if troops were landed it would render the negotiations with Raisuli more difficult, and it might endanger the Kaïd's life. Raisuli is sure to demand to be reinstated Kaïd, and, to obtain Kaïd Maclean's release, the Sultan may consent.

I am, &c
(Signed) EGBERT S. VERDON.

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[23352]

No. 30.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 211.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 9, 1907.*

IN my despatch No. 112, Confidential, of the 13th April I transmitted to you an estimate which had been made as to the liabilities of the Makhzen in view of the floating of a loan of liquidation.

Since then the State Bank has invited the Makhzen to communicate an account of their liabilities.

A copy of this statement, with which I have been furnished confidentially, is inclosed herewith.

You will observe that some of the items correspond with those included in the list originally furnished by me. On the other hand, there are some important omissions, such as the claims of all the foreign Legations, which the Makhzen probably regards as sums due by the different tribes and not by the Central Government. All the port works for Tangier, Laraiche, Casablanca, and Saffi have also been omitted, although in the case of Tangier the works are approaching completion, and the sum of 70,000*l.* will shortly be due.

All mention of the sums due for the Franco-Spanish police is also omitted, as well as for the drainage works, for which a contract has irregulary been signed.

On the other hand, the private loans negotiated for His Majesty by Sir Harry Maclean figure at 4,050,000 fr. instead of 2,000,000 fr.

A sum of 1,000,000 fr. is stated to be owing for bills drawn by the Governor of Oujda, and further sums amounting to nearly 5,000,000 fr. are noted as being due locally. These latter liabilities probably include salaries due to Makhzen officials and payments for purchase on account of the Makhzen.

The German advance of 12,500,000 fr. is due to be paid off in September. The so-called Liquidation Loan is hardly likely to be forthcoming by that date, but the State Bank will no doubt find means to arrange with the interested banks for the postponement of the repayment of this loan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 30.

*Statement respecting the Liabilities of the Makhzen.*

LISTE indicative des Dettes envers des Étrangers approximativement, sous réserve d'un Règlement de Comptes avec eux, savoir :

| | Fr. |
|---|---|
| Avance Allemande .. .. .. .. .. .. | 12,500,000 |
| Avance Française .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2,000,000 |
| Par l'intermédiaire du Caïd Maclean à diverses banques .. .. | 4,050,000 |
| Maison du négociant Allemand Haessner .. .. .. .. | 2,191,125 |
| Maison du négociant Braunschvig .. .. .. .. .. | 2,819,500 |
| Compagnie du négociant Fabarez (Compagnie Marocaine) .. .. | 2,695,875 |
| Compagnie du négociant Pariente .. .. .. .. .. | 1,150,000 |
| Traites d'Oujda tirées par Ben Abdessadok sur le Naïb Torrès .. .. | 1,000,000 |
| Total .. .. .. .. .. | 28,406,800 |

Ensuite, indication des dettes envers des indigènes effectuées et non effectuées, savoir :

| | |
|---|---|
| Engagées sur la petite caisse en faveur de divers porteurs de lettres Chérifiennes .. .. .. .. .. .. | 1,088,925 |
| Sur les douanes .. .. .. .. .. .. | 519,125 |
| Evaluations des comptes non encore effectuées environ .. .. | 3,300,000 |
| Total .. .. .. .. .. | 33,314,850 |

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[23353] No. 31.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 212.)

Sir,

*Tangier, July* 9, 1907.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 36 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a note I addressed to the Moorish Commissioner, impressing upon him the great interest which His Majesty's Government take in the safety of Kaïd Maclean, as also of the reply which I have now received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sid Torres.*

(After compliments.) *Tangier, July* 5, 1907 (23 *Jumad* I, 1325).

I ADDRESSED to your Excellency a letter on the 3rd instant, relative to the capture of Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean, and subsequently in a conversation with your Excellency informed you that His Majesty's Government rely upon the Makhzen to take every possible measure to obtain his release, and I have now received further instructions from my Government to impress upon your Excellency the great interest His Majesty's Government takes in the safety of Kaïd Maclean, and to request you to keep me informed of whatever measures the Moorish authorities may find it necessary to take with the object of obtaining the release of that officer, and I trust that your Excellency will not fail to convey to me any information that may reach you in connection with this incident.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

*Sid Torres to Sir G. Lowther.*

(After compliments.) *Tangier, July* 8, 1907 (26 *Jumad* I, 1325).

I RECEIVED your letter dated the 5th instant (23rd Jumad I), informing me that you had received instructions from your Government to impress upon me the great interest your Government takes in the safety of Kaïd Maclean, and to request me to keep you informed of all measures the Makhzen might see fit to employ towards that end, and you trust that I will not fail to convey to you any news which may reach me concerning this matter. I took note of this, and would inform your Excellency that only God knows the grief this incident has caused me, especially as the Kaïd Maclean is held by me in great esteem, he being servant of His Shereefian Majesty who has devoted himself to the Shereefian service to the extent of his ability. I have informed His Majesty of both your letters, and am impatiently awaiting a reply informing me of what decision His Shereefian Majesty has come to in order that effect may be given to it. I would also inform you that I will not fail to take all measures tending to the obtaining of his release in safety so long as a road thereto remains possible.

May you, &c.
(Signed) MOHAMMED-BEN-EL-ARBI TORRES.

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[24253] No. 32.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 22.)

(No. 213.)

Sir,

*Tangier, July* 9, 1907.

ARTICLE 66 of the Act of Algeciras provides that goods of foreign origin shall, on their entry into Morocco, pay a special tax of 2½ per cent. *ad valorem*, the revenue of which shall form a special fund to be devoted to public works to be undertaken for the development of navigation and trade generally in the Shereefian Empire.

No arrangements have yet been made with regard to the levying of this duty, although, as you are aware, the engineer who is to supervise the contemplated works has been selected by the Diplomatic Body. Nor is it clear by whom steps should be taken to see that this duty is levied. As, however, the engineer is a Frenchman, and his salary will come out of this fund, it is probable that the French Legation will move in the matter. This "Caisse spéciale" should produce about 80,000*l.* a-year, with which sum very useful works could be eventually carried out, but I understand that the idea of the bank would be rather to utilize the sum as the interest for a large loan with which much more extensive works could be carried out.

An indication has also reached me that the view of the State Bank is that the funds of this "Caisse spéciale" can be devoted to the harbour works of Laraiche, Casablanca, and Saffi, for which concessions were given before the signature of the Act of Algeciras, and need not necessarily be applied to works to be later decided upon. I am informed that the bank has reserved this point for further discussion.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

As I pointed out in my despatch No. 138 of the 9th May, my French colleague does not share this opinion, and it seems to me important that the bank should be in possession of the views of His Majesty's Government on this point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[23354] No. 33.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 214. Confidential.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 9, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 210 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit an extract of a private letter I have received from Dr. Verdon which throws some light on the manner in which Sir Harry Maclean was captured by Raisuli.

I also inclose copy of a private letter from Mr. Consul Macleod reporting on this subject, and recording a conversation he had had with Abelkrim-ben-Sliman.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 33.

*Dr. Verdon to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Private.)
(Extract.)

*Fez, July 5, 1907.*

THE following is the soldier's story. The Kaïd waited at Alcazar several days until Raisuli's man came for him; they then went to a village in Esserif, where the people are loyal to the Sultan. On the evening of the day of their arrival at Esserif Raisuli came in with eight men. He camped one night there and discussed matters with the Kaïd. The people of Esserif begged the Kaïd to allow them to capture Raisuli, but the Kaïd would not allow this, as Raisuli had "Amman" from the Sultan. Next morning Raisuli asked the Kaïd to go with him to some place one hour from Esserif where they could read in peace the Sultan's letters and discuss his proposals. The Kaïd hesitated, but Raisuli took him by the hand and swore by the Saint of El Kmas that he would neither injure nor capture him, and he took this oath before the Kaïd's men and others. The Kaïd consented to go a short distance. They went for over an hour, and the Kaïd protested, but Raisuli managed to persuade him to go farther until he got him three hours (according to the soldier) from Esserif. They were then in the El Kmas country, and Raisuli suggested they should camp. They camped the night there, and next morning Raisuli's scribe came to the Kaïd's tent and told him that he, the Kaïd, had done great harm to the country by bringing in Christians and introducing them to the Sultan, and that Raisuli would not allow him to leave until the Sultan reinstated him Kaïd. The Kaïd's tent was surrounded by armed men, and he could do nothing, and I understand that they stole his revolver; the Kaïd had only three mounted soldiers with him, and Raisuli had now sixty men. The soldier declares the people of the Zowia of El Kmas are very angry and refused to allow Raisuli to take the Kaïd from the Zowia or to go away himself. They say that Raisuli and the Kaïd are both refugees at the Zowia, and it would appear that the Kaïd put himself under the protection of the Zowia. They told Raisuli that the Kaïd was the "fearruba" of Sidna (drill-instructor of the Sultan), and that his capture would bring trouble on their heads. They would not allow Raisuli to send the Kaïd's letter by one of his men, and insisted that the Government soldier should take it. They gave the soldier privately a list of names of the important people of the Zowia who are against Raisuli, which list he was to take to the Government and to say that they were against Raisuli's action and were prepared to capture him and to release the Kaïd. I send you a copy my man made of the list of names; the original was written in pencil. The Kaïd is very grieved at his misfortune, and implores the Sultan not to consider him in any way, and to resist any unreasonable demands by Raisuli. He says he believes if the Sultan sent letters to the Chiefs of the Zowia of El Kmas and to the tribes in that district they would see to his safety and have him sent to Tangier. Carleton says much the same.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 33.

*Vice-Consul Macleod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Private.)
Dear Sir Gerard,

*Fez, July 5, 1907.*

VERY early this morning some of the Kaïds came in with letters from the Kaïd and Carleton to Verdon.

Their news was that many leading men of El Kmas (where Raisuli and the captive are) were very angry about the captive, and were disposed to attack Raisuli if the Sultan so wished.

Verdon seemed to think this attitude should be promptly availed of to support an energetic demand for the Kaïd's release at once.

I answered that this was a very delicate point, and great caution was necessary, for if either the tribes or Raisuli were "over-frightened" it might result in Raisuli, with his prisoner, being passed from tribe to tribe. This "over-frightening" had led to the non-recovery of the Spanish captives some years ago.

I then had a long talk with Ben Sliman. He said the Sultan and Viziers had been upset beyond measure by what had happened.

I inquired, for your information, what steps the Makhzen were taking, and assured him that anything he told me would be entirely confidential.

He said that the Makhzen's information was not as yet sufficient for deciding what to do in so difficult a case. For instance, minute inquiry would be necessary to ascertain the exact spot where Raisuli and the captive now were, and what particular Shereefs had influence there.

We then discussed the whole situation very minutely, especially any demands Raisuli might make for foreign protection. Ben Sliman said the Makhzen would have no objection to this. The best plan would be for the Diplomatic Body to come to an understanding by which Raisuli would be given a "special" protection by some Power. Ben Sliman did not mention any Power by name. The Powers would recognize him, for instance, as Kaïd. Thereafter, of course, if made a Kaïd, he must behave as such. Should he subsequently disobey the Sultan, the protecting Power could cancel his protection.

Ben Sliman said he would tell me fully what plans were made as soon as he could for your information. Perhaps after prayers to-day (Friday) some decision would be arrived at.

I then went to Gaillard, the French Consul (10·30 A.M.). He said that the two Wazanni Shereefs now here were of no use for such negotiations. One is very ill, and the other is a very stupid man. But the French-protected ones at Wazan would assuredly do their best in the affair, and he would use his influence with them when required to do so to that end.

About protecting Raisuli, Gaillard used practically the same language as Ben Sliman, save that he made no mention of the matter being arranged amongst the Diplomatic Body. But he strongly advocated that the protection be given by France. This would get the Sultan out of the particular difficulty about the capture of Kaïd Maclean, and also out of the "general" Raisuli difficulty, and be so great a service to the Sultanas probably to lead His Shereefian Majesty to entertain much better feelings towards France.

Gaillard had just sent off a special courier to his Legation, and I inferred had written in the foregoing sense.

Though neither the one nor the other said so, it was very plain that Ben Sliman and Gaillard had come to an understanding on the matter.

With kind regards, I remain, &c.

(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[23262] No. 34.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1907.*

YOUR telegram No. 59 [of 13th July: Capture of Sir H. Maclean].

I agree that result of mediation of Shereef of Wazan should be awaited before active military measures are attempted. Impress this upon Moorish Government.

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[23631] No. 35.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 216.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 10, 1907.*

THE Minister of War to-day read to me a letter he had addressed to the leading men and Shereefs of the Khamas tribe on the subject of the capture of the Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean. In this letter he explained that the Kaïd, when treacherously made captive by Raisuli, was engaged in the negotiations for the benefit of the tribe, and that therefore they should hasten to return him in safety to Tangier. By adopting this course he assured them that all past offences would be forgiven by the Sultan, and that His Majesty would be under a debt of gratitude to them, and that, as regards Raisuli, His Majesty would maintain the assurances of his personal security, of which the Kaïd when captured was the bearer, on condition that he repented of his misdeeds and returned the Kaïd in safety. Failing the Kaïd's return within a reasonable time, His Majesty would have to take coercive measures against their tribe, in which event most condign punishment would be inflicted upon them.

The letter seems to be, under the circumstances, the best that could have been sent.

From letters received by me from Kaïd Maclean, dated the 7th instant, it appears that Raisuli was unable to carry out his threat to move him. This I think is satisfactory, and is an indication that the Khamas expect to be treated with direct, and these are the lines on which my unofficial advice to the Moorish authorities has been framed.

Tribesmen have come down from the Beni Aros, the tribe bordering on the Khamas, expressing loyalty to the Sultan. A meeting of the Khamas tribe was to take place to-day to decide on a line of action, and the Shereef of Wazan, Mulai-el-Teb, who resides at that place, and who has been requested both from Fez and here to use his influence, should also reach Khamas at about this time.

Kaïd Maclean says that Raisuli is powerless if the tribe is not with him.

Sid Mohammed Guebbas assured me again to-day that he saw no necessity at present for the movement of any troops. His original desire in this direction was dictated by a wish to protect the army itself from the tribes, but the friendly disposition manifested by them has reassured his Excellency as regards its safety.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[23675] No. 36.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 60.)

Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 16, 1907.*

I HAVE received news dated the 13th instant from Kaid Maclean. He was unaware of presence in district of Shereef of Wazan, who I learn from another source is successfully negotiating with the tribes, and it is evident that Raisuli is endeavouring to induce the Kaid to try and get negotiations opened up direct with him.

I am assured by Minister of War that pending the negotiations of the Shereef no movement of troops will take place.

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[23864] No. 37.

*Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, July 17, 1907.*

LE Gouvernement Marocain vient d'approuver officiellement le choix par le Corps Diplomatique de Tanger de MM. Porcher et Llorens pour les fonctions d'Ingénieur Titulaire et d'Ingénieur Adjoint prévues par l'Article 66 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Les traitements des deux Ingénieurs doivent être imputés sur la Caisse spéciale destinée aux dépenses et à l'exécution des travaux publics instituée par le dit Article 66 (paragraphe 7).

Le Gouvernement de la République estime d'une part que le moment est venu d'organiser cette Caisse spéciale, et, d'autre part, que l'installation du Contrôle des Douanes Marocaines et la constitution imminente de la Commission des Valeurs





Douanières permettent, sans inconvénients pour le commerce, d'établir la surtaxe destinée à alimenter cette Caisse, conformément aux stipulations de l'Article 66.

L'Ambassadeur de France est chargé de demander au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères si le Gouvernement Britannique partage sur ce point les vues du Gouvernement de la République et s'il consentirait à donner des instructions dans ce sens au Ministre d'Angleterre à Tanger.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,*
*ce 15 Juillet, 1907.*

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[24169] No. 38.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 20, 1907.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 42 of to-day.

Maritime tax cannot, strictly speaking, be imposed, as "règlement" governing adjudications necessary under Article 66 is not yet finally approved. A dangerous precedent might also be created, as Makhzen might desire to apply to their benefit some other "règlement," the approval of which has not yet been finally obtained.

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[23864] No. 39.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 42)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 20, 1907.*

THE moment has now arrived, in opinion of French Government, to levy special import tax under Algeciras Act (Article 66). They say that Sultan's Government have approved engineers, who are to be paid out of fund formed from the tax in question.

Have you any objections to French proposal? If not, I will concur on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

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[23864] No. 40.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 20, 1907.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to send you herewith a copy of a Memorandum left at this Office by the French Ambassador on the 17th instant,* stating that the French Government are of opinion that the moment has now come for the imposition of the special tax on foreign goods entering Morocco, which is provided for under Article 66 of the Act of Algeciras, and which is to form a fund out of which money is to be provided for the payment of the salaries of the two State engineers and for the execution of public works.

The engineers, the Memorandum states, have already been selected, and the selection has been approved by the Moorish Government.

Sir E. Grey proposes, subject to the concurrence of the Board of Trade, to inform M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government share the view of the French Government that the special tax might now be instituted, and that instructions to this effect will be given to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier.

I am to ask that you will be good enough to move the Board to reply to this letter as soon as possible.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

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* No. 37.

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[24175] No. 41.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 21, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Kaïd Maclean.

British Consular Agent at Alcazar has received a letter from Raisuli, saying that he has forbidden Kaïd Maclean to receive or send any correspondence.

This step has probably been taken by him to force the Moorish Government to open up communications direct with him. The absence of news from Moulai Taïb regarding his negotiations is a discouraging feature of the situation.

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[24255] No. 42.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 217.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 10, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, in regard to the public sale of slaves in his district during the last quarter, and reporting action taken by him in this respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 42.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

Sir,

*Dar-al-Baida, July 4, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to report that no case of the public sale of slaves in the streets has been reported to me by the Vice-Consuls at Rabat, Saffi, Mazagan, and Mogador, during the quarter ended the 30th June.

Here, at Dar-al-Baida, a case of the public hawking of slaves was recently brought to my notice. I immediately sent a message to the Governor of the town requesting the withdrawal of the slaves from the public street.

The Governor at once ordered the auctioneer to stop parading the slaves—two children—through the streets of the town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[24256] No. 43.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 218.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 12, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 174 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to state that a letter has been received by the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps from Cid Mohammed Torres, under date of the 7th instant, stating that orders have arrived directing him to accept the designations of MM. Porcher and Llorens as engineers under Article 66 of the Act of Algeciras.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[24257] No. 44.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 219.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 13, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 198 of the 23rd June, I have the honour to report that, according to information which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, the recent tribal movements round Marakesh appear to have failed owing to want of cohesion, and order has been restored in the city. A few days ago all the coffee-shops were closed and the gates guarded by order of Mulai Hafid. It is not clear what was the object of this step, but it is evident that there is still an authority that can make itself felt in Marakesh. The tribal movement started against the Kaïd of Glawi for rendering assistance to Mulai Hafid in the matter of the dispatch of the Mauchamp prisoners to Mogador appears to have gone no farther. In fact, the Rehamnas, unable to obtain support against the Kaïd, have been compelled to ask for pardon for him.

Mr. Lennox, the British Consular Agent, reports that on his return to the city he was favourably impressed in regard to the situation there, the people showing no further signs of ill-will towards Europeans.

The Rehamna agitators appear to have failed to accomplish anything, and are now being threatened by the tribes, while Mulai Hafid has turned against them. The departure of the prisoners convinced them of their failure, and the placing of soldiers at the gates by Mulai Hafid and the report that all the Rehamnas were to hand over their guns to them before entering the city was another blow to them. Last market day very few of them ventured to come to the market, and it is said that the leaders are now hiding from their own people and from the other tribes who threaten to attack them. It is thought that if the Sultan can move to Rabat within the next two months there will be no danger of further trouble. Certain Shereefs who were leaving to arrange with the various Kaïds for the raising of tribal contingents for Fez have postponed their departure, as the Viceroy has received letters from Fez that the Sultan cannot leave for the present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[24258] No. 45.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 220.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July 14, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter I have received from Mr. Consul Macleod, giving an account of an interview he and Dr. Verdon had on the 8th and 9th instant with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the measures to be adopted to obtain the release of Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean. The letter gives a good account of the views held by the Makhzen authorities of Raisuli and of the dread they have of him.

Generally speaking, I think Mr. Macleod's language, under the circumstances, was the best he could employ, but I have written to him not to lose sight of the fact that the negotiation is in the hands of the Makhzen, and that they are primarily responsible for its issue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 45.

*Consul Macleod to Sir G. Lowther.*

Dear Sir Gerard,

*Fez, July 9, 1907.*

VERDON has read to me what he writes to you to-day. Our interview with Ben Sliman last night lasted over two hours. The first question I asked him was what orders had been sent to Mulai Taib. Ben Sliman answered it had been assumed that the Kaïd was a refugee at the Zowia of Sidi Yussef Tlidi, Akhmas. Mulai Taïb, therefore, had been directed to bring him away.

I pointed out that since the Kaïd had been moved fresh orders were necessary.



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Ben Sliman agreed that it would be well to send Mulai Taib directions to follow up the Kaïd and Raisuli, warn the tribes against Raisuli, and ascertain Raisuli's terms. I then said it was very likely that some of Raisuli's demands would be of such a kind as could be dealt with only at Tangier, and so it would be well for Torres to be authorized to ratify any terms your Excellency might arrange through, say, Mulai Hamed el Wazzani. We urged as strongly as we could that it would be very unwise to use force. I laid great stress on the following points :—

1. That the letter to Torres we suggested was only a reserve precaution for a negotiation which itself was a reserve (*i.e.*, to be resorted to only if the mission of Mulai Taïb should fail). I had been reflecting also that pressing this point now would do good in preparing the Makhzen for the acceptance of what may be very disagreeable conditions later on.

2. That your Excellency alone could in the last resort threaten Raisuli or the tribes with such force as might overawe them, or keep Raisuli's demands within possibility of acceptance.

3. That in all probability the Makhzen would find the terms of such a settlement cheaper than those they themselves might arrange.

4. That assuredly Raisuli was more afraid of foreign Powers than of the Makhzen.

5. That foreigners alone could give him any sort of (to him) passable guarantee.

6. That if the Makhzen troops were (as ten to one would happen) beaten, and evil befell Kaïd Maclean, a very very serious responsibility would rest on the Makhzen, especially after the warning your Excellency had given as to not moving troops, and the consequences might be just such as the Makhzen were now anxously trying to avert.

Ben Sliman advocated strongly the use of force promptly. He declared that Raisuli had nothing to gain by hurting the Kaïd and all to gain by doing well by him, so the Kaïd would run little or no risk. Raisuli was a man of tremendous ambition, a Shereef of specially holy descent. His aim was to become a sort of Khedive of the north-west region of Morocco. The tribes were just now disposed to assist the Makhzen, and Raisuli's following was small. If the tribes saw the Makhzen recoiling from a fright they would all, in fear of Raisuli's vengeance, join him very soon. Raisuli assuredly would not give up the Kaïd till all he required had been carried out, and that done it would be impossible for the Kaïd ever again to dispossess him. Raisuli once installed, no European's life would be safe. Outrages and European occupation would result. Therefore, whether the Makhzen fought him and lost or settled with him, the result would be the same, namely, the loss of at least the provinces north of the line, Laraiche El Ksar, and the Mediterranean. Though Ben Sliman did not say so, it was plain that he considered the consequences—as from the British Government on the Makhzen, should evil befall the Kaïd—were likely to be less serious than those of surrendering practically unconditionally to Raisuli. In the event, however, Ben Sliman said he would relate the whole discussion to the Sultan next morning, in order that a reply may be made to your Excellency's note.

He sent for Verdon and me this afternoon, and gave us the result so far of his discussion with the Sultan.

The Sultan, he said, had been assured by all the Moorish authorities at Tangier that unless force were promptly used that whole region would revert to Raisuli, and they had news that Raisuli had already commenced to corrupt the tribes. What had I to say ?

I again expatiated on the necessity (following the terms of your note) of making no forward movement which might endanger the Kaïd's life. This done, Verdon spoke fully in the same sense.

It was plain, however, that Ben Sliman was unconvinced, and that matters were coming to a deadlock.

While Verdon was speaking I therefore tried to think out some solution by which your ends and the Mkhzen's would be met, and which would be in keeping with the line you had taken. Your request to Torres, which he had not complied with, to warn Raisuli and the tribes around him that they would be answerable for the Kaïd with their lives seemed to afford an opening for some such plan. So I suggested, as the Makhzen's fear was that the tribes would relapse to Raisuli, might it not be sufficient if a warning were sent by criers to all the tribes and to Raisuli to the effect that the Kaïd must be given up within a short term of days. Failing this, the tribes and Raisuli would be responsible for any evil which might befall the Kaïd. This would





give time for Mulai Taïb to learn Raisuli's terms. It was to be strictly understood, however, that there must be no movement of troops.

Ben Sliman approved of this idea, and said he would at once recommend it to the Sultan. Since then I have learned from Verdon, who saw His Majesty thereafter, that the Sultan has approved it, and so I expect things will now go forward on that line.

After seeing Ben Sliman I received your despatch No. 31 of the 5th instant, which I communicated to Verdon, and at once went to the Palace with it. Ben Sliman was engaged with the Council of Ministers, but Bukili took in word of its contents, and assured me he would see that the orders issued would allow of no movement of troops of a kind which might endanger the Kaïd's life.

I trust earnestly that all this will meet your wishes.

(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[24259] No. 46.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 22.)

(No. 221. Confidential.)

*Tangier, July* 14, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 211 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a statement that has been furnished to me confidentially by the delegate of the bondholders of the Moorish Loan of the sums due by the Moorish Government to German merchants.

According to this statement, Haessner and Co. are owed about 2,337,500 fr., whereas in the statement given by the Moorish Government, inclosed in my despatch above mentioned, the sum given as owing to that firm was 2,191,425 fr.

On the other hand, the Moorish statement made no allusion to any sums owing to Renschausen and Co., whereas in this statement they are credited with 80,330*l.*, apart from interest due. These sums are probably what are owing for the harbour works here. It is, however, possible that this sum may have been included in the item that figured in the Moorish statement as "évaluation des comptes non encore effectués."

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 46.

*Statement respecting Sums due by the Moorish Government to German Merchants.*

SOMMES que le Gouvernement Marocain doit aux négociants Allemands suivants :—

Haessner et Joachimssohn, Tanger :

53,501*l.* 0*s.* 8*d.*, avec intérêts de retard de 7 pour cent depuis le 30 Juin, 1907.
300,000 dollars (Hassani), remboursables le 22 Septembre, 1907.

A. Renschausen et Cie., Tanger :

25,619*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*, avec intérêts de retard de 7 pour cent depuis le 1er Novembre, 1906.
25,619*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*, remboursables le 1er Novembre, 1907.
25,619*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* remboursables le 1er Novembre, 1908.
1,665*l.*, avec intérêts de retard de 7 pour cent depuis le 26 Novembre, 1905.
1,720*l.*, avec intérêts de retard depuis le 14 Juin, 1906.
799 fr. 70 c., avec intérêts de retard depuis le 27 Juillet, 1906.
1,632 fr., avec intérêts de retard de 7 pour cent depuis le 13 Août, 1906.

P.N.—Dans cette liste ne sont pas comprises les indemnités à payer par le Gouvernement Marocain pour les différentes réclamations Allemandes.

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[25234] No. 47.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 223. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 16, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 192 of the 18th ultimo respecting the desire of the British American Company (Limited), to participate in the impending tobacco monopoly, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a further communication which I have received from them on this subject, stating that the project is not one into which the Company desire to enter at present.

A report has, however, reached me that the State Bank is contemplating tendering for the monopoly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 47.

*British American Company to Sir G. Lowther.*

Sir, *Cecil Chambers, 86, Strand, London, July 8, 1907.*

IN the absence of Mr. Cunliffe Owen, who is at present in the United States, we beg to acknowledge receipt of and to thank you for your letters of the 18th and 20th ultimo.

The writer and one of his colleagues saw the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas in Paris last week, and discussed the question of the proposed tobacco monopoly in Morocco with them.

Our impression was that they did not consider the monopoly of very great value, particularly having regard to the disturbed state of the country and the difficulty of preventing smuggling.

It does not therefore seem to us, without more favourable light is thrown upon the matter, that the project is one which it would be profitable for this Company to enter into.

The Banque de Paris, however, have promised to communicate with us if they receive further information on the matter, and without finally saying that we do not care to go into the matter we will await their communication.

In the meantime, we beg to thank your Excellency for the trouble you have taken in the matter, and are, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH HOOD, *Director.*

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[24260] No. 48.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 224.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 16, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 208 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit a translation of a note I have received from the Moorish Commissioner, conveying to me the reply of his Government to the note I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which was inclosed in my above-mentioned despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 48.

*Sid Torres to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

I REPLIED to your Excellency on the 21st and 24th Jumad I (3rd and 6th July) in the case of Kaïd Maclean, informing you that I had reported the matter to His Shereefian Majesty, and that I was sparing no possible effort to obtain his release in safety, and I have now to inform your Excellency that a reply has reached me from His





Shereefian Majesty instructing me to reply to you that the Makhzen was caused much grief by this incident, and that it is most anxious to employ such measures as will result in the release of Kaïd Maclean in safety from the position in which he has placed himself, and also that His Shereefian Majesty recognizes that the safety of Kaïd Maclean is your object in requesting that the movement of the Government forces (Mehallas) towards the district in which Raisuli is be suspended. At the same time, you are not unaware that the withholding the movement of the troops may lead to greater difficulty in obtaining his release. His Majesty has therefore decided, in the first place, to use those measures which will be conducive to the speedy return of the Kaïd, and, if they succeed, well and good, otherwise it will be necessary for the Mehallas to assume the offensive to liberate him in safety, of which I inform your Excellency, and I also will spare no effort to that end, by the power of Allah.

May you, &c.
(Signed) MOHAMMED-BEN-EL-ARBI-TORRES.

3 *Jumad II*, 1325 (*July* 15, 1907).

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[24261] No. 49.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 225.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 16, 1907.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 41 of yesterday's date, I have to inform you that I this morning called upon the Minister for War to inform him of the latest news I have received in connection with the capture of Kaïd Maclean, and to inquire what news had reached him.

His Excellency told me that he had received copies of the letters sent by the Sultan to the Khmas tribe through Mulai Taib, the Wazzan Shereef, who is charged with the mission to endeavour to bring about the release of Kaïd Maclean by means of the influence he holds amongst the tribes surrounding the Khmas.

These letters are, he said, couched in threatening and conciliatory terms respectively, and it has been left to the Shereef to deliver which of them he finds the situation necessitates.

Letters have also been sent to the tribes east, north-east, and south-east of the Khmas, ordering them to make preparations to join the Sultan's forces, a term of three days being allowed them for that purpose. Should they fail to respond, they are threatened with the Sultan's extreme anger and punitive measures.

His Excellency maintains the opinion, which he states is shared by all native authorities, that the negotiations for Kaïd Maclean's release would be greatly assisted by a movement of the Government forces in the direction of the Khmas tribe, and the large force in this district under Ould Boushta-el-Baghdadi is to move on Thursday to within a few miles of Tetuan, absence of water at their present camp being the alleged motive for this movement. In any case his Excellency assured me that no serious movement of troops would be made pending the result of the negotiations in which the Shereef Mulai Taib is engaged.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[24176] No. 50.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 21, 1907.*

MISSION of Moulai Taib to obtain release of Kaïd Maclean.

I regret to have to report that the mission of this Shereef has proved unsuccessful, and that he has failed to obtain the release of the Kaïd. Owing to the riff-raff of the tribe being with Raisuli, the tribe would not support him.

In a correspondence which passed between Moulai Taib and Raisuli, latter informed him that he does not trust the Moors and will not negotiate with them; he says he will require a guarantee from Germany and to be appointed Governor of the mountain tribes before releasing Maclean.



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There is no doubt that the Moorish Authorities will now wish to occupy Chichouan, the chief town of the Khamas, where there is already a Governor appointed by the Makhzen.

I intend seeing Cid Guebbas as soon as possible.

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[24443] No. 51.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received Jnly 22.)*

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 22, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Kaïd Maclean.

Minister of War thinks that Raisuli being without money and his men only moderately armed he will soon be abandoned, and he is of opinion that Raisuli would not be given asylum by any other tribe. He is therefore of opinion that the moment has arrived for a show of force in the Khamas without, however, making any offensive movement against the tribe. He says that any suggestions of negotiation on the terms proposed are quite out of the question.

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[24169] No. 52.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 23, 1907.*

SPECIAL import tax under Article 66 of the Algeciras Act. Your telegram No. 61 of the 20th instant.

The Article contains no stipulation that the Regulations governing the adjudication of contracts for public works shall be finally approved before the special fund is formed. Unless there are strong reasons for not doing so, we wish to comply with the French proposal; moreover, it is clearly expedient that the Algeciras Act should come into force as soon as possible.

If, as far as you can see, there are no further objections, we intend to concur in the French proposal.

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[24654] No. 53.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 65.)
(Telgraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 23, 1907.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 43 of to-day's date, I have to state that the only objections are that no programme of works can be decided upon with special Committee as laid down in Article I of Adjudication "Règlement," nor can any adjudication take place before the final adoption of the "Règlement."

The arrival of the Engineer has, I understand, been stopped by the French Legation pending decision on this matter.

My view is shared by several of my colleagues.

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[24732] No. 54.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 25.)*

Sir, *Admiralty, July 24, 1907.*

IN reply to your letter of the 11th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they concur in the suggestion of His Majesty's Minister at Tangier that the captain of the escort who deserted British officers when captured by the Moorish brigand Valiente in the autumn of 1905 be now released from imprisonment.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

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[24654] No. 55.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 25, 1907.*

SPECIAL import tax under Article 66 of Algeciras Act. Your telegram No. 65 of the 23rd instant.

Engineer must presumably be provided with a salary, and there seems to be no reason why the fund should not accumulate pending the moment when the Regulations and the decision as to the programme of works are finally adopted.

The French Ambassador has therefore been told that you will be instructed to act in harmony with your French colleague.

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[24901] No. 56.

*Sir. G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July 26, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Kaïd Maclean.

The following communication from the Moorish Government has just been made to me by the Minister of War:—

"A bad effect has been made by the failure of the Shereef's mission and by the request made by the British Government that all aggressive movements be abstained from. Open rebellion and the collapse of the Sultan's Government would result from any discussion of terms with Raisuli at the present moment. The only remedy now is force, and the danger to the Government is increased by every day's delay."

The movements of troops which have already taken place appear to have had a good effect, and the Makhzen ask that all necessary movements of this nature be agreed to by British Government. The Minister of War maintains that there would be little or no danger would ensue from such movements to the life of Maclean, but it is impossible to form an opinion on that point.

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[24654] No. 57.

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.*

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, July 26, 1907.*

HIS Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the Memorandum which you were good enough to leave at this Office on the 17th instant, stating that the French Government hold the view that the moment has now arrived for the imposition of the special tax on foreign goods entering Morocco, which is provided for under Article 66 of the Algeciras Act, and which is to form a fund out of which the salaries of the State Engineers will be paid and the expenditure on public works benefiting trade and navigation be defrayed.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, in reply to your inquiry, that His Majesty's Government agree in the opinion of the French Government that the tax in question should now be instituted, and instructions have accordingly been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to act in this matter in concert with his French colleague.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[24995] No. 58.

*Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 27.)*

Sir, *Board of Trade, July 26, 1907.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, transmitting copy of a Memorandum left at the Foreign Office by the French Ambassador, stating that the French Government are of opinion that the

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moment has now come for the imposition of the special tax on foreign goods entering Morocco, provided for under Article 66 of the Act of Algeciras.

In reply, I am to state that the Board concur in Sir E. Grey's proposals to inform M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government share the view of the French Government with regard to this matter, and to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to that effect.

The Board note that Article 66 of the Act of Algeciras provides that the imposition of this tax shall be a temporary measure only, and I am to suggest, subject to Sir E. Grey's approval, that Sir G. Lowther should be instructed, in notifying to his colleagues the agreement of His Majesty's Government to the imposition of the special tax, to direct attention to this fact, and to express the hope that care will be taken to withdraw the additional taxation as soon as the necessity for its collection has ceased to exist.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GEO. J. STANLEY.

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[25051] No. 59.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 27.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July* 27, 1907.

ACCORDING to reports sent by Commander of Government troops to Minister of War, the advance has had good effect on tribes.

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[24901] No. 60.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July* 27, 1907.

SIR H. MACLEAN: Your telegram No. 66 of the 26th instant.

It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to give a general sanction such as that asked for by Moorish Government. My telegram No. 39 of the 8th ultimo represents the furthest limit to which they can at present go.

Responsibility for consequences resulting from any movement of troops must rest with the Moorish Government.

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[24253] No. 61.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 121.)
Sir,

*Foreign Office, July* 27, 1907.

IN the final paragraph of your despatch No. 213 of the 9th instant you inquired the views of His Majesty's Government on the question whether the expenditure on the harbour works at Laraiche, Casablanca, and Saffi should be defrayed from the special fund to be created out of the surtax on foreign goods entering Morocco provided for under Article LXVI of the Algeciras Act.

You should notify to the State Bank that His Majesty's Government consider it to result clearly from the wording of the Article in question, that the special fund is only intended to be applied towards paying for public works benefiting trade and navigation which have been leased out to contract in accordance with the Regulations drawn up under that Article.

As you will have already learnt from my telegram No. 44 of the 25th instant, His Majesty's Government have expressed their concurrence in the view of the French Government that the moment has arrived for the imposition of the special surtax. You should accordingly lend your support to your French colleague both as regards the institution of this tax and the disposal of the proceeds.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[25237] No. 62.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 29.)

(No. 228.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July* 18, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 208 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the reply which I have received from Sid-ben-Sliman to the note which I addressed to him in the sense of the instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 33 and 34 of the 3rd and 4th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 62.

*Sid-ben-Sliman to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

1*st Jumad* II, 1325 (*July* 13, 1907).

I RECEIVED your letter informing me of the instructions you had received from your exalted Government relative to what has happened to the friend, Kaïd Maclean, and urging that all possible measures be taken to obtain his release, and that no movement be made which might result in harm to him. I informed His Shereefian Majesty of this, and he took note thereof, and instructed me to reply that His Majesty is greatly grieved and distressed since news of the event reached him, and that he will not be happy or entirely at peace unless he is safely liberated very soon. How can it be otherwise in view of his lengthy service at the Shereefian Court? he having served longer than any other official, and the knowledge that it was his great friendship for the Makhzen and his zeal in the performance of his duties which led him to expose himself to this danger. How can the Makhzen overlook or neglect the case of one in this position? and besides this, neglecting it would possibly lead to further difficulties. Anyhow, you are aware of the efforts made by the Makhzen towards the liberation of the said friend in any way possible, in as short a time as possible, and in the manner which Kaïd Maclean himself requested, viz., by confining negotiations to the mountain tribes, and especially the Khamas, through the intermediary of the person sent there with the Shereefian instructions on the subject, and by keeping the Makhzen force in a state of preparedness, so that the tribes may elect to hasten to fulfil the orders sent to them, as there is no good in showing [weakness] which would result in their carrying out their designs. I pray to God that this man will be released very soon, and that the erring and forsaken man who deceived him will shortly be brought to account.

May you, &c.
(Signed) ABDELKRIM-BEN-SLIMAN.

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[25238] No. 63.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 29.)

(No. 229.)
Sir,

*Tangier, July* 18, 1907.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 109 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a Report upon the origin and nature of the Agreement made by the Moorish Government with the Administration of the French Loan of 1904 for placing the custom-houses in Morocco under the control of the latter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 63.

*Report respecting the Agreement with the Moorish Government and the Administration of the French Loan of* 1904.

UNDER the Agreement of 1904 the Administrators of the French Loan were accorded the right, presumably under Article 15 of that contract, of exercising a control of the Moroccan Customs, as also the right, in the event of the revenue derived



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from the latter falling below a certain standard, of raising the percentage of the total receipts to be paid to the bondholders. This was regarded as a necessary precaution to protect the French bondholders.

The year subsequent to the Agreement in question, the whole amount payable to the bondholders for that year was cleared off in the course of approximately eight months, at the rate of 60 per cent. of the total customs receipts.

Since that date the receipts have steadily fallen, principally as the result of systematic evasion of the customs dues. The second year after the Agreement was concluded, the interest due to the bondholders was not cleared off till after approximately ten months, and finally, at the end of the third year, the whole amount due had not been cleared off, and the Administration found themselves obliged to demand a payment in advance of the amount which still remained due.

It appears that the Administration of the loan then demanded that in view of the delay in clearing off the interest due to the bondholders, the rate of 60 per cent. of the total customs receipts should be advanced to 68 per cent. In reply, the Moorish Government, evidently desirous of forestalling an eventual demand by the French authorities, about one month ago requested the Administration to exercise their right of control of the Customs. With this request the Administration announced their readiness to comply, and instructions to that effect were given to the Custom-house officials on the 25th June.

The Administration proposes to appoint in each of the eight free ports (with an additional one at Tangier) an official whose duties are to consist in supervising the payment of customs dues and in checking the frauds which have for years past been practised upon the Customs authorities. But I am informed that to avoid irritation the duties of these officials will not at first be very strictly carried out.

It is estimated that the sum of which the Customs have of late years been defrauded amounts to at least 30 per cent. of the total receipts, while some experts place it as high as 80 per cent. To give two among the countless instances which have come to the knowledge of the French authorities: A short time ago a type-writing machine imported into Dar-al-Baida was there estimated as worth 4 dollars Hassani, or about 10*s.* 6*d.*, whereas the cost price was 20*l.*

In another instance, an importer of flour at Tetuan declared 100 sacks of flour instead of 300, thus, by the aid of the customary bribe to the Oomana, defrauding the Customs of duties on two-thirds of the whole amount.

As soon as the Customs Committee is established, the duties of the supervising officer will be limited to dealing with abuses of this nature, but until the Committee has commenced to exercise its functions, he will also be called upon to prevent an under-estimate being placed on goods to be passed through the Customs-houses.

It is estimated by the Administration of the Loan that the total customs receipts will be increased by at least 1,700,000 fr. as a direct result of the proposed control.

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[25240] No. 64.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 231.)

Sir,

*Tangier, July 20, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 223 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to incose a copy of a letter addressed by the State Bank of Morocco to the doyen o the Diplomatic Corps on the subject of the impending tobacco monopoly.

You will see that, as the Bank anticipates that this monopoly will furnish one of the guarantees for a future loan, it is considered that the security proposed, namely, 800,000 fr., is insufficient, and suggests that the entire capital of the Company should be required as guarantee, and further proposes that in the "Cahier des Charges" it should be stated that the paid-up capital of the competing Company should be at least 3,000,000 fr.

This letter has been circulated among my colleagues. For my part I considered that, as we had only been unofficially consulted by the Moorish Government in the drawing up of the "Cahier des Charges," we were not called upon to give an official opinion on so important a point, which, moreover, entailed a decision contrary to those already arrived at in our meetings.

It appeared to me also that the change proposed would very seriously limit the competition for the monopoly, and thus be opposed to the fundamental principle of the Act of Algeciras.





It has been decided to hold a further meeting of the Corps Diplomatique and the Moorish Delegates to discuss this point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 64.

*M. Guiot to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps.*

M. le Doyen,

*Tanger, le 9 Juillet, 1907.*

LA Banque d'État du Maroc a étudié, dans son dernier conseil le 29 Juin, la question du monopole des tabacs. Après avoir examiné le Cahier des Charges au point de vue de l'emprunt, elle a jugé que le cautionnement de 800,000 fr., égal seulement d'une seule redevance annuelle, n'était pas une garantie suffisante pour offrir un gage sérieux aux futurs souscripteurs de l'emprunt de liquidation. Il serait désirable, dans sa pensée, que le capital lui-même de la Société serve de garantie complémentaire, en cas d'insuffisance de recettes du monopole et du cautionnement.

Le Conseil estime donc qu'il y aurait lieu d'introduire dans le Cahier des Charges une clause portant que le capital versé de la Société devra être d'au moins 3,000,000 fr., son capital nominal n'étant lui-même pas inférieur à 8,000,000 fr.

Je crois devoir porter à votre connaissance cette suggestion de la Banque d'Etat, en vous priant de vouloir bien la faire examiner avec la plus grande attention avant que le Cahier des Charges soit devenu définitif.

(Signé) E. GUIOT.

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[25241] No. 65.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 232.)

Sir,

*Tangier, July 21, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 225 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter addressed by Raisuli to Mr. Carleton, British Consular Agent at Alcazar, from which you will see that Raisuli has decided that no further correspondence shall be received or sent by Kaïd Maclean.

It is evident from this letter that an attempt is being made by Raisuli to bring about direct negotiations between himself and the Makhzen. I do not consider that this decision on the part of Raisuli will have any effect upon the negotiations, however distressing it may be for Kaïd Maclean to be cut off from all communications.

Nothing definite has been heard from the Shereef Mulai Taib since he has been amongst the Khamas tribe, but the Minister of War, whom I saw this morning, believes that most of the surrounding tribes are now loyal to the Makhzen, and if this is the case the Khamas tribe will have to join with the others and the matter may be settled in a short time. Both the Minister of War and the authorities at Fez are of opinion that were Chichaouine, the principal town of the Khamas, to be occupied by troops, which he says could be easily done, it would produce a considerable effect, as all the people of importance of the Khamas have houses and keep their women and valuables there.

I pointed out to his Excellency that Raisuli would probably reply to such a move by a threat on the life of Kaïd Maclean, and therefore extreme caution was necessary.

The Minister of War added that money was a considerable factor in the settlement of this question, as it was urgently required for the maintenance of the forces, some of which were now ten days or more without pay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 65.

*Letter addressed by Raisuli to Mr. Carleton.*

(Translation.)

FROM the slave of his God Hamed ben Mohammed ben Abdallah Raisuli to our friend the English Consul Bibi, after making inquiries about your health, &c.

I received your letter and understood its contents. I have detained the letters you sent to the Colonel and will not deliver any of them to him. Henceforward he shall not receive any letters, as I have followed up his ideas and find he is determined to take the Makhzen's side and write to the Makhzen what he pleases, and to his family what he pleases, and does nothing but jest with me. He states that his Government have no need of him. If they have no use for him I have a use for him, and there is no need for any one to write to him, or for him to write to any one. I will then see what he does. Possibly it cheers him if people write to him that they are going to liberate him from my hands by means of a military expedition. If that is their intention let them shoe dogs and cats and come to release him, because pack animals will not suffice them for the preparations for the expedition. The generous gift you sent us has arrived, for which you are thanked, but the barley is for Maclean's account as he wrote to you for it. The account for the things you purchased has also arrived, and we will soon send it to you because your man is anxious, and we have not the money at present on us owing to our absence from our place. We only received 23 lbs. of candles, and I wish you to hasten to send the remainder if they have arrived from Tangier; and if they have not, write again about them without fail.

Finished.

7 *Jumad* 11, 1325 (*July* 19, 1907).

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[25382] No. 66.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 29, 1907.

KAÏD MACLEAN writes, under date of the 27th, Raisuli demands that movements of troops should cease pending negotiations, and that Torres should write to him and ask for his terms.

This proposal has been declined by Torres, who states that Moorish Government think with him that it would be fatal to enter into direct communication with Raisuli.

In my letter to Maclean to-day, I am asking him to tell Raisuli he must negotiate direct with General in command of troops or through the tribe, or, failing this, that he should address himself direct to Fez. I took this step after consultation with Minister for War. It is most important to gain time, in order to watch the impression produced on tribes by presence of troops.

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[25481] No. 67.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 30, 1907.

CAPTURE of Kaïd Maclean.

I am informed by Consul at Fez that it is assumed by Makhzen Raisuli's demands will be as follows:—

1. His appointment as Governor of district north of line Laraiche, Alkasar, and Mediterranean, including town of Arzila, but excepting towns of Laraiche, Alkasar, Tetuan, and Tangier.
2. Withdrawal from North-West Morocco of all Shereefian troops.
3. Ransom in specie for the Kaïd.
4. Compensation for losses.
5. Some foreign Power to protect or guarantee safety of Raisuli, and bargain to be duly fulfilled.

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25382] No. 68.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1907.

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

Warn Raisuli, if you think it would produce a good effect, that, were Sir H. Maclean to become the victim of any personal injury, we should insist on the Moorish Government taking measures for his severe punishment, and give all the assistance we could to attain that end.

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[25755] No. 69.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.*—(*Received August* 1.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August* 1, 1907.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day, which has been sent in cipher to the Rear-Admiral, Second Cruiser squadron, at Gibraltar, respecting the disturbances at Dar-al-Baida.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

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Inclosure in No. 69.

*Admiralty to Rear-Admiral, Second Cruiser Squadron, August* 1.—(*Communicated by Admiralty, August* 1, 1907.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

HOLD vessel of Second Cruiser squadron in readiness to sail to Dar-al-Baida to protect interests of Great Britain, but take no action until further orders have been received.

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[25603] No. 70.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 1.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 31, 1907.

DAR-AL-BAIDA was yesterday scene of serious disturbances. French port works and control of Customs have roused opposition of neighbouring tribes.

I am informed by British Consul that he is decidedly of opinion that no time should be lost in dispatching a ship or ships of war. The British Colony consists of about 140 persons.

A French war-ship is leaving here for Dar-al-Baida to-day.

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[25768] No. 71.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 1.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 1, 1907.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 70: Disorders at Dar-al-Baida.

I am informed by French Chargé d'Affaires that he has instructed Captain of war-ship to assist refugees to embark, but, if possible, to avoid any landing. He stated in confidence that it will, he is convinced, be necessary to occupy Dar-al-Baida.

We have received a warning from the Makhzen in regard to the tribes round Rabat being in a state of unrest.

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[25769] No. 72.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 1, 1907.*

RISING at Dar-al-Baida.

It would seem, from information just received, that at present the movement is entirely of an anti-French nature. It is stated by the Governor that embarkation of none but French citizens will be allowed by tribes. Almost all the French have now left the town.

The presence of a war-ship is still requested by British Consul.

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[25603] No. 73.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 1, 1907.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 70 [Disturbances at Dar-el-Baida].

Please ascertain from French Government what steps they are taking. Let them know that British Consul at Dar-el-Baida has asked for a ship of war, but before sending one we should be glad to learn views of French Government as to the situation.

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[25884] No. 74.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Paris, August 2, 1907.*

MOROCCO. Your telegram No. 60 of yesterday.

I am informed by Political Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the cruisers "Du Chayla" and "Condé" have been dispatched to Morocco in addition to the "Galilée," which is already at Casa Blanca. These ships have all got landing forces on board. Orders have been sent to the "Fortin" to proceed to Tangier from the Azores. M. Louis told me, in confidence, that it was more than probable that the action of the French Government would not be limited to a naval demonstration.

In reply to my inquiry as to whether the measures indicated would be taken conjointly with Spain, M. Louis said that there had not been time as yet for an exchange of views between the two Governments. He did not anticipate that Italy would take part in any demonstration that might be made. He expressed the view that it was for France and Spain to undertake all the measures required by the situation, and that it was unnecessary for other Powers to send war-ships.

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[25769] No. 75.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 2, 1907.*

DISTURBANCES at Dar-al-Baida.

Your telegram No. 72 of yesterday.

We are abstaining from sending a ship, in view of the measures being taken by the French Government. We have informed the latter of this, and have also told them of the Consul's request.

If we were to send a ship, other Powers might follow our lead, and, in the event of French troops being landed, inconvenience would arise if other Powers were to take a similar step. Sufficient protection ought to be afforded by the force being dispatched by the French Government.

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[25240] No. 76.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1907.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 13th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for your observations, a copy of a despatch, with inclosure, from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier,* respecting the impending tobacco monopoly in Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

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[25998] No. 77.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 4, 1907.*

DISTURBANCES at Dar-al-Baida.

According to reports received from the Consul, dated the 2nd, the town is now well guarded, though threatened. A message has been sent him by the tribes to the effect that there is no reason to fear anything.

Mr. Madden has directed the attention of the French authorities to the danger of occupying the town when so small a force is available, pointing out that this would endanger the lives of all foreigners. Hostile measures have been deferred on his representations.

The town of Mazagan is reported by His Majesty's Vice-Consul to be in a very disturbed state, as the tribes refuse to depart, and are summoning other tribes to enter. A ship of war is asked for by the Vice-Consul. This danger has been brought to the notice of the French authorities at Dar-al-Baida.

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[25999] No. 78.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 4, 1907.*

I HAVE received letters dated the 2nd from Kaïd Maclean, stating that if granted British protection for himself and family Raisuli will give him up. Although it is evident that Raisuli is weakening, I fear that the events at Dar-al-Baida may have an effect on the tribes, which may well endanger the Kaïd. The Commander of the troops may yet be successful in his negotiations. Would His Majesty's Government be willing to grant such protection in the last resort? This could be withdrawn in the event of misbehaviour, and would only cover pardon for past offences.

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[26005] No. 79.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 5, 1907.*

MOROCCO.

I learn from Political Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs that, in view of reports of agitation at Mazagan, the cruiser "Du Chayla" has been ordered to proceed thither. The French force sent to Morocco will consist of at least 3,000 men, together with a battery of artillery. The French Government will soon have enough ships and men off coast of Morocco to be able to deal rapidly with any emergency. They have complete confidence in the commanders of the naval and military forces, the former of whom is acquainted with Casa Blanca.

French action will be confined to re-establishing order at Casa Blanca, punishing

* No. 64.

offenders, and providing for the safety of Europeans at other ports if threatened. Though an advance into the interior is not in any way contemplated, it may be necessary to disperse any disturbing elements in the neighbourhood of the towns.

Measures will be taken to hasten the organization of the police in agreement with Spain; and the forces will probably not be withdrawn until this has been accomplished, as the repetition of similar incidents cannot be risked.

M. Louis stated that the announcement of the energetic action contemplated by the French Government has been well received in France and abroad, and added that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had informed M. Pichon that his Government hoped that France would "strike hard." From this M. Pichon inferred that the necessity for strong measures was concurred in by the German Government.

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[26004] No. 80.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 5, 1907.*

MY telegram No. 73 of the 4th instant.

French war-ship "Du Chayla" started from here for Mazagan last night.

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[25999] No. 81.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 5, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean: your telegram No. 74 of the 4th instant.

We infer from your despatch No. 214 of the 9th July, Inclosure 2, that Moorish Government are ready to consent to Raisuli being granted protection by one of the Powers. It would be well, however, that you should ascertain from your French colleague whether his Government would wish France to be the Power selected.

In any case, there can be no reason why the Moorish Government should not give a promise to some Power, who could convey it to Raisuli, that, during good behaviour, he and his family shall remain undisturbed. It would be best for France to be this Power, but, if she is not willing, it should be ourselves, so as to prevent any possibility of political complications arising.

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[26213] No. 82.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 234.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 25, 1907.*

IN my despatch No. 211 of the 9th instant I forwarded to you a list of the sums for which the Makhzen admitted their liability and which had been communicated to me confidentially.

I have now the honour to transmit a copy of a note addressed by Hadj Mohammed Torres to the doyen of the Diplomatic Body, setting forth His Majesty's reasons for notifying the amount of the liability of the Government, and asking for assistance in obtaining a loan for payment of the same, and inclosing the list, which is the same as that inclosed in my above-named despatch.

Beyond the observations contained in my despatch No. 211, I have only to add that the amount due to Mr. Pariente is stated to be 1,150,000 fr., whereas Mr. Pariente says that it should be 1,254,547 fr., to which discrepancy I will request the doyen to call the attention of Hadj Mohammed Torres.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 82.

*Sid Torres to Count de Martens Ferrão.*

NOTRE maître m'a ordonné de faire connaître aux Puissances amies le Mémoire envoyé par Sa Majesté Chérifienne et établissant le montant dû du Makhzen, et accompagné d'une liste. Mon maître, en m'invitant à porter cela à leur connaissance, m'a écrit une lettre, dont voici le contenu résumé: Le Directeur de la Banque d'État Marocaine ayant demandé d'avoir connaissance de toutes les dettes qui sont à la charge du Gouvernement Marocain, Sa Majesté—que Dieu assiste—a permis de lui donner une liste explicative et a ordonné de communiquer cette liste aux Représentants des Puissances amies et respectées, et de la faire connaître au Directeur de la Banque d'État et aux Représentants des Puissances. Sa Majesté a été très heureuse de permettre de donner ce Mémoire, en raison de l'intérêt qu'il y a pour Sa Majesté de mettre la banque au courant de sa situation, conformément aux indications de l'Acte de la Conférence, afin que la banque soit le meilleur des auxiliaires pour la consolidation de ses finances et pour qu'elle étudie la question de leur développement et amélioration, de telle sorte qu'elle puisse réparer la situation pénible où sont tombées les finances et combler les dettes dont elles sont grevées.

Le but du Makhzen, en faisant cette communication aux Représentants des Puissances respectées et aux chefs de la banque, est d'obtenir de leur sollicitude qu'ils concourent à la consolidation des finances et à la manifestation des signes de leur amélioration.

Notre maître demande aux Représentants des Puissances et aux chefs de la banque d'examiner la liste de ces dettes, et les pièces (justificatives) de ses comptes. Lorsqu'ils auront compris par ces pièces explicatives le but du Makhzen, c'est-à-dire, la réforme et la consolidation de ses finances, il leur demandera d'examiner les moyens nécessaires à la fois pour payer toutes ces dettes et pour que ces paiements une fois faits, il reste encore entre les mains du Makhzen de l'argent dû possible sur l'emprunt qui va être négocié et sur les autres revenus possibles, un reliquat suffisant pour des dépenses nécessaires à l'amélioration de la situation des sujets, au fonctionnement des pouvoirs et à l'établissement de l'ordre, jusqu'à ce que la perception des impôts puisse se faire dans les conditions qu'elle doit être faite, tant sur les sujets du Makhzen que sur les sujets des Puissances amies installées en ce pays.

Le Makhzen ne doute pas que les Représentants des Puissances comprennent tout cela et qu'ils ne négligent rien pour appliquer leur réflexion aux espérances que le Makhzen fonde sur eux et pour lui donner leur assistance en cette occasion.

Les résultats de ces travaux seront consignés par écrit et portés à la connaissance de Sa Majesté.

Comme votre Excellence occupe la présidence du Corps Diplomatique, j'ai cru devoir porter ce qui précède à votre connaissance, et vous trouverez ci-jointe la liste sus-indiquée pour que vous en preniez connaissance et la communiquiez aux Représentants respectés, en même temps que le contenu résumé de la lettre Chérifienne que j'ai mentionnée suivant le désir de Sa Majesté.

Une copie de la liste en question a été donnée à la Banque d'État et communication de la lettre précitée lui a été donnée conformément aux ordres Chérifiens. Tel est l'objet de cette lettre.

(Signé) TORRES.

4 *Jumad II*, 1325.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 82.

*Statement respecting the Liabilities of the Makhzen.*

[See Inclosure in No. 30.]

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[25892] No. 83.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 235.)

*Tangier, July 25, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, reporting an interview he had had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in connection with the capture of Kaïd Maclean and the mission of Mulai Taib to endeavour to effect his release.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 83.

*Consul Macleod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 62.)

*Fez, July 20, 1907.*

Sir,

ON the 9th instant I had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatch No. 31 of the 5th instant.

I at once called upon the Vizier for Foreign Affairs, and urged upon him the importance of the Makhzen being careful not to allow the movement of troops, which might endanger the life of Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean, now in the hands of Raisuli.

The Vizier replied to the effect that the Makhzen would be mindful on that point, the importance of which they fully recognized.

In the event no movements of troops were made, and the plan adopted by the Makhzen has been to endeavour to attain Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean's liberation by means of negotiations with the Akhmas tribe through the Shereef Mulai Taib, Head of the Zawia of Hazzan.

Yesterday I received your Excellency's communication of the 16th instant, and read it to Vizier of Foreign Affairs.

Sid Ben Sliman replied that he would inform the Sultan of its purport, and that the situation now was that the Makhzen, before taking further steps, awaited the result of Mulai Taib's negotiations. No report had yet been received from Mulai Taib, however, so the Makhzen did not know how the negotiations were progressing.

Three Shereefian letters in succession—the last sent off yesterday—had been addressed, the Vizier said, to Mulai Taib, directing him to report daily, to the Sultan and to the Minister of War, Tangier, what was being done.

I thanked the Vizier for this statement, and remarked that I trusted earnestly Mulai Taib would comply with these orders, for Kaïd Maclean had now been in captivity almost three weeks, and the strain it involved to him and his friends was most painful. I hoped, therefore, that there would soon be evidence of some progress having been made towards liberating him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[25627] No. 84.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 236.)

*Tangier, July 25, 1907.*

Sir,

SINCE my last report and my telegram of the 22nd instant, I have had nothing definite to report regarding the capture of Kaïd Maclean or the endeavours made by the Makhzen to obtain his release. The complete failure of the Shereef of Wazan—Moulai Taib—in his mission to induce the tribes to surrender Kaïd Maclean and Raisuli, or in any case the former, came somewhat as a surprise. Although it was hardly anticipated that the mission of this holy man would immediately prove successful, it was anticipated that it might open the way to negotiations. The report he sent to Fez has been awaited with impatience, and in the meantime rumours of all kinds have been rife, the accuracy of which it has been impossible to establish. Some describe Raisuli as being exultant and defiant, sustained by the conviction that he has all the tribes of that neighbourhood with him in practically open rebellion against the Sultan



and his Government; others, that he is a prisoner of the tribe with a handful of men awaiting events and ready to bargain the Kaïd's person against a stake which would above all guarantee himself against all future punishment.

The fact is that Raisuli has never, so far as I am aware, presented any demands in any direct or definite form, and he has probably purposely abstained from doing so, hoping that he would in the first instance be approached by the Makhzen. He has cut off all correspondence between Kaïd Maclean and the outer world, and has even sent away the majority or all of the Kaïd's servants, but it is impossible to say whether he has done so to remove all danger of an attempted rescue or whether he has hoped by these petty annoyances to induce those interested in Kaïd Maclean to appeal to his captor to declare his demands.

Eye-witnesses who have recently visited the spot where Raisuli is encamped with his captive, but on whose statements it is not possible absolutely to rely, state that he has with him some 60 to 100 men, who are constantly being changed as they are not well provided with food, that they are armed and have plenty of ammunition, and that Sir Harry Maclean is allowed to walk up and down outside his tent, but not to communicate with any one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[26215] No. 85.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 238.)

*Tangier, July 28, 1907.*

Sir,

IMMEDIATELY on receipt of your telegram No. 45 of yesterday's date I communicated its substance to the Minister of War, and pointed out to his Excellency that the movements of troops which have already taken place would appear to have been arranged and the requisite orders given before any notification of their intention to do so had been made to me; still, I trusted that the advance was merely to bring pressure on the tribe and that there is no design to attack Raisuli, and I made it clear to his Excellency that the full responsibility for this move rested with the Moorish Government.

His Excellency handed to me a letter he had received from Cid Ben Sliman to deliver to me, of which I beg to inclose herewith a translation, and informed me that in letters he had received he was instructed to join the forces in person, and his Excellency read to me the portion of the Shereefian letter referring to the mission of Moulai Taib. That Shereef had reported that he had been badly received by the Khamas tribe, and was convinced that negotiations would lead to no result, and recommended a display of force as the only means likely to bring the tribe to its senses and bring about the release of Kaïd Maclean.

The Minister of War also informed me that he had received news from the force under Oold Boushta-el-Baghdadi, which had occupied Chichaouine yesterday at 10 A.M. His informant stated that some opposition had been shown by the tribe, but they had been repulsed with some losses in killed and prisoners. The Chichauoine townspeople had all gone out to welcome the Sultan's troops. In answer to a question I put to him, he stated that the Commander of the force had instructions to lose no opportunity of negotiating for the release of Kaïd Maclean, and appeared sanguine that no harm would happen to him, as the tribe has been informed they will be held responsible for his safety, and has been threatened with heavy punishment if they fail to do so.

His Excellency assured me there is no intention of attacking Raisuli, and stated that he was not aware of the reasons which had induced the Commander of the "Mehalla" to occupy Chichaouine, as his last instructions were that it was to camp at the River Safilau, on the borders of the Khamas tribe. The only contemplated movement of troops which Cid Mohammed-el-Guebbas had notified to me was that of some troops to join those camped in the Beni Hassan country, who were said not to be in a very secure position.

Some of the principal tribesmen had made overtures to the Commander relative to handing over the Kaïd, but on condition that no demand would be made for the handing over of Raisuli, as they would be unable to do that. The Commander, however, it would appear, considered this as merely a ruse, and refused to treat with them on those terms, and the men left. He reports that he expects they will return shortly with other proposals. I pointed out to Cid Guebbas that he should impress upon all the authorities

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that the main point at present is the release of Kaïd Maclean, and that no opportunity must be neglected to obtain that object; the matter of Raisuli can very well wait until that is effected.

I pointed out to his Excellency that it would be difficult to convince any one that the Makhzen had exhausted every means of negotiation, or that Raisuli's demands are impossible of acceptance, as both the Makhzen and we are still in the dark as to what those demands are likely to be. His Excellency, however, only repeated what he has said so many times before, that once negotiations are open with Raisuli the tribes will conclude that he is about to be reinstated in his Governorship, and they will then all desert the Makhzen, which would mean the ruin of the Sultan and his Government. From reports Cid Guebbas says he received when he first came to Tangier, seven months ago, he is satisfied that Raisuli had called on the tribes up to Hiaina in the east to meet at Moulai Abdslam, in the Beni Aros, and proclaim him Sultan. He added that it was only the arrival of the Government forces here and severe weather in the mountains which caused this scheme to collapse, as representatives of the tribes were already on their way to sacrifice to the Saint and proclaim Raisuli Sultan, so that the present position can in no wise be compared to that produced by either the Harris or Perdicaris-Varley captures.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 85.

*Cid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman to Sir G. Lowther.*

(After compliments.) 11 *Jumad*, 1325 (*July* 23, 1907).

THE annoyance and grief of His Majesty at what has happened to the intelligent Kaïd Maclean and the regret caused thereby is not hidden, and since the news came His Majesty has been greatly concerned to obtain his release and liberation, as the Makhzen cannot be tranquil while he is in the power of the deceiver and rebel as a captive, as I have already written you. His Majesty had intended to use force from the beginning and obtain his release by force, but delayed doing so owing to the suggestion made by you and by Kaïd Maclean to postpone making use of force and to try diplomacy, so that his release might be effected with ease. His Majesty has given the greatest attention to the affair, and has made use of all diplomatic means likely to be successful, and has undertaken heavy responsibility to that end in agreement with your suggestion, so that God might fulfil the hope of attaining the release of Kaïd Maclean safe and sound, and since it sent the Chief of the Wazzan Zoura Moulai Taib to deal with the Khamas and the neighbouring tribes about this matter the Makhzen has been sending Shereefian letters to the tribes couched in such terms as would warrant the hope that they would have the effect of obtaining his release, and urged this upon all those it was thought might be of assistance in this; but now letters have been received giving the result of Moulai Taib's mission, showing that diplomacy has failed with the rebel Raisuli and his band, and thus the employment of force becomes imperative to restrain the said rebels and to exterminate them by the power of Allah. His Majesty has therefore sent Shereefian orders to the Chief of the Moorish army, the Fakih Cid Mohammed-el-Guebbas, to discuss the matter with you and to inform you of the exact state of affairs, as no reason for delay remains nor for negotiations or kindness, and instructing him to be energetic and advance against the rebels, to collect the Government forces and the tribes from all parts against them, and to make a combined and simultaneous attack on them up to the place where Kaïd Maclean is, and to use all means to release him from their hands—please God—and His Majesty has instructed me to inform you of the foregoing, in order that you may hear what the Chief of the army will tell you, and that you may assist by consenting to that which he has been instructed to carry out.

May you, &c.
(Signed) ABDELKRIM-BEN-SLIMAN.

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[26216] No. 86.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 239.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 28, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch I have just received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, reporting the reasons for the failure of the Mission of Mulai Taib to obtain the release of Sir Harry Maclean. Mr. MacLeod also reports a conversation he has had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the situation, and relates the terms which his Excellency imagines Raisuli would ask if direct negotiations were opened with him, and gives at length the reasons for which the Moorish Government would be unable to comply with them. Mr. MacLeod also gives a general appreciation of the views held at Fez as to the measures that should be adopted which would appear to be distinctly in favour of a show of force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 86.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Fez, July 24, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the reinforcements under Sid Mohammed Amrani for the troops at El Ksar which have been mustering for some time, left Fez on the 22nd instant. They number in all about 1,000 men, almost all infantry, and, by general admission, are very raw, untrained men, even as Moorish troops go.

Yesterday afternoon the Moorish Government at length received news from the Wazzan Shereef, Mulai Taib, who was sent to procure the liberation of Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean. The Shereef reported that his efforts had been quite unsuccessful. Raisuli had succeeded in persuading the Akhman people—or at least the younger men of that tribe—that Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean had tried to entrap him, but he had succeeded in capturing the Kaïd. The Sultan was an imaginary being, and the real Sultan was Kaïd Maclean, and so the tribe must keep him. If there were a Sultan let him come himself and ask for the Kaïd's liberation.

Meanwhile, Mulai Taib remained in Ahl Sarif, the loyal tribe on the south-western side of Akhmas, awaiting the Sultan's orders.

The Vizirs' consultation over this news lasted from 4 P.M. till 9 P.M. yesterday.

Thereafter I had an interview with the Vizir of Foreign Affairs. Sid Ben Sliman said the Sultan had directed him to write to your Excellency expressing how much moved His Majesty was at the attitude Raisuli and the Akhmas tribe had assumed, and saying that His Majesty could not tolerate such treatment of an old and trusted servant of his father's and his own like Kaïd Maclean, and proposed to compel the Akhman people to deliver him up at once. The letter would reach your Excellency through Sid Mohammed Cubbas, his Minister of War at Tangier, who was being instructed to confer with your Excellency on the whole matter.

I gathered from Sid Ben Sliman that it was being debated at Court whether or not the Sultan himself should proceed to that district, and I inferred that the Vizir was against such a plan, and, from all I hear, it seems certain that the Sultan himself and practically all the Vizirs, including Sid Ben Sliman, are against it.

As seen here, only two courses seem now open to the Moorish Government, firstly, to negotiate with Raisuli; or, secondly, to use force towards him and the Akhmas people.

As regards negotiating, the Moorish Government assume that the following will be Raisuli's demands:—

1. The withdrawal of all the Shereefian troops from north-west Morocco.
2. Appointment of Raisuli to Governorship of district lying north of the line Laraiche–El Ksar-el-Kebir, and the Mediterranean, excepting the towns of Laraiche, El Ksar-el-Kebir, Tetuan, and Tangier, but including the port of Arzila.
3. Compensation for losses, *e.g.*, the destruction of Raisuli's house at Zinat, suffered by him and his friends.
4. Ransom in specie for Kaïd Maclean.



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5. A protection to Raisuli from some foreign Power, or the guarantee of a foreign power for Raisuli's safety and the due fulfilment of the whole bargain.

The Makhzen hold that to grant such demands would be in effect to present Raisuli with the most important part of the Moorish Empire.

(*a.*) That in view of the weakness of the Government, it would be impossible to dispossess Raisuli without using foreign troops—a step they fear would be of infinite injury to the Sultan throughout Morocco and might lead to a permanent foreign occupation of the Tangier–El Ksar Peninsula.

(*b.*) That Raisuli would punish cruelly all the tribes which recently left him and joined the Makhzen.

(*c.*) That the reappointment of Raisuli would entail grave danger to the persons and property of Europeans at Tangier, and would make it impossible to carry out the reforms agreed upon at Algeciras, notably the establishment of the police.

(*d.*) That lesser terms than the foregoing could only be elicited by protracted negotiations, thus involving the prolonging of Kaïd Maclean's captivity, for it was inconceivable that the "Kaïd" would be liberated "on trust," or until Raisuli's terms were fulfilled.

(*e.*) That Raisuli is so utterly faithless that he would probably retain the Kaïd after the concessions were made, and then ask for more.

(*f.*) That Raisuli is a Shereef of great reputation, egregious ambition, and descended from the earliest Moslem Rulers of Morocco, and that once in possession of so much territory, and the port of Arzila, he would then proceed to add tribe after tribe to his following until he became Sultan of the whole country.

In regard to the alternative course, viz, using force to Raisuli and Akhmas, there is the obvious danger to which Kaïd Maclean's life might be exposed at the hands of the Akhmas, should they become enraged by having some of their number killed, or at Raisuli's hands, should he, from fear of the Akhmas deserting him, seek to secure their support permanently by embroiling them irretrievably with the Makhzen. Then there are the general worthlessness of the Moorish troops, and the chances of their being beaten.

The Makhzen acknowledge frankly the poor quality of their troops and the hardy character of these mountain rebels, but it is argued that the troops will be supported by many of the rebels' neighbours, also mountaineers, and that the courage of the rebel tribes is much exaggerated, and that they would be quickly overawed by the use of artillery.

This idea is, I think, worth serious consideration, and could the Makhzen but get a few good guns and the services of a body of thoroughly trained artillerymen, it is quite conceivable that a deep effect might be produced very quickly without much risk to the troops, particularly if such bombardments (a form of assault with which the tribes are quite inexperienced, and which they have no means of answering in kind) were carried out in combination with attacks in native style from the other sides by loyal tribes, and that the bombardments were sustained without faltering until the captive were given up.

It seems clear that, if such measures failed, the only remaining course would be for the Makhzen to apply for foreign troops to reduce those tribes.

As regards the danger to Kaïd Maclean himself, it seems to all of us here that the choice lies between the risks to life and health involved in the prolonged captivity which would probably be entailed by negotiating with Raisuli and the more immediate risks to life which might attend the use of force. If pressure enough could be brought upon the Commander of the troops to insure their attacking vigorously, and so unfaltering as to give the tribes no rest, and the tribes be effectively "contained," I should think the better hope for the captive would lie in using force. But if the fighting were to be of the usual languid, desultory style, I should fear the only results would be to exasperate the tribes to the murder or the injury of the captive, or, at least, to his being removed further away, and thus expose him to more privations than before.

The foregoing are the general ideas held here, and which I share, in the whole matter.

As regards the risks to Kaïd Maclean himself, it is evident that, whichever course be followed towards them, the more immediate and prominent interests of both Raisuli and the Akhmas people lie in preserving him in life and health, they have nothing but his life, health, and liberty to offer in negotiations, if negotiations be followed, or to attain peace if military measures be adopted.



On the whole, therefore, it seems to me that the best chances for the captive are afforded by using force, provided that assurance be had beforehand that the force is sufficient, and that it is vigorously applied. Whether such assurance can be taken is, however, manifestly beyond the knowledge and competency of any one here to determine.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD.

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[26217] No. 87.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 240.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 30, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 238 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I addressed to Sid-ben-Sliman informing him that the responsibility for the movement of troops must rest entirely with the Makhzen, and expressing the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government that every means should be taken to avoid all possibility of an unfortunate termination in the matter of the capture of Sir H. Maclean.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 87.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sid-ben-Sliman.*

(After compliments.) *Tangier, July 28, 1907 (16 Jumad II, 1325).*

HIS Excellency Cid Mohammed Guebbas handed to me to-day your Excellency's note dated the 23rd instant.

In this note your Excellency refers to the annoyance and grief of His Majesty at the unfortunate capture of Kaïd Maclean by the rebel Raisuli, and to the failure of the efforts made through the Chief of the Wazzan Zowia, Moulai Taib, to obtain the release of the Kaïd by negotiations through the tribes of Khamas and that neighbourhood. You state that the employment of force now becomes imperative, and you add that Cid Mohammed Guebbas has been instructed to discuss the matter with me with a view to bringing about a combined and simultaneous attack on the rebels in order to procure the release of Kaïd Maclean, and you state that you have instructed him to obtain my consent to that which his Excellency has been instructed to carry out.

Before the receipt of your Excellency's note Cid Mohammed Guebbas had, on the 26th instant, laid before me the condition of affairs, and had invited me to obtain the consent of His Majesty's Government to the proposed advance of troops, and I had already informed his Excellency that His Majesty's Government could not give a general sanction such as was desired by the Moorish Government, and that the responsibility of the action must rest entirely with them.

This view has no doubt been communicated to your Excellency by the Minister of War, but I desire to lay it before your Excellency in a more direct manner, and I would point out to your Excellency that the movement of troops took place before the assent of His Majesty's Government to that proposal was even asked for by your Excellency or by Cid Mohammed Guebbas, and that the town of Chechouen was actually occupied before your Excellency's note was in my hands.

Late as the appeal was made to me, and in spite of the operations referred to having already begun, I have thought fit to point out to Cid Mohammed Guebbas that an attack on the place where the rebel Raisuli is encamped with his prisoner seems to me altogether premature and might bring about a disaster, and the occupation by Government troops of the territory of the Khamas should furnish the necessary means of negotiating with that tribe for the release of Kaïd Maclean.

Your Excellency will readily understand the anxiety that is felt by His Majesty's Government for the safety of Kaïd Maclean, and their earnest desire that every means should be taken to avoid all possibility of an unfortunate termination to this affair.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[26218] No. 88.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 241.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 31, 1907.*

ON the receipt by the Sultan of news through the Minister of War that His Majesty's Government considered that direct negotiations with Raisuli should be undertaken, and that the British Government was not disposed to favour an attack upon the Khamas, and that they held the Moorish Government responsible for the safety of Kaïd Maclean, His Majesty, on the 27th instant, sent me, through Dr. Verdon, his medical adviser, the following message by special courier:—

His Majesty desired to say he was opposed to Kaïd Maclean going the second time to Raisuli, and only consented to his going on Kaïd Maclean promising that he would run no risks, that the latter assured him that he need not fear on his account, that he was not in the same position as other Europeans in this country, that he was the Sultan's soldier, and if anything happened to him he would take all the consequences, and that the British Government had nothing to do with the matter. When Kaïd Maclean was at Alcazar, the Sultan, on account of certain information he received, sent a message through Dr. Verdon by special courier, ordering Kaïd Maclean in the strongest terms to run no risks, and before venturing out of Alcazar to consult the people of the neighbourhood, and to follow their advice, and if they advised him not to go to any place to meet Raisuli he was to return to Fez. Kaïd Maclean sent back an answer that the Sultan need not fear, but he must go to meet Raisuli. The Minister of War also sent him two messages, warning him not to go, both of which Kaïd Maclean received. Since the Kaïd's capture he has sent several messages to the Sultan through Dr. Verdon, imploring His Majesty not to negotiate with Raisuli nor to grant his demands. The Sultan added that it would be impossible for him to employ European officers in his service if, whenever one was captured, he was expected to make such sacrifices as Raisuli demands. His Majesty states that he and all his advisers are convinced that the right policy is to ignore Raisuli and to attack the Khamas immediately. The long delay which, in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government, had already occurred had greatly strengthened Raisuli; the tribes believe the Sultan is afraid to attack, and one tribe, the Rahowa, had gone over to Raisuli, and others would do the same if the attack were further delayed. On the 27th His Majesty had received a letter from one of the Chiefs of the Khamas, who stated that Kaïd Maclean was camped at a place half-an-hour from Sidi Issef Tlidi, and that the Khamas people were hesitating to see what His Majesty would do, and he urged His Majesty to order an immediate attack and to move from Fez, and his informant believed that if this were done the Khamas people would deliver up the Kaïd and also Raisuli.

The Sultan informed Dr. Verdon that Raisuli's reply to the Shereef Mulai Taib was that he had no demands to make, that the Government must first come to him and that then they would see. His Majesty has information that Raisuli, amongst numerous other demands, asks for the withdrawal of all the troops, and that he be reinstated Kaïd from Alcazar and Laraiche to Tetuan, including Tangier, Arzila, and all the hill tribes, and that there should be a European guarantee for the above. The Sultan adds that it is obvious that if the above were granted n one in Tangier would be safe, and hundreds of poor tribesmen at present loyal to the Sultan would be eaten up by Raisuli.

I have informed Dr. Verdon that I have received the message and have communicated it to you.

I believe His Majesty's statements with regard to the several warnings given to Kaïd Maclean are strictly accurate, but His Majesty's insinuations that the delay in moving troops took place in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government can be set aside, for, as a matter of fact, the movements of troops have been marked by much greater promptitude than has usually been the case in a crisis in this country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[26219] No. 89.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 242.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 31, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Fez reporting a conversation he has had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the means to be taken for the liberation of Kaïd Maclean.

You will observe that the Minister stated that if the Khamas people did not give up Kaïd Maclean the Makhzen troops would proceed to wherever the Kaïd was detained and take him out by force of arms. This is a proposal that I have always strongly combated with the Minister of War, and his Excellency has always assured me that the troops would always be used to bring pressure to bear on the tribe, but that no risk would be taken in attacking Raisuli as long as Kaïd Maclean was in his hands, and that instructions in this sense had been given to the commander of the troops.

I have pointed this out to Mr. MacLeod and directed him to frame his language accordingly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 89.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Fez, July 27, 1907.*

I HAD occasion to see the Vizier for Foreign Affairs this evening.

I inquired whether the Makhzen had any news of Kaïd Maclean. The Vizier said: "No." Their last news was that the Kaïd was still at a spot within an hour's walk from Sidi Issef Tlidi.

I then asked what exactly had been Mulai Taib's proceedings. I had heard he had been in correspondence with Raisuli, whereas I had understood from the Vizier that Mulai Taib had been directed to deal with Akhmas only. Ben Sliman replied that Mulai Taib had addressed himself to the Akhmas people, but the replies to him had always come through Raisuli. Indeed, Raisuli had constituted himself spokesman for the Akhmas people, and in the event it was he who began the proceedings by sending defiant messages to Mulai Taib.

I then asked what exactly the Makhzen now proposed to do. Ben Sliman answered that they meant, with all the force at their disposal, to demand from the Akhmas people the liberation of Kaïd Maclean. No mention would be made of Raisuli. If the Akhmas people gave up Kaïd Maclean well and good. If not, the Makhzen's troops would proceed to wherever the Kaïd was detained and take him out by force of arms.

I said I could quite understand the Makhzen's feelings in the matter, but, in view of the very little the troops had accomplished these seven months on fairly easy ground, what chance had they of success on the Akhmas Mountains against such wild people, figting under the eyes of their women and children?

Ben Sliman answered vehemently: "But has nothing been accomplished these seven months? Compare the state of Tangier then and now. All the seven tribes nearest Tangier have entirely submitted to the Makhzen. Europeans can now trade and move about freely at Tangier. Could they do so eight months ago? Raisuli was then the terror of the place." He had now become, the Vizier went on, a desperate fugitive. Every sensible man in Akhmas was really on the Makhzen's side, and only awaited the Makhzen's appearance in force to declare himself. Raisuli was supported only by the hot-headed youths and bandits of that tribe and neighbourhood, who terrorized the quiet people. The troops would fight, if necessary, as they had never fought before, and the result would be both speedy and satisfactory.

I again said how much I appreciated the Makhzen's feelings for Kaïd Maclean, but I wondered whether it would be wise, if Raisuli, for instance, were to appear willing to come to some sort of practical terms, to risk so much on the Makhzen's force alone. Supposing he were to appear ready to content himself with a pardon and the Governorship of Akhmas? Sid Ben Sliman said (but in the mildest way) that he could not discuss terms for Raisuli; the Makhzen's one object was to get Kaïd Maclean liberated





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at once. Nothing but victory was to be thought of. There was no conqueror but God!

With this, of course, I agreed, but I reminded him of the panic-stricken rout of 8,000 or 9,000 good troops in December 1902, when they fled, no one pursuing, and having hardly been attacked, 40 miles into Fez, and abandoned camp, arms, money, and everything to the enemy. What would be the effect at Tangier of such an irruption? Might not the very chance of it move the Powers to send ships and men to be ready to secure their respective subjects against such an eventuality?

The Vizier answered (but rather uneasily) that of course the Powers might do so, but he thought it was unlikely there would be any resistance by the Akhmas if the Makhzen were resolute, and in any case he was sure any such resistance would fail very soon.

Just before seeing the Vizier I had learned from Dr. Verdon that your Excellency had been urging strongly on Sid Gubbas the inadvisability of using force, and that it would be better to come to terms peaceably with Raisuli for the release of Kaïd Maclean.

Still I was careful to explain at the beginning of our talk that I had had no fresh directions from your Excellency, and so whatever I said was not to be thought to have come from your Excellency. We were only speaking privately as between friends.

I hear that the mehalla of Mulai-al-Amin, near Casa Blanca, has been directed to go to El Ksar. It is said to consist of about 1,000 men under Kaïd Mtaai, who is reputed to be better than most Moorish officers, both as regards fighting and in his treatment of his men.

I have heard also (but have not yet been able to verify this) that the Basha Abdelkrin Eshirgui is being sent to Fishtaia to raise as many tribesmen as possible and proceed to El Ksar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[26927] No. 90.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 243.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 30, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 229 of the 18th instant, forwarding a report on the origin and nature of the proposed French control of the customs in Morocco, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, informing me that this control commenced at Dar-al-Baida and Rabat on the 21st instant, and seems to be working satisfactorily. At the latter place, however, it appears to have provided threats of molestation of Europeans on the part of some unruly Zair tribesmen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 90.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 146.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, July 25, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the French control of the custom-house commenced on the 21st instant, when the French Collector of 60 per cent. of the duties took his seat with the native Custom-house officials.

I am informed that the French Collector himself sits with the Umana for Imports, countersigning their notes of duties, and, if necessary, calling their attention to any points that may seem to him to require amending.

The clerk to the French Collector for the present performs similar services with the Umana for Exportation.

I am also told that the remaining 40 per cent. of the duties will, in a few days' time, be paid over to the State Bank, but, as the Umana had some back payments to make to the soldiers and for local services, these arrears are being now liquidated first.

The foreign control of the custom-house gave rise to the usual crop of native rumours, the outside Arabs alleging that a Frenchman was to sit with the Governor



of the town, another with the Kadi, and a third with the Mohtaceb. The tribesmen further, it was said, would hold a meeting to consider how best to put an end to the foreign control established at the custom-house.

No special importance need, I think, be attached to these reports, which are perhaps interesting to record as native opinion. Nevertheless, the increase of foreign influence in the country and the port works are not viewed with favour by the natives generally.

The Vice-Consul at Rabat informs me, in a report just received, that the French control has commenced at the custom-house at that port, and he adds that the system is very satisfactory, and the duty levied fairly and impartially.

He states, however, that about a dozen Chiefs of the tribe of Zair, a turbulent tribe, neighbours of Rabat, have been to the house of the Governor of the town, demanding the removal of the French Collector, vowing that if he remain there they will seize any European who may wander far enough from the heart of the town to expose himself.

The Governor of Rabat, the Vice-Consul adds, is not strong enough to seize these Chiefs, but is replying that the Sultan has permitted the French to collect the debt due to them.

In case the threat against Europeans mentioned by the Vice-Consul should be considered to be seriously meant, I have instructed him to warn British subjects not to expose themselves to any possible danger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 90.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 149.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, July 27, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 146 of the 25th instant, reporting the threat of the Zair tribesmen to seize Europeans as a protest against the assumption of foreign control over the custom-house at Rabat, the Vice-Consul informs me that he has warned British subjects against strolling into unfrequented whereabouts in the neighbouring places and gardens of the town.

The Vice-Consul states that the Governor of Rabat has addressed a Circular to the Consular Corps, begging them to warn their respective fellow subjects in this sense, and that the French Consul-General has written to Tangier on the subject.

Mr. Vice-Consul Neroutsos informs me also that the Governor had told him that he had arranged to give the Zair Chiefs a reply from Fez in ten days' time, but Mr. Neroutsos considers that these tribes really mean to give trouble.

The long absence of any authority over the Zairs, and the immense harvest they have gathered in this season, and their innate brutalism, as Mr. Neroutsos describes it, have rendered them dangerous, as they are at present in a position to dictate to the town of Rabat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[26247] No. 91.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 244.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 31, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches I have this moment received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting serious disturbances caused by the tribes in the neighbourhood of that town, and which seem to have been directed mainly against the French port works and against the French Controller of the Customs, but an emissary of the tribes appears also to have gone through the town threatening Christians.

Mr. Madden thinks about twelve foreigners were killed. The information of the French Legation is that only eight had up to last night been killed. The French

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Chargé d'Affaires is dispatching the French war-ship "Galilée" from here to render assistance. A steamer has just arrived bringing numerous refugees, and more are expected shortly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 91.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 151.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, July* 30, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 150 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to report that a meeting of the tribes of Showia was held at the Sunday market in Ulad Haris the day before yesterday, and the tribesmen arranged to send a deputation into this town to demand the removal of the French port works railway and of the French Controller at the custom-house.

This deputation was furnished by the tribes of Znata, Ziaida, Mediuna, and Ulad Zian, and, consisting of ten men, brought a letter from Showia Province to the Governor of the town, making the demands above reported.

At the Ulad Haris meeting above mentioned, it was further decided to send two representatives from all the tribes of Showia, namely, Emzab, Ulad Haris, Emzamza, Emdakra, Beni Meskin, Ulad Buziri, Ulad Siben Dowd, and others, to meet the southern tribes of Dukalla, Rahamna, Seraghna, &c., at the River Um-er-Rebia to discuss the matters they complain of. This at present appears a somewhat wide movement.

The deputation that came into this place yesterday was received by the Governor, and after some palavering was taken by the Kaïd, in company with all the principal local official Moors, with Notaries, to interview the Shereef Mulai-el-Amin.

I sent to the Governor this morning to ask for information about these events, and as to whether there should be anything to fear for the safety of British subjects and property outside the town.

The Kaïd replied that he had plenty of men and artillerymen ready in the event of any demonstration by the tribes against the town; he, however, considered that there is no cause for alarm whatever, as he believed the tribes had no fight in them. As regards the present deputation, the Kaïd said he had replied that what they complained of has been brought about by order of the Sultan; this answer did not satisfy the envoys, and then a reply from Fez was guaranteed to them in fifteen days. But, on a demand for an immediate reply, it was arranged to see the deputation again this morning, when the Governor said he intended to tell them that it is an affair of the Makhzen, and that they can get their reply from the Makhzen.

It is very unusual for the tribes, who are so busy with the large grain harvest, to take notice of town affairs in this way at this season of the year; after the harvest such might be looked for, when the tribesmen have nothing else to think of. The French control of the custom-house, too, has only been in force for about eight days.

It is the opinion of some that these troubles have been fomented by interested parties; and it is alleged that the Fez Umana may not be entirely strangers to the movement. It is a matter of common knowledge that many Fez merchants come to the ports in the train of the Fez Umana, and that they have in the past been the recipients of many favours at the custom-houses. By the French control all this is put an end to by one stroke.

Other theories are, indeed, put forward to account for the causes of the present troubles, but it is impossible to know for certain what the truth of it all is.

I hear from a native source that even at the meeting at Ulad Haris there was not unanimity among the tribesmen as to the steps taken, and the Governor of Dar-al-Baida states that the outside Kaïds have kept entirely apart from the movement.

It is certain, nevertheless, that there is a strong anti-French feeling in the country among the Arabs, and they have their sympathizers in the ports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 153.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, July* 30, 1907.

I REGRET to have to inform your Excellency that in the short time that has elapsed since addressing to you my despatch No. 151 of this date, a change for the worse has taken place in the situation in this town.

In the morning a mounted tribesman went about followed by a rabble and crying out threatenings against Christians, stating that any one bringing in provisions for the town or grain for the merchants would be robbed on the way in.

During the progress of the rabble a Portuguese man was wounded by a nigger in the crowd for desiring to prevent a child being ill-used. A shop of a British subject was stoned also. I protested to the Kaïd against this man's doings, but the Kaïd pretended to have no knowledge of it. I protested again, and also a third time, and then the affair settled itself, as the tribesman stopped his harangue.

Then the Kaïd sent me a message to bring up the Consular Corps to see him to hear explanations of what measure, he had taken to keep order inside and outside, as I had represented to him the necessity of guarding the residents and houses outside.

I called the Consular Corps together, and at 2 P.M. we went to the Kaïd's place, and he explained to us the demands of the tribesmen for the removal of the French railway and the French control of the custom-house, to which he had replied that it was a matter for the Makhzen entirely, a reply that was not accepted by the tribesmen. Then a report was brought in that two Frenchmen on the railway engine had been killed, as there had been stones put on the track by evildoers, and they could not get back to town. A scene of great excitement at once began, and the Governor ordered the soldiers of the Tangier regiment to go out. There was a further delay as the men had no cartridges, and these had to be obtained.

Much confusion prevailed, as the Askar came back and said the gates were closed. Up to the time of writing I cannot say for certain whether the men have gone out or not.

I have sent a circular to British subjects requesting them to keep to their houses as much as possible; and to those living outside the town that it is advisable for them to come into town.

So far nothing has happened of a serious nature in town, but for the Governor to have not arrested the crier was an act of folly in every way.

At the present time it is reported that there are more Frenchmen or Europeans working on the port works killed, but I am at present not in a position to confirm this.

I am decidedly of opinion that a ship or ships of war should be immediately sent to this place in case of further eventualities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—The Governor, Si Bubker Buzeed, seemed to me to be quite helpless, and unable to grapple with the serious situation. The feeling against the French broke out almost in a moment, but it is a fortunate thing that the tribesmen were not in town in force, else matters would have been still more deplorable.

It is reported now that seven people have been killed, but I cannot ascertain this for certain at present. It looks at present as if the workmen employed actually by the French Company were disloyal, as they have many men at work, and they ought to have been able to defend the European workers. It must be supposed that they were the fanatical victims to the incitement of the tribesmen.

*Later.*—The manager of the "Compagnie Marocaine" has been to inform me that it is now stated that there are twelve Europeans killed—French, Spanish, and Italian workmen.

He states that five escaped in a boat and the others were taking refuge in a house near the stone quarries, and were attacked there and killed. I cannot, however, confirm all these details. I am pressing the Kaïd to send out men in the event of its being possible to render assistance still.

A. M. M.

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[26221] No. 92.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 385.)
Sir, *Paris, August 3, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a leading article from the "Temps" which appeared this evening.*

The article states that though all the measures contemplated by the French Government are not yet known, it is certain that there is now a question of disembarking troops at Casablanca; it points out that the organization of the police in the ports will not be accomplished for several months, and that in the meantime the lives and property of French citizens are at the mercy of the fanaticism of the populace. The situation in certain towns such as Rabat is critical; at this port as at Safi it is not always possible for vessels to cross the bar. Measures should be taken to prevent fresh massacres. They might consist in the maintenance off Morocco of a division of cruisers: in the extension of the international police as far as Cape Juby: and possibly in the occupation of the most threatened points by Franco-Spanish forces.

Telegrams from Toulon published in the Paris press announce the departure to-day and to-morrow of three transports which, it is understood, will embark troops now in Algeria before proceeding to Morocco. Three other cruisers, the "Gloire," the "Gueydon," and the "Dupetit Thouars," are preparing to sail under the orders of Rear Admiral Philibert.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[26224] No. 93.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 389.)
Sir, *Paris, August 5, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from the "Temps" of this evening, particulars respecting troops which are under orders to proceed to Morocco in connection with the recent assassination of Europeans at Casablanca.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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Inclosure in No. 93.

*Extract from the "Temps" of August 6, 1907.*

VOICI la composition des troupes de l'armée de terre qui vont être envoyées à Casablanca, sous les ordres du Général Drude:—

Deux bataillons de Tirailleurs Algériens des 1er et 2e Régiments, pris à Blida et Mostaganem.

Un bataillon de la Légion Étrangère de Sidi-bel-Abbès, soit 2,400 fantassins.

Un peu d'artillerie et 300 cavaliers fournis par un escadron de Chasseurs d'Afrique de Blida, et un demi-escadron de Spahis d'Aumale.

Ces troupes seront embarquées en échelons, le premier à Oran sur les croiseurs, le second à Alger à bord de la "Nive." Ce second échelon comprendra en outre quelques bâtiments affrétés pour l'intendance et le service sanitaire.

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[26368] No. 94.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 6, 1907.*

CASA BLANCA.

The Councillor of His Majesty's Embassy had some conversation this morning with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter has as yet received no reply to the

* Not printed.



note handed on the 2nd instant to the Spanish Ambassador relative to the concerted action to be taken immediately at Casa Blanca. His Excellency appeared disturbed at the Spanish Government's hesitation.

He said that the French Government had made their preparations with the utmost expedition; the transports would arrive to-morrow; and, whether the Spanish Government would co-operate or not, the men would be landed immediately. Spain had three ships at Casa Blanca, and M. Pichon hoped that, to demonstrate the solidarity existing between the two Powers, Spain would disembark a contingent, if it were only of a hundred men. During the conversation a message was received from the Spanish Ambassador to say that he would call on M. Pichon this afternoon at 2.30.

The French papers of this morning have published a telegram from Reuter's Agency at Gibraltar that His Majesty's ship "Antrim" has sailed for Casa Blanca from that port. The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the hope that the intelligence was erroneous, and was told by Mr. Lister that no information on the subject had been received at His Majesty's Embassy.

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[26356] No. 95.

*Acting Consul-General Dundas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Algiers, August 6, 1907.*

TRANSPORT "Nive" left with 560 men for Morocco. Further troops sailing from Oran.

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[26384] No. 96.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 6, 1907.*

DAR-AL-BAIDA disturbances.

Following communicated to me by French Chargé d'Affaires:—

Men were landed from French war-ship yesterday to protect French Consulate, after understanding with Governor of Dar-al-Baida. Moorish Government troops immediately fired upon them, and Moorish quarter of town was then bombarded by "Galilée."

Many Moors killed. French casualties, one officer and six men wounded.

At the end of attack Spanish war-ship arrived.

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[26368] No. 97.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 6, 1907.*

DISTURBANCE at Casa Blanca.

Your telegram No. 37 of the 7th instant.

No news has been received by the Admiralty as to the "Antrim" having proceeded to Casa Blanca. If she has done so she will be instructed to return at once.

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[26389] No. 98.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 245.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 1, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 244 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you an account which has appeared in the local French paper regarding the disturbances at Dar-al-Baida.* The French Chargé d'Affaires tells me that these

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reports were confirmed to him in every particular by the French doctor, who was an eyewitness, except the report of the desire of the mob to burn the bodies.

No one appears to have had any warning of these acts, which were evidently mainly directed against the French harbour works. The Governor, whose dismissal the Diplomatic Body here has for some time been unsuccessfully endeavouring to obtain, appears to have shown himself quite incompetent, and the soldiers he detached for the protection of Europeans in some cases sided with the rioters.

The French Chargé d'Affaires immediately went to Sid Mohammed Torres, but he had received no news and declined to despatch any troops, fearing to denude Tangier any more of troops in view of the events that are proceeding in the Khamas tribe, &c.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER

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[26390] No. 99.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 7.)

(No. 246.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 1, 1907.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 245 of to-day's date, further news has reached me from Dar-al-Baida in despatches from His Majesty's Consul, of which I have the honour to inclose copies, from which it is clear that the movement has at present been entirely directed against the French, and there are indications that it was not entirely the work of the neighbouring tribes, but very possibly originated by more influential persons, whose interests were affected by the institution of the French control of the Customs. The forcible removal of the Governor by the Commander of the troops appears to be a good suggestion.

Mr. Madden states that the Governor declares that the "Zurufat," or rulers of the tribes, will not allow foreigners other than French to leave.

Three hundred refugees arrived here yesterday, mostly Jews, and about forty-five to-day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER

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Inclosure 1 in No. 99.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 154.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, July* 30, 1907.

THE night has passed without incident, but there is much tension. At present things are quiet, but the rabble is ready to get out of hand.

Eight or nine persons were killed, and in the most brutal ways. The corpses were mutilated horribly.

The British houses outside the town are guarded, and I visited them yesterday evening and found all well. The residents are, I think, perhaps more in security there than were they to come into town.

The French colony are at the French Consulate, with the bodies of the dead, but one body is said to remain outside. It is believed that six Frenchmen, two Spaniards, and one Italian have been killed.

The soldiers rescued some five Europeans last evening, and brought them into town, some in a wounded state.

At the request of the French Consul I went up to the Kaïd this morning and insisted on a strong posse of men being put at the French Consulate, as the men had been for some reason taken away. I also arranged for the embarkation of French subjects on board a British cargo-boat in harbour, the steam-ship "Demetian," at the desire of the Acting French Consul, and provided him with a letter to the master of the steamer to give asylum to the persons who should desire it.

The Arabs were this morning stopping persons embarking at the water-port.

A Khalifa from Mulai-el-Amin has just been to consult me as to the removal of the Town Governor, and putting Kaïd Wold Hadj Hamu, Governor of Klad Haris, in his place, as he, being a strong man, can assure security, Kaïd Ci Bubker being helpless and unreliable.

After consultation with the principal British merchants here and with the Consuls of career, we said that if the Shereef Mulai-el-Amin accepts the responsibility the



measure seemed the only safe course in view of the armed rabble ready to commit any outrages.

I will report later what action was taken, but I insisted to the Khalifa of Mulai-el-Amin that we are all under Makhzen protection, but at the present crisis we must consider what shall be the best to prevent any outrages.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—It is not known what started the killing of the Europeans, but it is not believed to have been the work of the tribesmen. The Ziada came in this morning and patrolled the town armed and mounted, crying out that there is no fear, and that they are responsible for public safety.

The deplorable affair seems to have been an explosion of pent-up hatred against the French.

In view of the state of affairs, the French Acting Consul has abandoned the French control of the custom-house by *force majeure*, and to help the authorities.

I have no hesitation in advising the dispatch of war-ships at once for our assistance in case of need.

The Governor has just refused permission to a British subject to embark on a steamer, and in reply to my representations states that the "Zurufat," or rulers of the tribes, will only consent to the embarkation of French subjects, thus making a clear distinction between the nationalities.

I have heard it stated that the workers on the engine and at the quarries were told to stop work, and that had they not refused and given way at once the killing might not have happened at all. The engine, still smoking, was observed last evening being knocked to pieces, and hot scraps put into the sea to cool them. Looting was going on in other parts as well.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 99.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 155.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, July* 31, 1907.

THE town remains quiet, and I venture to think that it will remain so, although the natives of the lower class are not very friendly.

The French colony is, with few exceptions, on board the British steam-ship "Demetian," anchored in the bay.

Mulai-el-Amin has not yet taken over the dictatorship of the town, and his intentions or plans are not known.

Some of the British residents outside have come in of their own free will. I have sent a circular to the remainder to request them to sleep in town, as rumours have reached me that another tribe, the Emzab, will arrive here to-morrow. It seemed to me more prudent that they should come into town, though I am at present uncertain if they will consent to do so, as I am aware that they feel in safety outside.

The servants at the French hotel have all left, being afraid to remain there. Only Mr. Broome of this Consulate remains there, the proprietress having gone on board the "Demetian."

Boys are still engaged in destroying the French railway; all the carriages have been burnt and the engine destroyed.

I inclose copies of correspondence, for your Excellency's information, regarding the embarkation of French subjects and the return of British subjects resident outside to sleep in town.

Should there be anything further to report before the mail leaves, I will add the same in a postscript.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—It is rumoured that the new Governor will come in and assume control to-night. At the water-port the Government soldiers were pointing out to the country Arabs when I passed this afternoon that the French Controller is no longer at the custom-house.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 99.

*Consul Madden to Captain W. Jones.*

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, July* 31, 1907.

THE French Consul has requested permission from me to send members of the French colony to take asylum on board your vessel, in view of the anti-French riots and feeling here.

I shall be grateful, therefore, in view of the danger they apprehend for their lives, if you will allow them to go on board your ship as desired.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 99.

*Consul Madden to Messrs. Cross, Bolton, and Murdoch.*

Dear Sirs, *Dar-al-Baida, July* 31, 1907.

I REGRET extremely to cause you any inconvenience, but I am of opinion you should come into town.

Several families are doing so now, and I hear it said that a further tribe are coming to Casa Blanca, and may be here to-morrow.

Under all the circumstances, I have to request you to be good enough to sleep in town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[26409] No. 100.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 7.)*

Sir, *Admiralty, August* 6, 1907.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day, No. 7, sent to the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

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Inclosure in No. 100.

*Admiralty to Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar.*

(Telegraphic) P. *Admiralty, August* 6, 1907.

HIS Majesty's Government do not desire to intervene. You need not, therefore, hold ship any longer in readiness, as she will not now require to be sent to Dar-al-Baida.

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[26466] No. 101.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August* 7, 1907.

THE account given in the press of attack on French picket at Casa Blanca, and of subsequent bombardment, was to-day confirmed by M. Louis, Political Director. Great importance is attached by the French Government to the fact that it was on the express invitation of the Pasha that the party was landed. Admiral Philibert's squadron ought to reach Casa Blanca to-day. It will land reinforcements immediately, and the whole coast, including Rabat, Mazagan, &c., will be patrolled by ships.

M. Pichon had a long interview yesterday with the Spanish Ambassador. He is



not yet quite satisfied with the attitude of the Spanish Government; they still appear to hesitate, and would have preferred a small naval demonstration. I was given to understand by M. Louis that it would afford satisfaction to the French Government if His Majesty's Government could by some means stiffen Spain's back.

In my conversation yesterday with M. Pichon he told me that he could see nothing alarming in the situation, as all the information he received tended to show that it was not the German Government's intention to create difficulties.

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[26463] No. 102.

*Acting Consul-General Dundas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Algiers, August* 7, 1907.

"DE GUEYDON" left Oran with troops for Morocco.

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[26464] No. 103.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 7, 1907.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 76.

Last night French war-ships passed through straits *en route* for Dar-al-Baida, Rabat, and Mazagan, where they are to disembark troops. It is expected that one of these will to-morrow return to Tangier.

Alcazar is reported to be disturbed, but situation here is at present quiet.

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[25884] No. 104.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 7, 1907.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 35, 36, and 37 of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th instant respectively.

You may inform French Government that His Majesty's Government do not intend to dispatch a ship of war to Casa Blanca. They rely on the French forces sent there to afford protection to British subjects if in danger.

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[26466] No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 7, 1907.

MOROCCAN affairs.

See Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 38 of to-day's date, repeated to you.

If there appeared to be a want of complete co-operation between the French and Spanish Governments it would produce a most unfortunate effect.

Such co-operation appears to His Majesty's Government to involve no risk.

You should impress this upon Spanish Government.

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[26584] No. 106.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 435.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 7, 1907.

M. CAMBON handed me to-day the statement, of which a copy is sent herewith, as to the action taken at Casablanca.

I said the French Government evidently had no choice except to act as they had



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done, and it was probably better that they should have been forced to take strong measures than half-measures.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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Inclosure in No. 106.

*Note communicated by M. Cambon, August 7, 1907.*

LES événements ont devancé les mesures arrêtées par le Gouvernement de la République à la suite des récents attentats commis à Casablanca, mesures qui allaient être portées à la connaissance des Gouvernements intéressés.

En présence de l'impuissance manifeste du Gouvernement Marocain à se faire obéir de ses sujets et à pourvoir à la sauvegarde des ressortissants étrangers, l'urgente nécessité s'affirme de plus en plus d'organiser la police dans les ports du Maroc. Le maintien et le respect de la haute autorité de Sa Majesté Chérifienne y sont intéressés au premier degré. C'est pénétré de ces sentiments que le Gouvernement de la République donnera suite aux mesures auxquelles il avait résolu de recourir en respectant scrupuleusement l'intégrité du Maroc et la souveraineté du Sultan. L'ordre et la sécurité, la liberté des transactions commerciales seront garantis à Casablanca par des forces suffisantes. Un châtiment exemplaire sera infligé aux indigènes responsables des massacres et des attentats d'hier.

Ces opérations seront accompagnées de l'organisation immédiate d'une police de la ville et de la banlieue de concert avec le Gouvernement Espagnol.

*Ambassade de France à Londres, le 7 Août*, 1907.

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[26483] No. 107.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 8.)*

(No. 392.)
Sir, *Paris, August 7, 1907.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 37 of yesterday's date, Mr. Lister found M. Pichon in a somewhat perturbed state of mind at the procrastination shown by the Spanish Government in connection with the concerted action to be taken by France and Spain at Casablanca. He had not, he said, as yet received any answer to the original note on the subject which had been presented to the Spanish Ambassador on the 2nd instant, but he hoped to hear something in the course of the afternoon, as the Marquis del Muni had announced his visit for 2·30. His Excellency said that he could only attribute the hesitation of Spain to fear, but he was at a loss to understand what there was to be afraid of at this juncture, as all his information tended to show that Germany had no intention of creating difficulties. In any case, he added, the French Government were determined to take decisive and rapid action with or without the co-operation of Spain—their preparations had been made with the greatest expedition, notwithstanding the absence of Ministers from Paris; the ships and transports would reach Casablanca on the following day, and no time would be lost in landing the troops, which consisted of some 3,000 men of all three branches of the service. He still hoped that the Spaniards, who, he understood, had three gun-boats at Casablanca, would co-operate with the French, as no matter how small a contingent they landed it was important to show that complete solidarity existed between the two Powers.

In the afternoon Mr. Lister called to see the Directeur Politique, with a view to ascertaining the nature of the Spanish reply. M. Louis was not able to receive him, but M. Crozier, French Ambassador in Vienna, whom he met on the stairs, informed him of the further developments which had taken place at Casablanca on the previous day. These were subsequently corroborated by one of the Private Secretaries of M. Pichon, and also much later by M. Louis, who asked Mr. Lister to come and see him on the following morning.

Being confined to his room, Mr. Lister was unable to go to the Quai d'Orsay, but Mr. Grahame went in his place. As reported in my telegram No. 38 of to-day's date, M. Louis stated that the version of the incident published in the newspapers was virtually correct. The French Government, he said, attached great importance to the





fact that the French force had been landed at the express request of the Pasha. The squadron under the orders of Admiral Philibert was expected to arrive to-day, reinforcements would be landed, and some of the ships would then patrol the coast, visiting Mazagan, Rabat, and, later on, Safi, and hold themselves in readiness to appear at any spot at which their presence might be required.

Mr. Grahame gathered that the reply of the Spanish Ambassador had not been altogether satisfactory, although M. Louis spoke guardedly on the subject. The Spanish Government still appeared nervous and hesitating, and would have preferred to limit their action to a naval demonstration on a smaller scale. They required to be *soutenu* and encouraged, and M. Louis gave Mr. Grahame to understand that it would be very agreeable to the French Government if His Majesty's Government were able to do anything in this direction, either in London or Madrid.

Mr. Grahame informed M. Louis that the Admiralty had no knowledge of the departure of His Majesty's ship "Antrim" for Casablanca, but that instructions had been sent that if she had sailed she should be recalled (see your telegram No. 62 of the 6th August). M. Louis expressed his thanks.

I inclose herein, extracted from the "Matin," a version of the proceedings at Casablanca,* which, M. Louis stated, appeared in the main to correspond with the official report received by the French Government.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

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[26592] No. 108.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, August 8, 1907.*

THE Spanish Ambassador in Paris was furnished on the 5th instant with instructions from Madrid, which have been shown to me in confidence by a member of the Spanish Government. These instructions are to the effect that the Government are resolved to continue their policy of agreement with France. The Spanish Ambassador is directed, at the same time, to offer all the opposition he can to the tendency ascribed to the French of allowing themselves to drift, under the influence of recent events at Casa Blanca, into a course of action which goes beyond the mandate given by the Algeciras Act to France and Spain.

As usual, the Spanish press is generally opposed to Spain engaging actively in Morocco in measures of coercion. The necessity of interfering by force would also have been gladly avoided, as is very evident, by the Spanish Government. The situation, however, has been aggravated by the occurrences of the 5th instant at Casa Blanca, and it is probable that Spain will now yield to the necessity of throwing in her lot with France, inasmuch as a landing has already been effected by Spanish troops in co-operation with the French troops.

It would appear that, at a Cabinet Council held in Paris on or about Saturday last, a course of action was laid down without any previous arrangement having been made with Spain. The Spanish Government take exception to this, and they are very sensitive on the subject.

When I go to San Sebastian on the 9th instant I shall not fail to impress upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs that full agreement with France should be maintained by the Spanish Government.

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[26594] No. 109.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Ildefonso, August 8, 1907.*

IN the course of my interview at Madrid yesterday with the Spanish Finance Minister, I anticipated by my remarks to him exactly the upshot of the instruction I have since had the honour to receive from you, to the effect that it is of the highest importance that Spain should co-operate closely with France. Señor de Osma had

* Not printed.



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been specially commissioned to confer with me on the subject of Morocco by Señor Maura, President of the Council of Ministers, who is at San Sebastian, and he at once made the latter acquainted with my observations by telegraph.

I intend to go myself to San Sebastian on the 10th instant. Meanwhile, your views are well known to the Spanish Government, who from the first have been fully informed with regard to them.

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[26599] No. 110.

*Acting Consul-General Dundas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Algiers, August 8, 1907.*

"OASIS" sailed with 260 men for Morocco viâ Oran.

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[26564] No. 111.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 8, 1907.*

CASA BLANCA. Last paragraph of Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 38 of the 7th August.

No disapproval of French action, but rather the reverse, has till now been indicated by language of German Chargé d'Affaires here.

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[26595] No. 112.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 8, 1907.*

DAR-AL-BAIDA disturbances.

According to news from French source bombardment continued till yesterday, when news was sent off.

All European shops and bank pillaged.

Foreign communities besieged in Consulates.

Passengers on merchant-vessel which brought news report that many Jews have been killed, but that French squadron landed 2,000 troops yesterday. According to them, Mazagan was yesterday also being bombarded.

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[26603] No. 113.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 394.)
Sir, *Paris, August 8, 1907.*

MR. LISTER saw the Political Director to-day and communicated to him the substance of your telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid No. 37 of yesterday's date, relative to the importance of complete co-operation between the French and Spanish Governments at Casablanca. M. Louis said that the instruction to Sir M. de Bunsen was exactly what the French Government had wanted, and that M. Pichon would be much gratified at the action of His Majesty's Government. The statement that the latter could not see any risk in the co-operation of the two Governments was, he considered, particularly valuable.

M. Louis then read Mr. Lister the note which had been presented to the various Powers, recounting what had occurred at Casablanca, and explaining the reasons for the French action. It should of course, he said, have been a joint communication by France and Spain, but the Spanish Government again were not ready, and the French Government were of opinion that the matter admitted of no delay. The Spanish Government had accepted the inevitable, and he believed that their Representatives abroad had now made a statement to the various Governments concerned to the effect that they concurred absolutely in the communication made by the French Government.



M. Louis drew Mr. Lister's attention to the wording of the last sentence of the note, in which the expression "organisation d'une police," not of "la police," is used. He said that in the present condition of affairs it was out of the question to think of a police constituted according to the provisions of the Algeciras Act, consisting, that is to say, of a force of Moors with French and Spanish officers. A police of Frenchmen and Spaniards would be formed immediately, and as soon as circumstances permitted and the suitable Moors were available the force would be transformed to meet the stipulations of the Algeciras Act. He imagined that the men would be recruited from the troops now being landed, mainly no doubt from the Algerian regiments, as it was important that they should have a knowledge of Arabic. This, as far as the French were concerned, need not take more than a day or two. The recent experience had been unsolicited; it had been forced upon them, and had been dearly bought. At the same time he could not help thinking that it might prove beneficial, as it had opened the eyes of Europe to the real state of affairs, and might save France and Spain from even more disagreeable surprises in the future. Croakers expressed the opinion that things would go even worse, but he is of opinion that the recent outburst was the result of the impunity which for the last year has been enjoyed by the perpetrators on a smaller scale of outrages of a similar nature.

M. Louis said that at Berlin all was honey ("on est tout miel"); that when M. Jules Cambon communicated the French note to M. Tchirschky, the latter, after reading it, said, "C'est parfait, vous avez fait exactement ce qu'il fallait."

Mr. Lister informed M. Louis that there was absolutely no truth in the report that His Majesty's ship "Antrim" had left for Casablanca, and that she was still at Gibraltar, and he expressed himself very grateful for this precise information.

Mr. Lister also availed himself of the opportunity to congratulate M. Louis on his promotion to the rank of a "Grand Officier" of the Legion of Honour, a distinction which has rarely been conferred on the official occupying his post at the Quai d'Orsay.

I have, &c.
(For His Majesty's Ambassador),
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

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[26596] No. 114.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 8, 1907.*

MY telegram No. 74 of the 4th instant.

According to Minister for War, the Governor of Tetuan has received news that tribe has taken Kaïd Maclean out of Raisuli's hands, and that he is now their prisoner.

This news, if confirmed, is satisfactory.

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[26714] No. 115.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 9, 1907.*

I HAVE received despatches dated evening of 7th from Dar-al-Baida. Quiet was then restored in the town. No British subjects had lost their lives as far as Consul could ascertain. British residences appear to have been all pillaged, and town is ruined.

Uneasiness caused by news from Rabat in spite of the presence of a French war-ship. There is no confirmation of the reported bombardment of Mazagan.

This morning one Spanish and two French war-ships arrived here. The former will leave again to-day for Dar-al-Daida.

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[26727] No. 116.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 9, 1907.*

DAR-AL-BAIDA. French and Spanish Legations to-day made an identic communication to Foreign Representatives to the effect that forces of both countries, in conformity with agreement between the two Cabinets, landed to restore order at Dar-al-Baida, and that all Europeans residing in town are safe, none having been reported killed.

This is the first sign of co-operation between France and Spain.

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[26592] No. 117.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 9, 1907.*

YOUR telegram No. 36 of 8th August.

You might point out, if necessary, to Spanish Government that, in view of the serious outbreak on the part of the Moors at Casa Blanca, and the consequent apprehension on the part of all foreigners, it would have been necessary for other Governments to send forces, unless France and Spain had taken the matter in hand promptly; our own Consul, for instance, was asking for a British ship.

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[26825] No. 118.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 10, 1907.*

CASA bLANCA incident.

Mr. Lister was again asked by M. Louis to-day to convey to you the gratitude of M. Pichon for the instructions sent to Sir M. de Bunsen at Madrid, in regard to the necessity of close co-operation between France and Spain. M. Pichon especially appreciates the promptitude of your action, the results of which have been most valuable.

Mr. Lister communicated to M. Louis the substance of your telegram No. 40 to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, with which he appeared to be much gratified.

M. Louis stated that the latest news was satisfactory.

The Moorish authorities at Tangier pay much more attention to the representations of the French Chargé d'Affaires than they did before. The "Jeanne d'Arc" has arrived, and the situation is reported to be calm.

All has been quiet at Rabat since the threat was made to bombard the adjacent native town of Sale on the slightest sign of disturbance.

The authorities at Mazagan have implored the Europeans not to leave the town, as they regard their presence as constituting a safeguard.

M. Louis states that there can be no doubt that the disturbing elements do not come from within the various cities, but from the tribes outside.

M. Louis says he is convinced that the Spanish Ambassador in Paris is in favour of a policy of the closest co-operation with France, but up to now he is not quite so certain as to the Spanish Government's view.

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[26826] No. 119.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 10, 1907.*

OCCUPATION of Dar-al-Baida.

Town was again being attacked by tribes, and, according to British Consul, the town was not nearly safe from the hordes of Arabs. The ruin of the British colony is almost complete, and food is very scarce.





Situation is somewhat less alarming at Rabat. Europeans have left Alcazar. Those resident at Mazagan are prevented from leaving by natives, who fear bombardment by the "Amiral Aube," which is there. The situation is very critical in that port.

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[26834] No. 120.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 11, 1907.*

SITUATION at Dar-al-Baida is at present quiet, and at Rabat more satisfactory. Foreigners forbidden to embark at Mazagan, where there is still great disturbance.

At Fez it is certain that situation will be critical, and there is danger for the Sultan as well as for foreigners. It is impossible for latter to leave now. Much anxiety is expressed by French Chargé d'Affaires, who is most desirous that Sultan may be at once supplied with money to help him in buying off tribes and levying troops. He hopes, and I agree with him as to the necessity for this, that His Majesty's Government will urge this on bank.

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[26835] No. 121.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 11, 1907.*

CASA BLANCA. On the 8th instant, before news of the bombardment of Casa Blanca had reached Fez, His Majesty the Sultan asked Dr. Verdon to convey to me the following message:—

The effect of a landing of troops and of a punitive expedition against tribes there would have disastrous effect both as regards himself and his country. Tribes would insist on a movement to drive foreigners from the country, and that His Majesty should head that movement. His Majesty trusts that moderation will be shown, and that our influence will be used towards that end.

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[26930] No. 122.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 249.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 2, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 245 and 246 of the 1st instant respecting the recent disturbances at Dar-al-Baida, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a Circular, which I have thought it advisable to address to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Fez, Mazagan, Rabat, Mogador, Saffi, and Marakesh, instructing them as to the course of action they should adopt in the event of any anti-foreign movements arising in their respective districts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 122.

*Circular addressed by Sir G. Lowther to Consular Officers in Morocco.*

Sir, *Tangier, August 2, 1907.*

IT is possible that the excitement which led to the recent regrettable events at Dar-al-Baida may spread to other parts of Morocco.

You should be careful to watch for any indication of such a movement in your port, and in such event warn British subjects to be careful to expose themselves as little as possible. You should then call upon the Governor and report to him any



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indications of an anti-foreign movement which may have come to your notice, warning him that he will be held responsible for any disaster that may occur to British subjects unless he immediately takes all the measures within his power to check any rising.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[26931] No. 123.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 250.)

Sir, *Tangier, August 4, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 246 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches just received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-el-Baida.

It will be observed that the hostile measures proposed by the French Acting Consul upon the arrival of the "Galilée" were, on the urgent representations of Mr. Madden and his colleagues, deferred, as it was pointed out by the latter that an occupation of the town with so small a force available would inevitably be the signal for a general attempt on the lives of all Europeans.

The town is at present quiet, but there is very great tension. In case of need a force of 150 men can be landed from the "Galilée," but, as stated, it is now hoped that there will be no necessity for hostile measures until the arrival of reinforcements.

The news from Mazagan is of a disquieting nature.

The disturbances at Dar-el-Baida have naturally reacted upon the populace in the other ports, and the tribes in Mazagan are refusing to leave, and call upon other tribes to enter the town. In view of the serious situation there, His Majesty's Vice-Consul asks that a ship of war may be dispatched.

I communicated to my French, German, and Spanish colleagues the information I had received regarding Mazagan, but only the French Chargé d'Affaires had received any news corroborating mine, and none of them were disposed to take any share in chartering a steamer to go to that port.

The French Chargé d'Affaires says he hopes that in the course of a very few days there may be a man-of-war available to send there. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires said that if two vessels of war were sent to the coast one might, if not required at Dar-el-Baida, be sent on to Mazagan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 123.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 156.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August 1, 1907.*

ALL British subjects are now safely in town. I have not considered it necessary to collect them at the Consulate so far.

The situation has been very complicated this morning. As so many tribes were assembled in town, the tribal authority at the Dar Makhzen ordered them out of town to settle their questions which they had raised about the responsibility for the murders of the Frenchmen and others.

The town is under tribal rule. Mulai-el-Amin did not carry out his intention to put Kaïd Hadj Hamu, Governor of the Ulad Haris at the Dar Makhzen, as the Mediuna and Ziaida, having arrived here first, threatened to fight if it were attempted. Instead, Mulai-el-Amin has apparently compromised the matter, and Kaïd Abbas-el-Mediuni, assisted by Kaïd Kasim l'Oodeyi, the Emshowri of Mulai-el-Amin, are at the Dar Makhzen, with Kaïd Ci Bubker as nominal Kaïd, but the latter is to all intents put aside, and can do nothing but by their orders. No communication has, however, been made to us as to any actual change of Governor.

The tribes have now sent me a message to the effect that they have no differences and there is nothing to fear. The authorities have arrested some of the workers (Moslems) of the French Harbour Company. Many others are known to possess stolen property of the Company. The Manager of the State Bank has presented to me,



as doyen of the Consular Body, a statement of the reserves at the Bank, in the unexpected event of any accident.

Spanish subjects have collected in large numbers at the Consulate, but I do not think the state of affairs warrants it, and I consider it is far best for Europeans to remain quiet in their own houses. Such is the advice I have offered them. At the request of a number of British subjects, I obtained guards last night from Mulai-el-Amin for their houses, and also for one French subject who had applied to me as doyen.

The French cruiser "Galilée" arrived here this morning.

There is still a difficulty at the water-port, where the Arabs prevent people going on board vessels in harbour.

There is no disturbance of any sort now in town.

Vessels are loading as usual, but of course there is no French control of the Customs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 123.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 157.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August 1, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the French Acting Consul, M. Neuville, requested me to call this morning with my German and Spanish acting colleagues.

M. Neuville began by informing us that he had received entire and full powers from the French Legation to carry out any measures in concert with the Commander of the cruiser "Galilée" he considered fit. He said he intended to occupy the French Consulate with an armed force, and he would give twelve armed men to each of the foreign Consulates of career.

I and my colleagues protested that such action, in view of the defenceless state we are in, would only be the signal for a general attempt on the lives of all the Europeans; that such small forces could avail nothing in protecting us; and that I was obliged to ask him to reconsider his stated determination, at least until adequate forces should be at hand, and our colonies had a chance of being put into safety on board vessels. We pointed out that, with few exceptions, the whole French colony is now on board a British merchant-vessel, and that the other colonies are very numerous, there being alone some 600 Spaniards, not counting other colonies.

After a long time the French Acting Consul said he would show his good-will by ceding to us, but he made three conditions:—

1. That the Kaïd cleared the water-port of Arabs and allowed free embarkment.
2. That the Arabs pillaging the railway-line under the guns of the "Galilée" should be removed by the Kaïd.
3. That he would embark all the remaining French subjects, and alone at the French Consulate with the French doctor he would claim full protection at the hands of the Kaïd.

Failing this being done, at 3 o'clock the vessel would bombard.

We succeeded in obtaining that, in the event of bombardment being decided upon, that we should be notified in good time.

M. Neuville would concede nothing further.

A full Consular meeting was then called upon by the French Acting Consul, at which the Kaïd was present, and the demands on him, as stated, were formulated to him. He promised instant compliance. In view, however, of the very serious state of affairs that the bombardment of the defenceless town would bring about, and as there are many sick people who could not be removed, I addressed the French Acting Consul, in my position as doyen of the Consular Body, a letter, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith, claiming an interview with the Commander of the "Galilée" in the event of a bombardment being contemplated, in order to place my views before him.

I understand, from a verbal message I have received from the French Consul, that my request will be acceded to if hostile measures are intended.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN

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P.S.—Later. No hostile measures have been taken to-day, the Kaïd having cleared the water-port of Arabs, and free embarkment was restored.

The other French demands were also carried out in a fairly satisfactory way.

I was invited to visit the "Galilée" unofficially, when the Commander listened to my views of the situation, and on the subject of bombardment, or firing to the side of the town.

A deputation of the chief townsmen (Moors) has been to see me and ask advice. I advised them to see the French demands are carried out properly.

The dead remain at the French Consulate. Nothing is yet decided as to their disposal. They number nine in all: three French, three Italians, two Spanish, and one unknown.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 123.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 158.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 2, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch I have received from Mazagan by special courier. I have informed the French authorities of its contents. They were willing to consider the advisability of sending an officer and twenty men on a French cargo-boat to Mazagan. As, however, I am only asked to send the despatch to your Excellency, I replied that I would therefore do as requested, while thanking them gratefully for offer of help.

There are said to be some skirmishes going on outside between the Makhzen troops and the Arabs.

Mulai-el-Amin is at the Dar Makhzen now.

We have taken dispositions as to places to assemble in the event of firing from the cruiser to protect the French Consulate in case of need.

The town is quiet, but there is very great tension. The Jews are terrified, and their womenfolk injure the situation occasionally by making a noise.

The French are hoping, so my French colleague tells me, to stave off any hostile measures until the fleet arrives and a sufficient force arrives. But in case of need a force of 150 men can be landed to sweep the streets of disturbers of the peace.

All the country Arabs have practically been got rid of, so in my opinion matters are better than they were.

I should be glad of British assistance should your Excellency be of opinion that it is required.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 123.

*Vice-Consul Spinney to Consul Madden.*

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Mazagan, August* 1, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you a Petition I have just received from some of the British subjects, in which they request that a British man-of-war should be sent here, and I have to add that I am of the opinion that the state of the town here warrants the said request.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. G. SPINNEY.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 123.

*Petition addressed to Vice-Consul Spinney by British Subjects in Mazagan.*

Dear Sir, *Mazagan, August* 1, 1907.

MAY we, the British subjects of Mazagan, request you to forward immediately to His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Tangier a request that he will be good enough to instruct the authorities to send us a man-of-war for our protection.



For the past few days the town has been anything but quiet, owing to the riff-raff of the El Ownat tribe at present here, and, in fact, it was only with the greatest difficulty that their Moorish friends prevented trouble a day or two ago. Now, in view of the extremely serious news from Casa Blanca, this tribe, although they have been requested to leave, absolutely refuse, and have this morning sent out couriers to other tribes, requesting them to also come and join them, and therefore we deem the position here most unsafe, and trust that His Majesty's Minister will see his way to grant this request as promptly as possible.

We have, &c.
(Follow signatures.)

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[26933] No. 124.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 12.)

(No. 252.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 4, 1907.

HEREWITH I have the honour to transmit extracts from two letters, dated the 2nd instant, which I have received from Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean.

I immediately telegraphed to you with reference to the protection required by Raisuli, and caused the Minister of War to be informed of the contents of those letters; but his Excellency replied that the question of the terms asked for by Raisuli must be referred to His Shereefian Majesty, as there is no one here with sufficient authority to grant them.

His Excellency, however, thought that Kaïd Maclean might give Raisuli his own personal assurances of British protection or even assure him that it would be granted by me, and that the "Aman" granted by the Sultan still holds good.

As regards the letters to the tribes, he stated that as he did not know their contents he was unable to give an opinion. He appeared to think it was a distinct move in the right direction that Raisuli should state his terms, and he attributes this change in his attitude to the successful operations of the Government force in the Khamas.

To gain time, and in order if possible to avoid that Kaïd Maclean should again be moved to the mountains, I have conveyed to him the substance of what the Minister of War said, and told him that the question of protection is under consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 124.

*Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Extract.) *Akhmas, August* 2, 1907.

I HAVE had a very long talk with Raisuli. He assures me that he is most anxious to settle this affair, but although he trusts the Sultan he cannot trust the people round him, and feels sure they will play him false whatever terms they make. Therefore he has requested me to beg you to ask the Sultan to allow you to give him British protection for himself and family in the same way as the French have given it to the Shereefs of Wazan. If you will grant him this favour he will swear to always do whatever the Sultan or you may tell him, and to be a good and loyal subject to His Majesty. He also begs that his women the Sultan has shall be returned to him, and that I shall be allowed to give the Royal letters I have to the tribes here, and that after all this is settled the Mehallas shall be removed from here. I am sure the Sultan will grant this if you ask him, and that Raisuli and these tribes would give no more trouble afterwards. I am afraid this is a very big order, but I feel sure if it is possible you will use all your endeavours to carry it through. If this is done, instead of Raisuli being a nuisance to every one, I am positive he will never give any more trouble. I am sending a letter to Bushta Bagdadi to tell him I am writing to you, and asking him to do nothing until he has orders. Kindly let me know as soon as you can that you will try.

I know everything here, and if I did not feel sure it is the best thing for the Sultan and everybody I would not ask you.





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Although I am not to go to the mountains until I receive your answer, I feel sure you will know that this has not influenced me in the least, and I leave myself entirely in your hands. Of course, if you can do this I am to return to Tangier at once, and I cannot help saying I shall be very glad, and if I have to stop here until the M'halla releases me, I am sure it will be a very long time.

Feeling sure you will do your utmost in this matter.

* * * * *

At first this proposal will seem preposterous, but if you will kindly think it over quietly I hope you will see it in another light. It will stop a lot of bloodshed, and I am positive the M'halla will never get here, and if Raisuli is killed his men would at once do for me, although this is not to be considered.

I will make any terms you like with Raisuli about the protection if you can give it.

I have told Raisuli's brother all you say in your letter of the 29th, which I have only just received, but he says Raisuli will not speak through Khamas or Bushta Baghdadi, and will only communicate direct with Torres. I told him he heard what you said, and it was no use my writing. Raisuli's brother says I am to go to the mountain again, and I am ready to go anywhere, only I think if this tribe is responsible for me they might see I am properly treated.

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[27744] No. 125.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 253.)

*Tangier, August 5, 1907.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 219 of the 13th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have received the following information with regard to the situation in the south from a source which I believe to be trustworthy.

As arranged with Mulai Hafid, the Rahamnas returned to the vicinity of Marakesh, presumably in order to proclaim him Sultan. The principal Chiefs, however, alarmed by the news of the Sultan's projected departure from Fez with a large army, refused to be present, and Mulai Hafid thereupon deemed it prudent to affirm his loyalty by dispatching the prisoners to Mogador. The present situation appears to be as follows :—

Kaïd Aissa and El Mtoogi, formerly enemies, are leagued together, and are far from cordially disposed towards Mulai Hafid. On the other hand, the mountain Kaïds of Glawi and Gondaffi are contemplating hostilities against El Mtoogi, and the Haha Kaïds threaten to join them in this movement. The Rahamnas are unsettled, and are engaged in extorting money from the Sus settlers, to whom grants of land within the Rahamna territory had been given by former Sultans. The Rahamnas deny that the Sultan has the right to make such grants.

Mulai Hafid is intriguing with the Dukala tribes, whose aid is indispensable in any attack upon Kaïd Aissa. Both Mulai Hafid and Kaïd Aissa have received affectionate letters from the Sultan, and the Kaïd has advised His Majesty to move out of Fez as soon as possible in order to prevent disturbances, and has been levying money to provide for the army.

Mulai Hafid is supposed to be in possession of some 5,000,000 dollars, and has informed the Rahamnas that when others give them silver he will give them gold.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[26934] No. 126.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 254.)

*Tangier, August 6, 1907.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of the 4th instant, I venture to submit certain considerations which have occurred to me in regard to the proposal to grant to Raisuli British protection in return for the delivery of Kaïd Maclean.

As against granting this request, there is in the first place a possibility that this proposal is not a firm offer, and may only be the outcome of Raisuli's desire to prove to the tribe that he can, if he so desires, get into direct communication with British or



Moorish authorities. This contingency we have from the first endeavoured to avoid. In order to render a move of this nature impossible, it would perhaps be advisable to give Raisuli a verbal assurance to the effect that he will be under the personal protection of the latter until the release has been effected, when he would be handed the full protection of His Majesty's Government. It might perhaps be suggested that the scene of the last meeting between Raisuli and the Kaïd previous to the latter's capture, viz., Ahl Serif, should be selected as the place where the exchange might take place. It is probable that Raisuli will accept the Kaïd's protection, but it is uncertain whether he would not be prevented by his fear of treachery on the part of the Moorish Government from proceeding further than Ahl Serif. There is, of course, a fear that Raisuli having seen that we are prepared to treat may gradually increase his demands; or that if free and a pardoned man he may make capital out of it, and revert to his former position of successful bandit, as the terror of his narrow escape gradually wears off. Against this, however, there is the opinion of practically all who know Raisuli, that if once relieved from the constant fear of punishment he might possibly be of considerable use to the Sultan and his Government in some district removed from all contact with foreigners.

Again, it may possibly be contended that the fact of granting protection to a brigand by a Power whose national has been carried off by him would be regarded as an immoral proceeding.

Protection is, however, so ingrained among the customs of this country that here it would have no bad effect, and, indeed, Raisuli is said, and I believe with some justice, to have enjoyed the favour of the German Legation for some time past.

If, of course, Raisuli is honest in his proposal, the release of the Kaïd would be immediately secured, and the Mehallas now pressing the Khamas tribe could be at once withdrawn. This would be a great economy for the Sultan, and the troops could be employed elsewhere, where they would be more useful. It must also not be lost sight of that the prestige gained by the Sultan's troops, to whose prowess the release of the Kaïd would, no doubt, be attributed by the tribes, would have an excellent effect in reasserting the authority of the Sultan and Makhzen.

Finally, the protection, if granted, would only be extended to Raisuli and his immediate family so long as he conducted himself well, and should he ever revert to his former misbehaviour, it could be at once withdrawn.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[26935] No. 127.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 255.)

*Tangier, August 6, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an unsigned communication which has been communicated to myself and my colleagues regarding the events which took place yesterday at Dar-al-Baida.

No communication has reached me from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, nor, as far as I can ascertain, have my colleagues received any direct information on the subject. The news was brought up by a French merchant-vessel, and is corroborated by some of the refugees who were on board. These latter state that some 150 Moors were killed.

At present the tendency seems to be to throw all the blame on the Makhzen.

The fact cannot be lost sight of that, when the news became generally known, there will be some danger to the unprotected foreign communities in other towns.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 127.

*Communication received by Sir G. Lowther.*

SUR l'avis favorable de Moulay Elamin et du Pasha de Casablanca et en raison de l'attitude hostile de la population et des Kabyles, une compagnie de débarquement du "Galilée" devait occuper le 5 Août le Consulat de France. A cet effet la porte de la Marine devait être ouverte pour lui donner passage à 5 heures et demie du matin.



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Lorsque les marins Français s'y présentèrent ils furent accueillis par des coups de feu ! Parmi les assaillants se trouvait un grand nombre de réguliers. Six hommes furent blessés, parmi lesquels l'officier commandant le détachement.

Le "Galilée" ouvrit immédiatement le feu. Il fut secondé par le "Du-Chavla," arrivé sur ces entrefaits, qui mit à terre à son tour une compagnie. L'ordre a été rétabli.

Aucun Européen a été atteint. Le tir des bâtiments a épargné les maisons Européennes.

Les Kabyles ont fait un grand nombre de tentatives pour pénétrer dans la ville ; ils en ont été empêchés.

La responsabilité des autorités locales est gravement compromise.

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[26861] No. 128.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 347.)

*Berlin, August 4, 1907.*

Sir,

THE disturbances which have recently taken place in Casablanca have been given great prominence in the columns of the German newspapers. The efforts of the press are chiefly directed to proving that German interference in Morocco has not encouraged the Moors to combat the restoration of order. A semi-official article in the "Kölnische Zeitung" explains that the desire which is expressed in the "Temps" for the immediate establishment of an efficient police at Dar-al-Baida is echoed in Germany. The "Frankfurter Zeitung," in a long article on the events at Dar-al-Baida, combats the theory put forward in the French press that Germany, in order to carry out the spirit of the Algeciras Agreement, should not content herself alone with refraining from placing difficulties in the way of France and Spain, but that she should cause the Sultan to be informed that the efforts of France and Spain to pacify Morocco are cordially supported by Germany. The "Frankfurter" declares that it is no doubt true that France should have moral and diplomatic support from the other Signatory Powers of the Algeciras Agreement, but it inquires whether such support has ever been withheld. A message from Germany to the Sultan at this juncture to the effect that she would not help him against the French would be totally useless. The Sultan and his advisers are not more foolish than other men, and by this time they must have grasped the fact that nothing tangible has followed the Tangier visit, and that they must deal with the French alone. If some fanatics do not yet understand this, they can very soon be taught that Frenchmen cannot be stoned to death with impunity. The articles are not very friendly to France, and the massacre of French citizens is treated with a levity which would certainly not have been the case had any of the victims been of German origin. It is interesting in this connection to compare the anger which the press expresses at the supposed insults offered by Tyrolese Irredentists to a party of German tourists who have just paid a visit to the German speaking parts of the Tyrol. The Austrian Government are abused for not having prevented this "outrage," and apologies and satisfaction are demanded. The murder of a number of Frenchmen in Morocco is looked upon as a mere outburst of fanaticism, for which the Makhzen can scarcely be blamed, and the French are told that it was more or less their own fault for not having established a proper police force at Dar-al-Baida, which, in the interests of all the European Powers, they should have done long ago.

Some papers compare the recent massacre with the murder of Dr. Mauchamp at Marrakesh. The "Vossische Zeitung" points out that the latter crime led to the French occupation of Ujda, and it expresses its fears that France will now proceed to the occupation of further Moorish territory, and that the other Powers, supporting themselves on the Algeciras Agreement, may not be so ready to assume an attitude of unconcern as they did in the case of the seizure of Ujda.

There has been no expression of opinion on the matter by the Government, except the statement in the "Kölnische Zeitung" that Germany desires to see proper police established at Dar-al-Baida, but in view of the recent occurrences, it is interesting to bear in mind Prince Bülow's statement to M. Huret, that the French could be quite sure that Germany will not place difficulties in their way in Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. C. LASCELLES.

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[26865] No. 129.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 353. Confidential.)

*Berlin, August 8, 1907.*

Sir,

M. JULES CAMBON, the French Ambassador, returned to Berlin yesterday morning, in order to communicate to the German Government the note which the French Government have addressed to the Signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras on recent events at Casablanca. M. Cambon informs me that his interview with Herr von Tschirschky was entirely satisfactory. His Excellency had even gone so far as to assure M. Cambon that the French Government could count upon the complete sympathy of the German Government in the action which they had been called upon to take at Casablanca.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

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[26917] No. 130.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 109.)

*Vienna, August 7, 1907.*

Sir,

THE recent events in Morocco have, as was to be expected, attracted a considerable amount of attention here. Articles in the press have been couched in friendly language towards France, whose right to protect her nationalists is freely admitted, and her sincerity in wishing to avoid any action which would lead to international complications has not been called into question. As an example of the tone adopted by the Vienna press on the subject, it will suffice to quote the following extracts from an article which appeared in the "Fremdenblatt" of the 6th instant :—

"It is natural and in conformity with the interests, not only of the French, but of other Europeans established in Morocco, that the French Government should have determined upon resolute action. Germany has promptly approved without any reserve the French proceedings, as well as the prudence displayed by the French Government on this occasion in order to avoid even the appearance of pursuing a course, under the pretence of taking military measures, contrary to existing arrangements. It is well worthy of remark that the French Cabinet has nowhere encountered the least shadow of suspicion in regard to its intentions. If one remembers how once, and not so long ago, the Moroccan question threatened to become the focus of international complications, one can now sincerely congratulate oneself on the change that has come about. Thanks to the adhesion and to the moral assistance which France has obtained without any difficulty in favour of her action in Morocco, Casa Blanca has become a proof of the improvement in the international situation, an improvement which is also shown by other symptoms. It is a long time since it was possible to remark such unanimity in any one case among the Powers. Europe shows herself on this occasion to be a collective entity, not only from a geographical, but also from a moral point of view."

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN.

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[26990] No. 131.

*Mr. des Graz to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 132.)

*Rome, August 8, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that it was not publicly known here till the evening of the 4th instant that three Italian subjects had been among the victims of the massacre at Casa Blanca.

The news was published in the press, and a semi-official communication appeared in the "Tribuna" on the following day to the effect that the Italian Minister at Tangier had received instructions to demand satisfaction in the usual form, the





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punishment of the guilty parties, and the payment of an indemnity on behalf of the families of the murdered men.

The Acting Under-Secretary of State at the Consulta confirmed this information when I had occasion to see him to-day, and said that the Moorish Government, even before receiving the demand for satisfaction, had sent a Representative to the Italian Legation to express their deep regret.

The French Chargé d'Affaires communicated officially to the Italian Government yesterday the measures which his Government are taking at Casa Blanca.

As the Italian training ship "Etna," which happened to be conveying the new Italian Minister to his post, has received orders to remain at Tangier for the present, but she will not proceed to Casa Blanca, nor is it the intention of the Italian Government to send any other ship to the latter place.

Beyond publishing the news received from Morocco, and the views of the foreign press, the Italian papers have so far made few comments on the situation. The "Giornale d'Italia," an opposition paper, and the organ of Baron Sonnino, has expressed the view that the disembarkation of the French troops does not call for any change in the attitude of Italy, whose duty it is, above all, to abide strictly by the Protocol of Algeciras.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. DES GRAZ.

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[27112] No. 132.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Sebastian, August 12, 1907.*

THE attitude of Spain with regard to Morocco now gives full satisfaction to the French Ambassador. The Spanish Government made a Circular communication on the 8th instant to the Powers, which proves that they now realize that, with Spain or without her, France is determined to take vigorous action, and that intervention has been rendered inevitable by the course of recent events on the coast of Morocco.

But the Government are anxious that the contingent of 400 Spanish troops, which was to embark yesterday at Ceuta and Cadiz, should be regarded as amounting in point of fact to nothing more than the detachment of police for Casa Blanca, which it devolves on Spain to enlist. Nothing more is needed for the present in the opinion of M. Révoil. Major Santa Olalla, Chief Spanish Police Officer for Morocco, will take command of the Spanish contingent. As he gets on well with the French, and can raise no claim to the chief command of the joint forces by reason of his low military rank, this appointment is quite satisfactory to the French Ambassador.

If necessity should arise for sending anywhere a more considerable force, there are, Señor Allendesalazar informs me, sufficient troops in the Spanish possessions on the Morocco coast, and also at Cadiz, to meet the emergency. In that case France and Spain have agreed that as far as possible each Power shall intervene either in co-operation with the other or single-handed, according as the district in which the disturbance occurs, is one in which the exercise of police control is to be carried out by the two countries jointly or singly by either of them. It is of course understood that the force of circumstances may modify these arrangements.

The Moorish Government will probably receive from the French and Spanish Legations at Tangier a communication in identic terms explaining the course taken, as happened when the joint naval demonstration at Tangier was made by France and Spain.

The necessity of the most friendly co-operation between the two countries has been fully recognized by the King of Spain in conversation with the French Ambassador at San Sebastian. At an audience with which the King honoured me yesterday, His Majesty held language to the same effect. He added, however, that the fear of being carried too far had made it necessary to proceed at first with caution.

In talking to Spanish statesmen, I have laid stress on the fact that, if England and consequently other Powers have abstained from interference, this is due to the assurance which the British Government feel that the special responsibilities of Spain and France on the Morocco coast will be acted up to by both those Powers.

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[27102] No. 133.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 12, 1907.*

INFORMATION from French source to the effect that at Dar-al-Baida greater determination is being shown in attacks by tribes.

Mazagan occupied by tribesmen, who, fearing bombardment, hold Europeans as hostages. Situation yesterday very serious.

Great uneasiness at Fez, but Laraiche is quiet, and situation is improved at Rabat.

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[26835] No. 134.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 12, 1907.*

SULTAN'S apprehension of general anti-Christian movement.

Your telegram No 85 of the 11th August.

You should tell Sultan, if you have not already replied, that the Powers are at one in approving the landing of foreign troops—a course which was necessitated by the outrages committed on Europeans.

His Majesty should do all in his power to pacify and restrain the tribes. Any movement, such as he mentions, will entail the gravest results for himself and his country.

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[26834] No. 135.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 12, 1907.*

NECESSITY for advance of money to Sultan.

Your telegram No. 84 of the 11th August.

You may act with your French colleague as suggested provided you feel sure that the Sultan will really expend the money, if supplied, in raising troops for pacification of the tribes and in buying them off.

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[27133] No. 136.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)*

(No. 256.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 7, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 255 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit copy of a communication that was sent last evening by the Spanish Legation to all the Heads of Missions here with regard to the occupation of Daralbaida.

No mention is made in this communication as to the hour at which the Spanish gun-boat arrived at Daralbaida, and, as you are aware, the bombardment took place at an early hour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 136.

*Note addressed to Heads of Missions in Tangier by Spanish Legation.*

*Tanger, le 6 Août, 1907.*

QUARANTE marins Espagnols de la canonnière "D. Alvaro de Bazan" ont débarqué hier midi à Casa Blanca et sont arrivés au Consulat d'Espagne pour l'occuper sans opposition de la part des indigènes.

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No. 137.

[27134]

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 257.) *Tangier, August* 7, 1907.

Sir,

I WAS advised last night by the French Legation that they regarded the situation at Alcazar as critical, and have therefore warned their Acting Consular Agent to retire with all French citizens. I have accordingly instructed the British Consular Agent to put himself in communication with the Moorish authorities, and should it be considered that it would be safer to leave to do so, and advise the British community to do the same. At the same time, I warned him to throw the responsibility for their protection on the Moorish authorities.

As it is also considered by the French Legation that the situation may become critical at Fez, and as a warning has been sent by them to their Consul in that city that he should be ready to leave in case of emergency, I issued a similar warning to Mr. Macleod, and I inclose herewith a copy of the despatch I addressed to him on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 137.

*Sir G. Lowther to Vice-Consul Macleod.*

*Tangier, August* 6, 1907.

Sir,

IN consequence of the anti-foreign feeling that may be caused in the Interior by the news of the events at Casa Blanca, the French Legation have, I understand, warned their citizens that should the necessity arise they should leave Fez.

On receipt of this despatch you will put yourself in communication with your French colleague and with the Moorish authorities, and should it be considered that it would be safer to leave you have authority to do so, and advise the British community to do so also, but you should throw the responsibility for your protection on the Moorish authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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No. 138.

[27124]

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 402.) *Paris, August* 12, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from the "Temps" of this evening, copies of a semi-official communiqué as to the intentions of the French Government with regard to the dispatch of troops to Casa Blanca, and with regard to the scope of their action there.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

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Inclosure in No. 138.

*Extract from the "Temps" of August* 13, 1907.

LE Gouvernement ne compte nullement envoyer des renforts au Maroc, où les effectifs actuellement sous le commandement du Général Drude sont considérés comme suffisants pour la tâche dont ils sont chargés et dont le programme ne sera pas étendu.

On sait que le programme comporte uniquement le rétablissement de l'ordre et l'organisation de la police.

Si des transports ont été envoyés de Toulon à Oran, c'est par pure mesure de précaution et pour parer à toute éventualité s'il apparaissait des nécessités qui, fort heureusement, sont improbables.

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No. 139.

[26933]

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1907.

SIR H. MACLEAN. My telegram No. 49 of the 5th August.

I replied to French Minister, who asked yesterday what kind of protection it was thought might be accorded to Raisuli, that either we or the French might ask the Sultan to promise that during behaviour Raisuli and his family should be undisturbed. The technical Moroccan sense of word "protection" was not intended.

I see from your despatch No. 252 of the 4th August that the protection asked for by Raisuli is the same as that enjoyed by the Shereefs of Wazzan. He ought to be content with the undertaking suggested above.

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No. 140.

[27243]

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 14.)

(No. 259.) *Tangier, August* 8, 1907.

Sir,

WE still remain here without any news of the bombardment of Dar-al-Baida beyond that which was dispatched by the Captain of the "Galilée" immediately after the event, and communicated to us either directly by the French Legation or through the press. It is somewhat significant that neither the British nor the German Consuls, who are both active officials, should have found an opportunity to dispatch a report, although it is of course possible that communication with the shore was hazardous.

It is not very easy to gauge the impression caused here. There have been endless rumours of threats by Moors of what would now occur, and how they would soon take their revenge, but the alarm has been almost entirely confined, as is not unusual, to the Israelite portion of the community.

Tangier has been left without any French or other man-of-war, with the exception of an Italian cruiser used as a training-ship, which is accidentally in the bay. It is somewhat fortunate that the neighbouring tribes for the moment have no special grievance, and still more fortunate that Raisuli, being otherwise occupied, has not been able to present himself as the saviour of the Moors from foreign aggression, and no other spirited leader is forthcoming. The Governor, driven by the very serious language of the French Chargé d'Affaires, has been very active in closing the mouths of those who boldly uttered anti-French or anti-foreign sentiments, and in hurling them into prison. Some are reported to have used very violent language and preached a holy war. But the general sentiment is, I think, divided between indifference to the fate of the Mahommedan population of Dar-al-Baida, with whom those here have no concern, and a contempt for the Government under which they live. Some are shocked at the vigorous attack upon a defenceless town, and others are painfully surprised that a body of some seventy-five sailors could have occupied the town practically without resistance. The general hatred for the French, which never can have been said to be dormant, has declared itself with some freedom.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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No. 141.

[27244]

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 14.)

(No. 260.) *Tangier, August* 8, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch immediately preceding, I have the honour to report that a merchant-vessel has just arrived bringing news from Daralbaida, but no despatch for me or, as far as I can ascertain, any Legation except the French. The French Legation have received information by this vessel to the effect that the foreign communities with the Consular officers have taken refuge in the British and French Consulates, which are guarded by French and Spanish sailors. The French Consulate has been besieged since the 5th instant, and on the night of that day a vigorous attack was made, but was repulsed with the loss of one French soldier killed and three wounded.





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The French and Spanish war-ships then recommenced the bombardment of that portion of the town which was sheltering the attack, and demolished several buildings including a mosque. The tribes were prevented from entering the town by the fire from the war-ships.

It appears that the bank and all European shops have been pillaged, while passengers on the merchant-vessel which brought the news state that many Jews have been killed. From the same source I learn that the French squadron arrived yesterday morning and at once landed 2,000 men. The Governor is stated to have resigned and to have handed over the administration of the town to Cid Allal-ben-Abu, who was despatched by the Moorish Government at the commencement of the disturbances.

It is reported that Mazagan was being bombarded yesterday, the "Du Chayla" having left for that port yesterday morning.

The situation at Rabat is also critical, but steam-ship "Ouad Sebou" is lying off the port in order to embark Europeans if necessary. I am informed by the French Legation that they understand the "Forbin" has been dispatched there.

In regard to the pillaging of the bank, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a communiqué which has been issued by the doyen of the Corps Diplomatique. It will be observed that a considerable sum of money has been stolen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 141.

*Communiqué issued by Doyen of Diplomatic Body.*

*Casablanca, le 7 Août*, 1907, 6 *heures du matin.*

Cher M. Gauran,

NOUS patientons en attendant la fin du siège ; le bombardement continue. La banque a été pillée, le coffre-fort Robic enfoncé, les boîtes portefeuilles éventrées ; une partie des traites a été retrouvée contenant 48,000 pesetas hassani et les caisses flottantes 99,000 fr., d'où une perte de 60,000 pesetas. Je ne sais si cette nuit on a enfoncé le coffre Fichat, car le Commandant de la place n'a pas fourni une garde, les troupes étant insuffisantes. J'ai les indications ci-dessus, car j'ai demandé à me faire accompagner par une patrouille dans la journée d'hier, ce qui m'a permis de voir que tout a été saccagé, y compris mon mobilier. Triste moment. Le personnel est sain et sauf.

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[27745] No. 142.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 261.) *Tangier, August* 8, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, reporting a conversation with Sid Ben Sliman on the subject of the liberation of Kaïd Maclean.

It will be observed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared to realize the danger of pressing Raisuli too hard pending the negotiations at present being carried on between the Commander of the Government troops and the Khamas tribe, and seemed hopeful of the result of these negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 142.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 68.) *Fez, August* 4, 1907.

Sir,

YOUR Excellency's note of the 28th July to the Vizier of Foreign Affairs was delivered to him yesterday morning.

This forenoon I had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatches No. 34 of the 30th July and No. 35 of the 31st July.

I have just had an interview with the Vizier for Foreign Affairs. I said His Majesty's Government and your Excellency were most anxious that the liberation of



Kaïd Maclean be effected at the earliest moment. The Makhzen, having occupied Chechouen, and punished the northern end of Khamas severely, were now in an excellent position to negotiate. The punishment inflicted and the approach of Sid Al Amrani's expedition could not but impress the Khamas considerably. It would be wise, therefore, to elicit an offer from them to liberate Kaïd Maclean, and such an offer should be closed with at once. The Makhzen could now, with no loss of dignity, accept any reasonable offer. On the other hand, it was to be feared that, if pushed too hard just now, Raisuli and his Khamas supporters might either become desperate and frantic and kill Kaïd Maclean, or, driven to bay, turn and inflict a severe defeat on the Makhzen's forces. It was one thing to lay waste outlying villages in the thickly populated north end of Khamas, where the country was comparatively easy and the troops near their base, with Chechouen to fall back upon. It might prove quite another affair to attack or be attacked by a few hundred desperadoes on their mountains. The consequences of such a defeat would be of incalculable injury to the captive, to the troops, to the public security of Tangier district, and, above all, to the Sultan's position generally.

Sid Ben Sliman said he entirely concurred with all this, and I could assure your Excellency that Kaïd Ben Bagdadi had been given the most explicit orders to procure the release of Kaïd Maclean. This was his first duty, and nothing was to be done or thought of until this was effected. Kaïd Ben Bagdadi had further been informed of the Sultan's wishes to the above sense, and Sid Ben Sliman felt sure Kaïd Ben Bagdadi realized how much he would please the Sultan by accomplishing His Majesty's wishes skilfully and promptly.

Sid Ben Sliman spoke very cordially and hopefully, and asked me, when giving your Excellency his greetings, to point out that the Sultan's position had now been vindicated, that your Excellency's views and objects and the Makhzen's were the same, and he trusted would now soon be all fulfilled to mutual satisfaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[27245] No. 143.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 14.)

(No. 262.) *Tangier, August* 8, 1907.

Sir,

NEWS of the murder of the French, Spanish, and Italian workmen at Dar-al-Baida reached Fez on the 4th instant, but was then only known to the official and merchant classes.

The Sultan on the 5th sent me a message to the following effect through Dr. Verdon, his English physician :—

"His Majesty is very grieved at the bad news from Dar-al-Baida ; he wishes you to know that he has been informed that the murder of the French and Spanish was due to the people resenting the presence of the French Agent in the customs-house ; that His Majesty had told the French Consul that he desired to defer the placing of the Customs under Europeans until the French left Oujda, and the police for the ports had been organized ; that His Majesty had reluctantly consented when the French Consul assured him that the Customs were always full of Christians and Jews, and that the people would not notice the change in the administration ; that His Majesty is convinced that if a force is landed, there will be further grave troubles in the south. He considers it would be wiser to send men-of-war to Dar-al-Baida to guard the town until he comes south."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. LOWTHER.

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[27215] No. 144.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 403.) *Paris, August 13, 1907.*

Sir,

MR. LISTER had some conversation to-day with the Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of Moroccan affairs.

M. Louis confirmed the statements made in Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 39 (repeated to me in your despatch No. 446 of the 12th instant). He attributes the present satisfactory attitude of the Spanish Government to the personal influence of the King. France, he said, was just as much convinced as Spain of the necessity for prudence, and would limit her action in Morocco to the strict necessary, but she was determined that whatever had to be done should be done thoroughly. He also fully indorsed the view that the command of the Spanish contingent should remain with the Chief Officer of the Spanish police in Morocco.

With regard to the situation at Casa Blanca, M. Louis takes rather a less pessimistic view. He told Mr. Lister that M. Regnault inclined to the opinion that active hostilities had so far been confined to the powerful tribe which surrounds Casa Blanca on the land side, and to the coast tribes between Casa Blanca and Mazagan. When these had been crushed he believed that the attacks would cease, but to do this it was possible that some offensive action might have to be taken by France and Spain. The situation at Fez no doubt gave cause for anxiety, but he trusted that the personal authority of the Sultan would be sufficient to maintain order. M. Regnault shares the view of the French Chargé d'Affaires that a sum of money should be placed at the Sultan's disposal to enable him to levy troops. His prestige is no doubt still very considerable, and a demonstration on his part might have a salutary effect. Of course assurances would have to be obtained that the money would be devoted to the purpose for which it was given.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

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[27309] No. 145.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 14, 1907.*

THERE is no change in situation at Dar-al-Baida, but the tribes are gathering together in force from considerable distances. Thanks to the presence of several war-ships, there has been some improvement in the situation at Mazagan. Rabat is quiet, but rather a disquieting feature is that there is no news from Fez.

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[26933] No. 146.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 14, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

My telegram No. 66 of the 13th August.

If it appears that the promise of protection to Raisuli during good conduct, as contemplated in your despatch No. 252 of the 14th August, is the point necessary to secure Kaïd Maclean's release, you should explain to your French colleague that, if France will not give it, we must do so, in order to release Maclean.

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[27331] No. 147.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 263.) *Tangier, August 8, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I received at 3 A.M. this morning from the British Vice-Consul at Rabat, informing me of the critical situation at that port. I immediately communicated its substance to the French Legation, and I am informed by the Chargé d'Affaires that the French war-ship "Galilée" is lying off the port, it being impossible to cross the bar. According to instructions from Admiral Philibert, the French Consul has been requested to inform the Governor of Rabat that if any attempt is made on the lives of Europeans in that place the sacred town of Sallee—situated across the river opposite Rabat—will be at once destroyed by the "Galilée."

I may add that, according to wireless message from the "Galilée" of the 8th instant, forwarded from Dar-al-Baida, the situation at Rabat is now more quiet.

The French Legation state that the war-ship "Du Chayla" and the packet-boat "Oued Sebou" are lying off Mazagan, and Admiral Philibert has requested the Consuls to embark with their colonies in case of necessity, as he is unable for the present to dispatch troops from Dar-al-Baida. The Governor will be held responsible with his life for the security of Europeans.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 147.

*Vice-Consul Neroutsos to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 4.) *Rabat, August 7, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's circular, dated the 2nd instant, with reference to the present situation.

The attitude of the Zair and other tribesmen being of a threatening character towards the town, I had for some days been in touch with the leading Moors of the town in case of need.

A Committee of Moors has been formed. They have decided that a body of 450 men be organized for the defence of the more remote and weak places of the town. The Fez Amin, Ibn-el-Kevian, tried from the first to defeat these measures by refusing either to supply the necessary funds or equipment from the Government stores. This official had actually to be threatened, and gave in. Still these arrangements almost fell through yesterday owing to a kind of panic among the populace. A large crowd proceeded to the Governor's house clamouring for rifles and ammunition to be distributed indiscriminately, and abusing the Committee, who became afraid. I at once called on the Governor, and pointed out the necessity for firmness on his part, and he at once imprisoned the ringleaders. Matters are again progressing nicely. These guards, however, would be inadequate to defend the town in the event of the tribesmen carrying out their threats.

The French controller has quitted the custom-house, but although his presence there was the avowed grievance of the tribesmen, should the rumours that Dar-al-Baida is in active conflict with the tribes be true there would be much to fear. The posts due yesterday and to-day from Dar-al-Baida have not arrived. Your Excellency will therefore be better informed that I am on this point.

The Krupp fort here is a source of great danger. It is stocked with an enormous quantity of gunpowder and cartridges of different sorts, and holds a large reservoir of fresh water. Should the Arabs invest this fort we would be lost.

M. Leriche wrote some days ago for a war-ship, but none seems to be forthcoming. Should your Excellency have had news from Dar-al-Baida I think that a British war-ship would give a great amount of confidence here. Several Moorish Notables have pleaded for a British war-ship's presence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEROUTSOS.

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## No. 148.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 264.) *Tangier, August* 9, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit copies of despatches which I have this morning received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting the bombardment and occupation of that town.

You will observe that, in his despatch No. 159 of the 2nd instant, Mr. Madden says that in the *procès-verbal* of the meeting of the Consular Body on the 1st instant, it was stated that the mission of the "Galilée" was to protect French life and property, and no mention was made of the protection of other Europeans.

In his despatch No. 163, Mr. Madden records some reasons which may have originally brought about the disturbance.

Mr. Madden is of opinion that the French began the attack with absurdly inadequate forces.

Even the Moorish sea battery fired shots on the cruiser, and in general the Government troops seem to have presented a great element of danger.

Much looting appears to have been done by the low-class Spaniards and Jews.

In his despatch No. 170, Mr. Madden expresses the opinion that all the destruction would have been avoided had the French waited a few days until they had a sufficient force at hand to take the town easily, but he bestows great praise on the pluck and work of the French in holding out against enormous odds.

My French colleague at this moment tells me that the tribes are preparing to attack the town in larger numbers, but that the troops that have been landed are sufficient to repulse the expected attack.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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### Inclosure 1 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 159.) *Dar-al-Baida, August* 2, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 157 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of the *procès-verbal* of the Consular meeting.

As regards the French demands made on the Kaïd, I beg to report to you that the Kaïd carried out the clearing of the streets by a trick. He sent round criers crying that every one who had a gun, or a horse, or a stick was to go out at once to meet him at the Mersat L'Hudi, or the Jews' port, a place on the beach. All the Arabs, thinking the Kaïd intended to use them to stop the French landing, flocked out at once. But, finding themselves duped, in the evening the town was very full again of Arabs, and the French demanded that they should be ejected by 9 P.M. last evening. The Kaïd took the order, but did not disclose it, and it was then too late to get rid of the Arabs, so that the townspeople were most seriously alarmed for some French action. The townspeople, however, thoroughly disturbed at last, were up most of the night patrolling the streets, and they got the Arabs out this morning.

The Arabs attempted to enter the town by force this morning, and one of them shot a soldier. He was riddled with bullets, and it is said five Arabs were killed. Bullets whistled over the town, but the Arabs were effectually stopped.

During the day the Kabyles have been observed in troops at various points. Their attitude is the only point left for anxiety, as the people in town are cowed. It is said that the Kabylesant pardon, and some say that fighting among themselves is imminent, as they are disputing as to which tribe is to blame for the French massacre. If they fight among themselves there is then no danger for the town.

The feeling against the French is still strong, as the French Acting-Consul, after leaving me here this morning, was insulted near the gate of the British Consulate. He tells me that he received a message from the Kaïd this afternoon to the effect that if cannons of the war-ship were put down into boats the Kabyles would fire on the boats. This message was sent on to the Commander of the "Galilée," who replied that the Kaïd could be informed that if the Kabyles did fire on the French war-ship's boats he would at once bombard them.



It is rumoured this evening that the Kabyles intend to come here to-morrow morning, but I cannot confirm this information. They are said to have it at the French Consulate.

Mulai-el-Amin has placed two Maxims on the walls to command the large British stores outside the walls, where there are thousands of pounds worth of merchandize belonging to British firms. Mulai-el-Amin did so at my request, but I am only doubtful if they know how to use them.

The Spanish cemetery was interfered with this afternoon by Arabs, but a British subject with some soldiers went out and caught three Arabs in the act of injuring graves, and they were seized and handed over to the Dar Makhsen, where they were flogged.

The French dead have been buried in the garden of the French Consulate, and the Spanish in the garden of the Spanish Consulate.

The town is very calm, the guards are posted everywhere. In company with Mr. Broome, Clerk of the Consulate, I went round the streets and market this evening, and there is perfect order on all sides.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—May I draw your Excellency's kind attention to that part of the inclosed *procès-verbal* wherein it is stated that the mission of the "Galilée" is to protect French life and property. No mention is made as to the protection of other Europeans; and the French Acting-Consul read to me his instructions, which were to the same effect.

As I pointed out to him, nearly 200 French subjects are safe on board the British steam-ship "Demetian," while about 800 other Europeans are ashore.

A. M. M.

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### Inclosure 2 in No. 148.

*Procès-verbal.*

M. NEUVILLE, Attaché à la Légation de France à Tanger, Gérant du Consulat de France à Casablanca, après s'être concerté avec le Commandant du croiseur "Galilée," arrivé en rade à 8 heures et demie du matin, sur les mesures à prendre pour sauvegarder la vie et les intérêts des ressortissants Français, a convoqué les trois Consuls de carrière (M. le Consul d'Angleterre, M. le Consul Gérant du Consulat d'Allemagne, et M. le Gérant du Consulat d'Espagne), et a décidé avec eux de réunir d'urgence le Corps Consulaire.

Celui-ci réuni au complet au Consulat de France, M. Neuville a déclaré avoir décidé avec le Commandant du "Galilée" de faire occuper par les marins Français le Consulat de France, ainsi que deux autres Consulats où pourrait être réunie la colonie Européenne. Tous les Consuls, à l'unanimité, ont déclaré que si des troupes Françaises débarquaient en ce moment en un nombre insuffisant pour occuper la ville, ce serait un massacre général des Européens.

Étant donné ces raisons, qui semblent justifiés, le "Galilée," ne pouvant disposer que d'un petit nombre d'hommes de débarquement, et vu que le Caïd a déclaré qu'il ne répondrait pas des suites de ce débarquement, M. Neuville a déclaré suspendue provisoirement cette mesure.

Mais il a exigé :

1. Que le Caïd ferait débarrasser la voie ferrée avant 3 heures de l'après-midi.

2. Que le parcours du Consulat de France au quai serait débarrassé des gens armés des tribus qui l'occupent et qui depuis deux jours interdisent l'accès de la mer. Les autres Consuls ont alors demandé d'exiger du Caïd que la route de leurs Consulats à la marine soit également dégagée, le tout avant 3 heures.

M. Neuville a déclaré en outre que, restant au Consulat avec le Dr. Merle et quelques Français pour garder les corps des victimes, il se voyait obligé de faire savoir au Corps Consulaire et au Caïd qu'à la moindre alerte mettant en danger réel sa vie et celle de ses concitoyens, le "Galilée," sur un signal du Consulat, prendrait les mesures nécessaires pour isoler avec les canons du bord, le Consulat de France et lui envoyer des secours.

M. Neuville a déclaré en outre au Corps Consulaire qu'avant cette action possible il avertirait les autres Consulats sans réunir les Consuls de nouveau ; c'est pourquoi il

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se voyait obligé de prier les autres Consuls de prendre dès à présent leurs dispositions en vue de cette éventualité.

Tout ce qui précède a été notifié au Caïd en présence du Corps Consulaire. Le Caïd a déclaré accepter ces trois conditions.

Le Gérant du Consulat de France,
(Signé) NEUVILLE.
A. M. MADDEN, *le Consul de Sa Majesté Britannique.*

(Ici suivent les signatures de tous les autres membres du Corps Consulaire.)

*Casablanca, le 1er Août*, 1907, *à 2 heures du soir.*

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Inclosure 3 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 162.) *Dar-al-Baida, August* 3, 1907.

Sir,

THE Makhzen this morning, desirous of arresting the exodus of town Moors fleeing from the town from fright, sent round criers that the houses and property of Moors leaving the place, or who had left, would be seized by the Makhzen, as there was now no danger to fear.

Mulai-el-Amin has sent me a message that any request made to him by the British Consulate shall be immediately granted.

Mr. E. Fernau, a British subject, reported to me this morning that his residence in the country had been attacked by robbers in the night, and his guards had arrested nine men, but that as the supply of ammunition they had was running out assistance was necessary. I at once applied to Mulai-el-Amin, sending up to him Mr. Broome, Clerk to the Consulate, and soldiers went out and arrested the nine thieves, and handed them over to the Dar Makhzen.

I was told confidentially by a Frenchman this afternoon that a quick-firing gun, so concealed in cases that its identity could not be disclosed, was landed in the usual way this morning, and taken to the French Consulate.

I held a meeting of British subjects this day to consider what steps should be taken to provide a place of refuge for women and children in case the necessity arises. It was decided to make use of the British steam-ship "Demetian," a cargo-boat on which the French refugees are staying; and with this view I requested the master of that vessel to refuse asylum to any more persons other than British subjects.

I paid a visit this afternoon to the vessel "Demetian" and inspected the state of affairs on board, which, considering all the circumstances, seemed to me to have been most ably arranged for by the master, Mr. W. Jones. On account of the mixed nature of the 250 refugees on board, the master informed me that he patrolled the ship himself all night.

There are two other vessels full of refugees, but most of them are terrified Jews, Jewesses, and children. One of these vessels is due to leave for the southern ports to-night, so presumably these people will have to make the voyage with the vessel.

I have been informed confidentially by my German colleague that he has been secretly informed that the French subjects still on shore are to meet to-night at the French Consulate in view of an intended landing from the cruiser during the night.

Such a landing would be possible by the beach wall of the private residence of the French Vice-Consul.

My German colleague tells me in confidence that he is accordingly inviting the German colony to meet in a house previously decided on for them to meet at in case of emergency.

I have no news of such intended landing, but I have privately informed the principal British subjects, and they have agreed with me, that in view of the large number of British subjects there are, and the excitement that our meeting in one or two places in order to be together in case of need would be certain to cause,



that we should remain quietly in our respective houses and keep a strict watch on events.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I beg to inclose copy of my further letter to the master of British steamer "Demetian."

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 148.

*Acting Vice-Consul Broome to Captain Jones.*

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 3, 1907.

Dear Sir,

I AM directed by His Majesty's Consul to request you not to take any more foreign refugees on board your ship, as he may require all the available room left, should the occasion arise, for members of the British colony.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. BROOME.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 163.) *Dar-al-Baida, August* 4, 1907.

Sir,

HAVING received urgent news from Mr. Vice-Consul Spinney that the state of things at Mazagan was very unfavourable yesterday in the afternoon, I called on the French authorities, and they promised to send the "Forbin," expected from the Azores, to Mazagan, should the Commander have no special instructions.

News from Mr. Vice-Consul Neroutses, of Rabat, received this morning is very unfavourable also, as the Zair tribe have told the Governor that they will wait no longer for an answer as to the removal of the French control at the custom-house, but will loot the town. The principal Rabat Moors are forming a sort of Town Council, Mr. Neroutses says, to guide affairs, apart from the Governor.

Everything in town here and outside is under a complete calm at this moment. The Kabyles seem to have disappeared as if by magic, the reasons being unknown, but it may be owing to dissensions among them as to the blame for the French massacre. The tribes say that their delegates were only told to obtain a reply, nothing else.

I beg to mention here one or two points that may be of interest to record about the present affair, and as showing in part how it all may have come about.

The French Harbour Company, not knowing the country, are declared to have had no really good Moorish overseers over their native labourers, too many Frenchmen being employed as overseers, many of them not knowing Arabic. As the Moor is not an energetic workman, the French overseers used French expressions, such as "allez, allez," to goad on the Moor, and being in turn roundly sworn at by the natives, who well knew that the Frenchmen understood nothing. I am assured that this has been known to have been going on from the beginning of the work on the port.

Then, again, the Umana have under their control some funds of the saint house of Sidi Billiott, and the natives spread the report that the French Controller was drawing from the sacred moneys. Very likely the Umana did not trouble themselves to disabuse the native mind of the allegation.

One incident I should like to bring to your notice, and that is that the local authorities sent off a lighter of "moona" (provisions) to the "Galilée," the lighter carrying the Moorish flag at half-mast. Naturally the "moona" was refused.

The Manager of the State Bank, a Frenchman, notified me, as doyen, that the Bank had closed its doors owing to the crisis, and applied to me to accept a sealed packet as a deposit at the British Consulate purporting to contain the keys of the safes. This deposit I accepted on the usual conditions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.



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P.S.—The rumours of an intended landing in the night which got about last evening caused uneasiness in town. They were unfounded, and our colony took no notice of the report whatever.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 6 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 165. Confidential.) *Dar-al-Baida, August 4, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that news has been received this evening from Rabat by steamer to the effect that all is quiet at that place at present. The Arabs are watching Dar-al-Baida. Arrangements have been made to organize a force of 450 guards to defend the town in case of need.

With reference to my previous Report regarding a rumoured French landing last night from the cruiser "Galilée," I have been confidentially informed by my German colleague that he has learnt secretly from a good source that such was the original intention. A semaphore message was received at the French Consulate from the cruiser in the afternoon to the effect that a landing would take place at night, as the "Forbin" was coming. In consequence the remaining French subjects on shore were kept at the Consulate. At 10 P.M. a further message from the cruiser was received by the flash signalling apparatus installed on the tower of the Consulate to the effect that there would be no landing "until" the "Forbin" comes. The French subjects, who do not usually remain at the Consulate for the nights, were thereupon allowed to depart. There was some mistake in the message received in the afternoon, as it was thought that the "Forbin" was not far away.

The rumoured landing leaked out, and caused much uneasiness all over the town, and lights were kept all night in almost all the houses.

The intention to land is denied at the French Consulate, I am told, but the signals with the cruiser were kept up till well after midnight.

I have omitted to inform you that the Commander of the "Galilée" landed the day after the vessel arrived here, and received a visit from the Kaïd at the Consulate. The Kaïd presented his regrets for the French massacre. The visit was not returned.

The French Acting Consul told me he had expressed surprise that the Kaïd had never offered any words of regret for the occurrence, but the Kaïd assured him it was due to no intentional fault on his part, but that he had quite "lost his head."

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 7 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 166.) *Dar-al-Baida, August 5, 1907.*

Sir,

CASA BLANCA was bombarded by the French cruiser "Galilée" this morning from 5·45 A.M. till 7·3 A.M.

A landing party first landed, consisting of about five boats and a steam pinnace full of armed men.

At 1·30 A.M. I received a visit from the French Acting Consul requesting me to circulate among the Consular Body his Circular notifying the French occupation at 5·0 A.M., and that in the event of opposition the town would be bombarded, and requesting us to take our dispositions accordingly. A promise was made to ask the Shereef Mulai-el-Amin to first surrender.

I beg to transmit a copy of my Circular to the Consular Body inclosing the French Acting Consul's Circular.

Having received secret information of the intentions of the French at 9·30 P.M., I gave Mr. Broome, Clerk to the Consulate, the necessary instructions to collect the English families into several predecided places of safety. Mr. Broome carried out the removals in a most admirable and unostentatious way, without causing any general alarm.



Other British subjects I called to the Consulate, and one Spanish family, having prayed for sanctuary, I admitted them also.

At 6·30 A.M. Mulai-el-Amin sent to me to intercede for the town, and I replied that, on an assurance that he would surrender the town to the French, I would give him a letter to the French Consul.

At 6·35 I received this assurance, and gave the letter, copy of which I have the honour to inclose.

We tied a white handkerchief to the ramrod of the gun of one of the envoys, and, putting it into the gun, told him to approach the French Consulate, holding the gun in one hand, and in the other the letter, high up in the air.

The Arabs got in the town, which is reported looted. Firing on the Arabs is still continuing from the cruiser's cannons.

The casualties must be very considerable; at present no details are known.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—When the Arab horsemen came along looting we heard them say, "Stop! stop! that is the English house," and we were not interfered with in the least.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 8 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to the Consular Body, Casa Blanca.*

(Circular.) *Dar-al-Baida, August 5, 1907.*

MM. et chers Collègues,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you a Circular from the French Vice-Consul, notifying the occupation of Casa Blanca by the French at 5 A.M. this morning.

I send the circular at M. Maigret's request, from whom I have this moment received it.

I am to add that the hospitality of the French Consulate is offered to any one desirous of taking asylum there.

Please sign the two Circulars.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN, *Doyen.*

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Inclosure 9 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to M. Maigret.*

*Dar-al-Baida, August 5, 1907.*

M. et cher Collègue,

THE Shereef Mulai-el-Amin has sent to me praying me to intercede with you to stop the firing.

They say they will surrender the town to you. Will you receive the envoys?

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 10 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 167.) *Dar-al-Baida, August 6, 1907.*

Sir,

AFTER the bombardment of the town ceased yesterday we were in the hands of Arab looters for some five hours, until the Spanish sharpshooters from the roofs of the Spanish Consulate and of the Spanish doctor's house arrived at 10 minutes to 2 and made terrific havoc among the looters in the streets.

I had shots fired from this Consulate to frighten looters near by, but not to kill. In the afternoon, however, the Arabs were killing Jews behind my house, and I allowed them to be fired on, and applied for a French guard.

At about 5·30 P.M. the French officials requested me to abandon the Consulate, as



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the defence of the Europeans was to be undertaken near the sea round about the French Consulate; at the same time the officials offered me a guard of an officer and twelve men should I determine to remain here. I refused to leave, but sent every one else away, except Dr. Kerr, of Rabat, who elected to stay with me. I knew the Arabs do not like acting before rifles in the dark. Nothing happened.

The French officials said that as the French troops are at present too few to get the gates these are all open, and hundreds of Arabs are flocking in; they feared a general massacre of Europeans.

As this morning the state of affairs behind the British Consulate is rather bad, I burnt the three cyphers and the telegraph code as a measure of precaution.

Had I abandoned the Consulate last night it would have been looted from end to end, and personally with the French guard I felt no especial alarm myself.

The French began the attack with absurdly inadequate forces. We must only be thankful they did not undertake at the first when they wanted to do it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I have no news of other British subjects, but I have no reason to think they are in any more danger than any one else; at the present moment a terrible bombardment and fusillade is going on.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 11 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 168.) *Dar-al-Baida, August* 6, 1907.

Sir,

I LEARN that Mulai-el-Amin surrendered to the French, but on landing the gate was shut. The officer in command of some sixty men pushed it open, and received a bullet in his hand from the guards.

The French rushed to the Consulate, shooting every one visible to them, and entered the French Consulate with a cheer. The Moorish sea battery fired three shots on the cruiser, which destroyed the fort and knocked down the Moorish flag.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 12 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 169.) *Dar-al-Baida, August* 7, 1907.

Sir,

THE French detachment on the terrace of the British Consulate was attacked by firing from Arab houses at the back of the building at 4·30 this morning, and it is still going on now (7 o'clock).

Some fifty Arabs advanced at about 6 o'clock, and ten men advanced from the Consulate and drove them back in the street.

There are apparently thousands of Arabs at the back in the direction of the Morocco Gate, judging from the noise prevailing. The back of the Consulate house has been hit many times, one bullet coming through a shutter.

I shall leave if we are advised to do so, but at present there is no danger to us. I have two Englishmen with me.

The cruiser is apparently now bombarding the Arabs in town.

The cannonade and firing have been terrible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I have every reason to believe that all British subjects are safe, in spite of the very trying time we have all passed through, owing to the inadequacy of the French relieving forces for the task.

*Later.*—At 8·30 the Arabs entered a house overlooking the Consulate garden, and several sorties were made, which sufficed to keep them in check. The French then occupied the hotel which commanded the street giving access to this house, so that a



rather uncomfortable half-hour was ended. Several Arabs afraid to leave are in the house. At 9·40 a small cannon was sent and placed on the Consulate terrace. I much regret to state that Lieutenant J. de Bernard de Teyssier, of the "Du Chayla," in command of the French detachment at the Consulate, has been wounded on the terrace in the thigh, the bullet passing out of him in the front. Dr. Kerr at once attended to him, and he is doing well. Three other French soldiers were struck, but not injured, by Arab bullets.

Three large French cruisers have now (10·50) arrived, and I imagine all danger is practically over.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 13 in No. 148.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 170.) *Dar-al-Baida, August* 7, 1907.

Sir,

THE town is now occupied by the French in force.

Since the arrival of the larger French force in the cruisers looting has been going on worse than ever, especially by the low-class Spaniards and by the Jews released from their places of refuge.

The town is ruined. The streets exhibit a most fearful scene of dead Arabs in all states, dead horses, cows, donkeys, and the remains of every conceivable article; the effluvia is terrible. Every shop is looted, nearly all the residences are robbed; all the British residences outside the town are ransacked, so I am assured.

The whole affair seems a criminal one, for by waiting a few days sufficient forces would have been at hand to take the town easily and avoid all the terrific destruction.

In the Circular which the French Acting Consul asked me to communicate to my colleagues notifying the occupation it was distinctly stated that the town would be occupied by imposing forces, whereas till to-day only 200 French and about 40 Spanish sailors were available to withstand the great Arab attack. Had the French attempted to carry out their first design to occupy the town when the cruiser "Galilée" arrived, all the Europeans must inevitably have been massacred, as we could have only held out a little longer to-day before the reinforcements came.

With such a small force, however, nothing but praise can be bestowed on the pluck and work of the French in holding out against the enormous odds. As they could not reach the gates, the Arab arrivals were enormous, coming from every part of the country, as only Arabs can do, so extraordinarily fast.

I am glad to report to you that no British subjects have lost their lives, so far as I can ascertain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[27433] No. 149.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 88.) *Tangier, August* 15, 1907.
(Telegraphic.) P.

AT Mogador Governor is powerless to resist tribes, who are threatening the town.

Last Sunday all Europeans were to leave Morocco City for the coast.

At every port now there are one or more French war-ships.

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[27443] No. 150.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 89.) *Tangier, August* 15, 1907.
(Telegraphic.) P.

I HAVE just been informed by Minister of War that he has received disquieting news from Fez, where the Ulema were showing an inclination to stir up the people, having taken the news from Dar-al-Baida very badly.

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[26811] No. 151.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 116.) *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1907.

Sir,

THE Spanish Minister called at this Office on the 9th instant, and handed to Sir C. Hardinge the Memorandum, of which a translation is inclosed, explanatory of the proposals of the French and Spanish Governments for the maintenance of order in Morocco.

Sir C. Hardinge took the opportunity of impressing upon the Marquis de Villalobar the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to harmonious co-operation between France and Spain, which appears to them to offer the only means of confining the necessary operations within proper limits and of preventing international complications.

Sir C. Hardinge observed that, in spite of the requests received from His Majesty's Consul, His Majesty's Government had refrained from sending a war-ship to Casa Blanca, in order to avoid the dispatch of other foreign vessels of war, and that they trusted to the French and Spanish military and naval authorities to take the proper measures for safeguarding the lives and property of British subjects in the seaport towns of Morocco.

The Marquis de Villalobar admitted that his Government had been slow to act, and said that he would telegraph to them in the sense of Sir C. Hardinge's remarks.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

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Inclosure in No. 151.

*Memorandum.*

(Translation.)

THE recent crimes committed at Casa Blanca, having demonstrated the impotence of the Moorish Government to make itself obeyed by its subjects and to protect foreigners, render it more urgent than ever to organize the police in the ports of the Empire. It is a matter which concerns the maintenance and the prestige of the Sultan's high authority. With this object, the Government of His Most Catholic Majesty have concerted measures with the Government of the French Republic respecting the organization of a police charged with the protection of the town and environs of Casa Blanca, and by means thereof and of the measures which will have to be adopted as far as scrupulous respect for the integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan permit, for the assurance of order and liberty of mercantile transactions in those regions. These would be guaranteed, and those responsible for the events above mentioned would not remain unpunished.

In order to carry out the principle which has been adopted, and to pursue the course which they have set before themselves, the Government of His Most Catholic Majesty desire that the Powers should have cognizance of the foregoing.

*Spanish Embassy, London, August* 8, 1907.

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[26603] No. 152.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 449.) *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1907.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency a copy of a despatch addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid,* recording a conversation which Sir Charles Hardinge had on the 9th instant with the Spanish Minister on the subject of the action which is being taken by the French and Spanish Governments in consequence of the prevailing disturbances in Morocco.

On the 10th instant the Marquis de Villalobar called again to see Sir C. Hardinge, and stated that he had received a telegram from his Government saying that there was now complete co-operation with the French Government in Moroccan affairs within

* No. 151.



the limits of the Algeciras Act. M. de Villalobar explained that the Spanish Government were very anxious to do nothing which could expose them to attack from other Powers for taking action outside the Algeciras Act, and that they feared a forward policy on the part of France. He asked whether His Majesty's Government could not draw the attention of the French Government to the necessity for prudence.

It appears to me possible that, in speaking thus, M. de Villalobar had in view the intention of the French Government to organize a temporary police force for service in Morocco, composed of Frenchmen and Spaniards, to which reference is made in your Excellency's despatch No. 394 of the 8th instant. Such a step seems to me to offer at the present moment the only means of providing for the safety of the Europeans at the open ports when the time comes for the withdrawal of the military and naval forces, but it would presumably be adopted as a temporary measure pending the formation of the police force contemplated by the Algeciras Act.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

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[27550] No. 153.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 16.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 16, 1907.

MY French colleague suggests that the payment of troops, referred to in your telegram No. 64 of the 12th instant, should be made through the French officers of the military mission. He is of opinion that representations should be made in Paris to the State Bank as they would be useless at Tangier.

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[27443] No. 154.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 16, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 89 of the 15th August: Situation at Fez.

You can, if you think it desirable, inform Sultan that news received from Fez is not reassuring, and again warn him that it is in his own interest, as well as that of foreign residents, to prevent the religious fanaticism of the natives from being worked upon.

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[27550] No. 155.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 17, 1907.

Sir G. LOWTHER'S telegrams Nos. 84 and 90 of the 11th and 16th instant.

We agree to immediate advance of money to Sultan, and to this being paid through French officers of military mission.

You can inform French Government of our assent, and arrange with them as to the form the representation should take.

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[27779] No. 156.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 19.)

(No. 119.)

Sir,

*San Ildefonso, August* 8, 1907.

IN the recurring periods of crisis which supervene in Morocco, you are aware that I endeavour always to impress the Spanish Government with a due sense of their responsibilities, arising out of the Agreements by which they are bound to France and England, as well as out of their geographical position and past history.

The present Spanish Government are well aware of the direction which you would desire that their policy should take, and I regret to notice that the recent outrages



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at Casa Blanca have created a situation in which, at least at first, they did not appear willing to co-operate whole-heartedly with France.

The Spanish Minister of Finance, Señor de Osma, having been commissioned by Señor Maura, President of the Council, to explain fully to me the manner in which the Spanish Government regard the present position, I went to Madrid yesterday to see his Excellency.

Señor de Osma showed me the telegrams received at the Ministry of State from Tangier, the instructions given to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, and a telegram just received from the latter, giving the text of the communication which France was about to make to the Powers, explaining the action taken at Casa Blanca. Señor de Osma also gave me an account of the views expressed by the Spanish Ministers at a Cabinet Council which preceded the instructions to the Marquis del Muni.

Those instructions were to the following effect: Spain adheres unreservedly to the General Act of Algeciras, and desires to accelerate as much as possible the date when the new Morocco police force, now in process of organization, will enter fully upon its duties. Meanwhile, the protection which the police is not yet able to afford must, of course, not be withheld from Spaniards as well as Frenchmen who are exposed to outrage at the hands of the Moors. With the object of affording such protection, the gun-boat "Alvarez de Bazan" has been ordered from the Canary Islands to Casa Blanca, and more men and ships can be sent if necessary. But it would be quite another matter to go beyond the mere protection of life and property, and to employ a Spanish force for the purpose of punishing atrocities already committed, and of carrying out measures which are not contemplated by the Algeciras Agreement. Such more extensive measures would require the previous consent of all the Powers that signed the General Act, and, even assuming that they all consented, it behoves Spain and France to weigh very carefully in friendly conference the four following points:—

1. Any derogation from the plain terms of the General Act of Algeciras would weaken the position of the two Powers for dealing with the Sultan and his turbulent subjects.

2. There would be danger in any action tending to lower the Sultan's authority and to increase the hostility of the tribes.

3. France and Spain must be careful how they undertake the burdensome task of making themselves responsible for public security in Morocco, thus substituting their authority for that of the Sultan.

4. An indefinite occupation of Casa Blanca may have results far exceeding what was intended.

Considerations like these, the instruction to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris goes on to say, have operated to hold back the hand of Spain from striking a blow in the neighbourhood of Melilla, where action analogous to that which France has taken on the right bank of the Maluya is urgently called for, if the special and undisputed rights of Spain in that region are to be adequately asserted.

The Marquis del Muni is directed to add that Spain is fully resolved to maintain a uniform line of action with France, that she desires nothing more than to discuss freely with her the situation arising out of the events of Casa Blanca; but that she hopes means may be found to restrict operations at Casa Blanca within the limits laid down in the existing Agreements.

Señor de Osma told me that, in the opinion of himself and colleagues, the French were disposed to go much further than was necessary; that they thought only of themselves; that the French Ministers had simply met in Council and laid down a far-reaching course of action without making any attempt to enter into previous consultation with Spain; that this might suit France with her vast resources, but that Spain was in no mood for a fire-eating policy, and must bear in mind that ten years hence she will be in a far better position, with a reconstructed army and navy, to assert her rights in Morocco than she now is. Spain wishes to proceed slowly and surely, and is to take no step which is not covered by the letter, or at least the plain spirit, of the General Act of Algeciras.

His Excellency also explained that to pursue an active policy at Casa Blanca, while tamely continuing to allow Melilla to be completely cut off from the interior by the contending forces of the Sultan and the Rogui, who had selected that district as their battle-field, would appear to public opinion as exposing the Government to the reproach of being more easily moved to take part in a showy demonstration than to attend to the obvious and pressing needs of a distressed Spanish possession.

The language of the Minister of Finance is only a repetition of that which is always



held by Spanish statesmen when they speak openly. Joint action with France is engaged in by this country with great reluctance. Especially is this the case with regard to joint action in Morocco, where the more numerous Spanish population is apprehensive of being gradually supplanted by the French. If the voice of the Spanish press were capable of exercising an influence, Spanish Governments would be compelled to abstain altogether from participation in naval and military operations on the Morocco coast. But the press exercise little authority, and Spanish Governments since the signature of the Algeciras Act have been compelled, though unwillingly, to follow the lead of France in these matters. In doing so, they never fail to repeat that they are guided much more by their determination to act as England would desire than by any natural inclination to tread in the footsteps of France.

That Señor Maura's Government will, in the end, adopt a similar course I hope events will show. Indeed, the reported landing of the Spanish detachment at Casa Blanca on the day of the bombardment would seem to have already committed Spain to parallel action with France, at least up to a certain point.

I thanked Señor de Osma for the freedom with which he had spoken to me, and I begged him to inform Señor Maura that, in my opinion, all considerations should yield to the necessity of its being clearly demonstrated to the world at large that Spain is capable of adjusting her Morocco policy to that of France, and that the two countries, even before the new police force is fully established, recognize that the duty of preserving order is primarily incumbent upon them. I said I was about to proceed to San Sebastian for a few days, in order to confer with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that my principal object would be to assist, if I could in any way do so, in removing any obstacle that might remain to a full understanding between Señor Allendesalazar and the French Ambassador.

Señor de Osma at once telegraphed to Señor Maura in this sense.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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[27223] No. 157.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 14.)

(No. 120.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, August* 10, 1907.

THE Spanish Government has published in the Ministerial organ "La Epoca" a definition of the manner in which it regards recent events in Morocco. It is to the following effect:—

"Persons versed in foreign affairs consider that the accounts which had been received of the action taken by the Franco-Spanish forces at Casa Blanca admit of the following statement of the facts being made:—

"1. The Moorish authorities assented to the landing of the Franco-Spanish detachments before the landing took place.

"2. The landing of these detachments, far from being a hostile act, was therefore not even unfriendly to the Empire of Morocco.

"3. The attack made by the Moors on the landing party as the latter was making its way, as agreed with the Moorish authorities, to the French Consulate, was absolutely and totally without justification, and could only be repelled and punished, as it was, by the use of force.

"4. The fact that, after such display of force by the troops and ships of France and Spain, the Moorish authorities apologized to the foreign Commanding Officer, and promised to punish the promoters of the assault, not only shows that the Franco-Spanish action was legitimate, but expiains its true significance as not involving the slightest hostility to the Empire.

"5. Consequently, not only does peace still prevail between France and Spain on the one hand, and Morocco on the other, but it behoves the French and Spanish Governments to continue in complete agreement with the Sultan, who is the first to deplore the outrages committed by certain tribes, to carry out the Resolutions adopted by the Algeciras Conference, and to complete, before all, the organisation of the police, the need of which is becoming more urgent every day."

This official statement shows the desire of the Spanish Government to make it appear that the understanding with France is complete, and that there was joint action



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at Casa Blanca between the French and Spanish forces, and that nothing has happened requiring a departure from the arrangements made at Algeciras or implying hostility to the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
(Signed) EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

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[27746] No. 158.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 265.) *Tangier, August* 9, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an identic communication which was to-day made to the foreign Representatives by the French and Spanish Legations in regard to the occupation in force of Dar-al-Baida.

This communication is noteworthy as being the first indication of any concerted action between the two Governments here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 158.

*Identic communication addressed to Foreign Representatives by French and Spanish Legations.*

LA Légation de France [*La Légation d'Espagne*] à Tangier a l'honneur de faire connaître à MM. les Représentants des Puissances que, conformément à l'entente intervenue entre les Cabinets de Madrid et de Paris, les forces Franco-Espagnoles ont débarqué à Casa Blanca pour rétablir l'ordre.

Au cours de cette opération, deux marins Français ont été tués et plusieurs blessés. Les marins Espagnols ont eu également un tué et plusieurs blessés.

On ne signale pas que personne des Européens ait eu à souffrir ; à l'heure actuelle, toutes les colonies étrangères sont en sécurité.

La police Franco-Espagnole doit y être organisée le plus tôt possible, conformément à l'Acte d'Algésiras.

D'après les dernières nouvelles reçues de Casa Blanca, le manque de vivres commençait à se faire sentir. La Légation de France [*d'Espagne*] s'empresse de signaler cette situation aux Légations intéressées, afin de les mettre à même de prendre en temps utile les dispositions nécessaires pour y remédier.

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[27747] No. 159.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 266.) *Tangier, August* 10, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 264 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida describing the terrible condition in which the town is, and reporting that it is still being attacked by the tribes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 159.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 171.) *Dar-al-Baida, August* 8, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of the Circular of the French Acting Consul notifying the French occupation with imposing forces. This Circular I referred



to previously, but had no copy to send you. I hope to obtain it in time for this mail.

I have heard it said that the French now excuse themselves for their action by saying that the men of the "Galilée" could not be held in, that is, restrained.

It is now known that all the small-arms ammunition was exhausted yesterday morning, so that had relief not arrived when it did, we should all have been massacred for certain, as thousands of Arab horsemen were rushing on the town, but were stopped by the cruiser's big guns.

I must place before your Excellency the truly terrible situation in which British subjects find themselves. They have lost everything: nearly all their houses are looted, though not quite all, especially those outside the town, which are emptied of everything, and many have not even a change of clothes. Provisions are very scarce, too.

It is a most deplorable affair altogether, for which the French have the entire responsibility, as we warned them. There was no need for precipitate action, as the town was perfectly quiet. I can only suppose that the French Consular staff lost their nerves.

It is difficult to know what will become of the British colony under their almost complete ruin.

I believe the French are clearing the streets of the dead bodies, which are a serious menace to the health of the place.

A more desolate, disgusting, and dreadful scene than the streets of this but lately flourishing town can only be conceived by seeing it with one's own eyes; there is utter destruction and ruin on all sides and everywhere.

A French Circular has just gone round that at 3 P.M. to-day all private guards will be withdrawn, and order will be maintained by French troops in the streets. Pillaging and looting are, it is promised, to be rigorously put down.

The French Consul now tells me that he cannot give me a copy of the Circular notifying the occupation by imposing forces now, as the tribes are attacking the town, and they are being bombarded.

The French troops have got very out of hand. One officer sent a guard with a British subject, but unarmed, saying that it is unsafe to let them go about with their arms as they would do damage. The patrol at this Consulate went out this morning and fired on the French party clearing up the bodies, and in the garden of this Consulate I heard the officer promising punishment for the affair.

It is reported that further troops will arrive this afternoon; in my opinion the place is not nearly assured yet from the Arab hordes advancing on it.

My German colleague tells me that Mazagan town is not threatened, although they are preaching the Holy War there, but asking the tribesmen to come to Casa Blanca and fight the Christians here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I venture respectfully to state that, in my opinion, a British vessel should be sent here to take those British families who desire it away to Tangier.

Spanish civilians have been finishing the pillage of the custom-house this morning.

The English church has been completely ruined.

Messrs. Lamb Brothers and Messrs. Murdoch, Butler, and Co.'s large stores outside have been pillaged; the latter store was largely destroyed by the shells.

A. M. M.

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[27748] No. 160.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 267.) *Tangier, August* 10, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day received from the British Vice-Consul at Rabat relative to the present situation in that port.

I learn from the French Legation that, according to a communication received to-day from Admiral Philibert, a considerable improvement has taken place in the situation at Rabat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 160.

*Vice-Consul Neroutsos to Sir G. Lowther.*

*Rabat, August* 8, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the French war-ship "Galilée" arrived this morning at this port. She is now at anchor. This ship has fired no salutes. The bar is too rough to-day to admit of communication by sea, but some signalling has passed between the Vice-Consul and the ship. The principal Moors of Rabat have called on the French Vice-Consul assuring him that all is safe here, at the same time entreating that no troops be landed from the ship, asserting that in such event the populace would be out of hand and disaster would certainly occur.

M. Leriche replied that he would transmit this suggestion to the Commander, but, he added, that should the Commander hold imperative instructions of other description he, the Vice-Consul, was himself powerless.

No news has reached here from Dar-al-Baida, except verbal reports, since a letter dated the 2nd instant.

Beyond possible complications between the war-ship and the populace all is calm.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE NEROUTSOS.

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[27749] No. 161.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 19.)

(No. 268.)

Sir,

*Tangier, August* 11, 1907.

IT is perhaps somewhat premature to attempt to establish with accuracy the reasons for the murders which led to the occupation and bombardment of Dar-al-Baida, but there is little doubt that a combination of circumstances led to the tragedy.

In the first instance, every Moor is convinced that the French desire to take his country, in spite of engagements, promises, Acts of Algeciras, and such like, of which they have small knowledge and in which they have no confidence. The quarry from which the stones were taken for the port works, in the opinion of the powerful tribe of Chaouia, which not only borders on Dar-al-Baida, but of which many have become townsmen, belonged to them, and they considered that their stones were being taken for a work which they looked upon with disfavour. There can be little doubt that repeated complaints were made to Mulai-el-Amin, in command of the troops in that neighbourhood, that the stones belonged to them, and they demanded either that terms be made with them or that the works cease. Mulai-el-Amin promised them no satisfaction.

On the other hand, the question of the French control of the customs, though no doubt a matter of indifference to the tribesmen, affected adversely the interests of the Moorish customs collector and the Moorish merchants, who with them enjoyed satisfactory opportunities for combining to defraud the Makhzen, and these no doubt contributed in a large measure in producing an anti-French feeling in the town and in the neighbourhood, though it is not to be supposed that they ever anticipated or intended that matters should go as far as they have done, for many of them must have been severe sufferers, but they imagined that by creating a certain movement they might obtain the removal of these customs controllers.

It is significant that postal couriers passing through the tribes in the neighbourhood of Dar-al-Baida, Rabat, and Mequinez, have latterly been frequently asked for whom they were working, and that British, German, and Spanish couriers were allowed to pass, while French were hurried back.

Naturally, once the disturbance began at Dar-al-Baida, all nationalities fell an equal prey to the desire of the natives for murder and loot.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[27750] No. 162.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 19.)

(No. 269.)

Sir,

*Tangier, August* 11, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch, which I have just received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, informing me as to the present state of the town.

It will be seen that quiet has been restored, there being very few Moors left in the town, but the French soldiery appear to be giving some trouble to Europeans.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 162.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 176.)

Sir,

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 10, 1907.

THE town is very quiet, few sounds being heard. There were shots last night, presumably against prowlers.

The Umana are at the Custom-house, but labourers at the waterport are few.

A crier went round this morning, asking for labourers at 4 fr. per day.

Scarcely any Moors are to be seen in the town, and I cannot say if there are many left to be seen.

I am told that cattle are being driven in. There is no buying or selling, as there are no shops left.

The French soldiery have been giving much trouble to Europeans; they looted three times a German store, smashing into it. Other German houses and some Germans have also been annoyed by these men.

Yesterday afternoon I went to visit the ruins of Mr. Bolton's, the missionary's, house outside the town, accompanied by my Moor. Four scoundrels of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, on seeing us, loaded their rifles and pointed them at us, shouting us to clear out. I turned round quietly and got away in safety, but was apprehensive of being ruthlessly killed. I fortunately found an officer, and we returned and I gave them all in charge, and I complained to the French Consulate. This morning an officer came to hear my statement, and that of my Moor, regarding this incident, and promised punishment to the men, saying he did not wish the French soldiers to be considered blackguards.

The wreck of the fine British residences and of the English church show the savagery with which the Arabs looted them. A poor Moorish lad I saw lying at the gate of the wrecked Spanish cemetery, suffering from a half blown off thigh. I at once wrote to the French Consul, advising him of the case, and asking him to send help. I hope he has done so.

Miss Spinney, an English trained nurse, who was here, has been taken on for hospital duty at the French Consulate.

The English residents are sending their wives and children away as soon as possible. The place is not fit for them to remain in.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[27751] No. 163.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 19.)

(No. 270.)

Sir,

*Tangier, August* 11, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 252 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that the improvement brought about by the vigorous measures taken against the Khamas has been maintained, and from information received from other sources, it would appear that that tribe is anxious to come to terms on the basis of delivering over Kaïd Maclean, although the latter is not yet out of the hands of Raisuli. At the

same time, Raisuli is not in the position he was at the earlier stages of this question, all my information pointing to the conclusion that he is being watched by the Khamas, who are reported to have given him plainly to understand that he must make what terms he can, as they wish to have the Mehallas withdraw and to make peace with the Government.

During the past week, Kaïd Maclean has been removed into the centre of the Khamas tribe to a place named Ait Bokham, some 8 miles or so from Chechowan, where a large meeting of the tribes took place and the reported decision was come to.

Orders have been sent to Oold Bushta-el-Baghdadi to suspend all hostilities and negotiations as the Khamas tribe refuse to negotiate with him, they regarding him in the light of a victor who has occupied their country, and they prefer to deal with Mulai-el-Merani, the Commander of the Government force, which has moved up to their borders from the Alcazar side.

A courier who brought in letters from Kaïd Maclean, and who is thought to be a partisan of Raisuli, confirmed the above information, and added that both the tribe and Raisuli are desirous of coming to terms, but wish to do so with the British authorities, as they have no confidence in any promises or engagements of the Makhzen.

Mulai-el-Merani has been instructed by the Minister of War to listen to any proposals which may be made to him and to keep in sight the main object, which is the release of Kaïd Maclean.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[27752] No. 164.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 271.) *Tangier, August 11, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, relative to the probable effect of the events at Dar-al-Baida upon the situation at Fez and in the interior of Morocco generally.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 164.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 74.) *Fez, August 8, 1907.*

Sir,

THE Vizier for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning. He said that the Sultan had directed him to ask me to convey the following message and appeal to your Excellency:—

His Majesty had learned with the highest indignation and grief of what had occurred at Casa Blanca, and meant at the earliest moment to punish the tribes concerned with the utmost severity. For the moment, unfortunately, all his troops were engaged against Raissuli, but it seemed likely that they would very soon end that matter, and His Majesty would then proceed with all speed with them against those tribes in the south. Meantime, however, His Majesty heard reports that the French Government intended to land troops at once and punish the tribes concerned. Such a step His Majesty feared would result in all the country rising both against the Makhzen and against foreigners generally, and no person could foresee the calamities which might follow. His Majesty knew the intimate and friendly relations which existed between the British and French Governments, and the British Government's regard for himself and his country. His Majesty therefore appealed to His Britannic Majesty's Government and your Excellency to use your most earnest good offices with the French Government towards procuring His Majesty time to punish these tribes himself.

Lastly, the Sultan directed the Vizier to ask me—(this with many flattering allusions to myself)—to do my best in the matter to advocate what His Majesty had requested.



The Vizier then asked me whether in my opinion the course His Majesty had indicated would not be the best for all concerned, and said that, of course, the Sultan and the Makhzen, under the circumstances, would have no objections to the French Government sending meanwhile ships of war to protect their subjects from recurrences of those outrages.

The Vizier ended by saying that the Sultan and the Makhzen placed themselves in your Excellency's hands in the matter, knowing your sincere regard for them and for this country, and your great ability in these high and difficult matters.

Having heard that similar requests had been made to the French Acting Consul and to the Spanish Consul, I had expected some such appeal, and had carefully considered what I should answer. I concluded that, if acceded to by His Majesty's Government and your Excellency, the favour required would be all the greater the more difficult of accomplishment could it be shown to be. On the other hand, were His Majesty's Government and your Excellency not disposed to accede to it, the sooner the Sultan and Makhzen understood this the better, and the less disappointed would they be afterwards. Moreover, the Sultan and Viziers are so optimistic that they invariably incline to exaggerate the slightest encouragement they may get from anybody when they are in a dilemma, and incline to become slack again and foolishly sanguine.

I therefore answered that I would, of course, at once forward the message His Majesty had given, but since the Vizier had asked my opinion on it all, and since we were such old friends, and as he knew the pain these few years' events gave me—than whom no one more earnestly wished to see peace and prosperity in this country—I felt no fear of speaking out plainly. The truth was that the Makhzen lay under a heavy, glaring blame in this business. Of Ben Sliman himself, everybody—and justly—spoke well. But the whole world, native and foreign, had seen with growing indignation the conduct of others in the Makhzen. They had enriched themselves at every turn, utterly indifferent of the consequences, and would never risk their little finger to serve the Sultan manfully and honestly. Finally, when, as the result of their greed and mismanagement, reforms which involved a limit being put to their malpractices were being begun, their angry and untruthful language had excited and misled the most ignorant classes. I did not suggest these officials plotted a massacre, but I was convinced their language had been a principal cause of these events, and that had they honestly co-operated to promote the true interests of the Sultan and his people, and to explain truthfully to their ignorant dependents and the humblest classes the sincere good-will of Europeans towards Morocco and the real advantages of the reforms, these murders would never have occurred. The maintenance in his post, against repeated remonstrance from all the Powers, of the Governor of Casa Blanca was inexcusable. (The Vizier here remarked that he could not answer that. It was obviously true. It was not his (Ben Sliman's) fault. I rejoined that the Vizier had to myself always spoken well of him, to which the Vizier answered that he had considered him honester than his neighbours, and that he had thought the Governor had enemies who traduced him. But the thing was done!)

As to the effect in the south of landing troops I could not, for want of knowledge, speak.

As regards Fez district, however, I suggested the point whether it was not rather against the group of advisers I had referred to than against Europeans that popular feeling was strongest. (The Vizier here said that was probably true, but foreigners might feel the consequences of landing troops.) I answered that in 1894 many Christians and Moslems were killed at Melilla. The Spanish Government mustered a large army there and war seemed imminent, but no ill-will was shown to foreigners here, neither thereat, nor at the costly settlement of that affair. The Vizier answered that the public looked on that affair as a dispute between the Spaniards and the Riffs—as, in other words, a local affair. The present case was different. I replied that, in my experience, I found all affairs were apt to be regarded by Moors as local rather than national. The Vizier rejoined that, to some extent, this was true; but the Makhzen then was strong—now it was weak, and the risk to Europeans was greater.

The Vizier then thanked me warmly for the candour I had used; that he knew I was as desirous as himself to see things improved. He added significantly that of course he could not be expected to concur in these views but he quite understood them.

I should explain that my language to the Vizier regarding the risks to Europeans in the interior should troops be landed at Casa Blanca was meant to combat a notion I know many members of the Makhzen are prone to entertain, namely, that they can always delay or modify action in Europe by conjuring up dreadful possible results to Europeans in the interior.

In the present circumstance, however, I have, after most earnest consideration, come to the conclusion that, should a punitive expedition of foreign troops be dispatched, the safety of Europeans in the interior might be dangerously compromised. The Makhzen, however willing, is utterly incapable of withstanding the least popular outbreak, having neither troops nor courageous men at the head of affairs.

I therefore trust that, should foreign military operations be decided upon, the Europeans here will first of all be withdrawn, except those few, such as Consuls or others, whose duties require them to remain.

I need scarcely say how regrettable a withdrawal of all Europeans would be. The population hereabout has, after many years of labour and much forbearance on the part of foreigners, become accustomed to seeing them, and appreciative of them as traders, medical missionaries, doctors, postal and Consular officials, and in many other capacities. It would, I fear, undo much that has been accomplished, and might take many years to regain the ground lost, should a foreign punitive expedition of a kind large enough to punish any particular locality, but not large enough to overawe the whole country into obeying the Makhzen, be sent.

I do not presume, however, to offer any opinion on so high and important a point of policy, for I realize how relatively small the numbers and interests of all Europeans in the whole interior of Morocco are. Their total number is under 100, and 50,000*l.* at the most would cover their material interests if left behind and lost.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—The Vizier did not suggest to me that Europeans should be withdrawn from the interior should troops be sent from abroad. I was somewhat surprised by this omission, as I had heard the Sultan had suggested it to other Europeans here.

J. M. MACL.

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[27568] No. 165.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)*

(No. 272.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 11, 1907.*

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit the message which has been conveyed to me from His Majesty through Dr. Verdon, his English Physician, expressing his alarm at the situation caused by the outrage at Casa Blanca, and begging that counsels of moderation may be given to the French. As I observed in my telegram, this letter was dispatched before the bombardment of Casa Blanca was known in Fez.

I am replying to Dr. Verdon that as far as I am aware, no punitive expedition into the interior is contemplated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 165.

*Note from the Sultan of Morocco to Sir G. Lowther, communicated by Dr. Verdon.*

"HIS Majesty understands from the telegrams in the 'Dépêche Marocaine' of the 4th, that the French contemplate landing troops at Casa Blanca, and sending a punitive expedition against the tribes who took part in the massacre.

"His Majesty says, if this is true, and the French land a force and attack the Mediuna and other tribes, all the tribes of Showia will resist them, and they will be joined by all the southern tribes, the French will be obliged to land a very large force, as these tribes are numerous and powerful, and there will be war, and the effect to him and his country will be most disastrous.

"His Majesty says that before attempting such a step he most earnestly desires that all Christians in the interior and the unprotected ports be recalled, as nowhere will they be safe from attack. His Majesty could not protect them.

"His Majesty says his kingdom would be in danger, and if the southern tribes were at war with the French, the tribes in the north would believe that the French invaded the country with the permission of the Sultan, they would come to Fez and



insist on the Sultan putting himself at the head of a movement to drive the Christians out of Morocco. His Majesty added, all my troops are engaged against Raisuli, and I could not resist the tribes.

"His Majesty declares that he personally has always been on good terms with all Christians, and he deplores the Casa Blanca outrage as much as the French do, he is prepared to promise and give the most solemn assurances to the French and other Powers that as soon as Kaïd MacLean is released, he will at once proceed to Casa Blanca, with the entire army now engaged in El Khanas, and will punish Mediuna and other guilty tribes with the utmost severity, and will do to them what Boushta Bagdadi is now doing to El Khamas.

"He begs you will use your influence towards moderation, and will persuade the French to be patient. Let them send ships to Casa Blanca to guard the Europeans, but allow His Majesty to punish the tribes.

"His Majesty says that for some months he has done his utmost to be on good terms with the French and to follow their advice, and the Casa Blanca outrage and the strong feeling in the country against Christians is due greatly to his having acted on their advice and placed Europeans in the Customs.

"His Majesty has been assured by the French that they are his real friends, ready and willing to assist him in the reforming of his country; he hopes they will now show their friendship by being patient and moderate with him in this great crisis, instead of taking a step that must bring misfortune to him and his country."

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[27754] No. 166.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 274.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 12, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida relative to the situation there and in the South of Morocco generally.

It will be seen that though the town itself is now quiet the tribes are still making determined attacks upon the French troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 166.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 172.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August 9, 1907.*

ORDER was restored in Casa Blanca yesterday afternoon.

The French soldiers first landed. Those of the Foreign Legion became unmanageable; lots of them were drunk and looted worse than the Arabs even. When put on guard to stop looting, they at once began to loot themselves the very places they had to guard. Owing to fear of the soldiers by British subjects who complained to me, I had to bring the matter before the French Consul. In the evening the men of the Foreign Legion were withdrawn from the streets, and the "Tirailleurs Algériens" replaced them.

The Arabs have left the town, and the "Tirailleurs" are now miles out in the country acting against the tribesmen, who will no doubt receive a proper lesson this time.

The French soldiers have made domiciliary visits to Moorish houses which fired on the Europeans, and have seized rifles and loot. Some of the offending Moors were secured and shot outside the town, I am informed.

All services are suspended, as the port is in the hands of the French. The German post-office was looted.

I am unaware what has become of Mulai-el-Amin. The Dar Makhzen is in the hands of the French, who partially destroyed the tower of the mosque at the Dar Makhzen, as shots were fired from it during the bombardment.

A few Moors are now reappearing in the streets, which are being cleared up.

Kaïd Ci Bubker has been put on to remove the dead bodies. He was preparing to





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leave the town, but was stopped; he sent out his wives and children, but they were carried off by Arabs. Jews have been lifting the dead into carts.

The business part of the town is a total wreck, and parts are still smouldering.

I have now learnt more fully what the people who were collected by the French in the new part of the town near the sea, close to the walls of Sidi Billiott, for defence purposes during the bombardment went through. They were terribly fusilladed by the Arabs beyond the town walls and in the outer soko. To show your Excellency how critical the French must have thought the situation to have been, I may inform you that at midnight on the day the landing was effected the French guards suddenly called, up Messrs. Lamb and Bolton, who were in the former's house near the water-port, and gave them and their wives and children five minutes to follow them to a place of more safety near the French Consulate. Even then the guard during its passage with them had to fire, and they themselves were stumbling over dead bodies to get there.

That afternoon, when the French could not guarantee the safety of the British Consulate, owing to its less favourable position, having the open Morocco gate behind it, I handed over all British subjects who were at my Consulate to the care of the French, as I was unable to accept the responsibility of their remaining with me.

I am glad to say that all the children of our colony, in spite of their most trying experiences, seem really none the worse for the ordeal, and the same may be said for the ladies, who have been so extremely plucky. I am only so sorry for them, as they have in many cases lost their homes, and have scarcely anything besides what they stand up in.

No British subject has lost his life. Mr. Murdoch, who was at the house of Mr. G. H. Fernau, has a slight wound in the face, which is not serious. It was done by a French guard on another house, who, I am privately told, was unaware that a French guard was at Mr. Fernau's house. This, however, has not been made public.

A few articles of value were stolen from my rooms at this Consulate by, I believe, men of the Foreign Legion. I am asking the French Consulate to make inquiries in case they can be recovered, which I fear is not very likely.

Criers are now going round by French orders crying that Moslems can go to the mosques and to their houses without fear.

I beg to inclose copy of the French circular notifying the French occupation, which was handed to me as doyen at night to communicate to my colleagues. Your Excellency will see that we were promised a landing in force last Monday morning from a French squadron at 5 A.M. What happened instead you are well aware of.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—The British post-office has reopened this morning.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 166.

*M. Maigret to Foreign Representatives.*

*Consulat de France à Casa Blanca,*
*le 4 Août*, 1907.

Messieurs et chers Collègues,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance qu'une escadre Française débarquera demain, Lundi, 5 Août, à 5 heures du matin, des forces imposantes. Elle a l'ordre de bombarder la ville si la porte de la marine n'est pas ouverte à cette heure et si un seul coup de feu est tiré sur nos hommes.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) ROGER MAIGRET.

Cette notification sera adressée en temps utile par mes soins à Mouley Lamine.

R. M.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 166.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 174.)

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 9, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that, in reply to inquiries concerning the resumption of the work of the port, M. Malpertuy informed me that the custom-house would be opened to-morrow, and the administrators be at their posts to superintend the work of loading and unloading the shipping in the bay.

A meeting of the Kadi, Adool, Oomana, and other local authorities was convened at the French Consulate, and the administration of the town was take effect immediately.

M. Malpertuy states that no survey of properties looted by the Arabs will be undertaken by his Government, excepting for French subjects. He advises each applicant to inform their respective Consuls of their losses in order that each Consul may report to his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 166.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 179.)

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 10, 1907.

Sir,

THE Arabs of Oolad Buziri have held a meeting to-day at Tadhert, and have attacked the French this afternoon; bullets were reaching the town walls. The frigates shelled them on the south near the Aunk of Dar-al-Baida, and the French cavalry have been seen chasing them, and it is reported that they have taken many prisoners.

I have sent to the French Consulate for the latest news from Mazagan, and if I can obtain it in time for the mail I will append a postscript.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I am told that Mulai-el-Amin has reoccupied the Dar Makhzen, as, I suppose, nominal Governor of the town.

The recent engagement has set light to Mr. Edmond Fernau's gardens outside the town, and they are now in flames.

Mazagan is surrounded by Arabs. The Forbin is there. The Europeans are in town, and not allowed to embark, because the Moors fear the same thing will happen to them as at this place if they allow the Europeans to embark. Kaïd Glawi is reported to be coming down from the hills towards Mazagan. French Consul says as he is a loyal Kaïd he supposes he is coming to drive off the Arabs. The French Consulate has intercepted a message from the Eiffel Tower in Paris.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 166.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 180.)

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 11, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my previous despatch, I have the honour to inclose herewith to your Excellency an account of the engagement of yesterday between the French and the Ulaod Buziri, as drawn up by Mr. R. H. Broome, clerk to this Consulate, who witnessed the whole thing from the high tower of the French hotel.

M. Malpertuy, the French Consul, who came back from leave to France with the French squadron, has been to see me to-day, and he informs me that Mulai-el-Amin has applied officially for French protection; in consequence, Mulai-el-Amin has been reinstated at the Dar Makhzen as the Representative of the Shereefian authority, but the administration of the town is undertaken by the French, as Mulai-el-Amin has not a single Makhazni. The French flag floats over the Dar Makhzen.

M. Malpertuy told me in confidence that the late Governor, Kaïd Ci Bubker



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Buzeed, is to be shortly arrested, and conveyed as a prisoner on board the Admiral's flag-ship.

M. Malpertuy tells me also that he has received to-day information that a large tribal gathering is taking place at a place called Dayar Sidi Ali, about 10 miles from here, with a view of attacking the French, and that a turning movement by the French troops is likely to take place against the tribesmen.

I believe that yesterday the tribesmen were severely handled, and many killed; but it is said that four or five French soldiers lost their lives also.

The town is absolutely quiet, and there is security; the townspeople are absolutely cowed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—I have omitted to state that M. Malpertuy informed me that he has instructions to work in accord with me, and I assured him that, for my part, I would do all I could in perfect harmony with him.

A. M. M.

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Inclosure 6 in No. 166.

*Engagement between Arab Tribesmen and French Troops, as witnessed by an Observer from a Tower in Town.*

TO-DAY, at half-past two in the afternoon, the tribe of Ooled Buziri, who had held a meeting at Tadert on the previous day, attacked the French camp, situated about a quarter of a mile south of the town.

The Arab horsemen, following their usual tactics, crept up behind the crest of the low hills which extend in a semicircle round the town, until they came within striking distance of the French position. The Arabs charged down the slope at a furious gallop, but the French war-ships made havoc amongst them with shells from their big guns; they, however, came bravely on, and the French infantry then met them with volleys of musketry-shot and shell from their quick-firing guns. The Arab onslaught was checked, and they were no longer a compact body, but cut up into various groups. This was the decisive moment for the French cavalry to act, and they rushed their quick-firing guns up to some rising ground and took up a commanding position behind a masonry building, and, after clearing the adjacent gardens of Arabs, they chased the routed Arabs in circles, taking many prisoners.

All was quiet again by 4 P.M.

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 10, 1907.

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Inclosure 7 in No. 166.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 182.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 11, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French authorities have just informed me that the Military Administration has authorized the installation of a market at the entrance to the French camp outside the town, where all ordinary articles and provisions can be freely bought and sold in security, with the exception of spirituous drinks, which are prohibited at that market.

I have accordingly exhibited a notice to this effect outside my Consulate, for the information of British subjects.

I have the honour to report that a number of English ladies and children, who were anxious to leave Dar-al-Baida, succeeded in getting away yesterday by English steamers. A great many Jews and Gibraltarians also left. Some of these latter applied to me for free passages, but I did not encourage them, and they got off on their own resources without any charges being made on public funds by me.

As regards the dead bodies interred at the Consulates after the recent massacre, I am told they are being exhumed and will be reinterred in the cemetery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 8 in No. 166.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 183. Confidential.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 11, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that I have received a circular from Herr Brandt, a German subject and Austrian Consul here, that he is going to Tangier.

I have been privately informed on this matter that Herr Brandt is going to Tangier to place the whole case of the bombardment of this place by the French before the German Legation on behalf of German subjects, and that he may possibly go on to Berlin.

The Germans consider that they have been deceived by the French, and they are very bad friends with the French authorities, so my informant tells me, and will not even speak to them.

Besides this, the house of Herr Luderitz, the German Consul, now on leave in Germany, has been completely sacked.

It is thought that there may be trouble on the part of the German Government regarding the affair of the bombardment of this place, as there was no necessity for precipitate action on the part of the French, the town being, before the French action, completely under control in the hands of Mulai-el-Amin.

No doubt the result of the premature action of the French is most deplorable.

My previous despatches I have handed to the French Consulate to be conveyed this day to your Excellency in the cruiser "Galilée."

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 9 in No. 166.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 184.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 11, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have just (12 midday) received a circular from the French Consul, inclosing a circular from the military authorities to the effect that it is unsafe for Europeans to leave the town, and that they must not go to the gardens outside. It is added that if they do so it is at their sole risk and peril.

I have consequently addressed an urgent circular to this effect to British subjects.

There is a good deal of dissatisfaction among Europeans having property in stores outside that they cannot get possession of the same, the French Consulate being seemingly powerless in the matter, as they give leave to take over the stores, but the soldiers cannot be got rid of, and these men steal a lot of goods.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[27756] No. 167.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 276.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 12, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the British Vice-Consul at Mazagan, informing me of the critical situation in that port.

It will be observed that the Europeans are held as hostages by the natives to prevent a bombardment by the French warships off the town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 167.

*Vice-Consul Spinney to Sir G. Lowther.*

*Mazagan, August* 11, 1907.

Dear Sir Gerard Lowther,

MANY thanks for your letter per "Gibel Dersa." She has on board nearly all the women and children of Mazagan of all nationalities. The French Vice-Consul's wife and children remain. Last week my mother and I were alone, as my sister was in Dar-al-Baida, and of course went through that trying time. We believe her to be all right, but have no news. While all this trouble was going on my brother arrived from a school, and another sister from France. As they both insisted on landing we are now four. I did not go into town until there was not a European left outside, but then as I was the only man to look after my people and the two lady missionaries and their children, I thought it better to go in. The lady missionaries left by the German steamer for Mogador yesterday. Of course, if anything happened in Mogador they would not be allowed to land, but on the other hand they would have been most uncomfortable on the "Dersa."

The situation here is bad, and there are always a lot of country Moors in here and a lot of talk about a holy war, but they cannot decide what to do. There have been several panics, and a row can happen at any moment. I really do not know who is the most frightened, the Jews, Europeans, or town Moors, and whether they are more afraid of the country Moors or of the French frigate here. The townspeople are always sending things away to the country, and now send their women. I believe that in case of an attack from the country Moors or from the French they would just run away. I have had a most trying time. I was born in this place, and my father was greatly esteemed by the Moors, so they have a good deal of confidence in me. Add to this that I am very friendly with the French Vice-Consul and you will understand that the Oomana Governor and leading townspeople are bothering me all day, and the Jews and Europeans have been terrible.

The day before yesterday the French informed me that a frigate would come in at 11 o'clock and land immediately some troops. Then we were again informed that there would be no landing at present. At night the Spanish Consul did a very foolish thing, he moved to another house and collected all the Spanish Colony. He also demanded a lot of guns, and the Moors all thought that a bombardment would take place and troops would be landed. I remained with the French Vice-Consul while all this was going on and knew nothing. When I got home I found the town in an awful state, and was quieting and reassuring the authorities until 4 o'clock in the morning. The Governor asked me to go there, and I found him just off, horse and saddle, ready to fly. However, I calmed him. Yesterday the French Vice-Consul came out to his house outside the town and slept there with his family. I could not come as my house is close to the Sea House and the Moors would think I wanted to get off at night. I have come out this morning with my people, and it has had a good effect already. But the country Moors are not to be trusted, so the French Vice-Consul has asked the cruiser to wire for help as she only has 167 men to land. I shall get as many people to come here as possible, but shall not insist on British subjects coming here, as it is a moot point as to which is the safer inside or outside of the town. The latest tale is that the horsemen who are leaving here now are off to Azimor to arrange for a general attack. The Oomana and Governor have both informed me they are willing to make arrangements for troops to come in, but they cannot trust the townspeople. The latter are mostly protégés of Europeans and have heard that Moors in similar positions were massacred in Dar-al-Baida. Marakesh I have no news of to-day, but Mulai Hafid informed the French Agent there that he would protect Europeans, and if made Sultan could look after the port too. Please excuse this rigmarole, but I have no head to-day. I am not the slightest bit alarmed as I have made all arrangements for a fight, but this Morocco question may mean my ruin. Our capital is all over the country at Marakesh and stocks here of course. Personally I do not care two pins, but I have my mother, three sisters, and a young brother on my shoulders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. G. SPINNEY.

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[27758]

No. 168.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 19.)

(No. 278.)

Sir,

*Tangier, August* 12, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, giving such news as he had received up to the 9th instant regarding the condition of affairs at Mazagan, Rabat, Saffi, and Mogador.

I also inclose a copy of a despatch from the British Vice-Consul at the latter port recording the condition of affairs up to the 5th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 168.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 175.)

Sir,

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 9, 1907.

THE French Consul has informed me verbally that he has bad news from Mazagan; he stated that the Europeans are inside the town, which is threatened by the Arabs.

He said that two gun-boats are to be sent down at once, with a message to the Chief of the Arabs that if a single European is injured the Arabs will all be killed.

A similar message is to be sent to Rabat to the effect that the town of Sallee will be bombarded if any European is touched.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hunot reports to me, under date the 5th instant, that all was quiet then at Saffi, but on receipt of the news from Casa Blanca the Europeans living outside the town walls had come in, and the blasting at the water-port has been suspended. Matters were normal, however.

His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador has addressed a despatch to your Excellency on the situation at that place.

Mr. Spinney (Mazagan) tells me, in a letter dated the 6th, and only received this day, that great excitement prevails at the news from Casa Blanca, but then nothing had happened. No doubt the news in the hands of the French Consul here is of a later date than that I have received from Mr. Spinney.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 168.

*Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 40.)

Sir,

*Mogador, August* 5, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the first news of what has taken place at Casa Blanca was received here by the German Vice-Consul on the 3rd instant.

He immediately informed the Spanish and French Consuls and myself, and Mr. Buigas, as doyen, called at once on the Governor of the town to request him to take the necessary measures for the protection and safety of the Europeans and Jews residing at Mogador. Kaïd Bargash, who appeared very surprised at the news, promised that he would do all in his power to avoid any disturbances or trouble, and the same evening the guards were doubled at the gates and soldiers were patrolling the streets.

From what I am able to understand, the Europeans are not unusually alarmed, but of course there is a certain excitement prevailing, whilst the Jews are rather nervous about the situation. The feeling of the natives is decidedly anti-French, and they did not even take the trouble to conceal their delight for what had taken place. The general opinion is that there may be trouble if the French Delegate at the custom-house is allowed to take up his duties without taking some precautions before—such, for instance, as the presence of a war-ship.

In this connection I have the honour to report that the German and Spanish Consuls have approached me with a view to find out if I would be ready to join them, in case it was considered advisable, in order to make some friendly representations to



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the French Consul, and ask him to delay, if possible, the installation of the French Delegate at the custom-house. I replied that I did not think I would be justified in taking such action without previous authority from your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

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[27669] No. 169.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 364.)
Sir, *Berlin, August* 16, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 347 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that the German press, in commenting on the French action at Casa Blanca, continues to take the "correct" line that Germany has no desire to interfere in the matter, and that the French have a perfect right to avenge the murder of Frenchmen, and the duty as well as the right to reinstate order in the town. At the same time the papers are giving more and more publicity to reports and rumours of heavy losses suffered by German subjects, the destruction of the German Post Office, &c., and this looks very like the beginning of a campaign for demanding large sums of money from France as compensation. The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" publishes a very violent article denouncing the whole proceedings as stupid, useless, and barbarous, and urging that the British and German Governments ought to make strong representations to France to forbid any repetition of such scenes. "We Germans are neither bound nor inclined to pay for the china that France has smashed."

I have, &c.
(For Sir Frank Lascelles),
(Signed) J. DE SALIS.

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[27869] No. 170.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 18, 1907.

I HAVE just been informed by a high Moorish official that the Sultan, desirous no doubt of keeping things quiet at Fez while time is gained, has appointed some forty personages of importance, representing religion and trade, to at once proceed to Tangier, where they may discuss the situation with the foreign Representatives.

The majority of these personages come from Fez, but some from other towns.

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[27868] No. 171.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August* 19, 1907.

ADVANCE to Sultan.

Since the date of your telegram No. 79 of the 17th instant the situation has changed, as the State Bank has arranged to advance immediately 1,000,000 fr. to the Sultan.

The question as to the method of paying the troops is under consideration, and every precaution will be taken to insure that the advance shall be devoted to the purpose for which it is made.

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[27897] No. 172.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 280.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 13, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of further despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, relative to the present state of the town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 172.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 185.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 11, 1907.

MR. R. H. BROOME, clerk to the Consulate, who did not remain at the Consulate during the Arab attack, but was with the general body of the Europeans on the sea side of the town under the scheme of general defence organized by the French naval authorities, has given me the inclosed account of events that took place, which I have thought might prove of interest to your Excellency.

I have omitted to mention that the French sailors and soldiers, especially the latter, brought a lot of loot into my Consulate. I threw all I could out of the gate, and did all I could to stop it, but in a state of war one cannot altogether prevent it. After the final departure of my French defenders, I discovered on the Consulate terrace a collection of all sorts of looted articles, sugar, cigarettes, boots, shoes, writing-paper, pickles, coffee, mustard, &c.

I took possession of all these articles, it being utterly out of the question to discover the rightful owners, and as I had two rather large and starving British families in the Consulate to feed, I found these articles nothing less than a God-send to us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 172.

*Accounts of Events which occurred at Dar-al-Baida from August 5 to August 7.*

*Monday, August* 5.—At 5 A.M. I went on the roof of the British Consulate and could see the "Galilée's" five boats laden with marines towed by a tug towards the water-port. Shortly afterwards I heard rifle-fire in the direction of the water-port followed by firing of shells from the "Galilée's" guns. The Moorish quarter called the "Tnaker" was being bombarded. Shell after shell burst over the unfortunate inhabitants, who mostly live in huts. Soon fires were raging in that direction, and wounded soldiers were rushing about the town, some armed, but others had thrown away their rifles.

The bombardment continued fiercely for some time longer, and we could both see and hear people being shot down by the Spaniards who had taken refuge at the Spanish Consulate.

The firing continued for some time after opposition on the part of the Moors had ceased. The Kaïd of Ooled Hariz's house, which is just at the back of the British Consulate, kept up a rifle-fire on all Europeans in sight, and I was on the roof of the British Consulate when poor Sassoon was riddled by bullets from this house. He was ascending the ladder to his tower to look what was going on.

During the morning Mouley-el-Amin sent a Makhazni to this Consulate to ask Mr. Madden to intervene and stop the firing.

Si Abd-el-Wahid, Mouley-el-Amin's Khalifa, came round to the Consulate and was admitted into the garden. He said that Mouley-el-Amin surrendered the town, and asked for a letter to the French Consul. Mr. Madden wrote a note to that effect, and we tied a white handkerchief to the Makhazni's ramrod and sent him off to the French Consulate.

On the firing ceasing the rabble began to loot, first the shops and stores, then the

custom-house. They were soon joined by country Arabs, who rode with a following of footmen, and broke open every shop, house, and store in their way, fighting among themselves for the booty.

During the afternoon the Spanish gun-boat landed some marines to defend the Spanish colony and Consulate.

They manned the roofs of the Consulate and opened a sharp fire on the looters, killing and wounding many. Several Moorish women were shot accidentally as the sailors could not distinguish between the native men and women, but both sexes were looting. I recognized among the looters two native servants of Europeans.

The front street of the British Consulate being swept by the Spaniards' fire was now kept empty of looters, but they betook themselves to the streets at the back of the British Consulate, and we shortly afterwards heard the cries of some unfortunate Jews in a house near by who were being murdered by the Arabs. We had only two rifles and a shot-gun for our defence, but we accounted for four Arabs in that house. The poor Jews were most grateful, as we had undoubtedly saved them from being murdered and plundered.

French marines were sent in the evening to guard the British Consulate, and the British refugees were most of them sent to houses near the French Consulate.

*Tuesday, August* 6.—All the night through at the Portuguese Vice-Consulate we were kept in a state of alarm. The Arabs had entered the town from the back in great force, and were using the high houses and towers to fire on the French marines. By daylight we could see thousands of horsemen approaching the town, and learnt from native Jews who had joined us that the whole tribes of Showia, and part of Ducalla, Zemmour Shulh, and Zair, were attacking and that they had been looting every one coming out of the town. They galloped furiously down the slope of the hills behind the town, and were repeatedly shelled out by the "Forbin" and "Du Chayla" from the west and pounded by the "Galilée" from the north-east, but still they came on. The Marrakesh gate remained with only half a door standing, and through this the hordes from the country poured. They fell on the Moorish houses in that quarter and showed no mercy to the Fez people, whose houses were cleared of everything. Women and children were carried off, and the Mellah fared no better; and many Jewish women were carried off to the country. The "Galilée" and "Du Chayla" kept up a terrific bombardment over all the houses in possession of the Arabs, and fires were breaking out everywhere. At the Portuguese Consulate, which is near the town wall, the window-bars had been taken out to facilitate the landing parties from the ships and the roof was made into a veritable fort, with a quick-firing gun mounted on an improvised carriage, and the walls of the terrace manned by French marines, who kept up a brisk cannonade on all Arabs approaching from the Rabat side.

From this roof we could see the Arabs swarming into town, but they had now learnt not to expose themselves to the cruiser's guns. This day we were under fire from the Governor's mosque and several French marines were hit. I attended the funeral of a French officer and marine in the afternoon at the French Consulate, and was sent for by M. Maigret to accompany him, under a strong escort, to the British Consulate, to try and persuade Mr. Madden to leave the British Consulate, as they considered the forces at their disposal inadequate for defending a house so remote from their main position, viz., the French Consulate.

We first visited the "Banque d'État" on our way to the British Consulate, and here a dreadful scene met our eyes. All along the way from the Danish Vice-Consulate the dead were lying about the streets, some with the loot still in their hands; the stench was dreadful—horses, cows, donkeys, and what had once been human beings lay pell-mell together. All the shops and stores on the route had been burst open and the remains of their contents lay about the streets. By the "banque" we marched ankle-deep in semolina; the streets were littered with every conceivable article of native and European attire, boxes of tea, sugar, confectionery, soaps, perfumes, coins, gold-leaf, chairs, books and papers. The "Banque d'État" had been looted, the safe broken open by steel crowbars from the French harbour works. One could pick up notes and bills of exchange all round the door; every scrap of paper and books had been thrown down on the floor and paraffin lamps smashed over them. The "Banque d'État" was the first to suffer, as we could hear the hammers working on the safes from the British Consulate the first day of the bombardment.

A poor Jew, with a letter in his hand, was the only soul we found alive in that street, but he was shot down by the French marines as he approached us; the French marines are quick to fire on any native, and they doubtless mistook him for an Arab. We then visited the Bank of the "Compagnie Algérienne," which we found in a similar





state of disorder—with this difference, that their money-safe was intact, but sorely battered.

*Wednesday, August* 7.—Dreadful firing all night long. The Arabs started their onslaught early, and the "Forbin" and "Du Chayla" again had to shell them out from behind the town. We at the Portuguese Vice-Consulate were busy shelling the mosque and high towers at the back of the town with our quick-firing gun, and in the thick of it, when our ammunition was almost exhausted, we could see the "Jeanne d'Arc" and her sister ships looming up on the horizon—a most welcome sight. An Arab who had been hiding in Sidi Belliot, hard by, crept round the corner and tried a shot at us, but he was riddled with bullets and buried in a hastily dug grave.

The war-ships opened a tremendous fire, sweeping the surrounding country on all sides and creating fearful havoc among the Arabs, who could be seen flying on all sides. Their losses must have been enormous, as the ships were making good shooting at the moving masses of horsemen.

Senhor José de Freitas and myself went down to the creek to show the landing troops the entrance to the creek, which is rather a bad place to land at at high water. As it was, two boats were swamped on the rocks, but no lives were lost.

Shortly after the troops landed the Kaïd's mosque was rushed and fifteen Arabs were shot inside; two others who were found in Sidi Belliot were taken to the French Consulate and shot.

I visited the French hotel, which had been looted by the Arabs and low-class Spaniards, and found a French guard of marines there. This house, from its commanding position, had been used by the Arabs as a vantage point to fire on the Spanish Consulate. After the French had invested it the Spaniards had looted the few things left by the Arabs. The French marines, in turn, stole what they fancied, and the "Légion étrangère," coming after them, made a clean sweep of the remnants.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 172.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 186.)

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 12, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a Memorandum giving a few details not already reported, which I hope may prove of interest to your Excellency to know.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 172.

*Memorandum.*

WHEN the small landing party of about sixty armed men landed from the cruiser "Galilée," on arrival at the beach the Moors who had slept there cried out to fire on the French, which they did. I hear that the position of the French detachment was not at all a nice one, and that the officer in charge had to urge on his men by shouting, "En avant! en avant!" Had the French landed from the cruiser when it first arrived, and when they wanted to land, the town being full of tribesmen, the landing party would not have even reached the French Consulate, probably, and all the Europeans would have been massacred for certain.

A French patrol on the terrace of Mr. Lamb's house one night fired on another French patrol on Mr. G. Fernau's house, unaware, doubtless, of its presence. This was when Mr. Murdoch was wounded in the face. A French soldier was killed and three wounded on Mr. Fernau's terrace by the French patrol on Mr. Lamb's house. There were no Arabs firing at the time.

These facts are not known publicly, and it is wished to keep it quiet.

The Spanish baker has been found with his throat cut, and burnt in his oven. Evidently the Arabs first cut his throat and then put the body into the still hot oven.

The Barbary Jews, and even those who usually appear in European garments, have compromised their dress by wearing native dress, but with hats on—some wearing old silk hats. They do this so as not to be taken for Europeans by the Moors or for natives by the French.

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The Jews were the first to loot directly the town was free of Arabs, and their houses are full of looted goods. They are appearing in new slippers and new clothes.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN,
*His Britannic Majesty's Consul.*

*British Consulate, Dar-al-Baida,*
*August* 12, 1907.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 172.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 187.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 12, 1907.

THE general situation in this town seems to me to be slowly improving. Bread can now be bought, and it is said some arrangements are being made for the sale of tinned provisions. Fresh provisions cannot yet be had.

The French General has stated to some British subjects that he requires some 10,000 men to subdue the Arabs, not so much because they constitute a formidable foe, but because of their annoying tactics.

It is generally thought that the Arabs will be unable to continue hostilities much longer, as they must be getting short of ammunition.

Some of the Arabs are, it is said, desirous of making their surrender, and it has been ordered that any one bearing a white flag shall be allowed to pass through the lines.

The French General at present can only guarantee the safety of the town, and is said to have between 3,000 and 4,000 men ashore, with which force he has entirely surrounded the immediate environs of Casa Blanca.

It is reported that the Arabs have received orders from Fez to fight the French, but this is only an *on dit*, doubtless. There are many similar rumours afloat.

In European circles much deep concern is felt to know who will pay the losses. The German Acting Consul tells me his colony is at present ruined. The same may be said of the British colony, in large part.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[27898] No. 173.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 281.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 13, 1907.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 63 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Consul at Fez in the sense of the instructions conveyed in your above-mentioned telegram, requesting him to impress upon Ben Sliman that the landing of foreign troops at Dar-al-Baida meets with the unanimous approval of the Powers. I have addressed a letter in similar terms to Dr. Verdon, who sent me the message direct from the Sultan, and whom I had previously told that it was out of the question that His Majesty's Government should intercede in his behalf with the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 173.

*Sir G. Lowther to Consul MacLeod.*

Sir, *Tangier, August* 12, 1907.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 74 of the 8th instant, in which you report a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in which his Excellency invited you to convey to me a message from His Majesty the Sultan regarding the recent events at Dar-al-Baida. His Majesty made something in the nature of an appeal to His Majesty's Government to use their good offices with the French Government towards procuring His Majesty time to punish these tribes himself.





I referred to His Majesty's Government the substance of His Majesty's message, and I have now to instruct you to take the earliest opportunity to see Ben Sliman and impress upon him very seriously that the landing of foreign troops at Dar-al-Baida meets with the unanimous approval of the Powers. It will be easy for you to make clear to his Excellency that it was the necessary consequence of the murderous attacks made upon certain Europeans at Dar-al-Baida.

From another source I understand that His Majesty has stated that if the French land forces, which has occurred, and attack the tribes he would be unable to protect foreigners in the interior, and that the tribes would insist on His Majesty putting himself at the head of a movement to drive the Christians out of Morocco.

You should inform Ben Sliman that knowledge of such language has reached me, and you should make clear to him that any movement of this nature would be fraught with the most serious results for himself and for Morocco, and that he and his advisers should use all their efforts to localize the trouble and restrain and pacify the tribes that are inclined to rebellion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[27899] No. 174.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 282.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 13, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, as also of my reply to the same, in regard to the advisability of the British community remaining at Fez for the present.

It will be observed that I have impressed upon Mr. MacLeod that he is in no way authorized to state that His Majesty's Government are in any way mediating between the Sultan and the Powers engaged in quelling disturbances at Dar-al-Baida.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 174.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Fez, August* 9, 1907.

MY despatch No. 74 of yesterday was written under pressure of time to go by a specially fast courier whom Dr. Verdon was sending to your Excellency at the Sultan's request, so I beg now to record one point which was omitted, and to mention some others which, perhaps, might have been more clearly put.

In his appeal for British good offices with the French Government, the Vizier for Foreign Affairs said that the Sultan and Makhzen remembered how considerable British interests in Morocco were, and was convinced that the British Government and nation could never become indifferent to events in this country.

I answered that indeed that was so. We had for several years seen, with growing apprehension, Morocco going from bad to worse, and had become convinced that only the introduction of certain reforms could avert, sooner or later, the disintegration of the Makhzen and its existence as one State. The French had the same conviction, and the Anglo-French Agreement—by which France promised to help Morocco and agreed that the political status of Morocco would not be changed—was designed to make assurance against the event both Governments so clearly foresaw. If rightly seen, no one had more to gain by this than the Sultan, whom it enabled to promote reforms while having the engagement of two Great Powers to secure him and the Makhzen against collapse. But the Sultan and his advisers had never seemed able to understand this. Sid-ben-Sliman replied that he realized this now. I alluded to this particularly, for the Sultan has informed Dr. Verdon that the Vizier gave him an account of our interview, with which His Majesty was highly pleased! The Vizier, it appears, uncandidly, and with characteristic timidity, had omitted all I said as to the culpability of the Makhzen, but expatiated only on my love of His Majesty and this country, and had drawn much consolation from the Article in the Anglo-French Agreement by which France declares she has no intention of changing the political status of Morocco.



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It will be observed that the Sultan presumed that a landing of troops and the punishment by them of the offending tribe was in contemplation, but had no objection to steps such as the sending of ships of war for the protection of foreigners.

From the press reports received here it appears that only the occupation of Casa Blanca by foreign troops is proposed, as yet at any rate. This may (though I doubt it) be held to be within the steps to which the Sultan does not object. If, in the meantime, no more than such an occupation were attempted, the effect would, of course, be less exciting to the interior population than actions which would look like an invasion of the country. Such an occupation could be represented here by the Makhzen as being merely temporary, and intended to support the Makhzen and good Moslems against rebels.

It will be seen from the second paragraph on p. 6 of my despatch No. 74, that the risks I apprehend towards foreigners in the interior were in connection with a foreign punitive expedition. The risks by an occupation merely would clearly be less, and if a punitive expedition followed bye and bye, the population, having had time to become accustomed to the new situation, would probably be less moved than by a sudden incursion into the country of foreign troops.

All reports now received point to the feeling being anti-French rather than anti-foreign, and this lessens the risks to other foreigners considerably.

The British colony here at present numbers only eleven persons, of whom six are women. In an emergency women are easily disposed of in friendly Moslems' harems; and five men who could live in one house—say, this Consulate—would be easy to protect against isolated non-concerted acts of lawlessness. I should not anticipate at Fez general unprovoked political rioting, but rather that the "police" state of the district would become bad by the weakness of the Makhzen, and consequently lawless acts become common. The exercise of prudence by foreigners themselves can almost always prevent such a state of things injuring them.

The landing now contemplated of troops seems likely to be carried out so soon that in all likelihood, if foreigners left Fez, they would be in the open country when the news reached the tribes. Even with an escort it is quite an open question whether they would not be safer here.

This morning the French Acting Consul, M. Maro, has informed me that, in pursuance of instructions he has just received, he has just asked the Makhzen whether they can guarantee the security of the French colony here. If the Makhzen answer in the negative he is to procure escort and take his colony to the coast. The Makhzen are just now debating on their answer. The French colony here numbers seventeen persons, children included. The total number of foreigners is fifty-eight. If the French colony should leave there would remain only forty-one, and those would obviously be exposed to less risk when it became known that the French had departed. Under these circumstances, I propose to place the situation before all British subjects, so that any who so wish may depart as soon as possible. I shall point out that they may be required to leave, but that, in the meantime at any rate, and pending any instructions your Excellency may send to the contrary, it seems to me they would do best to remain.

In regard to the appeal the Sultan has made to your Excellency, I would remark that it might have a soothing effect of obvious advantage to the British colony here could I circulate news that our Government were mediating in the matter.

In all the foregoing it will be seen the matter is treated of only from our local point of view. The interests involved, if viewed nationally, are perhaps small, but they are so important to the individuals concerned, that naturally I should feel very unwilling, unless directed to the contrary, to give advice at this moment which might prove of injury to those affected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 174.

NUMBERS of Foreigners at Fez, August 8, 1907.

| | Men. | Women. | Children. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Americans .. .. .. | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| British .. .. .. .. | 5 | 6 | .. | 11 |
| French .. .. .. .. | 12 | 3 | 2 | 17 |
| German .. .. .. .. | 10 | 2 | 1 | 13 |
| Italian .. .. .. .. | 4 | 1 | 4 | 9 |
| Portuguese .. .. .. | 1 | 1 | .. | 2 |
| Spanish .. .. .. | 2 | .. | .. | 2 |

Inclosure 3 in No. 174.

*Sir G. Lowther to Consul MacLeod.*

(No. 40.)
*Tangier, August* 12, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 75 of the 9th instant, offering some observations on the risks to which foreigners in the interior may possibly be exposed in connection with the recent events at Dar-al-Baida.

In your conversations with Ben Sliman you should make it clear to him that the action of the Powers now engaged will at the present undoubtedly be confined to the punishment of the guilty tribes, and that I am not aware of any punitive expedition on a large scale being contemplated.

As regards your community at Fez, you should continue to impress upon them the exercise of the greatest possible prudence.

If any of the British subjects at Fez insist upon leaving you should endeavour to provide for them a safe escort, but, in my opinion, it would at present be far safer for them to remain where they are than expose themselves to the danger of a journey through tribes incensed by news that may have reached them from the coast. And you are in no manner authorized to state to them that the British Government was in any way mediating between His Majesty and the Powers engaged in quelling disturbances at Dar-al-Baida.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[27886] No. 175.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 407.)
*Paris, August* 19, 1907.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 40 of to-day's date, the situation with regard to the immediate advance of a sum of money to the Sultan of Morocco to enable him to levy troops and to make a demonstration on the coast, has been modified since the despatch of your telegram No. 79 of the 17th instant. M. Louis informed Mr. Lister this morning that the State Bank had consented to advance a sum of 1,000,000 fr. to the Sultan immediately. The question of the actual mode of payment of the troops which His Majesty is to levy has not as yet been decided, but it is being considered, and every precaution will be taken to insure that the money in question is employed for the purpose for which it has been advanced.

In the course of conversation Mr. Lister alluded to the intention of the French Government to organize a temporary police force for service in Morocco composed of Frenchmen and Spaniards. He gave M. Louis to understand that you shared the opinion of the French Government that such a step seemed to offer at the present moment the only means of providing for the safety of the Europeans at the open ports when the time came for the withdrawal of the military and naval forces, but that you presumed that it would be adopted as a temporary measure, pending the formation of the police force contemplated by the Algeciras Act. M. Louis repeated what he had said in his original conversation on the subject with Mr. Lister on the 8th instant. The formation of the Franco-Spanish police was a purely temporary measure, and as

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soon as the situation had improved sufficiently and suitable Moors were available the composition of the force would be transformed to meet the requirements of the Algeciras Act. The whole question of the organization of such a force was at this very moment being considered; a detailed scheme was being prepared, and would be ready to be put into operation the moment that circumstances permitted.

M. Louis said that there seemed to be a general improvement in the situation, and told Mr. Lister that the French Government considered the recent declaration of the Sultan to his subjects on the subject of the Casa Blanca incident to be highly satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

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[27934] No. 176.

*Lloyd's to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)*

Sir, *Lloyd's, August 19, 1907.*

I AM directed to forward you herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the inclosed copy of a letter from Messrs. Murdoch, Butler, and Co., Lloyd's agents at Casa Blanca, dated the 10th instant, with regard to the state of affairs then prevailing at that port.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD F. INGLEFIELD,
*Secretary.*

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Inclosure in No. 176.

*Messrs. Murdoch, Butler, and Co. to Lloyd's, London.*

Sir, *Casa Blanca, August 10, 1907.*

WE beg to furnish a condensed report of recent occurrences here.

For some time past the surrounding tribes were becoming increasingly irritated by the proceedings of the French in this district. The project of wireless telegraphy and the port works were a source of much disquietude, which culminated by the appointment of a French Controller in the custom-house. The townspeople and some Arabs, being completely exasperated, waited on Mulay Lamin requesting him to have the port works stopped and the Controller removed from the custom-house. Later on the mob got out of hand, and made an attack on the construction line of the port works, and killed nine European employés, three or four of whom were French. This occurred on the 30th July.

On the 2nd instant the French cruiser "Galilée" arrived. On the 5th she sent a landing party of about sixty men with the object of protecting the French Consulate, for which step there was no immediate necessity. The party, being far too small, met with a determined resistance. The "Galilée," on a signal from the French Consulate, began to bombard the town. The townspeople at once commenced to loot the town, and shortly after the tribes broke in the town gates and joined in the looting. The custom-house stores and all the shops were broken open. A Spanish gun-boat and a French cruiser subsequently arrived, which helped considerably. No British man-of-war was sent. Up till the 7th instant the situation was most critical and dangerous. On that day, however, four French battle-ships with troops arrived. After a vigorous bombardment, lasting about three hours, some 1,200 troops were landed and at once assumed the offensive. The streets were cleared of looters with great loss of life. The town is now quiet and being patrolled by a military police force. The remainder of the troops are encamped outside the town to repel any possible attack by the tribes.

The destruction of life and property is very great. About two-thirds of the town is in ruins. We are glad to say that there is practically no loss of life amongst the Europeans.

There is no doubt that the action of the French was very precipitate. Had the





"Galilée" only awaited the arrival of the fleet on the 7th, it is most probable that the town would have been occupied without a shot being fired, or any loss of life or property.

We are, &c.
(Signed) MURDOCH, BUTLER, AND Co.

P.S.—The banks were also looted.

M., B., AND Co.

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[27961] No. 177.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)*

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 20, 1907.*

I AM informed by British Vice-Consul at Mazagan that on the 16th Mulai Hafid was proclaimed Sultan at Marakesh.

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[27956] No. 178.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)*

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 20, 1907.*

MAKHZEN have informed French Chargé d'Affaires that Notables, referred to in my telegram No. 91 of the 18th instant, will really only discuss with French Legation, though their mission is ostensibly to discuss situation with foreign Representatives.

It is also represented by Minister for Foreign Affairs that 3,000,000 fr. are most urgently needed, as Makhzen is entirely without funds.

A serious situation may be brought about here if troops are left much longer without pay.

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[27975] No. 179.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)*

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 20, 1907.*

THERE is very bad news dated the 17th from Fez, where there is much talk of a Holy War. The Moorish Government has no power to repress any outbreak, and an endeavour will be made by all foreigners to reach the coast under a strong escort.

It is now almost certain that the anti-French movement will spread through the country. The British Consular Agent at Marakesh, who has just arrived at Tangier, is persuaded that all the southern tribes will unite against the French.

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[27995] No. 180.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 283.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 15, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two despatches received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez. His No. 76 records a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the measures to be taken to insure the safety of the foreign community in the event of an anti-Christian outbreak, as also an exchange of views with the Acting French Consul.

Mr. MacLeod's language appears to have, under the circumstances, been suitable. Both Mr MacLeod and M. Marc appear to consider, as I anticipated, that it was impossible to take the risk, even with a considerable escort, of attempting to reach the coast.



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In his despatch No. 77 Mr. MacLeod relates the steps taken by the Makhzen, and the statement made to him and his colleagues jointly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 180.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 76.)

*Fez, August* 10, 1907.

Sir,

WITH the view of learning what answer the Makhzen were giving to the Acting French Consul's request respecting the security of the French Colony here, and to ascertain what steps the Makhzen proposed to take in regard to the safeguarding of foreigners here in general, I asked Sid-ben-Sliman for an interview last evening. The Viziers were in consultation all the evening, however, and so he did not see me till 6·45 this morning.

The Vizier said the Acting French Consul had asked for "an official guarantee" for the safety of the French Colony here, or on the road to the coast should they leave Fez. The Makhzen could not understand what this demand meant. They were confident they could, in Fez, safeguard Europeans, French included, but they would not give an assurance the terms of which they did not understand. What did the Acting Consul mean?

I answered that the circumstances were exceptional, and that it was obviously an exceptional, officially stated guarantee which was wanted, and that I could not understand the Makhzen's not seeing this.

Sid-ben-Sliman then said the Makhzen would consider what steps they should take —though they apprehended no outbreak here, and would answer the French Acting Consul at once—and he (the Vizier) would shortly convoke all the official Consuls to discuss this point. It was plain, however, the Vizier went on, that Europeans, especially French, even with an escort, would be safer here than in the country, when the news of landing of troops arrived. We then discussed the best means of protecting Europeans here. Practically all Europeans live, or could live, in one quarter of the city—that is in the one in which the British, French, and German Consulates are situated. The approaches to it are all narrow streets, with gates, and easy to defend. The east end of the Sultan's Palace, various houses of Viziers, and leading Shereefs, are near the approaches or inside this quarter. If a few soldiers (as good ones as were available) could be placed near the approaches—and the Viziers' and Shereefs' houses always had parties of trusty men, and Europeans refrained from going about the city—the risks would be minimized. This all should be done as unostentatiously, but as speedily as possible, for it was important that public attention should not be excited. Putting parties of soldiers (for the most part merely armed rabble) at Europeans' houses would do more harm than good. I advocated strongly the usefulness of the Makhzen keeping some influential Shereefs—notably two Shereefs of Wazzan now here—in and near the European quarter, and their impressing the Moorish people of the quarter—mostly sensible people in good position. These were the steps taken, with entirely satisfactory results, in the crisis following the late Sultan's death, and I mentioned one Shereef in particular, Mulai Dris-ben-Abdelhadi, who is highly and justly venerated by the public here, and did valuable service on the occasion referred to, as being one whose good offices should be available at any moment. I pointed out, however, that the principal house of Hadj Omar Tazzy was in that quarter, and I thought at present it would be well if Hadj Omar were to live elsewhere, as, did a riot occur, his house assuredly would be of enormous attraction to the mob, as would other Tazzy houses in the same quarter. I was careful to say, however, that it was the Makhzen who would be responsible for the measures taken and for the safety of Europeans.

I then inquired what the Makhzen proposed to do in regard to preparing the native population for the news of the landing of troops. Sid-ben-Sliman said that that was the question which was now engaging the Makhzen, and then went on, in a hopeful strain, to say that nothing would happen here. Fez people were sensible, not like tribesmen, and so on. Didn't I think so? What were my ideas about it. I said there was a large population here, most of whom were peaceful, industrious people. There was a large substratum, however, of ignorant rabble. They were very amenable, however, to the Shereefs and Ulema. I thought the Sultan would do well once and for



all to put himself on the side of France and Europe, and to take the Shereefs and Ulema into his confidence. His Majesty could explain to them, and they to the ignorant and dangerous classes, this was not an affair between Moslem and French, or between Moslems and Christians, but between justice and injustice, authority and savage, cowardly rebellion, and imbue these leading men with the truth that all Europe, and France in particular, sought only to uphold the authority of the Prince of Believers. As they had lent money, so had the Powers lent men, and the circumstances were such that the Makhzen at Fez had not had either time nor power to act, and so the Powers had acted at once, as the situation on the spot had demanded, and in co-operation with His Majesty's uncle Mulai-al-Amin. Were this course followed promptly, and were news from Casa Blanca forestalled by energetic and judicious circulation of the foregoing, which was the truth (I said with all the emphasis I could) I should have hope for a good result both here and elsewhere permanently. But if the Sultan, at this juncture, took the opposite course and ranged himself at the head of all the ignorant, savage people in the country, and against France and Europe, the result would be such a deluge as no one could imagine. Could the Vizier expect any other issue to such a struggle? The Vizier answered that he, too, could see no other result, and assured me he would do his best to advocate such a course being followed.

He then went up to the Palace.

On returning here I received your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant.

The French Acting Consul had then gone to the Palace. Soon after he returned, I had a long discussion with him on the whole situation, and told him the language I had held to the Vizier. M. Marc agreed with it all entirely, and said there was now no question of any foreigners here, in the meantime going to the coast. They could, obviously, be made safer here than on the road, even if escorted. Less than 500 good soldiers would not be sufficient escort for the French colony, and 500 good soldiers were not to be had.

M. Marc suggested that in following the plan I have described it would be well that the command of the European quarter here should be entrusted to one man, and that he be very carefully selected, and be a man of unquestionable high authority.

With this I agreed. M. Marc then said he had suppressed the circulation of newspapers with Arabic version of recent events, which could do no good and might do infinite mischief. I shall do the same with Arabic papers, which in a few days may come from Egypt or elsewhere by our post.

This afternoon I communicated the foregoing to my Spanish colleague, and he entirely concurred therein. He and Dr. Bolenguer, the only Spaniards, and Mr. and Mrs. Sampayo, the only Portuguese subjects here, live in an outlying quarter on the north-east of the city. They will all probably come at once to a house attached to the French Consulate, kindly afforded to them by M. Marc, so will be with the rest of the European colony, except the German officers, who live in New Fez next to the Sultan's Palace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—Sid-ben-Sliman has asked the Consuls to see him this evening.

Yesterday our courier from Rabat told me that tribesmen near there said they had heard cannon firing at Casa Blanca, but did not know the cause of it. I asked Sid-ben-Sliman this morning if he had any news. He said "Something," but would not pursue the subject. I conclude, for he was in good spirits, that it was only of the certainty of troops being landed that he had heard. I learned, by your Excellency's despatches, of the bombardment on reaching here after seeing Ben Sliman.

J. M. MACL.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 180.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 77.)

*Fez, August* 10, 1907 (*evening*).

Sir,

THIS afternoon many leading Shereefs, Ulema and other Notables were summoned to the Palace and informed by the Makhzen of what occurred at Casa Blanca, and towards evening the news began to be whispered in town. So far, however, there has been no commotion to report.

Prices of wheat and other foodstuffs (here sure indications of popular feeling) have only advanced some 10 per cent., and still remain very cheap.

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In the evening the Vizier for Foreign Affairs sent for the Consuls. He said the Sultan had requested him to express how much His Majesty had been moved by the murders of Europeans at Casa Blanca. But for his troops being all engaged against Raisuli, His Majesty would by now have himself been punishing those tribes. These people had died, however, as decreed by God! The Sultan wished to say that nothing that had happened would make any difference in his feelings towards all foreign Governments—particularly the French Government, and looked forward to a happy issue from all present troubles. In the meantime, His Majesty had to remark that there might naturally be some emotion felt by the Moslem population when they learned the numbers of their fellow Moslems who had died, and before they understood the facts of all that had happened, and so he hoped the Consuls here would enjoin on foreigners to remain in doors for a few days. The Makhzen would be glad to have lists of the names and addresses of all foreigners here, and the Acting Governor would send for the leading Moslems neighbouring them all, and the heads of the quarters, and warn them that they would be held responsible for their safety, and that careful guard be kept over them, and the least manifestation towards them be promptly checked.

We thanked the Vizier for this message, and said we would at once give effect to what had been asked of us. The measures proposed appeared to all of us very satisfactory and much preferable to the use as guards of soldiers as the Makhzen have at Fez.

In reply to a request I made of him the Vizier said that the Kaïd of Sefroo would be instructed to send a sure escort from Sefroo on Monday the 12th instant, with Mr. and Mrs. Simpson (Americans) and Miss Mellet and Miss Denison, and to this escort the Makhzen would add a party of horsemen of the Makhzen tribe (Sheraida) whose lands lie between Fez and Sefroo.

The Spanish Consul and Dr. Belenguer, and Mr. and Mrs. Sampayo have come up to the house M. Marc has lent them in this quarter.

We all remarked that the Vizier and his secretary, Sid Bakili, who was with him, were much less moved than might have been expected. Indeed, we half suspected them of thinking the Makhzen had been relieved of a most embarrassing duty.

Some days ago the Makhzen received letters from various tribes at Tafilelt offering their services of some 2,000 men to go on a campaign with the Sultan, on the same terms as in 1903, when such a body accompanied His Majesty against the Pretender. They proved both useless and costly, and their services have been declined.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[27996] No. 181.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 284.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 15, 1907.

IN some of Mr. Madden's despatches which I have had the honour of forwarding to you, there have been expressions of opinion to the effect that the pillage of Dar-al-Baida might have been avoided by a less hasty landing of an insufficient force by the French, and the same view has reached me from a variety of other sources, including some of my colleagues. In Mr. Madden's despatch No. 183 of the 11th instant it was stated that Mr. Brandt, a German subject and Austrian Vice-Consul, was coming to Tangier to lay that view before the German and Austrian Chargé d'Affaires. Mr. Brandt came here and stayed in the house of the German Chargé d'Affaires. That gentleman has been very discreet about venturing an opinion on the subject, but from what I have been able to gather I believe he was not entirely convinced of the justice of Mr. Brandt's view. Moreover, I gather that the Moorish officials here, framing their opinion on the letter received from their colleagues at Dar-al-Baida, are convinced that these latter had on the eve of the landing of the first French party, convinced themselves that the town could no longer hold out against the invading tribes, and had so informed the French Acting Consul.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[27997] No. 182.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 285.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 15, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador relative to the situation there.

I may add that, as the despatch came through Dar-al-Baida under flying seal, Mr. Madden at once communicated with the French authorities there, and I am informed by the French Legation that a war-ship has now been dispatched to Mogador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 182.

*Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Mogador, August* 12, 1907.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 40 of the 5th instant, there has been no visible change in the situation in this town and district.

Thanks to the German Vice-Consul, who receives a daily report from the German postmaster at Mazagan, we have been more or less kept *au courant* of what has taken place at Casa Blanca and the other coast towns, and the news received so far is not of a nature to allay the anxiety prevailing. The population, Europeans and Jews alike, have been daily expecting the arrival of a war-ship, which would have the effect of tranquillizing even the most panic-stricken, but up to this moment no ship has come, and the anxiety is increasing. The Spanish Consul made it his duty on repeated occasions to call on the Governor and ask him to take all necessary precautions. On his asking the Kaïd a few days ago whether he could rely on the loyalty and support of the garrison, Bargash replied he was afraid he could not count on them simply because they were not sufficiently paid. M. Buigas thereupon wrote to the Governor urging him to have their pay increased for the moment, as undoubtedly the Makhzen would sooner pay a few extra hundred dollars than have a repetition of the events at Casa Blanca. The Governor promised he would endeavour to raise the money for that purpose.

The danger lies in the event of Anfluz and his followers trying to come into Mogador. It is the general opinion that even if the Governor attempted to prevent them he could not do so, not so much because of the great number of tribesmen that Anfluz could muster, but on account of the great popularity he seems to enjoy amongst the Moorish population of the town. Indeed, I am told that every one of the soldiers would join him at once.

Another source of danger is the rumoured visit of the Sheikh Ma-el-Ainin. Yesterday he was said to be within a short distance of Mogador, and that he had sent a message to Bargash informing him of his intended visit. The French Consul, on hearing this, called on the Governor this morning and pointed out the danger of allowing Ma-el-Ainin to come into Mogador at such an inopportune moment, and the Kaïd said he had requested the Sheikh to postpone his visit.

At a Consular meeting held this morning, it was unanimously agreed to detain the Spanish steamer "Cartagena," which arrived from the Canary Islands, and to request the French Consul to write at once to the captain of the French cruiser, said to be at Saffi, to come here with his ship or to try and send another ship without delay. But as a German steamer has just arrived bringing the news that the French cruiser has left Saffi for the north, we decided to dispatch the "Cartagena" direct to Casa Blanca with a collective telegram begging that a man-of-war may be sent to this port as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

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[27998] No. 183.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 286.)
*Tangier, August* 15, 1907.

Sir,

I YESTERDAY received a letter direct from Raisuli, translation of which I inclose herewith. In this letter he demands that the two Mehallas should be withdrawn and that the British Consular Agent at Alcazar should go out and negotiate with him, as he declines to accept any Makhzen authority in this capacity. This may indicate that Raisuli has been driven into a corner, especially as I hear at the same time from Kaïd Maclean that Raisuli and he moved to another spot. But on the other hand, it is now apparent that the Khamas have not Raisuli in their possession as they have endeavoured to make us believe, and as the Moorish authorities also stated.

I was, however, unwilling to disregard altogether the letter of Raisuli though not in favour of replying direct to him. I have, consequently, sent a letter to Kaïd Maclean, a copy of which I inclose herewith, stating that the Mehallas will be withdrawn when Kaïd Maclean is liberated, and that the French Government will guarantee him and his family against molestation or interference, provided he undertakes to live quietly and in peace, if Kaïd Maclean is delivered up within five days. I also, as you will see, added a note in Arabic so that Raisuli should have no doubt as to the exact terms of the arrangement regarding the proposed guarantee to be given to him. This I had concerted with my French colleague before dispatching the letter, and he has written to the Makhzen intimating that in case of necessity he would be prepared to extend to Raisuli a protection of this nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 183.

*Raisuli to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) 2 *Rajab*, 1325 (*August* 12, 1907).

YOU are not aware of the negotiations which passed between us and the Makhzen through Kaïd Maclean and those negotiations were conducted by us and him in perfect good faith, and when he went to Fez and the agitators at Court who do not look to results nor pay heed to the disasters into which they will fall, saw that the matter was about to end satisfactorily through your intermediary they made haste to seize my property and to arrest those who are related to me so that the negotiations might thereby be broken off and disorder be produced. On the return of Kaïd Maclean from Fez as it was clear to me that the Makhzen was not working honestly nor for good results to any one I took Kaïd Maclean—in safety and protected—and told him in order that the settlement may take place through you as regards what has passed and what has happened between me and them. You have paid no attention to this and you have listened to those, on whose words and doings no reliance is to be placed, as though you did not know them and they make you promises that I and Kaïd Maclean will be brought in by means of the sword and I have turned away my eyes from negotiations until all talk is proved vain and all doubt removed. Those who are conducting Kaïd Maclean's case have no desire to do so, they have two objects, one to await his death because of the nonsense to which no shrewd ears would listen which is told to them, the other to cause delay because of their salaries as the greater their salaries the less their work. They place reliance on any one who tells them lies and calumny and put you off with it. It is now forty-five days that Kaïd Maclean is in my hands and you have had no result from their talking and actions. It is now necessary to write to you and if you have any desire to negotiate in the matter the two Mehallas of Ben Bagdadi and El Merani must be removed and both of them depart and Consul Bibi (Carleton) come out to me that I may speak to him personally about negotiations in the case. I will neither accept El Merani nor any other of the Makhzen people except through your Government and if you expect to get Kaïd Maclean through any other means than through your Government, by God they will never see him from me and if they have more Mehallas let them bring them, by God.





Up to the present I have paid no heed to them nor have I met them with the opposition they merit, this from regard to you. I have told Kaïd Maclean verbally what I have written to you as in his letter inclosed. Reply to me about this.

(Signed) HAMED-BEN-MOHAMMED RAISULI.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 183.

*Sir G. Lowther to Kaid Sir H. Maclean.*

My dear Kaid,
*Tangier, August* 14, 1907.

I HAVE received Raisuli's letter of the 2nd Rajab, but he will understand that it is impossible for me to have any dealings with him direct. Raisuli is aware that negotiations were in progress between him and you on behalf of the Makhzen, which were being conducted in perfect good faith. I would have seen that any arrangements made by you were carried out, but he broke his word and took you prisoner.

You may, however, tell Raisuli that the British Government no longer take the same interest in Morocco as formerly, and therefore cannot give him the protection themselves, but the French Government have expressed their readiness to guarantee him and his family against any molestation or interference, provided that he undertakes to live quietly and in peace, on condition that you are delivered either to the Mehallas or at Alcazar or Tangier within five days from the hour you give Raisuli this information. It should be quite clear to Raisuli that His Majesty's Government after their experience of his want of good faith would never allow any British subject to place himself at his mercy, as he would treat him in the same way as he has treated you.

Meanwhile, nothing whatever will be done by me to suspend the action of the Mehallas, which are acting entirely independent of us. At the same time should Raisuli take advantage of this loophole which is offered him to escape from his present precarious position, and release you, the Mehallas will of course be at once withdrawn, the object of their expedition having been obtained. The inclosure in Arabic is the following: (This can be given to Raisuli and should relieve him of all doubt as to our sincerity)—

"Mehallas will not suspend their action until Kaid Maclean is released, when they will be at once withdrawn.

"In consideration of release of Kaid Maclean the French Government have promised the British Minister to guarantee Raisuli and his family against any reprisals so long as he lives quietly and in peace."

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[27999] No. 184.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 287.)
*Tangier, August* 15, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit copies of two further despatches from His Majesty's Consul relative to the present situation at Dar-al-Baida.

It will be seen that it is rumoured that some friction is occurring between the French and Spanish authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 184.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 189.)
*Dar-al-Baida, August* 14, 1907.

Sir,

THE following wireless message has just reached me from the French authorities:—

"From the British Vice-Consul, Mazagan, to the British Consul at Casa Blanca:

"All Europeans were to leave Marrakesch Sunday morning for Saffi under escort of Mulai Hafid.

"Mazagan town quiet, but we always fear an attack from the Arabs, which town could not resist.

"Have no news of Miss Spinney. Is she well?"

I replied that Miss Spinney is quite well.

Yesterday, having a chance of writing to Saffi by a British cargo-boat, I directed Mr. Vice-Consul Hunot to dispatch a letter from me to Mr. Consular Agent Lennox at Morocco city, informing him of events at this place, and advising British subjects to go to Saffi or Mogador, and leaving Mr. Lennox a free hand to do what is for the best in all the circumstances. It is therefore very satisfactory to know that they should all be safe on the coast by this time.

I beg to inclose copy of a Circular regarding the distribution of bread sent by your Excellency to British subjects.

Mr. Vice-Consul Wilkinson has addressed your Excellency a despatch asking for a war-ship to be sent to Mogador, as an incursion by Kaïd Hamed Anflus was to be feared.

The storm which has just broken out against Europeans here has, in the opinion of people who have lived long in this place, been steadily brewing for a very long time, but it was not expected that trouble would have taken place till after the harvest. I am informed that even respectable foreign protégés fired from their houses on the French; at least one (esteemed previously) French protégé did so, and, seeing the game was up, to save himself he threw out of his windows thirteen rifles and a lot of ammunition and many empty cartridge cases. The Moors made a determined effort to drive Christians out, once for all, into the sea, and they nearly succeeded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 184.

*Circular issued by Consul Madden respecting Distribution of Bread.*

To all British subjects:

HIS Majesty's Minister has kindly sent me a supply of bread and fresh meat.
The bread is now at this Consulate, but the oxen are not yet landed.
Those who would like some bread can have it by sending for it now.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 14, 1907.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 184.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 190.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 14, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a note of the Spanish troops in Casa Blanca furnished to me by the Spanish authorities.

I hear privately that the French and Spanish are not getting on very well together; the French desire the Spanish to go outside, as the French have undertaken the policing of the town. It seems that there have been a good many orders and counter-orders and confusion.

I suppose an arrangement will be come to in the matter.

The French Captain was heard saying this morning that the French complained bitterly of the searchlights displayed by the Spanish war-ships last evening; they were illuminating the French outposts, and therefore making them visible to the Arabs, while the French could not see the Arabs on account of the lights.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—The cruiser "Gloire" was yesterday afternoon again bombarding the Arab villages to the south of Casa Blanca with her heavy cannons.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 184.

*Note of Spanish Troops in Dar-al-Baida.*

DON ENRIQUE GUITTERREZ VALCARCEL, Captain of Ceuta Infantry.
Another officer of same rank.
7 officers.
1 army doctor.
3 sergeants.
20 corporals.
317 soldiers.
25 mules and material.
10 "tiradores de Riff."
120 cavalry, under a Captain.
A section of "ametralladores," under a Lieutenant, and 10 or 12 soldiers.

By steam-ship "Ciudad de Cádiz."
All at the disposition of the Chief of Police (Spanish).

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[28112] No. 185.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 22.)

(No. 121.)

Sir, *San Ildefonso, August* 18, 1907.

IN my telegram No. 39 of the 12th instant I reported from San Sebastian, where I was spending a few days, that M. Révoil, French Ambassador, was then quite satisfied with the attitude which, after some apparent hesitation, the Spanish Government had been led by French and British persuasion, and by the force of events, to adopt with regard to joint action on the Morocco coast.

M. Révoil had been summoned to Paris on the outbreak of the troubles at Casa Blanca, and had taken part in the Councils of the French Government at which the course to be pursued was determined. The language at first held by the Marquis del Muni, Spanish Ambassador at Paris, and the note in which he embodied the instructions, which the Spanish Government enabled me to report to you in my despatch No. 119 of the 8th instant, were regarded in Paris as indicating a desire on the part of the Spanish Government to abstain from the vigorous action held by M. Clemenceau's Government to be absolutely necessary. France accordingly took her measures without waiting to concert them in detail with Spain. There was, indeed, not a moment to be lost, but in Spain, where joint action with France is not popular, the promptitude and independence of the first steps taken by her neighbour, and the issue of a French Circular to the Powers without Spanish participation, gave considerable offence and created among the members of the Spanish Government an impression that France was taking advantage of events at Casa Blanca to embark on a military expedition into the interior of Morocco. In such a venture Spain would not allow herself to become involved if she could help it.

Such was the Spanish frame of mind when on the 7th August the news arrived of the landing of a French detachment at Casa Blanca from the "Galilée," of the resistance offered by the Moors, of the consequent bombardment, and of the landing of a Spanish detachment from the "Alvaro de Bazan," for the protection of the Spanish population.

It at once became evident that measures similar to those adopted by France could no longer be avoided. M. Révoil arrived at San Sebastian from Paris on the morning of the 7th. The last vestige of hesitation felt by Señor Allendesalazar, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was overcome by his representations. Señor Maura, President of the Council of Ministers, before leaving San Sebastian that day for a German health resort, gave his full consent to the course proposed. A Spanish Circular to the Powers was hastily drafted on the lines of the French Circular; troops were prepared for embarkation at Cadiz and Ceuta; a steamer of the Transatlantic Company of Barcelona was chartered to convey them to Casa Blanca; and by the 11th instant 300 Spanish marine infantry and 100 cavalry, with several machine guns, actually embarked for the scene of the disturbances. They are believed to have reached their destination on the 13th instant.

Although I had from the first urged the necessity of proceeding hand in hand with

France, and had sent a special message to that effect to the Spanish Prime Minister through Señor de Osma, Minister of Finance, on the 7th instant from Madrid, I thought it my duty to proceed myself to San Sebastian, whence the foreign affairs of the country are now being conducted, in order to assist M. Révoil, if in any way I could do so, in keeping the Spanish Government up to the mark.

M. Révoil, as stated above, was satisfied with the turn which events were taking in Spain. The necessity of free co-operation with France had been fully recognized by the King of Spain in conversation with his Excellency. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was no longer in any doubt of what should be done. News had been received of the plucky behaviour of the Spanish landing-force, which had for the time almost reconciled the press to the unpopular policy of intervention.

France had no desire to press Spain to send a larger force than that which was already on its way. On the contrary, a small force, under the command of Señor Santa Olalla, the Chief Spanish Police Inspector for Morocco, suited French views entirely, as the thorny question of the command-in-chief of the forces was thereby settled without dispute in favour of General Drude.

I found Señor Allendesalazar also quite satisfied with the course of events. He thought, indeed, that he was entitled to take credit to himself for having led the French Government, by the tone of his instructions to the Marquis del Muni, to restrict somewhat the extent of their armed intervention in Morocco. He also continued to hope that no advance into the interior would become necessary, and he attached importance to the explanations of the action of Spain, which he had caused to be published, and by which her participation was represented rather in the light of a first step towards the organization of the new police force than in that of a military expedition.

M. Révoil considers that there is no harm in the Spanish contingent being regarded by Spain as a police force, if Spanish participation is thereby rendered easier, and I have not myself disputed this view of the matter. Up to the date of my leaving San Sebastian (15th August) to return to San Ildefonso I did not hear from Señor Allendesalazar that any lack of harmony existed between the Spanish Commander and General Drude, such as the newspapers have reported.

During an audience with which I was honoured by King Alfonso, His Majesty said that Spain had at first found it necessary to define carefully the limits within which she could consent to take part in warlike operations on the Morocco coast. He was, however, fully determined to take a due share in the French proceedings, which he recognized had been forced upon the French Government by the barbarities committed by the tribes. His Majesty was much gratified by the reports he had received of the behaviour of the Spanish landing force.

I need not repeat that the Spanish armed intervention is unpopular in this country. Besides the aversion to assisting France towards establishing a hold over Morocco which would threaten Spanish interests, there is a feeling that those interests would be more efficiently served by employing the money and troops, now being used for a common object with France, in restoring communications between Melilla and the interior, and in thus asserting the predominance of Spain along the Riff Coast.

The situation at Melilla is rapidly becoming intolerable.

The Sultan's troops, unpaid and unreinforced, suffice only to block the single road into the interior, and they make no impression on the rebel troops behind. The latter, indeed, are said to be gaining in strength, and there are not wanting influential voices in Spain which demand an understanding with the semi-independent tribes in place of the continued hopeless endeavour to bolster up an Imperial Power at Fez which is rapidly becoming a mere phantom.

The Spanish tendency to support the tribes against the Imperial troops was illustrated a few months ago in the encouragement extended from Ceuta to the Valiente family, in opposition to the Angera Chief, who enjoyed the support of the Sultan.

In Melilla the same tendency is becoming more and more marked as the Imperial authority approaches the vanishing point.

But though the Spanish Government sympathizes with this feeling, they recognize that their first object must be to fulfil, however much they dislike doing so, the duties undertaken by them at Algeciras. Those duties have forced them into co-operation with France, and there is no present sign of their withdrawal from the partnership.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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[28149] No. 186.

*Acting Consul-General Dundas to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Algiers, August* 22, 1907.

TROOPSHIP[S] left Oran for Casa Blanca with troops and stores.

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[28152] No. 187.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 22, 1907.

SHOULD new Governor appointed by Mulai Hafid arrive at Mogador with armed escort and be opposed by actual Governor, Vice-Consul, Mogador, wishes to know what he should do. I can only communicate with him with difficulty; I propose, however, to instruct him that he should do all in his power to avoid a conflict, and that he should support the Governor, who is most likely to secure the safety of Europeans.

The appointments made by Mulai Hafid might be recognized on the grounds that he was Sultan's Viceroy.

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[28741] No. 188.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 472. Confidential.)
(Extract.) *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1907.

I TOLD M. Geoffray to-day that, though I had not yet seen Sir Charles Hardinge, he had sent me a written account of his interview with Prince Bülow.

It had been very favourable, and friendly in tone.

* * * * * * *

With regard to Morocco, Prince Bülow had said that he was most anxious for an improvement in the relations between France and Germany. He thought this could be effected by a display of tact on both sides, especially on the part of the local Representatives of the two Powers. He was convinced that France had no intention of attacking Germany; and he gave most formal assurances that Germany had no intention of attacking France, nor of creating difficulties for her in Morocco. He realized the difficulties which France already had in Morocco, and he did not desire to increase them. He had sent instructions that the Moorish authorities were to be made to understand that, as long as France and Spain acted in conformity with, and within the limits of, the Algeciras Act, the Moorish authorities would have no support from the German Government or German Representatives in opposition to France and Spain. All Prince Bülow wanted was that German traders and merchants should not be unfairly treated by the French authorities, and should not be excluded from fair competition.

M. Geoffray said all that France desired was to act in conformity with the Algeciras Act. He further observed that during the last few weeks there had been a favourable change in the attitude of the German Legation in Morocco.

I said it was very likely that, when Prince Bülow spoke of the need for tact on the part of local Representatives, he had Dr. Rosen in his mind.

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[28161] No. 189.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 23.)

(No. 410.) *Paris, August* 22, 1907.

Sir,

THE "Journal Officiel" of yesterday announced that the following officers have been placed by the Ministry of War at the disposal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for employment in the police force of Morocco, viz.:—

Captain Poulet, of the 2nd Tirailleurs;
Adjutant Brèthès, of the 3rd Tirailleurs; and
Sergeant Dieuche, of the 2nd Tirailleurs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[28162] No. 190.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 23.)

(No. 411.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 22, 1907.

AN official communiqué was issued to the press yesterday evening, stating that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for War and the Under-Secretary of State for the Interior met yesterday morning at the Ministry of Marine to consider the despatches recently received from Morocco, and to settle various questions of detail.

The communiqué adds that Admiral Philibert has telegraphed that General Drude considers it necessary that his forces should be increased in order effectively to insure the protection of Casa Blanca.

The "Débats" states further that it understands that Admiral Philibert's request for reinforcements will be complied with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[28275] No. 191.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 23.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 23, 1907.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 73.

French Chargé d'Affaires thinks it premature to give instructions for eventuality in question, and has not yet done so.

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[28152] No. 192.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 95 of the 22nd instant.

It would be advisable to ascertain what instructions French Consul at Mogador has received, as it is important that the Consuls should all act together, and their action must depend upon view taken by the French, who have material force there to back it.

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[28359] No. 193.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 24, 1907.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 92 of the 20th.

British Consuls at Mazagan and Saffi now confirm proclamation as Sultan of Mulai Hafid. Most of the powerful southern Governors are supporting him, and it is expected that he will immediately march to Dar-al-Baida. Some appointments have already been made by him.

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[28374] No. 194.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 25.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 25, 1907.

MOST of the troops in this district belonging to the South, and War Minister being totally devoid of funds to pay them, he fears that Proclamation of Mulai Hafid will cause desertions on large scale, if not mutiny and looting.



French Chargé d'Affaires has expressed to me the hope that pressure may be immediately brought to bear by His Majesty's Government, otherwise situation may become very serious here, as the State Bank in Paris insists on receiving the guarantees demanded by them from Fez, before paying out the sums in their hands.

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[28414] No. 195.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 288.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 15, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the instructions which I have sent to His Majesty's Consul at Fez, requesting him to put himself in communication with his French colleague and to use his discretion in regard to leaving Fez with the British colony.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 195.

*Sir G. Lowther to Consul MacLeod.*

Sir, *Tangier, August* 15, 1907.

THE recent events at Casa Blanca must necessarily be followed by the punishment of the guilty tribes, and although comparative calm appears to exist at Fez, any advance of foreign troops may be the signal of an anti-Christian outbreak at Fez, or even a movement against the Sultan, which might place the lives of foreigners in danger. There is a likelihood that for some days the French and Spaniards at Casa Blanca will only act on the defensive, and that this may produce a period of calm which might give an opportunity to the foreign community to withdraw to the coast. On the other hand, it is within the range of possibility that the Sultan may consider it possible for him to move to Rabat, in which case the foreign community might leave at the same time and place themselves under His Majesty's protection. You should therefore concert with your French and other colleagues as to whether, granted that quiet continues to prevail for the moment, it would not be advisable for you to demand a sufficient escort to leave Fez. But you must necessarily be guided by the conditions and circumstances of the moment, and keep in close touch with your French colleague, who will no doubt be kept well informed of the action of the French troops.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28416] No. 196.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 289.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 16, 1907.

ON the receipt of your despatch No. 121 of the 27th ultimo, I addressed a communication to the Director of the State Bank here, informing him that His Majesty's Government considered that it resulted clearly from the wording of Article 66 of the Act of Algeciras that the special fund was only intended to be applied towards paying for public works, benefiting trade and navigation which have been leased out to contract in accordance with the Regulations drawn up under that Article.

My communication was referred to the Central Office in Paris, and the Director has now replied to me in the letter of which I inclose copy herewith.

You will perceive that the Director inquires whether the omission by me of all mention of the Tangier port was intentional. I purposely did not include Tangier, as the works for that port were decided upon and the contracts drawn up before the Conference at Algeciras met, and that, therefore, it seemed to me that there could be no question whatever of these being paid for out of the funds of the "Caisse Spéciale."

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 196.

*Director of the State Bank of Morocco to Sir Gerard Lowther.*

*Paris, le* 10 *Août*, 1907.

M. le Minister,

NOTRE Directeur à Tanger nous transmet la lettre que vous avez bien voulu adresser à la Banque d'État du Maroc à la date du 3 Août.

Nous prenons très bonne note de l'avis que reproduit cette lettre au sujet des dépenses relatives aux travaux projetés dans les ports de Casa Blanca, Larache, et Saffi.

Est-ce intentionnellement que vous n'avez pas compris dans cette énumération les travaux du port de Tanger?

Nous aurons soin de communiquer votre lettre au Conseil d'Administration de la Banque en sa prochaine séance, qui aura lieu le 17 Août.

Permettez-nous de vous rappeler que la Banque est, en vertu de l'Acte d'Algésiras, le trésorier-payeur du Gouvernement Marocain, et qu'elle ne peut payer en dehors de cas spéciaux visés dans le dit Acte que sur des ressources versées ou concédées par le Gouvernement Marocain.

Nous ajouterons que nous n'avons jusqu'ici reçu aucune communication au sujet des travaux projetés, ni au sujet de leurs paiements.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) BANQUE D'ÉTAT DU MAROC.

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[28111] No. 197.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 290.)

*Tangier, August* 16, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 283 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, recording what took place at the meeting of the Ulema and Shereefs called by the Sultan. The Report is a far more encouraging one than that given by the Minister of War, and that which I have gleaned from other sources here. The attitude assumed by the Sultan appears to have been the best to adopt under the circumstances. Sid Mohammed Kitsani, who is said by Mr. MacLeod to have suggested that the French should be bought off, no doubt saw in the proposal a possibility of enriching himself, as he is known to be very grasping.

The action of the Sultan and Makhzen seems, on this occasion, to have been more proper than is usually the case on the occasion of a panic, but the action of the hill tribes has yet to be awaited.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 197.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 78.)

*Fez, August* 12, 1907.

Sir,

THE Ulema and Shereefs summoned by the Sultan on the 10th instant were some thirty in number, all men of the highest standing.

While waiting to see the Sultan there was some discussion amongst themselves. One of them, Sid Hamed Ben-el-Khayat, said Moslems were getting tired of this sort of thing (meaning the whole course of events during the last few years). Let them fight the Christians, and end the situation one way or the other . . . . as God might Decree! The rest of the Ulema unanimously dissented, saying: "We have neither force, nor money, nor "policy" (meaning high political skill or resources of policy), and, lastly, the Christians have not been the aggressors. Sid Mohammed Kitsani said, half sadly, half scornfully: "This is no time to debate whether or not to fight those people. We must first pay them. Thereafter it will be time enough to debate the question of peace or war!"

The Ulema were then received by the Sultan. The Sultan said he had sent for them to tell them the facts of certain events, to prevent them from being misled by untruths which might by-and-by be circulated. About Oujdah, they knew how that





matter stood. He had been doing his best to settle all that, and was on the point of success, when the Raisuli troubles (*i.e.*, the capture of Kaïd Sir H. Maclean) occurred. Lastly, bands of ruffians from Shawia and elsewhere had, without provocation, massacred no less than nine Christians at Casa Blanca! The Sultan then, to the Ulema's surprise, gave them his blessing, and the audience ended. They, however, on reflection quite understood His Majesty's meaning, which was that this, for the moment, was the only fact for them to keep in view and to propagate.

This seems to me a wise manner of trusting the Ulema, because when rumours get into circulation the ignorant classes will inquire of the Ulema what the matter is, and they will answer thus: "The tribes at Casa Blanca unprovokedly murdered nine Christians."

Next morning (yesterday) the Sultan summoned the leading Moslem merchants to the Palace. Some fifty attended. To them the Sultan repeated what he had said to the Ulema, but added words to the following effect: "And the result is that my troops and troops of the French Government are in occupation of Casa Blanca," and concluded by saying that there were foreigners living in Fez, the Makhzen was on friendly terms with all their Governments, and so His Majesty enjoined them to treat all foreigners as guests, to be safeguarded and respected.

Yesterday afternoon the Acting Governor of Fez by the Sultan's order convoked all the "Aminats"-es-Suak (Headmen of the various trades) and "Mukuddmin" (Headmen or Sheikhs of city wards), and addressed to them the same language exactly as His Majesty had held to the merchants, and added that they would be held responsible for the safety of each Christian near them, and for any disorder in their respective markets and quarters, and they must suppress with the utmost promptness and energy the slightest appearance of ill-will to foreigners or disorder of any kind. Cafés in particular must be watched carefully. (In Fez cafés are resorted to only by the lowest orders.)

To forestall any panic in regard to food becoming scarce, the Makhzen put Embeznia (gendarmes) at all the grain markets. No person was allowed to buy more than two measures of wheat at a time. The result of this wise precaution was that speculators were prevented from buying up stock, and every poor person could find a supply of bread. Wheat rose from 17 to (no more than) 25 reals vellon per measure.

The general population appear, withal, still to be concerned chiefly with the results to themselves personally of disorders and troubles amongst the Kabyles, leading to scarcity of food, fuel, &c., which they think possible.

In the evening guards of soldiers were placed at the approaches to this quarter, in which all the Europeans (except the German officers) are now residing.

This forenoon such public feeling as there was seems to be subsiding, and wheat has fallen from 25 to 21 reals vellon the measure.

Miss Mellett and Miss Denison, together with Mr. and Mrs. Simpson and their children, have to-day arrived here safely from Sefroo, escorted—as requested by me—both with soldiers from the Kaïd of Sefroo and horsemen of the Sherarda tribe. They say accounts of the fighting at Dar-al-Baida are already prevalent amongst the tribes around Sefroo, but are in the sense that the fighting was with the French, and that the Moslems by a stratagem led the foreigners away from the sea side and then slew them all!

Their escort were all most friendly, and, indeed, cheerful; telling the travellers not to think of going to those disorderly coast places, but stay in regulated, sensible places, like Fez and Sefroo! One acquaintance of the missionary ladies, perfectly seriously, told them he knew all the "road-cutters" in the district, and could give the ladies such an escort as would put them beyond all conceivable harm (I would remark here that such is the Berber tribes' respect for a "Satat"—once arranged and paid for—that the speaker was by no means talking nonsense. In all likelihood such an escort would have proved sure enough; but, happily, no recourse to it was needed).

In case any mistaken report should reach Tangier of the Grand Vizier's death, I would remark that a brother of Sid Charnit died here yesterday, apparently from some kind of fit, which he had after beating one of his slave women.

The position taken by the Sultan, and the manner in which it has been defined to the public, seem very satisfactory. In effect, he insinuates to his people that he has been able to get French troops to support his own troops and good Moslems against rebels in the country, and that it is not at all a quarrel between nation and nation and Government and Government. It is quite conceivable, however, that should the present excitement spread, many of the Berber tribes may come to Fez inviting the Makhzen's help against the Christians, and may back this up with threats of taking possession of the city and Government unless they are heeded. I think the Makhzen would do well at once to inculcate the truth with all energy and diligence amongst the townspeople and

tribes hereabouts to insure that, should the emergency arise, they may all see one issue only, namely, rule by the lawless Kabyles (Zemmur, Zayan, Beni Mguild, and the like), endangering the persons and property of every honest person; or rule by the assistance of friendly foreign troops—by which all these things would be secured to the city.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD

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[28416] No. 198.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 291.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 16, 1907.

THE tragedy of Casa Blanca has found some relief in an incident which has its humorous side.

Immediately after the bombardment the French Legation dispatched to Casa Blanca Captain Mangin, an officer of great experience in Oriental countries, who had been named to command the police here, and who was immediately appointed Military Commandant of the town of Casa Blanca. The Spanish Government, somewhat tardily having awakened to the idea that they should take some part in the administration of that town, dispatched Captain Santa Olalla, the Spanish officer who was the colleague of Captain Mangin here for the organization of the police, and superior to him in rank.

Although, according to the arrangement made at the time of the Algeciras Act, the town of Casa Blanca was to be policed by the French and the immediate neighbourhood by the Spanish, Captain Santa Olalla claimed that, as senior to Captain Mangin, he should be charged with the administration of the town.

A meeting was consequently arranged for the settlement of the matter at the French Consulate on the day after the arrival of the Spanish officer. The French Admiral was present, as also the French and Spanish officers above named, and another French naval officer, who shone by his discretion.

Upon Captain Olalla claiming his right by seniority to be Commandant of the town, the naval officer present proved to be superior to him in rank, being an old "officier de frégate" on board the "Gloire," and was at once presented as the new Commandant of the town. The Spanish officer was unable to enter a protest, and Captain Mangin, who is a very active officer, remains practically in charge of the town, though the naval officer, whose name is not at present known to me, is nominally so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28417] No. 199.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 292.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 17, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida regarding the situation of the tribes in the neighbourhood of the town.

The French Chargé d'Affaires has been very reticent regarding the future action of the French troops, but I gather that they propose to make the tribes pay, in any case, for a share of the damage done, and they believe that those tribes, if very severely handled, could produce within a comparatively short time 4,000,000 dollars Hassani, or about 500,000*l.*

Until, however, the safety of the foreign community at Fez is assured, any forward movement would be fraught with great danger to those persons, and it is to be hoped that the French Government will not take that risk.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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**Inclosure in No. 199.**

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 195.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida August* 16, 1907.

I HEARD yesterday at the French Consulate that an attack by Arabs on the French forces is anticipated shortly—it was said for to-day.

I have heard from an independent native source this morning that the situation among the tribes is the following:—

Emdakra, Oolad Saïd, Emzamza, Oolad Buziri, Oolad ban Dowd, Gedana, Shtouka and Mediuna (there are said to be no Oolad Hariz among them), are assembled at Tadhert, about one hour from here, in large numbers.

They say they want couriers sent to them by the French to say what their intentions are, whether buying and selling can be resumed and safety guaranteed to them.

I am unaware what the French intentions are. They may wish to give the Arabs some more salutary lessons, or they may be waiting for a move by the tribes on their own initiative for peace overtures.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[28418] No. 200.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 293.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 17, 1907.

THE disturbances which after the massacres at Casa Blanca on the 30th ultimo spread to the other coast towns have had no echo at Tangier or in the neighbourhood. The first news that was spread by the Moors was that the tribes in the neighbourhood of Casa Blanca had gained a great victory over the French, and had driven 200 of them into the sea and captured four guns. Gradually, however, the truth has no doubt become known, and feelings have been much divided. There is little sympathy with the tribesmen; indeed, there is little connection between the Moors in these parts and those tribes either through relationship or in business. It is only among the soldiery, several of whom belong to the Chaouia tribe, that some sympathy for the disturbers of the peace may exist, and it is these Government troops that are regarded here with some suspicion and fear. But energetic measures were from the first taken by the Makhzen authorities, all those who gave vent to anti-French or anti-foreign sentiments being immediately consigned to prison.

One element of danger has been the large number of refugees from the coast towns who, with their dramatic tales of the horrors of the siege of Casa Blanca, spread alarm through the Jewish and Spanish population here, large numbers of whom fled to Gibraltar and Spain. An unfounded report that the Spaniards were about to land 500 men here also struck terror into the inhabitants, and it was more from the effects of a panic than from any real existence of danger that trouble was to be feared.

As for the neighbouring tribes, they appear to be quiet and to regard with indifference the events on the coast. The Anjera to the east of Tangier, who are always ready to fight, appear to be too much taken up with their internal quarrels to occupy themselves much with any other matters, and the other tribes to the south have too recently suffered at the hands of the Moorish troops in connection with the Raisuli incident to be disposed to make any disturbances for the present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28420] No. 201.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 295.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 17, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, reporting a conversation which he has had

with the Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to the effect which the events at Dar-al-Baida may have upon the situation at Fez.

It will be seen that Ben Sliman gave vent to distinctly optimistic views, and Mr. MacLeod inferred, from his tone and good spirits, that he was by no means sorry for what had happened to the tribes at Dar-al-Baida.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 201.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 79.)
Sir, *Fez, August* 13, 1907.

I HAD an interview with the Vizier for Foreign Affairs this morning. Sid Ben Sliman said the Makhzen had no very recent news from Casa Blanca, as couriers could not come through Shawia just now. In regard to Rabat, however, the Makhzen had news continually that the town was quite orderly, and that no disturbance was to be apprehended there. Rabat, he went on, was a fortified town, inhabited exclusively by an orderly urban population, and so fortified as to be quite impregnable by tribesmen. At Casa Blanca the population consisted largely of ignorant tribesmen living in huts within the walls. If the people became excited it was evident that the whole place would readily fall into disorder unless the authorities there had forces numerous enough to overawe these tribesmen.

I inquired what the Vizier thought might be the effect on the Berber tribes, *e.g.*, Zayan, Cimmur, Beni Mguild, and others, when they heard of events at Casa Blanca. Would they not be apt to call upon the Sultan to lead them against the Christians? Might not parties of them even come here with that object, and possibly use threats? The Vizier said he had no fear of their doing so. These people could never leave their own lands unless summoned by the Makhzen. Parties of them might roam about lawlessly in the neighbourhood of their own lands, but even such parties would never venture to move more than 20 miles or so from their own homes; they were too afraid of their neighbours to do so. I agreed that this was so as a rule, but I thought the present circumstances were so very exceptional that the tribes might quite conceivably be moved to forget their usual mutual animosities, and, though the parties which might come here might be small, the tribes might hold such large gatherings on their own lands as to greatly alarm the public hereabouts, and prevent the Makhzen carrying out proper measures. Sid Ben Sliman, however, said he felt certain they would never come in large enough parties to do so. These southern tribes had been left to themselves so long, untaxed and unpunished, that they had become swollen with insolence and conceit. From his tone and good spirits I inferred Sid Ben Sliman was at heart by no means sorry at what had happened to them.

I then inquired what language the Sultan had held to the Ulema, Shereefs, merchants, and others. The Vizier's relations of it all corresponded with the accounts I have already sent to your Excellency, except that he added that the Sultan had pointed out that the foreign troops were simply being used until the Police provisions of the Act of Algeciras were carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—3 P.M. All continues quiet. Wheat is still only 20 to 21 rou. the measure. Exchange pound sterling to Hassani has fallen from 63 per cent. to 60 per cent.

J. M. M.

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[28421] No. 202.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 296.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 17, 1907.

I YESTERDAY had the honour to receive your telegram in which you direct me, should I think it desirable, to warn His Majesty the Sultan, in his own interests as well as to secure the safety of the foreigners in the capital, that he should use every endeavour to prevent any growth of fanaticism among the population.





All the recent despatches which I have received from Mr. Consul MacLeod, and which I have forwarded to you, would seem to indicate that His Majesty has acted for the best under very discouraging conditions, and has endeavoured to guide public opinion into a groove to avoid danger to foreigners. His Majesty, it seems, has also, by a generous expenditure from his private purse, persuaded Kitsani, to whom I referred in my despatch No. 290 of the 16th instant, to moderate his views, which were at one moment inclined to be very unfavourable to Christians.

Under these circumstances I do not propose for the moment to take any action on your telegram, more especially as my directions to Mr. MacLeod, and my advice to Dr. Verdon, have all along been to speak to the Makhzen and the Sultan in this sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28422] No. 203.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 297.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 17, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting a conversation which he has had with M. Guinard, Manager of the local branch of the Banque d'État, which was looted during the late disturbances, relative to the landing of the French sailors from the "Galilée."

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 203.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 196. Confidential.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 16, 1907.

I VISITED the local branch of the Banque d'État this afternoon, which was looted, and one safe pillaged. The Manager, a Frenchman named M. Guinard, in conversation gave me some interesting information which I desire to report.

He first read me a letter from the chief office at Tangier, dated the 4th instant, in which he was informed that the French Government intended about the end of the following week to occupy Casa Blanca militarily, and that meantime he, M. Guinard, need fear nothing, and should remain at his post here.

M. Guinard then said that on the arrival of the "Galilée," the French residents here were warned to expect serious things, but that after the Consular meeting, nothing more was said on the matter.

On Sunday, the 4th instant, however, French subjects were called to the French Consulate at 5 P.M., and a sealed despatch from the Commander of the "Galilée" was read to them. M. Guinard did not say what this despatch contained, and presumably it was secret.

In the middle of the night, French subjects were again summoned to the Consulate, that is, the night of the 4th instant, and they were informed that "forces imposantes" would disembark at 5 A.M. to occupy Casa Blanca. All night they were on the tower of the French Consulate looking out for the ships which did not come.

Immense surprise was occasioned, M. Guinard added, when the next morning only the "Galilée" was in the bay, and she landed some sixty-five men to occupy Casa Blanca with.

M. Guinard said that some censure the French Consular officials, and others the Commander of the "Galilée"; but he supposed that the inquiry would settle the question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—M. Guinard said also that, in his opinion, they could easily have waited a few days more, as the town was, to use his own words, "morte."

A. M. M.

[28423] No. 204.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 298.)

*Tangier, August* 19, 1907.

Sir,

THE Makhzen has made endeavours from time to time to secure the Brigand Valiente, but has met with no success, and has always pleaded as an excuse that, when pressed, Valiente took refuge within the Spanish lines near Ceuta (see my despatch No. 149 of the 17th May last). There is little doubt that it has been the policy of the Governor of Ceuta to keep on good terms with the brigand, as he had it within his power to seriously interfere with the food supply of Ceuta, but it was understood that the late Governor of Ceuta was withdrawn, owing to his relations with Valiente being too intimate. No improvement has taken place under the rule of the present Governor, and Valiente is permitted to introduce all the cartridges he requires. To produce direct evidence of this is, of course, difficult, but it is a fact that recently Valiente took 6,000 cartridges to Raisuli, and this supply has added materially to our difficulties in obtaining the release of Kaïd Maclean.

Si Mohammed Guebbas has asked me on one or two occasions to speak to the Spanish Minister on the subject, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs has also requested me to use my good offices with the Spanish Minister to obtain the arrest of Valiente, or at any rate that the Governor of Ceuta should not connive at his doings. I have spoken to my Spanish colleague, but he does not appear to be in a position to take any action. He said he would mention the matter at Madrid, but probably Valiente has been careful that there should be no grievance against him on the part of the authorities at Ceuta, and they have no special desire to be agreeable to the Moorish Government, but it is obviously unjust to the Makhzen that Valiente and his family should be allowed to take refuge within the Spanish lines whenever he is pressed by the Moorish troops.

Perhaps as we have a double interest in the capture of Valiente, that is to punish him for his past misdeeds, and to prevent a supply of cartridges to Raisuli, you may be disposed to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador to mention the matter at Madrid.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28424] No. 205.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 299.)

*Tangier, August* 19, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador reporting on the situation at that port.

It will be seen that the Commander of the French cruiser "Du Chayla," in deference to the wish expressed by the Consular Body, postponed his departure for Saffi, and the cruiser remains off Mogador for the present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 205.

*Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 43.)

*Mogador, August* 14, 1907.

Sir,

IN continuation of my preceding despatch, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that, instead of the collective telegram to our respective Ministers, which we had agreed to send, it was decided ultimately to write to the French Admiral at Casa Blanca the letter, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, together with a copy of the *procès-verbal* of the Consular meeting held on the 12th instant.

It was with great relief that the Europeans saw the French cruiser "Du Chayla" arrive here yesterday at noon, but it has had quite a contrary effect on the Moorish population. The ship did not salute the town, a fact which rather annoyed the local





authorities; but the French Consul told me afterwards that, in order to smooth matters, he had explained to the Governor that, as the French were in mourning after the events at Casa Blanca, it was not their custom to fire salutes under the circumstances.

As a strong wind was blowing, no communications with the shore were possible, except by signals. Soon after the arrival of the ship the French Consul called upon me to inform me that the Captain's orders were to protect not only the French residents, but all the Europeans. He added that the Captain had signalled that his instructions were to come and ascertain if everything was quiet here and sail the same evening for Saffi, where, it appeared, the situation was serious. M. Kouri, however, was of opinion that it would not be safe to allow the ship to leave for the present, and he was anxious to have the opinion of all the Consuls on the subject. I told him that I fully agreed with him, and, at his request, wrote him the letter, copy of which I have the honour to inclose herewith. I understand that all my colleagues are also agreed that Mogador should not be left without a war-ship, and later the French Consul sent his "Chancelier" with a message to the Captain in that sense.

Early this morning the Captain of the "Du Chayla" landed in a shore-boat, accompanied only by the doctor of the ship. He was met at the landing place by the Governor and the Administrators of the Customs, who were escorted by the whole garrison of the town, some 200 men. I believe that this has had an excellent effect on the entire population, both Europeans and Moors; the latter, who, since the arrival of the ship, were in a state of fear, have realized that no bombardment or landing of troops is to take place as long as they do not give cause for it.

Several British subjects have called on me with the object of asking me if it was safer to send away their families. I replied that, personally, notwithstanding the many sinister rumours about, I considered there was no immediate danger, so long as a war-ship was stationed here, but that, of course, I could not assume the responsibility of giving them any advice in the matter, as, with the present temper of the population, and especially of the many countrymen who have been coming into the town lately, the least incident might provoke, if not a general rising, disturbances, the consequences of which would be deplorable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 205.

*Letter addressed by Consular Body at Mogador to the French Admiral at Casa Blanca.*

M. l'Amiral,

*Mogador, le* 12 *Août*, 1907.

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous faire connaître que les nouvelles qu'on reçoit ici tous les jours de Casa Blanca produisent au milieu de la population Musulmane de notre ville, comme parmi les tribus voisines, une effervescence qui met dans un sérieux danger toutes les colonies Européennes de Mogador.

D'autre part, le Cheik Ma-el-Aïnin, qui se rend à Fez, accompagné par environ 600 guerriers de l'Adrar et 300 autres de Smara, est aujourd'hui chez le Kaïd Anfluz, c'est-à-dire à quelques heures seulement de Mogador; il est vrai qu'on ne lui prête pas l'intention de venir à la côte; mais étant donné le caractère de ce personnage, nous avons tout lieu de craindre une surprise dont les conséquences seraient irréparables. Du reste, le seul voisinage de Ma-el-Aïnin dont les exploits sont universellement connus, joint à l'état de excitation dans lequel se trouverait les Arabes de la région, suffit à jeter parmi les Européens une alarme inénarrable qu'il importe d'apaiser au plus vite.

Dans ces conditions, nous avons spécialement affrété le bateau Espagnol "Cartagena" pour vous mettre, par la présente, au courant de cette situation et vous prier instamment de vouloir bien nous envoyer sans retard un navire de guerre pour assurer la sécurité de nos colonies.

Veuillez, &c.

[Here follow signatures of the Consuls and Consular Agents.]

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Inclosure 3 in No. 205.

*Procès-verbal of Consular Meeting held August* 12, 1907.

L'AN 1907, le 12 Août, à 10 heures et demie du matin :

Le Corps Consulaire de Mogador s'est réuni sous la présidence de son doyen, M. Buigas de Dalmau, Consul d'Espagne, pour délibérer sur les mesures qu'il convient de prendre afin d'assurer la sécurité des colonies Européennes de cette ville.

Privé depuis longtemps de nouvelles officielles au sujet des événements de Casa Blanca et ne sachant exactement quel développement ils ont pu prendre ;

Ému d'autre part par l'arrivée aux environs de la ville du Cheik Ma-el-Aïnin, qui se rend à Fez accompagné par une escorte d'environ 1,000 hommes ;

Il décide de prier M. le Consul d'Espagne de retenir dans la rade de Mogador le bateau Espagnol "Cartagena," qui vient d'y arriver, jusqu'à l'arrivée d'un autre bateau Européen, et de prier M. le Consul de France de demander au croiseur Français "Du Chayla," qu'on dit être depuis hier matin à Saffi, de se rendre le plus tôt possible à Mogador.

En foi de quoi, le présent procès-verbal a été dressé et signé, après lecture, le jour, mois et an que dessus.

[Here follow signatures.]

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Inclosure 4 in No. 205.

*Vice-Consul Wilkinson to the French Consul at Mogador.*

*Mogador, le* 13 *Août*, 1907.

Monsieur et cher collègue,

JE m'empresse de vous remercier de la démarche que vous avez bien voulu faire auprès de moi pour savoir si j'étais de l'avis de nos collègues qu'il fallait retenir à tout prix le croiseur Français arrivé ce matin.

Comme je vous l'ai expliqué verbalement il y a quelques moments, je n'hésite pas à vous le confirmer par écrit, qu'à mon avis ce serait une chose très grave, et qui pourrait avoir des conséquences désastreuses et irréparables, que de laisser partir le bateau de guerre, après lequel toute la population Européenne a soupiré pendant ces quinze derniers jours.

En outre, l'action que nous avons cru devoir prendre hier, lorsque nous avons écrit à l'Amiral Français à Casa Blanca, pour le prier de nous envoyer, d'urgence, un navire de guerre, impliquait, il me semble, que le navire une fois arrivé devait rester en rade tant que la situation l'exigeait.

Il serait superflu d'ajouter qu'il aurait mieux valu que nous fussions restés sans un navire de guerre, que d'avoir eu sa visite de quelques heures, car si la situation était alarmante avant son arrivée, elle ne peut qu'avoir empiré depuis.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) P. WILKINSON.

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[28425] No. 206.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 300.)

Sir,

*Tangier, August* 19, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida reporting that a serious engagement was in progress yesterday evening.

I learn from the French Legation that the Arab attack was repulsed with considerable loss, while the French sustained but few casualties.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 206.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 199.)

Sir,

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 18, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that after a few days without any sound of heavy guns, a serious bombardment of the Arabs, with much firing outside, commenced this morning at about half-past eight o'clock, and still continues now at 10·30 a.m.

The Chancelier of the French Consulate, who has been in my office, informed me that the Arab attack is considered to be a serious one, and that it is estimated that some 5,000 Arabs are attacking, composed of all the tribes about here.

Details are at present unknown.

Field artillery has this morning been landed from a French transport.

Everything is perfectly tranquil in the town.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—Some further details are now given, and may be of interest. One spahi is reported to have been captured by the Arabs, and had his head cut off. It is said, also, that several French soldiers are wounded. The Arab line extended from the Oolad Hariz road to the Rabat road. From Morocco city the news comes that all Europeans have left except one German, named Steiwachs, who remains under the protection of Mulai Hafid.

12 *Midday.*—No firing is now going on.

A. M. M.

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[28426] No. 207.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 301. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Tangier, August* 19, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 284 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting a conversation he has had with the late Acting French Consul on the subject of the landing of sailors from the "Galilée."

It will be seen that M. Neuville states that neither he nor M. Maigret were in any way responsible for this action.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 207.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 197. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Dar-al-Baida, August* 18, 1907.

M. NEUVILLE, lately Acting French Consul here, who called last evening upon me, made a statement to the effect that he had no responsibility whatever for the recent action of the cruiser "Galilée" in bombarding Casa Blanca. He said, to begin with, Vice-Consul Maigret had some days previously assumed the duty as Acting French Consul, but that neither M. Maigret nor himself were responsible.

He went on to explain to me that at 11·30 on the night of the 4th instant, when, he said, everything was perfectly tranquil, a telegram was received at the French Consulate intimating that, by order of the French Government, imposing forces would be landed from the French fleet at 5 A.M. the next morning (*i.e.*, the 5th August) to occupy Casa Blanca, and that the foreign Representatives were to be notified. Being a Government order it was immediately obeyed as such.

It must be said, however, M. Neuville was careful to add, that the above message was sent into the French Consulate from the cruiser "Galilée."

Beyond this he could give me no further information.

M. Maigret, he added, had left for Tangier to see the Comte de St. Aulaire, French Chargé d'Affaires.

M. Neuville also informed me that the French forces were again attacked by Arab horse on the night of the 16th instant, the Arabs taking advantage of the fog to approach. Some ten Arabs were killed, and these were found to have a good supply of ammunition on them, one man having twenty-five rounds.

There are about 3,000 French troops here now.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[28427] No. 208.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 302.)
*Tangier, August* 19, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the European community of Marakesh have safely arrived at Saffi on the 12th instant. The natives en route are reported to have been very insolent to the party.

One German subject is believed to have remained at Marakesh.

The decision to leave was otherwise unanimous.

Mulai Hafid, on being invited to furnish an escort, declined, as he wished it to be understood that he could not protect foreigners. He only consented to grant them an escort on the receipt of a written statement that they wished to leave, not on account of any trouble in the city, but because they feared the consequences of the measures which would be necessary in the Dar-al-Baida affair.

Mr. Lennox states that on the journey down everyone was discussing the Holy War, that the feeling was very strong, and that they were freely cursed.

Mulai Hafid has, it seems, called a meeting of all the tribes, and Mr. Lennox believes he would be proclaimed Sultan at once were he prepared to lead the tribes against the French.

Whenever I have recently mentioned to my French colleague the possibility of Mulai Hafid being proclaimed Sultan, he has not appeared to consider it as a serious matter; indeed, he rather left on me the impression that it would not be unfavourably received by his Government, but under the present circumstances it seems impossible to conceive that Mulai Hafid would be well received by the tribes with any but a violently anti-French policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28428] No. 209.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 303.)
*Tangier, August* 19, 1907.

Sir,

ON receipt of your telegram No. 63 of the 12th instant, I at once requested His Majesty's Consul at Fez to take the earliest opportunity to impress upon the Sultan, through Ben Sliman, very seriously that the landing of foreign troops at Dar-al-Baida met with the unanimous approval of the Powers. A copy of this despatch to Mr. MacLeod was inclosed in my despatch No. 281 of the 13th instant.

I have now the honour to report that in reply to the communication made to him in this sense by Mr. MacLeod, through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Sultan has asked the latter to say that he thanks His Majesty's Government sincerely for their answer, which he would bear in mind with the closest attention, and to inform them that he concurs entirely with their views on the subject in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28429] No. 210.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 304.)
*Tangier, August* 20, 1907.

Sir,

CONCEIVING that it might, in the course of the negotiations for the release of Sir H. Maclean, become necessary that Raisuli should be granted something in the nature of a foreign protection, I caused the Sultan some time ago to be sounded as to how he would regard such a proceeding.

I have now received a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, copy of which is inclosed herewith, from which you will perceive that His Majesty accedes to an arrangement of this nature on certain conditions. These are that Raisuli should live in Tangier, and that he should not mix in the affairs of the tribes, and Ben Sliman also insists that the Makhzen letter should not be divulged to Raisuli before the release of the Kaïd. This will obviously not be done, but as regards fixing the abode of Raisuli, I do not think we need be bound by the wish expressed by Ben Sliman, if Raisuli is prepared to deliver up Kaïd Maclean, while renewing to himself full freedom as to his place of residence.

If he is forced to deliver up Kaïd Maclean, the blow to his prestige will probably be so great that for some time, at any rate, he will not be an element of danger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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**Inclosure in No. 210.**

*Sid Ben Sliman to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)
2 *Rajab*, 1325 (*July* 12, 1907).

HIS Shereefian Majesty has heard that Raisuli is discussing with you the release of Kaïd Maclean on receiving through you satisfactory assurances of pardon for the past, and that the Makhzen will treat him, his family, and affairs well and with respect, and that no evil will happen to him as regards them. And His Majesty has instructed me to write to you and say that if the foregoing is in your opinion true beyond all question, and you are sure it will succeed, His Shereefian Majesty may undertake to accede to it, from his desire to hasten the release of Kaïd Maclean, on condition that he resides in the town of Tangier and that he does not leave it, and that he does not again mix in the affairs of the tribes, so that he may be tranquil and at rest; and on condition that this shall not be done, nor this letter reach him until the release of the Kaïd Maclean is accomplished, and he has withdrawn from the country tribes, and shall have broken off his interests with them, and is residing in the town of Tangier, because it is not hidden that should this letter reach him, or he have knowledge of its contents before fulfilling the said conditions, it is not impossible that he will play false, as is his custom, and bring it to the knowledge of the loyal tribes and incline them over to support him in his projects, and thus defeat all the Makhzen has done about him, and thereby obtain that which he has been desiring since a long time, as it is well known that he did not submit to that which he voluntarily requested, but has submitted to the pressure of force sent against him by the Makhzen. Therefore the Makhzen urges that this means be employed, if it is quite certain that it can be done with safety, and without fear of its leading to greater difficulties, as it is not hidden that if the contents of this letter are divulged before the attainment of the object, and what is feared be thereby brought about, there will be no room for doubt that the divulgation is certainly the cause of the resulting harm.

(Signed) ABDELKRIM BEN SLIMAN.

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[28430] No. 211.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 305.)
*Tangier, August* 20, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida stating that he has received news of the Proclamation as Sultan of Mulai Hafid.

It will be observed that, in conversation with Mr. Madden on this subject, M. Malpertuy, the French Consul, stated that this event would greatly complicate matters, as it might now be necessary for the French to penetrate into the interior of Morocco in order to pacify the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 211.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 200.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 19, 1907.

I RECEIVED this morning from Vice-Consul Spinney the following letter:—

"*Mazagan, August* 19, 1907.

"Mulai Hafid was proclaimed Sultan on Friday at 1 P.M.; no further details. A meeting of fifty heads of Dukalla tribes is now taking place, which I believe will end quietly, and that they will inform Governor [? of Mazagan] that they need have no fear of Dukalla."

I called on the French Consul at once, and he stated that last evening they had received a wireless message from the "Condé" in the south to the effect that Mulai Hafid had been proclaimed Sultan by all the neighbouring tribes at Morocco city.

M. Malpertuy said that this event would complicate matters greatly he feared, as it might be necessary for the French forces to penetrate into the interior of Morocco in order to pacify the country. Hitherto, they had done all in their power to work on the lines of the Act of Algeciras, and to pacify only the coast towns where the safety of Europeans demanded it, and that is what they are trying to do here in Casa Blanca.

As regards French claims from the recent bombardment and loot of the town, he was simply at the present moment having "constatations" drawn up for reference to whatever Commission of Inquiry that it may be hereafter decided to refer these claims to.

I am following the same procedure in regard to the British cases.

M. Malpertuy said that there are three hostile Mahallas of Arabs in the vicinity of Casa Blanca, numbering between 3,000 and 4,000 men, cavalry and footmen combined. He stated that in the fight of yesterday there was some actual bayonet fighting between a party of French troops and some Arabs, one spahi was killed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—The Arabs are being again heavily bombarded this morning.

A. M. M.

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[28431] No. 212.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 306.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 20, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from the British Vice-Consul at Saffi, written on the eve of the reported proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan.

Mr. Hunot, who is generally well informed, draws rather a gloomy picture of the condition of affairs in the south, and considers that the French task of pacifying the tribes will be a difficult one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 212.

*Vice-Consul Hunot to Sir G. Lowther.*

Sir, *Saffi, August* 14, 1907.

CONFIRMING my letter of yesterday, I have now to communicate to your Excellency to-day's news from Morocco city.

Rahamna, Zeinran, and Misfewa have occupied Morocco city. Half of the city has been allotted to them by Mulai Hafid and the principal citizens. To-morrow, the 15th, will prove the result of their consultations. Every one believes that all the tribes are of one mind to proclaim Mulai Hafid Sultan. Letters were received from Ma-el-Ainim at Morocco on Saturday last, in which the Mrabt states that he will arrive with a great number of Arabs from the desert, and will proceed to Dar-al-Baida —presumably to fight the French. Kaïd Aissa has just addressed a Circular letter to the Consular officers here, stating that he will endeavour to change his route so as to avoid touching at Saffi. From all accounts there will be much trouble, and the French task to pacify will be a difficult one. The tribes from all parts are about to concentrate near Dar-al-Baida. Kaïd Aissa tells us here that there will be no further trouble at Mazagan. He is using his influence with certain Chiefs of the outside districts, and I believe he has given them money to keep quiet. There is absolutely no government anywhere. We have had an exciting time. Any moment the Arabs might get beyond the slight control existing over them. Ma-el-Ainin is to sleep to-night near the Saturday market, in Abda, and orders have been issued by Kaïd Aissa to the districts for his provisions. I have sent a man to count the Arabs with him—they are nearly all the blue shirt men from the desert and Soos. Reports from the Khamiss market, in Dukalla, say that a Shereef called Mulai-el-Bashere-el-Biajouwie-el-Showie has assembled a considerable number of Arabs. He and another man, Wuld Bo Abeed Shirkowie, have shaved their heads, and are preaching the Jehad at Casa Blanca (war for their creed and country). The Showias are following, and presents are showered upon them—grain, sheep, and cattle—and the French will probably have to be reinforced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. HUNOT.

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[28535] No. 213.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 124.)
Sir, *San Ildefonso, August* 22, 1907.

SOME French correspondents having reported from Casa Blanca to their newspapers that friction has taken place between Major Santa Olalla, the Commander of the Spanish force, and General Drude, and that the Spanish troops are not behaving well, the Spanish Government have thought fit to make an official communication to the press on the subject. It is to the following effect:—

"Though details are not yet to hand, it is evident that if the Spanish Commander has declared that the object of his Government in sending troops is to contribute to the provisional organization of the police and to defend the interests which it will be the duty of the police to protect, he has said no more than what has been concerted between Spain and France, communicated to the Powers who signed the Algeciras Act, and understood by everybody concerned. If any differences of opinion arose between the two Commanders with regard to their respective powers, there is nothing in this to excite surprise considering the peculiarity of the circumstances and the fact that each Commander remains independent of the other (literally 'preserves his autonomy'). But, however this may have been, all friction must now be at an end, owing not only to the friendly sentiments by which both Major Santa Olalla and General Drude are animated, but to the instructions which both Governments have sent to Casa Blanca. Before they had even heard of any differences between the Commanders, the two Governments exchanged views with regard to the relations of the Spanish and French forces with each other and with the Moorish authorities. The unfavourable judgments passed by certain correspondents on the behaviour of the Spanish troops, and the

gratuitous inaccuracies which their patriotic zeal has led them to publish, are much deplored in French official circles."

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

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[28536] No. 214.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 125.)
Sir, *San Ildefonso, August 22, 1907.*

IN my despatch No. 121 of the 18th instant I remarked on the contrast which is drawn by many people in Spain between the readiness of the Government to embark on expensive warlike operations, together with France, for a purpose which is not exclusively Spanish, and their continued neglect of the scattered Spanish possessions in Africa, all of which stand in urgent need of protection and support.

In order, perhaps, to clear themselves from this reproach, the Spanish Government have drawn up and published in the "Gazette" the Royal Decree, inclosed in translation, providing for the constitution of a kind of Chartered Company for the purpose of developing the resources of the Spanish possessions on the North and West Coast of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea. (See also inclosure, p. 5, in my despatch No. 103, Commercial, of the 5th instant.)

I understand that the Company, which undertakes to construct all kinds of public works, to make roads, foster commerce, agriculture, and fisheries, compete for Concessions in Morocco, and even in some places to collect taxes for the Government, is none other than the well-known "Compañía Transatlantica" of Barcelona. For the above purposes it is to be reconstituted under the name of the General Hispano-African Society. It is to receive a Government subvention of 20,000*l.* a-year, in exchange for a very problematical 50 per cent. which the State is to receive on net profits above 8 per cent. of the invested capital.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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Inclosure in No. 214.

*Extract from the "Madrid Gazette" of August 20, 1907.*

*Señor Allendesalazar to King Alfonso.*

(Translation.)
Sir,

DESIRING to direct and stimulate the action of Spain in Africa, your Majesty's Government proposes to improve the fortified posts which she holds on the northern coast, to intensify her influence in Morocco, and to cultivate and colonize, more progressively and more rapidly than before, here possessions on the west coast and in the Gulf of Guinea. With this end in view the Ministry of State has been considering how best to give effect to the idea of setting on foot a Company which, in agreement with the Government, and under conditions excluding all foreign participation, possessed, moreover, of means proportionate to the object pursued, may serve as the instrument enabling the Government to accomplish its aims with the assistance of private enterprise, and thus to carry out in a practical manner and without delay some of the undertakings which they took upon themselves at Algeciras.

In order to promote the development of the material interests of Spain in Morocco, the Company will be required—

1. To set up factories under conditions enabling them to place Spanish products on the Moorish market, in competition with foreign products;
2. To undertake to construct the harbour works accepted by the Government, to convey water to Ceuta and Melilla, to make public cisterns and artesian wells, to build a coal depôt at Ceuta and a market place with a "fondak" in the Tarajar, besides other public works, as may be agreed upon with the Government;
3. To tender for public services and Concessions in Morocco, such as the tobacco monopoly, wireless telegraphy, &c.;





4. To stimulate Spanish emigration to Africa by setting up agricultural and mining enterprises, if desirable, and by promoting commercial operations calculated to foster and extend the commerce of Spain.

In order to encourage the development and advancement of the Spanish possessions on the west coast, it will be the duty of the Company—

1. To increase the business done in the factory of Rio de Oro, by establishing a police service to put down the robbery which now keeps many natives away from that commercial centre, and so to attract the Native Chiefs from the interior by inducing them to take part in business transactions.
2. To organize, in concert with the Government, journeys of exploration and discovery into the interior, with a view to setting up sub-factories, both on the coast and in the interior, at convenient points.
3. To encourage the development of the fishing industry, by duly exploiting the banks existing in those waters. Other parties desiring to take a hand in these fisheries shall be allowed to do so, and there shall be no monopoly.
4. To give facilities for the establishment of a small Spanish and native population in the Rio de Oro territory.
5. To execute, under Conventions agreed upon with the Government, the public works held to be necessary, beginning with the most urgent ones, as, for instance, a lighthouse, quay, coast signals, wireless telegraphy, water supply, Government house, barracks, &c.

And, lastly, in order to contribute to the prosperity of the Spanish Colonies in the Gulf of Guinea, the Company will undertake—

1. To execute and keep up the requisite public works in Fernando Po, such as the quay at Santa Isabel, the roads from Santa Isabel to San Carlos, from Santa Isabel to Concepcion, the road to Moka, the extension of the Basilé Road, &c., all under agreement with the Government.
2. To found a bank for operations of credit and exchange, and especially for making advances on farms and crops, so as to relieve the agricultural situation and to encourage the development of agriculture on a workable basis.
3. To discharge certain official services, under Convention with the State, such as Treasury services, collection of taxes and duties, &c.
4. To stimulate to the utmost the business operations of the commercial centre of the Colony.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the benefits which would accrue to the life and prosperity of our national interests if these contemplated measures could be carried out under the eye of a Company to be formed under guarantees excluding any participation of foreign capital.

The undersigned Minister has given this matter the attention which its extraordinary importance demands. He holds that the scheme is deserving of official support, of a kind to facilitate the formation of the private Company destined to undertake an enterprise of such vast proportions, by advancing the necessary resources.

The proposals submitted by the representative of the Company in process of formation appear to be satisfactory. The Undersigned thinks they may well be accepted, so that the said Society, after the approval of its statutes, may be enabled to begin discharging its duties, under the designation of the General Hispano-African Society.

In order that the Society may be definitely constituted, and that it may attract the necessary capital, which must be exclusively Spanish, it is indispensable that it should receive a State guarantee, in the shape of a contribution, which might take the form of an annual subvention of 500,000 pesetas (20,000*l.* at par). On the other hand, the Society would give the State a fair share of the profits, say 50 per cent. on all excess of net profit exceeding 8 per cent. In this way the official and private interests of the Society will be merged.

Article 8 of the existing Budget Law authorizes the Government to negotiate Conventions with private Companies for the development, and even for the administration, of the Spanish possessions in West Africa, either jointly with the Government or separately. In the present case there is no question of investing the Society with administrative authority, and the concurrence of the Cortes is therefore not necessary.

The undersigned Minister has the honour to submit, for your Majesty's approval, the annexed draft of a Royal Decree.

(Signed) MANUEL ALLENDESALAZAR.

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Annex.

ROYAL DECREE.

At the proposal of the Minister of State, and in agreement with the Council of Ministers, I decree as follows :—

Article 1. On the legal constitution of the General Hispano-African Society, the Minister of State is authorized to make a contract with it for the encouragement and development of Spanish interests in Africa.

Art. 2. The said Society shall receive a subvention of 500,000 pesetas (20,000*l.*), engaging, on the other hand, to pay the State 50 per cent. of its net profits, provided the latter exceed 8 per cent. of the capital invested in the enterprise.

Art. 3. The next Budget shall make provision for the execution of this undertaking, the Ministers of State and Public Works ("Fomento") agreeing to contribute 250,000 pesetas (10,000*l.*) each.

Given at San Sebastian, August 10, 1907.

(Signed) ALFONSO.

MANUEL ALLENDESALAZAR,
*Minister of State.*

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[28490] No. 215.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 118.)
Sir, *Vienna, August* 23, 1907.

THE situation in Morocco is attracting considerable attention in the Austrian press, and the views expressed by the semi-official "Fremden Blatt" and by the "Neue Freie Presse," which is notoriously inspired from the Wilhelmstrasse, may not be without interest at this juncture.

The "Fremden Blatt" expresses confidence that French public opinion would never consent to a policy of adventure in Morocco, and that there is accordingly no fear of the mandate intrusted to France and Spain under the Treaty of Algeciras receiving an abusive interpretation. At the same time, it observes that the only practical way to obviate the necessity of an extension of French action in Morocco, and the attendant dangers of international criticism, would be to effect a general exodus of Europeans from Morocco. In any case a wide latitude must, says the "Fremden Blatt," be accorded to the military measures which, under stress of circumstances, and in fulfilment of her mandate, France may be compelled to undertake.

The "Neue Freie Presse," in a leading article of the 21st instant, sounded a note of warning which owes its significance to the well-known German proclivities of that paper. While recognizing that hitherto there is no reason to believe that France and Spain will not be equal to the task intrusted to them in Morocco, it points out that there is nothing in the Treaty of Algeciras to prevent other Powers sending men-of-war to that country and landing troops, should the contingency of a serious menace to European life arise.

Since writing the above an interesting article has appeared in the "Fremden Blatt" of to-day's issue upon the situation in Morocco as affecting Franco-German relations. The article in question sees in the approaching interview between M. Cambon and Prince Bülow at Norderney the possibility of a frank and outspoken interchange of views upon the Morocco question which may ultimately pave the way to a wider and more durable accord between France and Germany. The meeting at Wilhelmshöhe and M. Clemenceau's recent visit to His Majesty at Marienbad may be regarded as important political factors in the situation in so far that they indicate that the international atmosphere is favourable to such a *rapprochement*.

The Morocco question, which has been the cause of serious misunderstandings between France and Germany, may, in the opinion of the "Fremden Blatt," now



provide the necessary elements of an understanding between those countries—an understanding which, in view of the heavy responsibilities France has assumed, and the serious difficulties she is encountering in Morocco, it is certainly in her interests to seek.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
(Signed) L. D. CARNEGIE.

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[28531] No. 216.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 415.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 24, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of an official communiqué which has been printed in the "Temps" of to-day, stating that the Franco-Spanish *entente* over Moroccan affairs has not been weakened, and that the French Government has made no proposals in regard to an expedition into the interior of Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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Inclosure in No. 216.

*Extract from the "Temps" of August* 24, 1907.

DIVERS journaux publient des informations desquelles il résulterait que des dissentiments se seraient produits entre la France et l'Espagne au sujet d'une expédition à l'intérieur du Maroc que le Gouvernement Français aurait proposée au Gouvernement Espagnol.

Cette nouvelle est dépourvue de tout fondement. L'entente entre les Gouvernements de Paris et de Madrid ne s'est jamais démentie. Le Gouvernement Français n'a proposé au Gouvernement Espagnol aucune expédition à l'intérieur du Maroc, et il n'a jamais varié dans sa résolution de n'entreprendre aucune expédition de ce genre. (Havas.)

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[28632] No. 217.

*Acting Consul-General Dundas to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Algiers, August* 26, 1907.

TWO vessels sailed from Oran for Casa Blanca with troops and war material.

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[28636] No. 218.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 26, 1907.

DR. VERDON remains at Fez; all other British subjects there have left for Laraiche.

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[28639] No. 219.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 26, 1907.

LARGE majority of British subjects here have sent a deputation to me stating that there are indications of coming trouble, and that in their opinion French and Spanish

war-ships at present in the bay are not sufficient for general protection of the town. They declare that a rising here would be much more disastrous in its consequences than at Casa Blanca, owing to the scattered nature of the houses in this town, and demand a British war-ship, believing that it would do much to calm the existing panic if one were stationed here.

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[28374] No. 220.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1907.

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 98 of the 25th instant.

You should communicate with French Government, and, after understanding with them, endeavour to secure the advance by State Bank of funds required.

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[28275] No. 221.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1907.

REQUEST of Vice-Consul at Mogador for instructions as to attitude to be observed towards Governor appointed by Mulai Hafid.

Your telegram No. 96 of the 23rd instant.

In this respect, as in all others, Vice-Consul must endeavour to act in harmony with the French.

If his French colleague receives no instructions you should, in the last resort, instruct him to act as suggested in your telegram No. 95, but the word "support" should be changed to "recognize."

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[28677] No. 222.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 27.)

(No. 307.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 21, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, informing me as to the great elements of suspicion that were present in the situation there on the 20th July, the day after the massacre of the Europeans.

It will be observed that the conduct of Kaïd Ci Bubker was such as to give grounds for the suspicion that he was in some way conniving at the destruction of the whole French colony.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 222.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 201.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 19, 1907.

I BEG leave to be allowed to report to your Excellency (what I regret, owing to pressure of business during the recent crisis, escaped my memory) the great elements of suspicion that were present in the situation here the day after the massacre of the Europeans, that is on the 30th July.

When M. Neuville, the then Acting French Consul, applied to me regarding the withdrawal of the Moorish soldiers guarding the French Consulate (his interpreter, M. Zagury, a Jew, was under the circumstances afraid to go with M. Neuville up to the Basha), there were present in the courtyard of the Dar Makhzen a rabble of youths and boys, whose presence there was, to say the least, most extraordinary. It was difficult to say what their business there was.

The guards at the French Consulate, where all the members—men, women and





children—of the French colony were assembled, and where the bodies of the dead lay, had disappeared, and French subjects were being prevented at the waterport from embarking.

It really looked as if Kaïd Ci Bubker Buzeed was in some way tacitly conniving at the destruction of the whole French colony.

As more may be heard of Kaïd Ci Bubker, now a prisoner in the hands of the French, it appeared to me it might be of interest to your Excellency to learn the above facts.

Happily, as I have reported, the guards were replaced, and the French colony was embarked on the British steam-ship "Demetian."

M. Neuville's cool demeanour and courage during those trying times, I feel it right to say, excited my complete admiration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[28678] No. 223.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 27.)

(No. 308.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 21, 1907.

ALTHOUGH on the 16th instant Mr. MacLeod reported from Fez that the emotion regarding recent events was subsiding satisfactorily, and that the French Consul was considering whether it would not be more prudent to take the French colony away but that the rest of the foreigners had decided to stay, on the evening of the 17th both Mr. MacLeod and Dr. Verdon drew a very different picture.

Mr. MacLeod writes on the evening of the 17th that in the Beni Hassen and the Gharb provinces and at Court and amongst the lowest classes in Fez there was much talk of a Holy War. He added that the Makhzen, even if the Sultan remained at Fez, could not be trusted to repress the least popular outbreak. He also stated that Ben Sliman, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, agreed that it was advisable that they should leave under an escort which the Makhzen would provide.

Dr. Verdon also informed me privately that the townspeople were talking of looting the Viziers' houses and killing the Frenchmen in Fez. Ben Sliman had told him that if the Sultan left he feared the populace would loot the Palace and kill the women.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[28679] No. 224.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 27.)

(No. 309.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 21, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a letter addressed by M. Guiot, a member of the Special Committee of the State Bank of Morocco, to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body here, suggesting that the snuff, kiff, and opium monopolies should be included in the tobacco monopoly, and that the minimum yearly payment should be increased to 1,250,000 fr.

This letter having been circulated, my French colleague approved the proposal as being likely to facilitate the contemplated loan. The only objection I can see is that the monopolies in question have already been granted for the year and are usually granted locally in the different districts. My other colleagues have referred the matter to their Governments and have declined to offer an opinion.

Unless you have any special instructions, I propose to support my French colleague in the matter, and perhaps some means may be found by which the objections I have put forward may be overcome.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 224.

*M. Guiot to Doyen of Diplomatic Body at Tangier.*

M. le Doyen, *Paris, le 29 Juillet*, 1907.

POUR faire suite à ma communication du 9 de ce mois relative au projet de cahier des charges du monopole des tabacs, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que dans l'opinion de la Banque d'État du Maroc il conviendrait qu'au monopole du tabac à fumer fussent adjoints le tabac à priser, le kif, et l'opium, et que la redevance fût en conséquence élevée à 1,250,000 fr.

La Banque n'a pas perdu de vue que l'Article II du projet de cahier des charges réserve, dans son dernier paragraphe, à l'adjudicataire du monopole des tabacs un droit de préférence sur les adjudications du tabac à priser et du kif; mais elle n'en croit pas moins devoir vous recommander la proposition ci-dessus exposée.

Je vous serai obligé d'accuser réception de la présente communication.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) E. GUIOT.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 224.

*Senhor Martens Ferrão to M. Guiot.*

M. le Directeur, *Tanger, le 15 Août*, 1907.

VOTRE lettre en date du 29 Juillet écoulé m'est parvenue aujourd'hui. J'ai donné connaissance de sa teneur à mes honorables collègues du Corps Diplomatique.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) MARTENS FERRAO.

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[28697] No. 225.

*Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received August 27.)*

Sir, *Board of Trade, August 26*, 1907.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the proposed tobacco monopoly in Morocco, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state that they have now been informed by the British-American Tobacco Company that they have decided not to tender for the monopoly.

Anticipating that a reply to this effect might be given by the Company in question, the Board had caused the following firms, viz., the Ardath Company, Albert Baker and Co., Gallaher (Limited), Taddy and Co., and Rutter and Co., to be approached with a view to ascertaining whether any of them would be willing to submit tenders. Each of these firms has now replied, however, in the sense that they do not desire to take the matter up.

The schedule of conditions in its earlier form, returned to this Department with your letter of the 16th instant, is forwarded to you again herewith.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WILSON FOX.

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[28722] No. 226.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 41. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *San Ildefonso, August 23*, 1907.

THE French Ambassador writes to me privately that his understanding with the Spanish Foreign Minister is now quite satisfactory. Their Excellencies have together settled the positions which the contingents of the two countries are to take up respectively at Casa Blanca. A similar arrangement has been made as regards Tangier, in case of necessity arising. Instructions were accordingly sent to the Spanish Commander. There was unfortunately some delay in his receiving them.





Hence, during the French engagement on the 18th instant with the Moorish tribes, there arose some trifling misunderstanding between the French and Spanish Commanders.

The new police force is to be organized without further delay, and pressure is being brought to bear on the Moorish War Minister with a view to the completion of the formalities.

When Señor Maura returns to Spain in a few days M. Révoil intends to urge him to adopt a perfectly clear attitude, calculated to remove all doubts as to the intention of this Government to act up to its responsibilities in Morocco. His Excellency hopes, by his language, to dispel the hesitation still remaining in the minds of the Spanish Government.

I mean myself to speak to Señor Maura in this sense when he comes to Madrid. M. Révoil thinks this might be useful.

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[28758] No. 227.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 27*, 1907.

ADVANCE to Sultan of Morocco.

Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 98 of the 25th instant, and your telegram No. 84 of the 26th.

I am informed by M. Pichon that the difficulties which the State Bank has raised are excessive, and some means must be found to induce the Delegates to take a more reasonable view as to the action which the situation demands. The actual difficulty at Tangier has meanwhile been surmounted, as the Algerian Bank has consented, at the request of the French Legation, to make an advance on security offered by Moors of substance. The Commander of the troops had stated that he could not be responsible for order unless money were forthcoming.

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[28765] No. 228.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)*

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 27*, 1907.

OWING to want of money to pay troops operating against tribes where Sir H. Maclean is being kept prisoner, Minister of War stated again to-day that situation is very grave. Troops have not received pay for a fortnight. Sid Guebbas may be able to maintain one of the two armies acting against the Khamas if it is immediately paid; the other has been defeated, and must be withdrawn. If the troops are not paid they will sell their arms to the tribes and desert, and it is probable that the latter will now combine and threaten Tangier.

The French Chargé d'Affaires has received a similar communication.

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[28639] No. 229.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 27*, 1907.

SITUATION at Tangier.

You should inform French Government of the contents of Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 100 of yesterday's date, and say that we wish to avoid increasing complications by sending a ship unless they desire us to do so. We should, however, like to learn what they think of the situation, and whether, in their opinion, French forces on the spot are sufficient to cope with it.

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[28770] No. 230.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 310.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 22, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting a further bombardment of the tribes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 230.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 203.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 21, 1907.

THE large French cruiser "Gueydon" this morning went north, and bombarded the Zenata tribe from the sea.

The "Gloire" also went south, and fired on the Arabs.

It is stated that the Arabs, owing to the shell fire they have received from the ships stationed at different points, have been so scattered that they cannot reunite in force.

In the fight of last Sunday, wherein the French lost one spahi, the Arabs are said, on good authority, to have been severely punished, and to have lost 280.

As the prices of the European commodities which the Arabs are so fond of are reported to be enormous in the country, it seems possible that they may find it is of no use to continue indefinitely attempting to attack the French forces.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—Later. An Arab report, just received, and which, I hear, has been given to the French Consulate, is that the Kabyles are very numerous, but, as above stated, scattered; that Mulai Hafid has written to Shawia to say he is advancing and the tribesmen are to wait for him, every Arab to send a horse, or 5 dollars in its stead.

I have no other confirmation of this reported advance of Mulai Hafid.

A. M. M.

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[28874] No. 231.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August* 28, 1907.

SITUATION at Tangier.

Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 100 of the 26th instant and your telegram No. 86 of yesterday.

I am informed by the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that there are five large and four small French ships of war policing the coast between Tangier and Mogador. Of these ships there is one large and one small one at Tangier, and it was decided this morning by the French Government to send another large ship to Tangier, with a landing contingent. An old Spanish war-ship, which is also at Tangier, is to be replaced by a modern one. There are troops at Oran ready to embark at short notice.

The French Government consider that in these circumstances they are in a position to provide for the protection of foreigners at Tangier and the maintenance of order, and they do not wish for the dispatch of a British ship of war to that port.

The fears of the foreign colonies at Tangier appear to be exaggerated, according to the latest information received by the French Government.

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[28860] No. 232.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 42. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *San Ildefonso, August* 28, 1907.

MOROCCO: My telegram No. 41 of the 23rd instant.

Writing again on the 25th instant, M. Révoil confides to me privately that, though the Spanish Foreign Minister is holding satisfactory language, the attitude of the Government as a whole, and particularly that of Señor Maura, President of the Council, leaves a good deal to be desired. Major Santa Olalla, as the French Ambassador is informed, places on his instructions an interpretation which prevents all Spanish participation in the military proceedings, even of a purely defensive character.

I shall visit Señor Maura at Madrid to-day, and sound him on these points.

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[28856] No. 233.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 28, 1907.

SIR H. MACLEAN.

I have received no reply from Raisuli to my offer of French guarantee of security. He is sure to increase the demands he may have till now had in view, owing to the withdrawal of the Government troops.

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[28867] No. 234.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 28, 1907.

I AM informed by British Vice-Consul at Mazagan that new Sultan has been accepted by Mazagan and Azimor. The tribes have received letters from Mulai Hafid, stating that he is prepared to arrange settlement with France and other Powers, and ordering them not to attack the French unless latter invade Showia.

French Legation confirm news from Mazagan.

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[28765] No. 235.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 101 of the 27th instant.

You will now have received Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 41 [of the 27th instant], reporting advance made by Algerian Bank. You might endeavour to arrange with your French colleague for payment of troops still in the field out of this loan.

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[28883] No. 236.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 29.)

(No. 311.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 23, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 258 of the 15th instant, containing a copy of the instructions which I sent to His Majesty's Consul at Fez as to his course of action in the event of its being considered advisable for the British community to leave the capital, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch

which I have now received from Mr. MacLeod, in which he reports that it has been decided that the foreign communities shall leave Fez for Laraiche on the 24th instant under a strong escort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 236.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Fez, August* 19, 1907.

IN reply to inquiries by the Consuls, the Sultan last evening, through the Vizier for Foreign Affairs, has answered that he agrees to our proposal that foreigners should leave Fez for the present, and said that a large escort of tribal cavalry would be ready on the morning of Saturday, the 24th instant, to conduct the foreign communities here in one party to Laraiche.

M. Marc states he has written suggesting that a French ship of war be ready at Laraiche about the 27th instant to embark the party. The Makhzen will assist in procuring transport animals for the party.

I have to-day received your Excellency's despatch No. 43. The same ideas as your Excellency expresses therein occurred to us all with increasing force the last few days.

We consider further—

1. That the Sultan cannot leave Fez until he raises sufficient money, and it does not seem certain when His Majesty will get an advance of 3,000,000 fr. he now requires.
2. The weak state of Fez Government should the Sultan depart.
3. The Sultan's wish that foreigners should not accompany His Majesty on the ensuing campaign.
4. The loss of employment, and possible discontent and ill-humour, of certain classes at Fez when the Court leaves.
5. A distinct increase of anti-Christian feeling, and bitterly contemptuous attitude of the populace towards the Makhzen visible the last few days.
6. The extremely dangerous position in which foreigners here would be should a "Jehad" (Holy War) be proclaimed by the interior tribes.

Should large parties of Berber tribesmen come to Fez on such an occasion, the authorities or the populace might accede to any demands of theirs about Christians, to save the town.

7. The danger of foreigners being held as hostages should foreign troops continue to operate in Morocco. In the event, for instance, of a foreign army marching on Fez, the results to foreigners there might be of the gravest kind, and the consideration of their safety greatly hamper operations, for should a "Jehad" break out the Sultan would either have to join it or be overcome by it, unless saved by foreign troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[29010] No. 237.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 30.)

(No. 417. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 28, 1907.

I HAD occasion to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and I showed to him your despatch No. 472, Confidential, of the 22nd instant, which I had just received, as I thought that M. Geoffray might not have reported so fully as your despatch records the information which you gave to him in regard to the interviews which Sir Charles Hardinge had at Wilhelmshöhe with Prince Bülow and at Ischl with Baron d'Aehrenthal.

M. Pichon expressed himself as much pleased with the information which your despatch contained, and at the evidence which it afforded of the relations of mutual confidence established between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic. His Excellency said that there certainly was a relaxation of the



tension between Germany and France, and that the German Government were not making difficulties in regard to the French treatment of the Morocco question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[28879] No. 238.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 29.)

(No. 418.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 28, 1907.

I INFORMED M. Pichon yesterday that His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador had inquired what conduct he should adopt in the event of the new Governor appointed by Mulai Hafid arriving there with an armed escort and being resisted by the present Governor; that His Majesty's Minister at Tangier had asked his French colleague what instructions had been given to the French Vice-Consul at Mogador, and that M. de Saint-Aulaire had replied that none has been sent, as it was considered premature to take any action in the matter.

In these circumstances, the British Vice-Consul had been instructed to conform his attitude to that of his French colleague in this as in other respects. His Majesty's Minister had, however, been instructed that, in the last resort, and failing the receipt of instructions to the French Vice-Consul, the British Vice-Consul should recognize the Governor who offered the best security to Europeans, and should do his utmost to avoid a conflict.

M. Pichon told me that the instructions given by the French Government, in concert with the Spanish Government, were that their Consular Representatives were not to intervene in any way whatever in the controversies between the various Moorish Functionaries, but, in the event of actual danger to the lives of Europeans, to deal with those who might for the time being be *de facto* in authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[28979] No. 239.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 29.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August* 28, 1907.

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 101 to you, dated the 27th instant, has been repeated to me.

Moorish Government have not made any application to French Government for money advance, apart from previous request (see telegram No. 98 from Sir G. Lowther, dated the 25th instant), for which, as I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 41 of the 27th instant, an arrangement with Bank of Algeria has been made.

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[28873] No. 240.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 29.)

(No. 43. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, August* 28, 1907.

MY telegram No. 42 of the 28th instant.

I have received in confidence from M. Révoil a copy of the telegraphic instructions sent to the Spanish Minister at Tangier on the 26th instant. The Spanish Commander at Casa Blanca is to be directed that, so long as the present exceptional situation lasts, his troops, who are acting as a police force, are to occupy the zone outside the town designated by agreement with General Drude. Major Santa Olalla is to keep order in that zone, to defend it in co-operation with the French contingent, but avoiding any share in punitive expeditions or acts of reprisal, and to adopt an attitude of cordial friendship towards the French officers and men.

These instructions mark some advance on the former ones, and M. Révoil thinks that for the present they must suffice.

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[28980] No. 241.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 44. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, August 28, 1907.*

SEÑOR MAURA has explained to me in some detail his opinions and intentions as regards Morocco. The following is a summary of them: Without waiting to gather the views of the Spanish Government, France launched out into a course of action from which no issue is apparent, except a situation in which it will be ten times more difficult than before to carry out the programme devised at Algeciras. The French military operations are being conducted outside the sphere assigned to Spain by her secret Agreement with France signed in October 1904. Spain would have been justified in refusing to send a force there. But she wishes to co-operate as far as she possibly can with France, and, as a sign of such co-operation, she sent to Casa Blanca a force of 400 men, which was, in fact, a police force. This police force she will not be induced to employ as if it were an army, or indeed for any object other than that of defending itself against a positive attack and of keeping order. Spain made certain engagements at Algeciras. She will continue her efforts to carry them out. If more is required of her, the Signatory Powers must first be asked if they concur.

A telegraphic report was yesterday received from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris stating that a suggestion had been made to him by the French Foreign Minister as to whether it would not conduce more surely to the attainment of the aims of both the Spanish and the French Governments if the endeavour to act in concert at any particular Moorish port were to be abandoned, and replaced by a plan under which each country would take the coast lying within its particular sphere under its own special protection for the purpose of keeping order there. The proposal is regarded by Señor Maura as being worthy of consideration. He stipulates, however, that Spain shall reserve a right to consider, at each point within the Spanish sphere, by what special means the object of keeping the peace can best be attained; and that she shall not be required to undertake to occupy by force any point on the coast. Señor Maura apprehends that possibly this kind of forcible occupation is what France intends. The consent of all the Powers interested in Morocco would be necessary, and Tangier, of course, would have to be subject to special arrangements.

The great point, I told Señor Maura, was that whatever was done should be by agreement between France and Spain. His Excellency would be grateful if he could be informed of the manner in which the French proposal strikes His Majesty's Government.

I have informed Sir Gerard Lowther of the foregoing.

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[28999] No. 242.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 29, 1907.*

WITH reference tc your telegram No. 79 of the 28th, only 25,000 fr. were forthcoming of the advance promised by the "Compagnie Algérienne," and without the approval of the State Bank the Company refuse to produce remainder. Up till now this approval has been withheld. It is more important that money should be supplied for Tangier garrison than for troops in the field; the pay due to the latter amounts to 3,000*l.*

M. Guiot, member of the Special Committee, who is now in Tangier, yesterday sent a very strong telegram urgently demanding money to the State Bank in Paris. Pay is due next Sunday, when money must be forthcoming without fail.

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[29000] No. 243.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 29, 1907.*

MY telegram No. 104 of the 29th instant.

Some of my colleagues think that French Chargé d'Affaires has hesitated to report to Paris the true state of affairs here, though he seems to have a due sense of the gravity of the situation.





There will probably be a panic here if Mulai Hafid appoints Raisuli as Governor.

Comte de Saint Aulaire informs me that there is, in his opinion, considerable danger at every port, and that it is not possible to keep requisite force to effect a landing at each one without danger.

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[28874] No. 244.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

[By Post.]

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 29, 1907.*

I AGREE that it is both unnecessary and undesirable for us to send a ship to Tangier, but it will be useful to Sir G. Lowther to be able to give a reassuring answer if the British colony again appeals to him, and the reply of the French Government will enable him to do this.

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[28874] No. 245.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 29, 1907.*

SITUATION at Tangier.

In view of Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 43 of 28th August, we consider it unnecessary and undesirable to send a British ship.

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[28980] No. 246.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 29, 1907.*

WE desire to be acquainted with the views of the French Government before expressing an opinion on Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 44 of the 28th instant.

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[28421] No. 247.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 145.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 29, 1907.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 296 of the 17th instant, and, having given my attention to the considerations you put forward, I concur in your view that it is for the present unnecessary that you should convey a warning to the Sultan as to the necessity of his endeavouring to prevent the growth of fanaticism among the population, as directed in my telegram No. 68 of the 16th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[28429] No. 248.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 146.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 29, 1907.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 304 of the 20th instant, inclosing a translation of a note received by you from the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, giving the Sultan's views upon the proposal to grant some degree of foreign protection to Raisuli in return for the release of Sir H. Maclean.

I agree with your opinion that, so long as Raisuli is prepared to deliver up his captive whilst retaining to himself freedom of movement, it is undesirable to insist upon his residing at Tangier, in accordance with the wish expressed by the Sultan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[29011] No. 249.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 419.)
Sir, *Paris, August 28, 1907.*

M. PICHON was not at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this afternoon. I therefore called on the Political Director, and communicated to him the contents of Sir Gerard Lowther's telegram No. 100 of the 26th instant, which reported that a deputation representing a large majority of the British residents in Tangier had expressed to him the opinion that the French and Spanish forces were inadequate for the general protection of the town, and had urged that a British ship of war should be stationed there.

I said that His Majesty's Government were reluctant to add to existing complications by sending a ship unless the French Government desired it, but they wished to know the view which the French authorities took of the situation, and whether there were sufficient forces off Tangier to deal with it.

M. Louis informed me that five large French ships of war and four small ones were policing the coast from Tangier to Mogador; that one of the large ones and one of the small ones were actually at Tangier, and the French Government had decided this morning to send to that port another large ship, which would have a landing contingent ("troupe de débarquement"), and that there was also an old Spanish war-ship, which was to be replaced by a modern one; that at Oran there were troops ready for embarkation at the shortest notice. In these circumstances the French Government considered that it would not be necessary or desirable that a British ship of war should be sent to Tangier, for they felt able to provide for the maintenance of order and the protection of foreigners. M. Louis added that the most recent information received showed that the fears of the foreign residents at Tangier were exaggerated.

I have had the honour of reporting to you by telegraph the information contained in this despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[29130] No. 250.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 30, 1907.*

YOUR telegram No. 93 and Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 44 of yesterday respecting Morocco.

M. Pichon, whom I have just seen, is dissatisfied with attitude adopted by Spanish Government. He is to confer with Spanish Ambassador to-day, and will receive me again afterwards. The view of the Spanish Government that before measures are taken for the maintenance of order at Tangier the Powers must be consulted might, he says, entail a catastrophe and lead other Powers to intervene.

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[29131] No. 251.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 30, 1907.*

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 104 of the 28th instant, I am informed by M. Pichon that the Algerian Bank have undertaken this morning to advance the money to the Moorish Government.

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[29096] No. 252.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 30, 1907.*

ALL British subjects from Fez arrived safely Laraiche. Expected here to-day.

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[29133] No. 253.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 30, 1907.*

MY telegram No. 104 and your telegram No. 82 of yesterday.

The Banque d'État now express their readiness to accept signature of Moorish delegation instead of that of Finance Minister with regard to the 130,000 fr. belonging to the Makhzen now lying at the bank.

The Compagnie Algérienne are now also willing to advance the remaining 75,000 fr. for payment of the garrison here.

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[28423] No. 254.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 141.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 30, 1907.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier,* relative to the unsatisfactory attitude adopted by the Spanish authorities at Ceuta towards the brigand Valiente.

You will observe that complaints are made by the Makhzen that, when Valiente is pressed by their troops, he is permitted to take refuge within the Spanish lines, and that the difficulties of obtaining the release of Sir H. Maclean have been materially increased by the recent supply of ammunition forwarded to Raisuli by the brigand in question.

I request that you will utilize the facts related by Sir G. Lowther to form the basis of a representation to the Spanish Government, drawing their attention to the bad impression which cannot fail to be produced when the authorities of one of the two Powers charged with the organization of the police in Morocco afford encouragement and protection to one of the principal disturbers of order in the country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[29168] No. 255.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 379.)
Sir, *Berlin, August 27, 1907.*

CONSIDERABLE interest has been evinced in the press with regard to a visit which the French Ambassador paid to Prince Bülow at Norderney on Saturday last. Some attempts were made, especially before the visit came off, to impute to it all sorts of far-reaching motives, some papers even going so far as to suggest that a Franco-German Commercial Treaty or Intercolonial Arrangement was to be arranged. The semi-official papers have now announced in a few words that it was merely a friendly and polite visit during which the two statesmen were able to assure themselves of the peaceful development of Franco-German relations, and the rest of the papers repeat the same at somewhat greater length. It is pointed out that this interview, the visit of M. Clémenceau to the King at Marienbad, and the conversations of Baron von Aehrenthal and M. Tittoni on the Semmering and at Ischl are further links in the chain of political meetings which all have the same beneficial tendency of insuring the peace of the world. The King's name is seldom omitted in such articles, and His

* No. 204.

Majesty is apparently believed to have been more or less instrumental in them all. The various official and semi-official communiqués stating that Baron von Aehrenthal's interviews with Sir Charles Hardinge and M. Tittoni have resulted in complete agreement on the question of the reform of justice in Macedonia are quoted in full with satisfaction, and great pleasure is expressed at the renewal of cordial relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy, and the assurance that both countries firmly base their policy on the Triple Alliance.

The situation in Morocco naturally occupies much space in the columns of the press. The "North German Gazette," in its weekly review, assures its readers that France is quite determined to abide by the Algeciras Act, and observes that a conclusive proof of the absurdity of supposing that she intends to conquer Morocco is afforded by the small number of troops sent out which would be quite insufficient for such an operation. Some of the other papers are less convinced on this point, and the Liberal "Frankfurter Zeitung" published a leading article on Saturday expressing not only the belief that France would probably be forced to go further, but the conviction that the other Powers ought to allow and request her to do so.

There is on the whole in fact a most unusually peaceful and amicable tone in German journalism—even the subject of Morenga's reappearance on the borders of German South-West Africa is treated with moderation—but one or two slightly jarring notes have made themselves heard. The "Hamburger Nachrichten," for instance, has published an article warning its readers against attaching too much importance to all these meetings of Monarchs and statesmen, throwing doubts on the honesty of the King's friendly utterances, and urging the Germans to keep their weather-eye open and their powder dry.

I have, &c.
(For Sir Frank Lascelles),
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

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[29162] No. 256.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 420.)
Sir, *Paris, August 29, 1907.*

A SEMI-OFFICIAL communiqué was published in the press this morning to the effect that owing to the events connected with the proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan, and in order to provide against all eventualities, General Drude had asked that the two battalions of reinforcements held in readiness at Oran might be dispatched to him. Orders were immediately given for the embarkation of these troops to-day for Casa Blanca, although the instructions previously given have not been altered.

The "Temps" publishes an article this evening on the subject of the operations to be undertaken by the French troops, in which attention is called to a semi-official note published in the "Süddeutsche Reichskorrespondenz" this morning, and to an article in the "Deutsche Tageszeitung," relative to the attitude of Germany in regard to French action in Morocco.

Copies of the article in question are inclosed herein.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[29163] No. 257.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 421.)
Sir, *Paris, August 30, 1907.*

I RECEIVED by post this morning the telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, No. 104 of yesterday, which you forwarded to me in your despatch No. 483 of yesterday, stating that of the advance promised by the Algerian Company only 25,000 fr. were forthcoming, and the Company declined to furnish the remainder without the approval of the State Bank, which was still withheld.

I immediately communicated with M. Pichon, and he received me this morning. I told his Excellency what Sir Gerard Lowther reported, and that he stated that the

* Not printed.





pay due to the troops in the field amounted to 75,000 fr., and that it was still more important that money should be provided for the Tangier garrison, and that it would be due on the 1st September, when it must be forthcoming.

M. Pichon informed me that the Algerian Company had this morning undertaken to provide the money, and that the Morocco State Bank Delegates were beginning to take a more sensible view of the requirements of the situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[29164] No. 258.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 422. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, August 30, 1907.*

I CALLED on M. Clemenceau yesterday, as I had not seen him since his return to Paris from his "cure" at Carlsbad. His Excellency said that he had heard that I had made representations at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the fears of foreign residents at Tangier of a rising which the French forces would be unable to deal with. I explained to his Excellency the communication which I had made, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and the assurances which had been given to me, and which I had no doubt would be considered satisfactory by His Majesty's Government. M. Clemenceau then told me that Prince Büiow had assured the French Ambassador that Germany had no intention or desire to impede any action that France might take, so long as no attempt was made to upset the Algeciras arrangements. As the French had no intention of doing anything beyond maintaining order and security for life at the ports and in their immediate vicinities, and to exact reparation for the outrages committed against Frenchmen, there was nothing to which the German Government could reasonably object. No more troops than might be required for these objects would be sent to the Morocco ports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE

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[29166] No. 259.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 424.)
Sir, *Paris, August 30, 1907.*

I HAD the honour to receive last night your telegram No. 93 of yesterday, and the one from His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid therein referred to (No. 44, Confidential, 29th August).

This morning I asked M. Pichon to receive me, and I saw him at 12 o'clock. I told his Excellency that the Spanish Government had sought your advice on a matter respecting which you would wish to learn the views of the French Government before making a reply.

M. Pichon stated that the attitude of the Spanish Government regarding Morocco was anything but satisfactory, and he could only hope that they would soon be brought to deal with the question in a reasonable manner.

I then informed his Excellency that, in the opinion of the Spanish Government, the course adopted by the French Government, on which they had not been consulted, will render the execution of the Algeciras programme much more difficult than hitherto. They consider that Spain would have been justified in refusing to join in military operations outside the Spanish sphere defined by the Secret Convention of 1904. As, however, she wished to act with France as far as possible, she sent a police force of 400 men to Casa Blanca. This force is intended solely for the purpose of maintaining order, and for self-defence if attacked. Spain is ready to carry out her engagements undertaken at Algeciras, but for anything beyond them she must, the Spanish Government hold, seek the concurrence of the Signatory Powers. The Spanish Government are, they say, considering a proposal from the French Government, viz., that France and Spain shall each undertake the preservation of order on the coast lying within its own sphere. They desire, however, to reserve for themselves liberty to consider at each point how their object can best be secured, and to give no undertaking to occupy any

point by force. Any measures in regard to Tangier would, they consider, have to be the subject of special arrangements, to which the consent of all the Powers would be necessary.

M. Pichon said that he expected to see the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon, and would after then be better able to state the views of the French Government. Later in the day I received a message requesting me to call at the "Quai d'Orsay" at 6 o'clock. The Ambassador was with the Minister when I arrived, and when he came away from his interview he told me that M. Pichon had informed him that I had inquired of him whether the French Government felt able to maintain order and protect the lives of foreigners at Tangier as the British residents there had expressed their apprehension as to what might take place, and had asked that a British ship of war should be sent thither, but that His Majesty's Government, on receiving explanations from the French Government as to the means at their disposal for insuring the security of foreigners, had considered them satisfactory, and had determined not to send a ship.

I told the Marquis del Muni what had passed on the subject between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, and I suggested to him that if a British ship were sent the ships of other nationalities would probably appear also, and the Morocco international complications would begin again. I then went in to see M. Pichon. His Excellency informed me that the Spanish Ambassador had, by order of the Spanish Government, expressed to him their surprise that the French Government should, without consulting with them, have sent another big ship of war to Tangier with troops and further reinforcements to Casa Blanca, bringing the force there up to over 8,000 men. These measures looked like preparations for a military expedition, which was not at all in the programme anticipated by the Spanish Government.

M. Pichon had, he told me, replied that the additional ship for Tangier had already started, that it was a cruiser of some 7,000 tons, and that it had on board a landing contingent of 150 men. The other ship at Tangier having a light landing contingent, there would be the possibility of landing in all 300 men, which would not be too much for the protection of Tangier with the support of the ships. It could not be regarded as a preparation for a military expedition nor could the additional troops sent to Casa Blanca be so regarded. The troops actually there were 4,444, and the reinforcement of 2,000 men would bring the total force up to 6,444, from which must be deducted the non-effectives, so that the fighting force could not be considered as more than adequate to prevent the tribes from successfully attacking Casa Blanca and its immediate vicinity. The French Government had no intention of embarking on an expedition into the interior. It must, however, be borne in mind by the Spanish Government that the Powers had delegated to France and Spain certain duties and responsibilities in regard to Morocco. The French Government were quite ready to discuss with the Spanish Government the measures to be taken, but they could not incur the risk of leaving Tangier unprotected and wait till an agreement had been come to with the Spanish Government before making precautionary arrangements. What would the Powers, what would the French Parliament say, if, owing to the dilatoriness or inaction of France and Spain, there were a mas-sacre of foreigners at Tangier? M. Pichon could not take on himself such a responsibility, but now that preparations had been made he would be quite ready to discuss the question in detail with the Spanish Government. He could not admit that the concurrence of the Powers must be sought for what the French Government have done, and intend to do, for the protection of Tangier and the foreigners there. The question of the organization of the police was also a matter for discussion, but for the time it was in abeyance owing to the state of affairs at the ports of Morocco.

M. Pichon informed me that it was possible that the Spanish Ambassador might go to San Sebastian to explain personally to the Spanish Prime Minister the intentions and views of the French Government, and to assure him that there is no question of a military expedition into the interior of Morocco. M. Pichon trusts that His Majesty's Government will use their influence with the Spanish Government to bring them to adopt the policy of working in accord with France on the bases which he explained to the Spanish Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[29232] No. 260.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August* 31, 1907.

MY telegram No. 44 of to-day.

I was informed by M. Pichon this evening that the Spanish Ambassador had this afternoon expressed to him the surprise of his Government that the French Government should without consulting them have sent to Tangier another ship with troops and additional reinforcements to Casa Blanca, whereby the total number of troops there would be increased to over 8,000 men. This action had the appearance of preparations for a military expedition which was not contemplated by the Spanish Government.

M. Pichon replied that the additional ship sent to Tangier, which had already started, was a cruiser of 7,000 tons, with a landing contingent of 150 men. With the similar landing contingent of the other ship there it would be possible to land a force of 300 men, which, with the support of the ships, would not be too great to provide for the protection of the town and vicinity. This could not be looked upon as a preparation for a military expedition.

The additional 2,000 men sent to Casa Blanca brought the force there up to 6,444 men, which, when allowance was made for non-effectives, could not be regarded as excessive for the defence of the town against the combined tribes, whose numbers were increasing. The French Government had no intention of undertaking an expedition into the interior.

The Spanish Government must not forget that certain duties and responsibilities in regard to Morocco had been delegated to Spain and France by the Powers. The French Government were prepared to discuss the measures to be taken with the Spanish Government, but they could not incur the risk of leaving Tangier without protection until they had arrived at an agreement with Spain. What would be said by the Powers and the French Parliament if there were a massacre of foreigners at Tangier owing to the inaction or dilatoriness of France and Spain? He could not assume a risk of this nature, but he would be ready to discuss the question in detail with the Spanish Government now that preparations had been made. M. Pichon could not admit that the measures taken or contemplated by the French Government for the protection of foreigners at Tangier required the concurrence of the Powers.

The question of the organization of the police was also a matter for discussion, but it was temporarily in abeyance owing to the state of affairs at the ports.

M. Pichon stated that it was possible that the Spanish Ambassador might go to San Sebastian in order to explain the intentions and views of the French Government to the Prime Minister, and to assure him that no military expedition into the interior of Morocco was contemplated.

M. Pichon trusts that His Majesty's Government will endeavour to induce the Spanish Government to adopt the policy of working in accord with France on the basis which he explained to the Spanish Ambassador.

I gathered from the remarks of the Spanish Ambassador, whom I met as he was coming from his interview with M. Pichon, that the latter had mentioned to him, as an indication of the dangerous state of affairs at Tangier, the request made by the British residents that a British ship might be sent to Tangier, and the satisfaction expressed by His Majesty's Government at the precautions taken by the French Government. I accordingly told him what had passed on the subject between the British and French Governments.

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[28760] No. 261.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 145.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1907.

THE Spanish Minister inquired on the 26th instant what view was taken by His Majesty's Government of the situation in Morocco produced by the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan.

The Marquis de Villalobar was informed that, speaking generally, His Majesty's Government wished to support the policy decided upon by the French and Spanish Governments, and that in reply to a request for instructions from the British Consul

at Mogador, I had said that it was desirable that the Consular Body should act together, and that in the last resort, and should no agreement have been arrived at on the subject, he should recognize the Representative of whichever Sultan seemed able to maintain order and protect life and property.

M. de Villalobar said he supposed the Consuls would naturally take this line.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[29288] No. 262.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 313.)
*Tangier, August 23, 1907.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 286 of the 15th instant, I have to report that no further communication has been received from Kaïd Maclean or Raisuli, and fearing that some accident may have happened to the courier carrying the letters referred to in my said despatch I caused copies of them to be sent to Kaïd Maclean yesterday.

I regret to say this case makes little progress towards a solution.

As the results of doubts which had apparently arisen in the minds of the Commanders of the Mehallas operating in that district, as to the trustworthiness of the overtures being made by the Khamas tribe for the handing over of Kaïd Maclean, and in order to accelerate the Kaïd's release, communications passed between the two Commanders, and it was agreed to make a simultaneous attack on the tribe from the north-west and south-west. This attack came off on Monday last, and the force under El Merani, then in the Beni Issef tribe, advanced and reached the villages of El Houta and El Zowia, where Kaïd Maclean was taken immediately on his capture, and the villagers' grain stacks were burned.

Some resistance was shown by the tribe, assisted by Raisuli, and owing to rumours of treachery on the part of the neighbouring tribes the force retired on the camp which was held by one-third of the force. Some of the tribal levies withdrew from the Mehalla and joined the rebels, who were collected near with the intention of attacking the camp. Some further fighting occurred during the retreat, and threatening letters were received by the Beni Issef tribe from Raisuli and the neighbouring tribes, ordering them to make common cause with them against the Government forces. They refused to do this, but requested El Merani to withdraw his Mehalla, which he agreed to do as the tribes were threatening him, and he fell back towards Sumata on the Tuesday morning. During that afternoon the force found its way blocked by Raisuli and tribesmen at the village of Beni Yahia in the Beni Issef, and it was decided to attack them there. The village was taken and burned, but the troops were compelled to again fall back on the camp owing to its being attacked. The fight lasted until 9 P.M., when the tribesmen were eventually driven off. The casualties on both sides were very small.

El Merani has requested reinforcements, and the Minister of War tells me that 400 more soldiers are being sent at once.

Oold Boushta-el-Baghdadi's force on the other side of the tribe's territory had some small success in its operations on the Monday, but it would seem the results were too insignificant to bring sufficient pressure on the tribe to induce it to come to terms.

El Merani reports that almost all the tribes in that district are now disaffected, and are anti-Makhzen, thus fulfilling the fears given rise to as to the effect on them of recent incidents at Dar-al-Baida.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[29289] No. 263.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 314.)
*Tangier, August 23, 1907.*

Sir,

THE condition of Morocco at this moment presents a picture which can only be painted in the most gloomy colours. Casa Blanca remains in much the same condition as it did two weeks ago after the bombardment. General Drude holds his own





against the attacks of the tribes whose fanaticism drives them on to the French regardless of their losses. No attempt has been made on the part of the French to penetrate more than a very few miles into the interior, and the guns of the French ships are constantly in action repelling the attempts of the Arabs to enter the town. No efforts have been made to come to terms with the tribes, who seem to have at present suffered but small loss. The country in the immediate neighbourhood of Casa Blanca has been entirely burnt either by the shells of the vessels or by the Arabs themselves.

Under these circumstances, and as the country close round Casa Blanca is very poor, there seems little prospect of the French being able to recover from the immediate neighbourhood sums in anything like sufficient quantities to cover the damage done at Casa Blanca.

The other ports on the coast have continued in a state of unrest, but fortunately no serious incident has occurred, the presence of French men-of-war at all of them having apparently had a good effect. Many European and Jewish refugees have left all the ports. The freedom from molestation of some of these ports may be accounted for by the fact that the action of the tribes has been to a great extent concentrated at Casa Blanca. It is quite impossible to estimate how long the arms and ammunition possessed by these tribes will hold out. Many of them have come from great distances. A report has been freely circulated that Mulai Hafid, the Viceroy of Marrakesh and brother of the Sultan, was proclaimed Sultan on the 16th. No official confirmation from Moorish sources has been received, and at present it is impossible to say whether the intention is that Mulai Hafid should be Sultan only of Southern Morocco or of the whole country. Nor is it known under what banner he would propose to lead his countrymen, whether proclaiming war against the French and Christians generally or against the present order of things and the incapacity of the Viziers. The want of cohesion amongst the tribes in the south may yet furnish this Pretender with ample difficulties and anxiety.

Tangier has until now remained quiet, though much alarm has been shown by the foreign and Jewish population owing no doubt to the dramatic stories which come from the coast, to the habitual restlessness of the tribes in the neighbourhood, and to the conviction that it would require a large force to occupy the town satisfactorily.

The operations of the Sultan's troops amongst the tribes where the Kaïd Maclean is held prisoner have not met with the success that was hoped for, and nearly all the tribes have combined against the Government troops, which have been compelled to remain on the defensive awaiting reserves. The negotiations for the release of Kaïd Maclean have thus for the present failed.

The condition of affairs at Fez is far from reassuring, and all or nearly all the foreigners there are intending to leave at once for the coast, and have been advised to do so by the Makhzen. The Sultan, with no freedom of action, though perhaps willing to make an effort to move to the coast and then give some indication of authority, is unable to do so, restrained as he is by the Viziers, who fear that once they leave Fez all their property will be looted, and that in the absence of a proper garrison the town will be at the mercy of the Berber tribes. Moreover, such armies as His Majesty possesses are all occupied elsewhere, and the coffers of the Imperial Exchequer are empty. If His Majesty appeals to the tribes for contingents his call would probably remain unanswered. Such small sums as occasionally the State Bank offers him suffice only to meet his immediate wants. It therefore seems almost hopeless to expect that the Sultan will make this move from Fez which might save the situation for him; and if he does not move, the existing condition of anarchy and chaos can only grow worse, and through this state of affairs it is difficult to see any daylight.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[29290] No. 264.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 315.)
*Tangier, August 24, 1907.*

Sir,

MR. HUNOT, British Vice-Consul at Saffi, reports under date of the 18th instant that Mulai Hafid was proclaimed Sultan on the 16th instant by the people of Marakesh and most of the powerful tribes, and by the Kaïds and Chiefs.

On that day the Moors of Marakesh prayed for him as their Sultan, and Mr. Hu no thinks that there is little doubt but that all the tribes will join him. El Glawi, the strongest of the Atlas Kaïds, has been made Governor of Marakesh. Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar has not yet declared himself. He and Mtoogi were the most important of the Kaïds loyal to Sultan Abdul Aziz, and it is probable that both of them will now throw in their lot with Mulai Hafid.

Mr. Spinney, Vice-Consul at Mazagan, practically confirms the above news under date of the 22nd, and adds that Mulai Hafid was reported to be starting for Casa Blanca, having written to the Ducala tribe to meet him in Shragna. He had not yet communicated with the authorities at Mazagan, but Mr. Spinney felt sure they would accept him as Sultan. Mulai Hafid has, it appears, already named a Vizier and a Head of the Oomana, but there is at present no indication as to the programme he proposes to lay before his countrymen, and whether he will decide for a Holy War or for conciliation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[29292] No. 265.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 317.)
*Tangier, August* 26, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from the British Vice-Consul at Mogador, reporting the steps taken by him to insure the safety of British subjects in the event of possible disturbances.

I only received this to-day, but the wireless telegraphy reports have not till now brought any disturbing news from that port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 265.

*Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 45.)
*Mogador, August* 17, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency's Circular of the 2nd instant, instructing me to warn the British subjects to be careful to expose themselves as little as possible, I have the honour to report that, although there is at present no indication that the events at Dar-al-Baida are likely to be repeated here, I have considered it advisable to give them this warning.

At the same time, and as it is possible that disturbances may break out quite unexpectedly, as has been the case at Casa Blanca, I called personally on all the British subjects to arrange with them for a place of concentration, where we should all join and defend ourselves if the necessity arises. I was most anxious that the place of meeting should be the Consulate, but, on discussing the question, it was pointed out to me that the Consulate is far too exposed, and that it would require a much larger number of men that we could muster to hold the building, even if it is a matter of a few hours. There are sixteen windows and two street doors which will require to be guarded, and it faces on one side a synagogue, which is sure to be invaded by the mob, and on the other, and at the back of the house, there are Moorish or Jewish residences, with roofs easy of access, and overlooking some of the rooms of the Consulate; besides, one of the town gates, leading to the Arab quarter, is close by, and the probabilities are that if there is a rising that gate could not be held. Under these circumstances, I agreed with the others that it will be safer to concentrate at the German Vice-Consulate, which is a strong house with only one opening in a narrow street, and has the distinct advantage of being adjacent to the French Consulate. It is perhaps needless to add that the latter place will be the one which will first receive all possible assistance from the French war-ship. Indeed, I am told that a plan for its defence is already drawn up by the Captain of the "Du Chayla," in concert with the French Consul and the leading members of their colony.

The German Vice-Consul, M. Von Maur, whom I saw subsequently, readily





agreed to my suggestion that the British colony should take refuge in his house if ever there is any danger of an anti-foreign movement at this port. M. Von Maur, who is generally well informed, and whose business brings him in constant touch with the natives, stated to me that he had been assured by a trustworthy Moor that two-thirds of the townspeople could not be trusted, and that they would undoubtedly be the first to join in any disturbance, with the primary object of looting, not only European property, but also that of their own co-religionists. His informant added that the remaining third of the native population, even if they tried to keep order, could not succeed, as they would be greatly outnumbered, and they would have to follow the majority. M. Von Maur also informed me that there is a certain nervousness noticeable amongst the Moors. Some of them have received letters from their people in the country asking them to leave Mogador, and others are selling their goods in great haste, and even at a loss, in order to be ready to clear out at a given moment. This, added to the alarming news received daily from the coast, cannot but impress the European colonies, but so far there is no indication of an exodus on their part.

This morning I called on the Governor, and we had a long conversation on the present situation. He assured me that there was no danger whatever. He has taken all possible measures for the safety of the town and the protection of the Europeans, and he was willing to assume the responsibility. As I had heard, just before calling on him, that Anfluz had sent him a message offering to undertake to protect the town from any attack on the part of the tribesmen, if the Consuls could give him a formal guarantee that no troops would be landed here, I asked Kaïd Bargash if there was any truth in this report, and he said that it was true. He took this opportunity to inquire whether any such landing was contemplated. I replied that I could not, of course, guess what was going to happen, but that I understood that as long as there was no cause for it no troops were likely to be landed.

With reference to my preceding despatch, relative to the Spanish sailing-ship with the arms on board, I have the honour to report that the Spanish Consul did not see his way to dispatch the vessel to Tangier, owing to objections raised by the master. It was then decided to tranship them on board the French cruiser, the Commanding Officer undertaking to send them to the Spanish Legation at Tangier by the first safe opportunity. The Governor was informed accordingly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

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[29293] No. 266.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 318.)
*Tangier, August* 26, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from the British Vice-Consul at Mogador, reporting the receipt of the news in that town of the proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan at Marakesh.

Before the receipt of this despatch I had already transmitted to Mr. Wilkinson a reply to his telegram, instructing him as to the course he should follow under the circumstances which he appeared to foresee. A copy of my instructions to him are herewith inclosed.

In view of the statement contained in the last paragraph of Mr. Wilkinson's despatch, I intimated to the French Legation that I had instructed Mr. Wilkinson to place himself in communication with his French colleague in case of difficulties, but that the latter has shown little sign of acting with his colleagues since his arrival in Mogador. I was assured that instructions would at once be sent to him to correct his attitude.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 266.

*Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 47.)

*Mogador, August* 19, 1907.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 45 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that yesterday a special courier from Morocco city brought the news that Mulai Hafid had been proclaimed Sultan in that city on the 16th instant, and that one of his first steps was to appoint Kaïd El Chelawi Governor of the town.

The news was received here with apparent indifference by the native population, but it created a stir amongst Europeans, who cannot foresee the consequences of this fresh complication. I called on the Governor and asked him what his attitude would be in the present circumstances; he said the only authority he could recognize was that of Sultan Mulai Abd-el-Aziz. Kaïd Bargash is inclined to believe that some of the tribes in Southern Morocco will remain loyal to the Sultan at Fez, but his belief is not shared by everybody here.

In talking it over with the Spanish Consul, he suggested that we should telegraph to our respective Legations, and I venture to hope your Excellency will not disapprove my having sent to-day, by an Italian steamer bound for the Canary Islands, the following telegram :—

"Mulai Hafid proclaimed Sultan in Morocco city the 16th August. In case new Governor is appointed here by Mulai Hafid and arrives here with an armed escort, what ought we to do should the present Governor resist and refuse open gates of the town? Spanish Consul telegraphs in the same sense to his Minister."

The French Consul did not think it was necessary for him to telegraph, but, of course, he has other means of communication with his superiors, owing to the presence of the French cruiser at this port. Besides, I ought perhaps to mention that M. Kouri has made it a point, since his arrival at Mogador, to keep aloof from his colleagues, and to act quite independently, even in cases when a joint action is indicated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 266.

*Sir G. Lowther to Vice-Consul Wilkinson.*

(No. 14.)

*Tangier, August* 23, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE received your telegram of the 21st instant, asking for instructions as to what you should do in the event of a new Governor being appointed by Mulai Hafid and arriving at Mogador with an armed escort and the present Governor refusing to open the gates to him.

Should such an eventuality occur you should concert with your French colleague in regard to any action which it may be considered necessary to take, as it is most desirable that all Consuls should act together, and their action must depend on view taken by the French, who have material force there to back it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30134] No. 267.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 319.)

*Tangier, August* 27, 1907.

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 311 of the 23rd instant, transmitting copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Fez reporting that the 24th instant had been fixed for the departure of the European communities from the capital, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch which I have now received





from Mr. MacLeod stating that, with the exception of Dr. Verdon, all British subjects started for Laraiche on the 24th instant under strong escort.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 267.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

*Fez, August* 24, 1907.

Sir,

FOR the reasons given in my despatch No. 83 of the 19th instant, and also in consequence of my French colleague having informed me that General Drude had received orders to punish the tribes guilty of the recent massacres of certain Europeans at Casa Blanca, I have this day left Fez for Laraiche.

Dr. E. S. Verdon, notwithstanding my advice to the contrary, has decided to remain with the Court until the Sultan tells him to go.

The escort consists of some fifty Sheraga tribesmen, mounted and commanded by the Khalifa of the Basha Abdelkrim Eshergin.

The routes to be followed is viâ Ben Ito, Hajra-Shereefa, Warga, Cheahan, and Harradin, and it is expected that the journey will take five or six days.

I have placed the Consulate in charge of my interpreter Hadj Tahir Mikwar, with my soldier as caretaker.

The post office continues working, except for money business.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[29294] No. 268.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 320.)

*Tangier, August* 26, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 98 of the 25th instant, informing you as to the danger of a mutiny among the soldiers of the Tangier garrison, I have the honour to report that the Minister of War was enabled to distribute the arrears of pay on Sunday morning, the money having been obtained in the following manner :—

The "Banque d'État" having announced their inability to make an advance until certain formalities regarding the signature of the Minister of Finance had been complied with, necessitating the dispatch of a courier to Fez, and a consequent delay of several days, the French "Compagnie Algérienne," yielding to the urgent representations of Comte de Saint Aulaire, consented to make an advance of 100,000 fr. This advance was only made under the personal guarantee of the four members of the Moorish delegation, who are charged with the elaboration of the "Règlements" under the Act of Algeciras. Of the 100,000 fr. thus placed at the disposal of the Moorish authorities, 25,000 fr. was at once devoted to paying the garrison, and it is estimated that the remaining 75,000 fr. will enable Cid Guebbas to distribute pay to the soldiers in Tangier and outskirts for at least three weeks.

The danger of a mutiny among the garrison here is thus for the present rendered less likely, but there is little doubt that if it be again found impossible to distribute pay, the situation will at once become critical.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[29295] No. 269.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 321.)

*Tangier, August* 27, 1907.

Sir,

A LARGE meeting of British subjects took place yesterday to consider the present situation at Tangier, and after some discussion it was decided to send a deputation to call upon me and submit their views.

This deputation, consisting of the most respectable members of the community, informed me that the feeling was general in the British community that, in view of the unrest and state of alarm existing in Tangier, the means at hand for protecting their lives and property were totally inadequate.

There were only two foreign men-of-war in the harbour, one French and one Spanish, and in the event of disturbances, should it be found necessary to land men, the effect of landing in such small numbers would inevitably be to produce a disaster greater even than that of Casa Blanca.

I asked the deputation what reasons they had for supposing that there was any probability of trouble occurring, and their reply was that during the last few days it has been a matter of common knowledge that the soldiers' pay was in arrears and that these had threatened to loot if it were not forthcoming, that a large number of bad characters had recently arrived in the town, who had no occupation, and only awaited the moment to begin looting, that latterly several of Raisuli's men had been seen about the place, and, in fact, speaking generally, that there existed such a panic in the town that the slightest spark might set the place ablaze.

I endeavoured to calm the deputation, and pointed out that as regards the soldier's pay that matter had for the moment been satisfactorily disposed of, that as regards the bad characters I would call the attention of the authorities to the matter, and as for the presence of Raisuli's men here that was nothing new, as it was their custom to come and go with impunity. I reminded the deputation that it belonged to France and Spain, since the Act of Algeciras, to police the ports, to which they replied that the inadequacy of the protection was felt not only by British subjects but by French and Spaniards and other communities also, and they considered that now, if ever, they were entitled to the protection which would be given to them by the presence of a British man-of-war in the bay.

I consequently transmitted this request to you at once by telegraph. I may add that on the previous day the Spanish community, which numbers some 7,000 persons, held a similar meeting, protesting against the insufficiency of the protection afforded them and asking that they should all be armed. The Spanish Minister informed them that the "Numancia" was at their disposal in case of trouble, but that he could not consider their request for arms.

A copy of the Petition which has now been presented to me is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 269.

*Petition to Sir G. Lowther from British Residents in Tangier.*

WE, the undersigned members of a deputation appointed at a meeting of British residents held this day, beg to submit to your Excellency the following Petition for presentation to His Majesty's Government:—

Having regard to the critical state of affairs in Tangier, we urge upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of providing immediately for the protection of the lives and property of British residents.

Having regard to the special circumstances of Tangier and the large and scattered population, we submit that the presence of a French and a Spanish cruiser is not adequate protection; we would also point out that many British residents are not in position to leave Tangier.

We therefore urge upon His Majesty's Government the urgent necessity of sending a British war-ship, the presence of which would create confidence and go far to prevent a repetition of the disastrous consequences of the landing of an inadequate force as at Casa Blanca.

(Signed) E. WALLER.
D. MACLEOD.
W. HARRIS.
J. KIRBY GREEN.
E. T. ABRINES.

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[29296] No. 270.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 322.) *Tangier, August 27, 1907.*

Sir,

AT the request of the Minister of War I to-day called on him, and he gave me a very gloomy account of the present position of the forces in this district owing to the entire absence of funds from which to keep the pay of the soldiers up to date.

A weekly sum of 19,000 dollars (about 2,280*l.*) is required for this purpose alone, and that sum is apportioned thus: about 12,000 dollars (1,440*l.*) for the two forces operating against the Khamas, and 7,000 dollars (840*l.*) for those guarding Tangier and Arzila and keeping the roads open.

The Minister of War had fears at the end of last week, as reported in my telegram No. 98 of the 25th instant, that if the arrears due to the soldiers here were not paid, desertions, and possibly mutiny, would result owing to the news of the proclamation of Mulai Hafid, which, in the absence of pay, would probably assume an exaggerated importance in their eyes.

The arrangement referred to in my despatch No. 320 of the 26th instant, however, does not provide for the maintenance of the two forces in the Khamas district, which are already over two weeks in arrears, and require over 25,000 dollars to pay them up to date, and his Excellency has asked me to assist him as far as possible with my French colleague to obtain funds for this purpose.

Should such funds not be furnished without delay, he gave me to understand that the forces under Bushta-el-Bagdadi and El Merani would gradually disperse after having disposed of their rifles to the tribesmen in order to obtain food with the proceeds. The Mehallas, with their guns and ammunition, would thus, he said, soon become an easy prey for the tribes.

He told me that El Merani's force would not take any further part in the operations against the Khamas, as recent events had shown that it is not sufficiently strong to traverse the Khamas and make a junction with El Bagdadi's force; he therefore proposes to instruct El Merani, who, owing to all the tribes having gone against the Government, has had to retire from the neighbourhood of the Khamas to withdraw to Alcazar and send a portion of his force as reinforcements to El Bagdadi, who, he considers, will then be able to hold his own and even take the aggressive again against the Khamas, provided money is forthcoming for the pay of the men.

I pointed out to Sid Guebbas that, although the forces have been operating against the Khamas' tribe for about six weeks, the only result they had attained, so far as I could see, was to make all the tribes in that district hostile to the Makhzen. His Excellency said, however, and I think with great reason, that this state of things has been brought about almost entirely by the reports of French action at Dar-al-Baida and the news of the proclamation of Mulai Hafid at Marakesh, and that before those events the tribes were desirous of maintaining their loyalty to the Sultan.

I further remarked that the withdrawal of the troops would be regarded as a great victory by Raisuli and the tribes, and certainly make Raisuli's demands much more onerous than they would otherwise be, to which his Excellency replied that unfortunately was sure to be so, but in the absence of money for the men's pay there was no alternative.

His Excellency hinted that he might receive instructions to send all available troops to Fez to accompany the Sultan to Rabat, in which case he would be compelled to withdraw all troops from the Khamas, and only leave sufficient here to maintain security and keep the roads open.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[29333] No. 271.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)*

(No. 425.) *Paris, August 31, 1907.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 418 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a communication which I have received to-day

from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, explaining the views of the French Government as to the attitude to be adopted in regard to the recognition of agents appointed by Mulai Hafid in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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Inclosure in No. 271.

*Communication respecting Morocco from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Sir F. Bertie.*

LE Département des Affaires Étrangères remercie l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique d'avoir bien voulu lui faire connaître que le Consul d'Angleterre à Mogador avait reçu pour instructions d'agir d'accord avec son collègue Français, dans le cas où un nouveau Gouverneur, envoyé par Mulai Hafid, arriverait dans cette ville.

Il paraît au Gouvernement de la République qu'avant d'examiner la question de la reconnaissance officielle d'agents nommés par Mulai Hafid, on doit attendre de se trouver en présence d'un état de fait bien défini, résultant de la proclamation de nouveaux Gouverneurs dans les mosquées et de leur acceptation en cette qualité par les fonctionnaires et la population.

Les instructions envoyées en ce sens à notre Légation à Tanger se concilient donc avec les directions que le Gouvernement Britannique a données à son Représentant. Les Légations à Tanger sont d'ailleurs, dans les circonstances actuelles, en mesure d'être renseignées très promptement sur les événements de la côte Atlantique et il leur serait facile de régler presque immédiatement l'attitude de leurs agents si des conflits ou des substitutions de Gouverneurs se produisaient dans les ports.

Des derniers renseignements reçus à ce sujet il résulte que, les Gouverneurs des ports du sud ayant reconnu Mulai Hafid, il n'y a pas eu de changement dans le personnel des autorités locales. Les Agents Consulaires restent donc en rapport avec les mêmes Gouverneurs.

*Le* 29 *Août*, 1907.

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[29334] No. 272.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 426.) *Paris, August* 31, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 45 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a communication which I have to-day received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that the Algerian Company have agreed to advance 100,000 fr. to the Shereefian Delegates at Tangier to provide for the payment of troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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Inclosure in No. 272.

*Note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Sir F. Bertie.*

LE Département a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique que, sur les conseils du Gouvernement Français, une banque Française, la "Compagnie Algérienne," vient d'avancer aux Délégués Chérifiens à Tanger la somme de 100,000 fr. destinée au paiement des troupes de cette ville et de la région.

*Paris, le* 30 *Août*, 1907.

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[29447] No. 273.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 2, 1907.

LOCAL authorities at Mazagan have refused to surrender a very large amount of warlike stores to Mulai Hafid's agents, who demanded that they should be handed over. An invitation was then made by Makhzen authorities here to French to take over stores on their war-ship, but surrender of arms to them is likewise refused by local authorities. An occupation of the town by the French may now become necessary if they have to use force to obtain surrender of stores.

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[29448] No. 274.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 2, 1907.

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

My despatch No. 286 of the 15th August.

I have received letters from Kaïd Maclean stating that French protection is refused by Raisuli. He desires that some British subject should be sent with whom he can negotiate direct, or that one of his men should be sent to arrange matter with His Majesty's Legation at Tangier. Latter proposal I am now writing to accept. In view of your telegram No. 67 of the 14th August, I suppose that British protection may now be offered him.

I have told my French colleague of Raisuli's refusal to accept French offer of protection.

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[29426] No. 275.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1907.

WITH a view to checking the importation of arms into Morocco, French Government ask us to assent to French or Spanish naval authorities being authorized to visit and search vessels on Moorish coast, instead of trusting to procedure contemplated in Article 24 of Act of Algeciras. It is stated that German Government promised to send their Minister at Tangier instructions to come to an arrangement. Has German Legation received such instructions? Unless objections are raised by other Powers we are not disposed to make difficulties.

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[29448] No. 276.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1907.

IN view of the circumstances which you mentioned in your telegram No. 110 of to-day, you are authorized to grant, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, protection to Raisuli. It should, however, be conditional on his agreeing to release the Kaïd and be of the nature already described by me (see my telegram No. 66 of the 13th ultimo).

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[29166] No. 277.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 2, 1907.*

YOUR telegram No. 44 of the 28th ultimo.

You can assure Spanish Government that we have every confidence that French Government desire to avoid an expedition into the interior, and that, but for the measures they have already taken, we should have been obliged, in answer to demands from British residents, to send a ship to protect them at Tangier. In view of fact that policing of ports is intrusted to France and Spain, this would have led to most undesirable complications. We sincerely hope, therefore, that Spain will continue to co-operate with France in giving protection at the ports on basis explained to Spanish Ambassador by M. Pichon.

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[29106] No. 278.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 486.)
*Foreign Office, September 2, 1907.*

Sir,

THE French Minister called here on the 30th ultimo, and made a verbal communication to the effect that your Excellency had conveyed to the French Government an expression of the anxiety felt by His Majesty's Government with regard to the financial situation of the Makhzen.

M. Geoffray said that, at the request of the French Government, the Algerian Bank had consented to advance to the Shereefian Delegates at Tangier, on their personal guarantee, a sum of 100,000 fr., which would be employed for the payment of the troops.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[29107] No. 279.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 487.)
*Foreign Office, September 2, 1907.*

Sir,

THE French Minister called at this Department on the 30th ultimo and made a verbal communication to the following effect:—

The French Government, in view of the increased state of unrest in Morocco consequent on the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan, have been compelled to decide on the dispatch of reinforcements to General Drude, to cope with any incidents which might occur at Casa Blanca, Rabat, Mazagan, Saffi, or Mogador.

Further troops are held in readiness at Oran in the event of safety of the Europeans at Tangier being threatened.

In any case the programme of French intervention remains unchanged, namely:—

1. Concerted action with Spain, with a view to the complete organization of a police force at the ports mentioned in the Act of Algeciras;
2. The dispersion of tribes gathered round Casa Blanca; and
3. No expedition into the interior.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[29593] No. 280.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 3, 1907.*

IMPORTATION of arms into Morocco.

Your telegram No. 88 of yesterday.



My German colleague has only been requested to state his views, but has received no instructions on the subject. He does not desire to be quoted, as the opinion of his Government is not yet known to him, but he thinks that an authorization might be given to France and Spain to visit and search vessels as a merely temporary measure.

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[29594] No. 281.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 3, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

Your telegram No. 90 of yesterday.

Please direct me as to my course of action in case Raisuli should demand a Governorship in addition to British protection.

The grant of protection to Government officials is forbidden by the Madrid Convention (Article V), but a precedent to the contrary is formed by the case of Sid Menebhi, who, however, only received protection at Sultan's special request.

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[29601] No. 282.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)*

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Sebastian, September 3, 1907.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs being at San Sebastian, I have thought it my duty to come here in order to call his serious attention to the points mentioned in the instructions contained in your telegram No. 61 of the 2nd instant. I could not see Señor Allendesalazar to-day, as his Excellency has gone to Bilbao, but I had a conversation with M. Révoil, French Ambassador, who told me he was engaged in concerting with the Spanish Government the necessary arrangements in view of a Franco-Spanish force being possibly compelled to effect a landing at Tangier. There is a tendency, it would seem, on the part of the Spanish Government to consider that Tangier falls within the limits of the sphere of influence assigned to Spain by her secret agreement with France. In case of a recognized emergency they would be ready to disembark a small force from such vessels as may be lying in the bay. But the French Ambassador points out that there would inevitably be a call for reinforcements, and these the Spanish Government objects to engage itself to send, unless there be a previous mandate, issuing from the Powers, to that effect. The positions to be respectively occupied by the Spanish and French troops are also giving rise to difficulties in the Spanish mind. It is true that in February last arrangements with a view to defining the positions to be taken up at Tangier by the joint police force were made between the two Governments. But Spain apparently does not consider that these arrangements apply to the present condition of affairs. M. Révoil is urging strongly the contrary opinion, arguing further that it would be highly imprudent to waste time in talking about a new distribution of forces. He suspects, moreover, that the real object kept in view by Spain is to secure by such redistribution the predominant place for the forces of Spain. An appeal to the Powers is also strongly discouraged by his Excellency.

On the above points I intend to give the French Ambassador all the support I can.

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[29562] No. 283.

*Acting Consul-General Dundas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Algiers, September 3, 1907.*

TWO transports sailed Casa Blanca with troops, war material.

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[29609] No. 284.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 323.)
*Tangier, August* 27, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida relative to the situation created by the Proclamation as Sultan of Mulai Hafid.

It will be seen that it is considered likely that Mulai Hafid may effect a settlement with the French, and be able to restore order in the South.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 284.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 211.)
*Dar-al-Baida, August* 26, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report the following native information communicated to me this evening by one of my native employés. It is to the effect that a courier belonging to the Spanish Post Office has come in this afternoon from the Arab camp at or near Tedhert, bringing news that the Arabs are in a sulky mood, complaining that their homes and homesteads have been scattered and broken up; that some are for fighting the French, while others desire peace.

Further, that on Saturday last a letter arrived from Mulai Hafid stating that he was leaving Marrakesh last Friday, accompanied by all the great southern Governors, Glawi, Wold Anflus, and others, for Dar-al-Baida, and enjoining the tribesmen to await his arrival, and meantime to do nothing. The letter stated that what the Arabs had done in killing the Christians was a bad act, and that he, Mulai Hafid, is coming to bring about a settlement.

The Arabs were instructed in the letter not to go and fight the French, but that if the French came and attacked them then to fight them.

The Arabs then exclaimed: "The Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan, God be merciful to him! Mulai Hafid, God give him the victory! Since the reign of Sidi Hassan there has been no Sultan."

Such is the native news just brought in.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 284.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 212.)
*Dar-al-Baida, August* 27, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a statement sent to me by Mr. Vice-Consul Spinney of Mazagan, regarding Mulai Hafid.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hunot, of Saffi, in a letter dated the 24th instant, states that, according to reports from Morocco city, Mulai Hafid is becoming daily stronger by the adherence of the tribes, who are coming forward offering him their allegiance. He has released all the prisoners, appointed his Ministers, while the "Afrag," or Sultan's tent, is being rapidly prepared.

The question of Kaïd Tiggi, of M'tooga, and Kaïd Si Aissa-ben-Omar joining in the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid is not definitely decided, but, Mr. Hunot adds, appearances favour their deciding in his favour.

Mulai Hafid has, however, already sent orders to Si Aissa-ben-Omar to join him.

At Saffi the townspeople are cleaning the guns and making preparations against attack, not by the French, but by the Arabs.

All seems, however, to be fairly quiet at Saffi at present.





Mogador is reported perfectly quiet. The Jews are sending large quantities of their jewellery to London for safety.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 284.

*Statement communicated by Vice-Consul Spinney to Consul Madden.*

TO-DAY a Kaida Erha arrived bringing letters to the authorities and townspeople of Mazagan from Mulai Hafid. He (the latter) sent a copy of the document made in Marrakesh when he was proclaimed Sultan. He states that after the murder of Dr. Mauchamp Mulai Abd-el-Aziz failed to give France satisfaction, and they occupied Oudjda.

After the occupation Mulai Abd-el-Aziz informed the tribes that the occupation was only temporary, but nevertheless he has taken no steps in the matter. Now that the affair of Casa Blanca has taken place he (Mulai Hafid) is prepared to give France satisfaction and come to an arrangement with her and the other Powers. He states he is leaving at once. The only orders that the Administrators of Customs have received from him are to send up all the guns and cartridges they have.

To-day emissaries arrived from Fez to meet El Mal-aleen (? Ma-el-Aineen) to get him to go to Marrakesh to persuade Mulai Hafid not to take any steps against Mulai Abd-el-Aziz. As they heard that this gentleman is already on his way to Marrakesh to swear fidelity to Mulai Hafid, they are leaving to-morrow with the same object.

Mulai Hafid is said to have a very large supply of all kinds of guns, and has a lot of cannons that were bought by Mulai Hassan, and have never been used.

Ducala and Rabamna have accepted Mulai Hafid, and there is no doubt that Si Aissa will do the same. About M'tugi's and Anflus' movements we have no news; but there is no doubt that they would suffer if they should show any resistance. Meanwhile, Mulai Hafid is making every preparation to leave Marrakesh. He has also written to all the tribes not to attack the French at Casa Blanca as long as the French do not come into Showia.

Mazagan and Azimur have accepted the new Sultan; from Saffi and Mogador we have no news.

In my opinion Mulai Hafid has a very good chance of being able to restore order in the South, and that his policy will not be anti-European. It is thought that he will go straight to Casa Blanca and then to Rabat.

(Signed) T. G. SPINNEY.

*Mazagan, August* 28, 1907.

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[29610] No. 285.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 324.)
*Tangier, August* 28, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the State Bank of Morocco on the 20th instant addressed a letter to the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps intimating that, in view of the expressed desire of the Sultan to leave Fez for the coast, it had been decided to make an advance of 1,000,000 fr.

A copy of the letter addressed to the Minister of Finance was inclosed, explaining that half the sum in question would be paid on the receipt of the letter, and the other half on the arrival of His Majesty at the coast, presumably at Rabat.

As this sum was required to provide an army to accompany His Majesty, a provision was added that the payment of these sums should be controlled by the French military mission at Fez.

As, however, the foreign officers are believed to have left Fez with other foreigners, some difficulty is likely to occur regarding this payment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[29611] No. 286.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 325.)
*Tangier, August* 28, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit an account received from a native source and courteously supplied to me by the French Chargé d'Affaires, giving an account of the ceremony which took place at Marakesh on the occasion of the proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan.

There does not appear in this account to have been any question of Mulai Hafid being only appointed Sultan of Southern Morocco, but of the whole country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 286.

*Account of the Ceremony on the Occasion of the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan.*

MOULAY HAFID avait réuni à Dar-el-Makhzen le Caïd El-Glaoui, son intime ami, les Notables de la ville, les gens de Fez, les Cheurfa, les membres de sa famille, les savants, les fqihs, &c., et l'on commence à prêcher.

Moulay Boubeker, cousin du Sultan, prit la parole et dit :—

"Vous avez entendu que le Sultan nous a vendus aux Chrétiens ; vous savez les ravages qu'ils ont faits à Casa Blanca et ce qu'ils font à nos frères Chaouïa." (Celui-ci se mit à pleurer et tous les autres l'imitèrent.)

Moulay Boubeker continua :—

"Pour cela nous devons aider et délivrer nos frères des mains de leurs ennemis, qui, aujourd'hui à Casa Blanca, seront demain à Marakech, et feront de même. Il faut se presser de remplir les devoirs du 'Djehad.' Pour cela, il nous faut une tête, un Chef, un Roi."

Alors, un Chérif des Notables de la ville, nommé Ould Moulay Ali-bou-Messoud, répondit et dit :—

"Pour avoir un Roi, c'est aux savants de le choisir."

Ceux-ci répondirent qu'il est permis de le faire. Alors, Moulay Ould-el-Rachid répondit :—

"Le seul qui convient à la dignité de Roi, qui est déjà Khalifa, fils et petit-fils de Sultan de la dynastie Impériale, homme savant, capable, et intelligent, &c., c'est Moulay Hafid (que Dieu lui donne la victoire !)."

Alors s'avança celui qui a joué le plus grand rôle dans cette affaire, le Caïd El-Madani-el-Glaoui ; il se prosterna et dit :—

"Que Dieu prolonge la vie de Moulay Hafid, notre Sultan ! "

Tous les assistants répétèrent ce cri en chœur, et tous les savants, fqihs, Notables, et autres durent signer. On s'attendait à un moment de terreur au cas où Moulay Moustapha refuserait de signer, car on dit qu'il murmurait qu'une femme n'épouse jamais deux maris à la fois. On l'aurait tué sur-le-champ. Moulay Moustapha dit qu'il signerait le dernier, mais, devant l'attitude hostile des assistants, il signa de suite le premier.

Le Fqih Sebahi, qui, par sa haute situation, doit être le premier à signer la Beia, se trouvait à son "azib" à Mesfouïa. Il s'y est rendu, dit-on, en cachette pour ne pas assister à un pareil acte ; mais on le fera venir et signer quand même.

Vendredi soir, Moulay Hafid a fait ouvrir tous les magasins d'armes, tentes de trésors, &c. ; enfin, tout ce qui appartient au Sultan est maintenant à lui. Les canons tonnent le matin et le soir. Les crieurs publics circulaient Vendredi dans les rues de la Médina et autour du Mellah (sans y entrer), et criaient : "Que Dieu accorde sa clémence à Moulay Hassan et donne la victoire à Moulay Hafid ! "

Un dixième de la population est content de ce qui se passe, parce que les faits lui sont profitables ; les neuf autres dixièmes ne sont pas satisfaits, dans la crainte que





les choses ne tournent peut-être d'une autre façon, surtout depuis qu'ils entendent dire que Moulay Abd-el-Aziz sort ou est déjà sorti de Fez. L'on pense aussi aux réponses de Torrès, des Ministres, des Oumana des ports. Enfin, un grand embarras s'empare de toutes les têtes, &c.

Les cadeaux : Hier, Samedi, les Israélites se sont rendus chez Moulay Hafid et lui ont apporté douze paquets de mousseline et de draps.

On dit que Holzman se trouvait le même jour chez Moulay Hafid.

Les Arabes ont été les premiers à se présenter chez ce dernier avec leurs cadeaux.

Abd-el-Medjid, fils de Hadj Abdesselam-el-Ouarzazi, était à leur tête comme Pacha, et représentait son père malade. Comme cadeau, il présenta trois négresses bien parées, pour son compte ; le harnais, étoffes, selles, &c., pour compte de la masse des Arabes de Marakech. Puis vint le cadeau des Arabes de Fez, et après le tir du canon le cadeau des gens du Mellah, qui fut apporté par une députation ayant à sa tête M. Ishaa Corcos. Les Israélites s'en retournèrent. Seul, M. Corcos fut appelé par Moulay Hafid ; on pensa qu'il allait lui demander un emprunt forcé, mais le Chérif lui dit simplement : "Nous aurons soin des Juifs et de toi."

Moulay Hafid était assis sur le trône, avec les Caïds Glaoui et Goundafi debout à ses côtés. Enfin, le Dar-el-Makhzen présentait l'aspect qu'il avait du temps de Moulay Hassan.

On distribua des rafraîchissements.

La valeur des cadeaux est estimée à 80,000 douros.

On a pillé la maison de Ben-el-Arbi, Caïd El-Traguia de Moulay Abd-el-Aziz, actuellement à Fez. On y a trouvé une caisse remplie d'or, et qui avait été récemment envoyée à Fez.

Le Pacha Ben Kebbour est devenu Vice-Roi depuis hier. L'Administration des Habous a envoyé hier à Moulay Hafid 45,000 douros.

Le Senhadji est chargé de recevoir les plaintes.

Suivant l'usage des Sultans, Moulay Hafid est allé en pèlerinage à Tamesloht. Il s'est rendu là en cachette, avec la Glaoui, Jeudi, dans la nuit, et de là à un autre Saint d'ici, Sidi-bel-Abbas.

Moulay-el-Hadj de Tamesloht est revenu hier avec certains autres Chérifs de Tamesloht, et tous présentèrent leur cadeaux.

Les Arabes sont encore excités, malgré la présence d'un Sultan en ville.

Pour la Proclamation, on n'a pas attendu l'arrivée du Caïd Mtougi Si Aissa, &c., les Rahamnas et les Shragna non plus. Mais les Rahamnas sont venus hier avec une centaine de cavaliers qui ont fait la fantasia. Les Shragnas, dit-on, ne veulent pas reconnaître Moulay Hafid.

Le sceau a été fabriqué Vendredi par les orfèvres Arabes pour les lettres qu'on avait à adresser aux tribus, Caïds, et villes.

On dit que Moulay Boubeker est le Khalifa du nouveau Sultan.

On dit que le fils de Hadj Abdesselam reste encore Pacha de la ville.

On dit que le départ de Moulay Hafid pour la guerre sainte chez les Chaouïa aura lieu dans quinze jours. Aujourd'hui, Sallam Lévy a eu l'ordre de préparer l'Afrag.

*Marakech, le* 18 *Août*, 1907.

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[29612] No. 287.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 326.)
*Tangier, August* 29, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida reporting that Mulai l'Amin, uncle of the Sultan, has been reinstated by the French as Shereefian Representative at Dar-al-Baida, and giving particulars of an interview accorded by him to Mr. Broome, Clerk of the Consulate.

It will be seen that Mulai l'Amin entirely disapproved of the action of Mulai Hafid, and is of opinion that there will be a great struggle between him and the actual Sultan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 287.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 213.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 27, 1907.

AS Mulai l'Amin, uncle of the Sultan, has been reinstated by the French as Shereefian Representative here, I instructed Mr. Broome to call at the Dar Makhzen to see him.

After the usual exchange of compliments, Mulai l'Amin, who was naturally under the circumstances reserved, spoke about his nephew Mulai Hafid.

He considered the news of the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid as Sultan as particularly bad, and that Morocco had never before passed through such a bad moment as the present.

Mulai Hafid would, he said, be coming to Showia, and the Showia tribes would listen to him; but he believed he was coming in peace, as no doubt Mulai Hafid's object was, by stopping the tribes fighting the French, to obtain the support of the Powers to his nomination as Sultan. He was very anxious to learn what attitude the powerful Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar would adopt towards Mulai Hafid.

Mulai l'Amin said he entirely disapproved Mulai Hafid's action in going against his brother the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, and in his opinion there would be a great fight between the two of them.

As regards Mulai l'Amin's position here, he stated that he regulates questions and claims between Europeans and Moorish subjects when these matters are presented to him either through the French Consulate or in a private manner, but he holds no official communication with the Consuls.

The French flag alone floats over the Dar Makhzen; there is no Moorish ensign there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[29613] No. 288.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 327.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 29, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from Sid Torres, informing me of the departure of the British colony from Fez, and conveying to me the Sultan's regrets that this step should have been considered necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—An exact account of what really happened will be transmitted to you on the arrival of Mr. MacLeod.

G. L.

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Inclosure in No. 288.

*Sid Torres to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) 18*th Rajab*, 1325 (*August* 28, 1907).

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the Consul of your nation at Fez and your nationals at that town have been so impressed by the events of Dar-al-Baida that they have decided to leave for Laraiche, and notwithstanding all the endeavours made by His Shereefian Majesty to induce them to remain, and his assurances that there was nothing at which to be alarmed, those assurances did not reassure them, and as they were bent on this he could only agree to their desire, and they have left for Laraiche accompanied by a considerable guard of Shereefian troops; and our Master has instructed me to make clear to you his regrets at their departure, and to say that he only consented to their doing so when he saw that they could not be dissuaded (while





taking all measures to protect them from what they feared), and because it was not possible to do otherwise than agree to their wishes.

I therefore inform your Excellency of this in order that you may have cognizance thereof.

May you, &c.
(Signed) MOHAMMED-BEN-EL-ARBI TORRES.

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[29614] No. 289.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 328.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 29, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting that the Governor of Mazagan has refused to deliver up to the Commander of the French war-ship there all the warlike stores in the town, owing to a similar demand having been received from Mulai Hafid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 289.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 214. Confidential.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 28, 1907.

A REPORT has reached me from a private source, likely to be well informed, that the Commander of the French war-ship at Mazagan had requested the Governor of that town to deliver up to him all the Makhzen arms and ammunition he possessed. Since then it is stated that Mulai Hafid has requisitioned all these warlike stores, and the Governor now refuses to give them up to the French Commander.

My informant thinks this refusal of the Governor of Mazagan may lead to a seizure of the place by the French, especially as it was said in my informant's presence that Mazagan and Rabat are supplying the Kabyles, unable to come to Casa Blanca, with all the European commodities they require.

I therefore venture to report this information to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[29615] No. 290.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 329.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 29, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida informing me of the landing of some 100 Goumiers, and giving particulars as to the nature of these irregular troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 290.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 215.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August* 28, 1907.

THE French have landed here a squadron, some 100 in strength, of Goumiers from the furthest Sud-Oranais.

I beg to append some details regarding these Goumiers in case it may prove of interest.

These men, almost Moors themselves, state that they have to provide their own horses and receive "moona" and pay. They say they were requested by the French military authorities in Algeria to come to Morocco to assist in chastising a rebellious tribe which had taken up arms against the Sultan. On arriving in Oran they learnt the true state of things, and they state they did not wish to come here, but were shipped against their will.

These Goumiers claim to be Shurfa, descendants of Sidi Omar-bil-Khattab, and related to the tribe of Bujaad in Tadla, Morocco.

They are armed with a carbine and sword, and wear no uniform beyond a red turban and a cartridge bandolier, being otherwise dressed as Algerian Arabs, and are said to be devout Moslems. They are splendid horsemen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—The French are still landing artillery here.

A. M. M.

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[29729] No. 291.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 47. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Sebastian, September 4, 1907.*

REFERRING to the subject of my telegram No. 46 of the 3rd instant, I am happy to report that the assurances which I have received from Señor Allendesalazar of his wish to co-operate with France without any friction are satisfactory. In his opinion arrangements can be easily made with the French Ambassador as regards landing a force at Tangier if the necessity should arise, and he thinks Señor Maura, the Spanish Prime Minister, is coming round to his (the Foreign Minister's) views.

Señor Allendesalazar considers if Spain and France explained their action to the Powers by means of a simple declaration such a course would be preferable to requesting the Powers to supply the two countries with a fresh mandate. If Spain had her way it is clear she would like to land at Tangier a force superior to the French force, under a Spanish General whose rank would entitle him to take the chief command of the two detachments. The Casa Blanca conditions would thus be reversed. Leading up to this, the Spanish Government have sent their cruiser "Carlos V" to Tangier, and she should arrive there to-morrow. The "Numancia" is already at Tangier. Between them they could land a Spanish force of some 600 or 700 men, which is twice the force the French ships could land.

In February last the French contingent of police for Tangier was fixed by arrangement with Spain at double the Spanish contingent. This understanding M. Révoil is prepared to depart from in some degree, though I doubt if he will go the lengths desired by the Spanish Government.

But, in the opinion of the Spanish Foreign Minister, an agreement can hardly fail to be arrived at in the end.

The contents of your telegram No. 61 of the 2nd instant, which I communicated to his Excellency, as instructed, produced a very good effect upon him. I omitted the concluding words as to Spain being guided, in her co-operation with France, by the bases explained by M. Pichon to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris. I did so because I have now ascertained that the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, and not M. Pichon, was the author of the proposal for a division of the action of France and Spain into separate spheres of territory. Señor Maura had understood this proposal as having emanated from the French Government, and it was so that I explained it in my telegram No. 44 of the 30th ultimo.

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[29728] No. 292.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 4, 1907.*

ALTHOUGH hampered by want of funds Sultan is apparently endeavouring to leave Fez. It is doubtful whether even this can save him in view of Mulai Hafid's popularity, but it is his only chance. Under these circumstances the 1,000,000 fr. previously offered, but now withheld, must be advanced by the Banque d'État if His Majesty is not to be abandoned.

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[29750] No. 293.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 330.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 30, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting a sharp engagement which took place there on the 28th instant.

It appears that the Arabs advanced with greater courage than usual and fired with more precision, which gives rise to the belief that further tribes have arrived to fight the French.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 293.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 216.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, August 29, 1907.*

A SHARP engagement, lasting from 2·30 P.M. till nearly 6 P.M., took place yesterday between the French forces and the Arabs, who came nearer the town than usual, and numbered, speaking roughly, perhaps 2,000. They charged in wild skirmishing order over an extended line of some 5 miles, thus making it impossible for the French cavalry to charge. The field artillery had to be protected by squares of the Foreign Legionaries, the Arabs advancing to within a range of 300 yards.

The "Gloire" fired a vast number of shells, which apparently did but little execution among the Arabs.

It is stated that three French soldiers were killed and several wounded.

The Arabs, I am told, seemed to act more methodically and fired with more precision than before, thus giving rise to a belief that further tribes have arrived to fight the French.

There are said to have been about 800 French troops actually in the field, supported by batteries of 75-millim. pieces.

It is believed that very few Arabs were killed. Further firing has been heard this morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

P.S.—The behaviour of the Goumis in their action against their co-religionists seems to have been disappointing.

A. M. M.

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[29751] No. 294.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 332.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 30, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 320 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to report that the actual situation in regard to the advance made by the Compagnie Algérienne is as follows:—

Out of the 100,000 fr. at first advanced by the Company, 75,000 fr. was withheld pending the authorization of the Banque d'État. This authorization has now been obtained, and the 75,000 fr. are at the disposal of the War Minister for the payment of the Tangier garrison. In regard to the sum of 130,000 fr. lying at the Banque d'État to the credit of the Makhzen, payment of this sum has been withheld until the signature of the Finance Minister, now in Fez, could be obtained. In order to avoid further delay it has now been agreed to accept the signature of the Moorish delegation instead of that of the Finance Minister, and accordingly the money will, no doubt, be now forthcoming.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[29836] No. 295.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 5, 1907.*

MY telegram No. 113 of yesterday.

The Sultan has, I understand, been promised a loan of 500,000 fr., the departure of the Court from Fez forming the condition upon which the cheque will be cashed.

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[29887] No. 296.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 5, 1907.*

SPANISH Minister stated on the 3rd instant that instructions had been sent to Spanish Naval Commanders at Tangier to give fullest protection possible to British interests in case of need.

Please convey to Spanish Government the cordial thanks of His Majesty's Government for their friendly action.

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[29594] No. 297.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 5, 1907.*

YOUR telegram No. 112 of the 3rd instant.

We trust Raisuli will agree to release Sir H. Maclean on sole condition of receiving British protection.

We cannot put any pressure on Moorish Government to give former a Governorship. If, however, they are willing to do so, we need not withhold protection on that account. But it must be their doing alone.

The protection should be regarded as a promise made to us by the Moorish Government not to hurt Raisuli or his family during good behaviour.

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[29938] No. 298.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)*

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, September 6, 1907.*

I HAVE received telegrams No. 113 of the 4th and No. 114 of the 5th instant from Tangier.

I am informed by the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that 500,000 fr. has been promised to the Sultan of Morocco for preparations to move his Court if he really starts. When he reaches Rabat he is to receive another 500,000 fr.

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[30052] No. 299.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)*

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Sebastian, September 8, 1907.*

THE rumour that France intends to land an armed force at several Morocco ports has again made the Spanish Foreign Minister rather nervous. Referring to the more important points within what Spain calls her particular sphere of influence, Señor Allendesalazar thinks that the new Moorish police force under Spanish inspectors should suffice to keep the peace at Larache, and certainly at Tetuan, which is so near the Spanish stronghold of Ceuta. Tangier raises more difficult questions. If nothing more is wanted there than a force to afford police protection, the Spanish contingent might well content itself with numbers not exceeding the French contingent, and the two contingents might occupy the respective zones agreed upon last February with France, that is, France the neighbourhood and Spain the interior of the town of Tangier. It may be, however, that there will be a call for reinforcements amounting to a regular army, which would take up a position behind the town in readiness to strike a blow in any direction. Such a military operation as this Spain would like to set on foot, if needed, by herself alone. She claims, at all events, that the army employed upon it should not be a French army exclusively.

M. Révoil, on the other hand, is convinced that it would not be possible to carry on military operations in the field, in partnership with Spain, with any degree of harmony.

The Spanish Ambassador in Paris and the Spanish Prime Minister are both coming shortly to San Sebastian to discuss the situation.

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[30136] No. 300.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 333.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 30, 1907.*

ONE of the most difficult problems with which the French military and naval authorities have to cope here is the introduction by contraband of arms and ammunition at many places on the coast, and they are powerless to search any vessels carrying a flag other than French or Moorish.

One of the French men-of-war patrolling the coast a few nights ago found within 10 miles of Tangier a large sailing vessel at anchor, and boats apparently plying between her and the shore. On being approached she hoisted an Italian flag, and explained that she was repairing some damage done to her rigging.

The French Government, I understand, contemplate proposing to the Powers a temporary arrangement by which her ships of war should be authorized to search for vessels in these waters of all nationalities, an exception being made for those belonging to the Companies that are in the habit of trading on the coast of Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30137] No. 301.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 334.)

*Tangier, August* 31, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 325 of the 28th instant, I am informed by the British Vice-Consul at Saffi, in a letter dated the 29th instant, that Mulai Hafid has not yet been proclaimed there, but it appears that, as a result of the latter's success with the tribes, all the Chiefs who have not yet tendered their allegiance to the new Sultan are now hastening to do so.

Kaïd Aissa has sent his son to Marrakesh, it is believed, with the intention of rendering allegiance to Mulai Hafid. Should this be the case, the new Sultan's position, in the opinion of Mr. Hunot, will be firmly established, as Kaïd Aissa's influence extends over the powerful Chiefs Mtoogi and Anfloos and the important Dukala and Shiadma tribes.

The situation at Saffi was quiet, and the Proclamation of Mulai Hafid was hourly expected there. The reason for the delay is supposed to be an allusion to a Jehad or to the French contained in the letter of Proclamation. Ma-el-Ain has changed his route for Marrakesh, where it appears that great joy reigns, as a result of the accession of Mulai Hafid.

Vice-Consul Hunot reports that from a reliable source he learns that a camp of over 12,000 men, fully equipped with field guns, has been formed by Mulai Hafid outside Marrakesh. This force is under the command of Woold Mulai Reschid, and is composed of five regiments of regulars and a number of yeomanry, the rest being irregulars of the Arab tribes, all well mounted and armed. The destination of this army is unknown, but it is said to be ready to leave Marrakesh at once.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30139] No. 302.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 336.)

*Tangier, August* 31, 1907.

Sir,

SID MOHAMMED MOKRI, the Second Moorish Delegate, has received orders to proceed without delay to Fez, and leaves very unwillingly to-day. He declares that he has no intimation of the reasons which have induced His Majesty to send for him, but in any case he hoped to return very shortly.

It is possible that His Majesty knows that, as the relations between Sid Mohammed Mokri and the French Legation have during the past few months improved almost to the point of cordiality, the former is in a better position to enlighten him as to the policy of France as regards Morocco in the present crisis. On the other hand, the step may be suggested by the idea of adding another to the many counsellors whose advice His Majesty is always calling for in a crisis, and which advice His Majesty as frequently ignores.

Sid Mohammed Mokri came to see me yesterday to bid me good-bye. My Spanish colleague happened to be present, so I was unable to speak to his Excellency in confidence, but before he left he said that he hoped that the present Sultan would be able to count on the support of His Majesty's Government to whom His Majesty has always shown very friendly feelings. I replied that His Majesty's Government knew but one Sultan, namely Abdul Aziz, with whom His Majesty's Government had always entertained the best relations, which condition of affairs would, I trust, continue.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30140] No. 303.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 337.)

*Tangier, September* 1, 1907.

Sir,

THERE does not until now appear to be any indication of activity on the part of the Sultan with a view to resist the pretensions to the throne of his brother, Mulai Hafid. When the news of the Proclamation of the latter reached Fez it was treated in the same manner as the many rumours to the same effect which in the past few months had been received.

Vague suggestions of a move on the part of the Sultan were, it is true, made, but nothing precise has been stated as to the direction in which His Majesty should move, or where he should find the force with which to march.

A few troops have been moved from here, and what remains of the two unpaid forces that have been operating against the Khamas may perhaps reach Fez in a leisurely manner later on.

If funds are forthcoming, and small sums always are in a crisis here, His Majesty could probably reach Rabat without opposition, and, in the opinion of serious Moors, this course appears to be indicated as absolutely necessary. But His Majesty appears to entertain an idea that there he would not necessarily be secure, and that he might have something to fear at the hands of the French. Moreover, no doubt the conviction exists in His Majesty's mind that if he leaves Fez troubles will arise there, his Palace may be looted, and it may be difficult for him ever to return. It is also quite possible that when Mulai Hafid hears of his brother moving on Rabat he will do the same, and his advance, with the powerful support he now has, is likely to be more rapid than that of the Sultan. Should, however, his Majesty be able to reach Rabat, it is difficult to see how he would, without very material support from the French, leave it and march upon his brother.

The fact must not be lost sight of that the Sultan, if not hated, is, in any case, despised, as all the weak Rulers of Morocco always have been, and very large numbers of his subjects would probably see with satisfaction his silent withdrawal from the throne in favour of one who, though not admired, has shown some vitality, in preference to a struggle which they appreciate must bring further ruin on this impoverished country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30141] No. 304.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 338.)

*Tangier, September* 1, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador reporting on the actual situation there.

It will be seen that Mulai Hafid has not yet been proclaimed at Mogador, but the attitude of the Governor would appear to depend on that of Kaïd Aissa, who, as already reported, is supposed to have tendered his allegiance to the new Sultan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 304.

*Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 48.)

*Mogador, August* 25, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that everything is quiet in this district, but, in spite of the tranquillity prevailing, a number of Moors have sent away their families from the town, lest an incident should take place which might give rise to disorders. If on the one hand some of the townspeople have left, on the other

there are many new-comers who apparently came with no other object than waiting for events. The Jews, who are always the first to lose their heads, are still in a state of fear, if not of panic, and they are taking all sorts of precautions; they have sent more than 15,000*l.* worth of jewellery to the United Kingdom by the last English boat, and the poorer classes are buying up feverishly whatever produce is brought into town from the country.

At a Consular meeting held yesterday, the French Consul was asked if any, and what, precautionary measures had been taken by the Commanding Officer of the French cruiser, stationed here, for the protection of the Europeans. M. Kouri replied that even if he knew the nature of the measures to be taken he could not disclose it, as it could not be made public property, but he agreed with his colleagues that the Consular Body should arrange for a plan of concentration and defence, which he would submit to the Captain for any useful suggestions the latter might have to make. As I understand that most of my colleagues propose to remain at their respective Consulates, I came to the conclusion that it would be out of place, and would, moreover, create a bad impression, if I were to seek refuge out of the British Consular building, and I propose to inform the British subjects that I shall not leave the place, and that those who wish to join me will be quite welcome.

Yesterday M. Steinwachs, a German subject, who had remained at Marakesh after the last exodus of the Europeans from that city, arrived here escorted by twelve soldiers that Mulai Hafid placed at his disposal as an escort. He was not interfered with on his entering the town, but the soldiers were requested by the guard at the gate to hand over their arms, and they had to comply with the order. M. Steinwachs reports that Mulai Hafid sent letters to the Governor of Mogador, informing him of his accession, and to the Administrators of the Customs, reappointing them and requesting that all public funds should in future be remitted to Morocco city. Simultaneously with the arrival of the letters from Morocco city, a special messenger came from Fez with letters from Sultan Abd-el-Azis to the Governor.

With regard to the attitude to be taken by Kaïd Anfluz and the other Governors of the surrounding districts, reports are contradictory. Some people seem to think that they will eventually rally round Mulai Hafid; others say that they will remain loyal to Abd-el-Azis. Very much depends, I am given to understand, on what Kaïd Si Aissa, of Safli, will do.

The French cruiser "Du Chayla" was relieved by the "Amiral Aube," and the torpedo destroyer "Cassini" paid a flying visit to this port a few days ago. The Captain of the "Amiral Aube" followed the example of his predecessor and landed the day after his arrival here. He was again received at the landing place by the Governor and the garrison. French officers are now often seen walking about the streets, and no hostility is shown by the natives.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

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[30199] No. 305.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 340.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 2, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 328 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida relative to the refusal of the local authorities at Mazagan to hand over the warlike stores in the town to the French.

It is feared that if the French have to use force to obtain delivery of these stores, which they have been invited to take over by the Makhzen authorities here, this may necessitate an occupation of the town by the French.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 305.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 222.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, September 1, 1907.*

MR. VICE-CONSUL SPINNEY, of Mazagan, informs me that a native named El Maezee, Emkaddem of Shiedma and Shtuka, parts of Showia, has been to see him and stated that he has been requested by Showia, with whom he has influence, to act as peacemaker between Showia and Casa Blanca. Mr. Spinney has placed the matter in the hands of the French Consul here for such action as he may consider advisable, as he was requested through me to call on M. Malpertuy.

The question of the military stores in the hands of the native authorities at Mazagan may lead to trouble at that port.

M. Malpertuy, whom I saw to-day, said the Sultan had authorized and wished the French to take over these warlike articles, and it is most important they should not fall into the hands of Mulai Hafid. He said, if necessary, force might have to be used to take over these stores, and this course the French wished to avoid if possible. The townspeople would, it is affirmed, resist the shipping of the stores on board the French cruiser at Mazagan.

I understand there is a proposal to ship them by British vessel to Mogador, there to be handed over to a French cruiser at that port, but I am not aware if such a course will be followed or not.

M. Malpertuy said the Sultan had authorized the French to take any military measures they considered necessary to safeguard the lives of Europeans at the ports.

Two thousand more men and several hundred cavalry, he added, are momentarily expected to arrive at Casa Blanca in view of eventualities from any action of Mulai and his followers.

M. Malpertuy said the Arabs, with their love of destruction, could at this moment be seen smashing down the roofs of a farm recently destroyed partially by French shells, and bodies of horsemen are appearing on the hills, which, he said, may be the prelude for an attack on the French.

The "Gloire," he stated, had fired an immense number of shells during the late crisis, but that was due to the vessel having a large quantity of old ammunition, which should have been discarded long since; unfortunately, he added, several shells had burst prematurely, as might be expected with old ammunition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[30200] No. 306.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 341.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 2, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 313 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit extracts from a letter from Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean which I received to-day. From these you will see that Raisuli declines to accept the French guarantee of safety which was proposed to him. He asked that the matter may be settled direct with the British Legation by sending some Englishman to treat with him. Under the circumstances this would be too great a risk to take. Kaïd Maclean adds that Raisuli should be asked to send his brother or some one with full powers to settle the affair with him.

This suggestion I think, under the circumstances, is the best, and I have sent a letter to that effect in English and Arabic to Kaïd Maclean, a copy of which is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 306.

*Kaïd Sir H. Maclean to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Extract.) *R'Zowwhar, August* 30, 1907.

THANKS for your letter of the 14th, a copy of which I received to-day from Carleton with your note of the 22nd. Raisuli opened the letter Hamudo brought and took out the Arabic note. He does not want French protection, or to have anything to do with the French over this affair, but wants to settle it with you, and I hope you will be able to allow him to do this; as far as I can see it is the only chance of my obtaining my release. I have been here nine weeks to-morrow, and the Government have not been able to do anything, and I have had an awfully bad time. On the 17th I was told at 12 o'clock that I was to move. I was kept all day without food in a small round tent, at night they took me to the Zowia. I had to walk over very bad ground with a thick "jehab" on, and it was a very hot night. When we got to the Zowia I was taken to where Raisuli keeps his animals, and a lot of Moors came round me and cursed and swore at me for half an hour. I was then told to go into a soldier's tent. There was nothing in it except a straw mat, very dirty. I had to sleep on the floor without a thing until Thursday. In the daytime I was taken to a broken-down room, 13 feet by 6 feet, and was kept all day in a corner of the room, 6 feet by 4 feet, and was not allowed to move. On Sunday, after El Merani's attack, the room was crowded by Moors, and they threw a head in front of me and cursed and swore at me. On Monday, very early in the morning, 300 Moors came to Raisuli from the different tribes. Directly they saw my tent they all got round it and cursed and swore at me, and I was taken to the room, the Moors all followed and broke down some of the room to see me. The whole day they went for me, and I was taken out five times during the day and had to stand in front of them all to be cursed and sworn at. On Wednesday I was told to get up at 4·45, and I was taken to the place I first went to when I arrived. . . . .

Since I have been here I have not been bullied, and the three Moors with me are fairly good. There is a Moor here named Ci Absulam R'Zowwhar, who is very kind, and sends me food and got me a change of clothes. During all the above I had no water to wash with or ever took off my clothes. I do not know why I have been treated like this, except that they asked me to write to El Merani and Ci Bubker to go away and I refused. I have never said a word. Raisuli sent to tell me to write again to you yesterday, and to ask you to have this affair settled by some Englishman just between you and him. I am positive the Mehallas will never obtain my release, and I hope you will kindly let Carleton come here, or send me a letter in Arabic addressed to me I can show Raisuli, telling me you have received my letter and will send Carleton, or else tell me to ask Raisuli to send his brother or some one with full powers to settle this affair with you in Tangier, and to try and arrange that you can give Raisuli protection and not the French. . . . .

I am glad to say I am well, only I feel all this a little, and I cannot see the end. Raisuli says if you do not consent I am to be killed. I sent word to tell him I wish he would do it at once. Do not tell the courier I have told you all this, but if you write the Arabic letter put in that you hope Raisuli treats me properly. I only hear one gun now, I think from El Merani's camp, but it sounds a very long way off. . . . .

The Moors that come to see me all say that the hill tribes want Raisuli. . . . . They tell me Mulai Hafid has been proclaimed Sultan and that the Moors are all dead against the French. Raisuli says he always liked the English and that is why he wants this arranged by you. I never see him, so all I say is messages from him. . . . .

I hope you will not think I should have more patience, and that you will kindly do your best to meet Raisuli. He hates the French, so please do not say anything about them in your letter. . . . .

Please thank the French Minister for his kindness about the protection. . . . .

P.S.—I am writing on the floor, and my bones all pain me from sleeping so long on the ground. . . . . Please answer me in Arabic, so that I can show your letter to Raisuli. Raisuli asked me several times to write to El Merani and Ci Bubker to go, and of course I refused.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 306.

*Sir G. Lowther to Kaïd Sir H. Maclean.*

My dear Kaïd, *Tangier, September* 2, 1907.

I was very pleased to get your letter of the 30th, but regret that Raisuli did not accept the offer of French protection, which I had hoped he would accept, as it would have afforded him the same protection as it does others who hold it.

You say Raisuli has told you he wants the matter of your release settled directly between him and the Legation, and after mature consideration I would propose that he depute some one in his confidence to come to Tangier to arrange about it with me. This I feel sure will be the most satisfactory way of arriving at a solution. Whoever he sends should of course know all that is in Raisuli's mind, and if this course is followed I have great hopes that a satisfactory result will be arrived at.

Owing to the generally unsettled condition of the country Raisuli will understand that it is impossible for me to send an Englishman up into the mountains.

I am always glad to hear that Raisuli and his men treat you well and are doing what they can for you.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30201] No. 307.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 9.)

(No. 342.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 2, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 327 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Consul MacLeod, reporting as to the considerations which influenced him and his colleagues in leaving Fez with their respective nationals.

It will be observed that the departure was decided upon with the express sanction of the Sultan and the Makhzen.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 307.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 86.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 31, 1907.

WITH reference to Sid Torres' letter of the 28th instant to your Excellency, I beg to state that the departure of the Europeans was a matter of mutual agreement between the Consuls and the Moorish Government.

In our first discussion, Sid Ben Sliman and the Consuls agreed that it would be better, meantime, to remain at Fez. The Vizier then said: "We can guarantee you security here, but we cannot tell what the state of the roads may be. The Sultan, however, is leaving Fez shortly, and will take with him any foreigners who choose to leave."

Subsequently the Vizier and the Consuls learned that the roads were safe, and likely to remain so for at least two or three weeks. The Vizier then said: "We can guarantee you safety either at Fez or on the road—it is for you to choose whether to go or to remain." We must note, however, that the Sultan had now decided that it would not be prudent for him to take Europeans with him on his ensuing campaign.

We answered that we desired to do what would be safest for our nationals and be of least embarrassment to the Sultan. The fewer responsibilites His Majesty had at Fez, the easier would it be for him to act. As no one could foresee what the situation might be a few weeks hence, the wiser course seemed to us for the Europeans to leave. Sid Ben Sliman submitted the question to the Sultan, and His Majesty agreed to our departure. In telling us of the Sultan's decision Sid Ben Sliman raised no objection, and merely deprecated our leaving in such terms as good-nature and politeness required. Had the Makhzen really wished us to remain they might have addressed

the Consuls formally, in writing, in that sense through the Acting Governor of Fez.

For our part we were, however, studiously careful to avoid pressing the Makhzen. The latter had such immediate interest in keeping us in Fez that we thought it would be wiser to use our own judgment than to stake the security of our compatriots on the foresight, or the want of it, of the Makhzen. We therefore sought to do everything as moved by common ends.

Probably with the view of forestalling claims, the Makhzen, once we were gone, have apparently written protesting against our departure. I would point out—(1) that had we remained, and had any evil resulted, the Makhzen could with equal justice have answered that it was our fault for having declined to avail ourselves of their offer of safe conduct to the coast; (2) that it was important to act at once, as the tribes were nearly finishing their threshing work. Thereafter they would be more likely to become disorderly and excited, and we might have had no choice left but to remain at Fez, whatever the state of things there might be. All this was fully explained to Sid Ben Sliman. Lastly, it was quite conceivable that the course of events in Southern Morocco (particularly near Casa Blanca) might be of a nature to increase anti-foreign feeling, and against this it might not be in the power of the Makhzen to secure us entirely.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MacLEOD.

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[30202] No. 308.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 343.)
Sir, *Tangier, September* 3, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida relative to the situation at Mogador.

It will be seen that, in the opinion of Mr. Madden, it is most important that a small and powerful cruiser should be sent into the Bay of Mogador without delay, in view of the difficulty of landing men in rough weather from a ship which is too large to enter the bay.

I have communicated Mr. Madden's opinion to the French Legation, who are communicating with Admiral Philibert in regard to the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 308.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 223.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, September* 1, 1907.

THE French cruiser "Du Chayla" left here this evening for Mogador to relieve the "Amiral Aube," now on guard-ship duty at that place.

Ensign de Teyssier, who called on me, stated that the "Du Chayla" cannot enter the Bay of Mogador, but has to remain in the offing.

There were rumours current here last evening that the tribes are assembling near Mogador. I trust this may not be the case, but it appears advisable it should be pointed out that, in order to reassure the inhabitants of Mogador, a vessel should be sent there which can enter the bay, and so occupy a commanding position for the protection of the town, as well as one outside.

The town, being at the end of a sandy neck, could be well protected by a vessel inside the bay co-operating with a second one on the north acting from the sea outside.

From a long residence in Mogador I can say that it frequently happens that a furious north-east wind prevails at Mogador, rendering it impossible for large war-ships to approach the coast, much less to land men in small boats, as the Arabs well know, and it seems most important that a small and powerful cruiser should be sent into the Bay of Mogador without delay as a measure of precaution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[30203] No. 309.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 344.)
Sir, *Tangier, September* 3, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida reporting the arrival of messengers from Mulai Hafid at the Arab camp at Teddert.

It is stated that the majority of the Arabs arriving at Teddert have come with a view to loot, and not with the object of fighting against the French.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 309.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 224.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, September* 2, 1907.

I LEARN from a reliable source well in touch with the natives that a few days back a crier, mounted on a camel (as is customary for native criers on special occasions), followed by two men riding mules, was crying in the Arab camp at Teddert to the following effect: "Sultan Mulai Hassan, God be merciful to him! Sultan Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, God be merciful to him (as if he were dead, that is)! Mulai Hafid, God give him the victory! Mulai Hafid will soon be coming, and then we shall be able to deal with those dogs of Mahommedans who stayed with the Christians in Dar-al-Baida."

It is stated on the same authority that numbers of Arabs are daily arriving from the interior at the camp, but for every one armed some ten come armed only with clubs.

The object of these new-comers is stated not to be for fanatical or Holy War ideas, but simply in the hope of loot at Dar-al-Baida. The Arabs have reported that heaps of loot still remains in the town; and this idea has been fostered because the Arab looters threw down so many things when in their hurry they espied something they liked better than the things they were actually running off with, on the first day of the bombardment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[30178] No. 310.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 129.)
Sir, *San Ildefonso, August* 30, 1907.

IN my telegram No. 44 of the 28th instant, I have endeavoured to give a summary of the views of the Spanish Prime Minister on the present position of affairs in Morocco. I knew that Señor Maura took a keen interest in the question, and, on his return to Madrid after a brief absence in France, I lost no time in going to see him. I found his Excellency entirely engrossed in the subject. He was good enough to explain his opinion at great length, and he spoke with much earnestness and emphasis. Though at several points I thought his reasoning open to obvious replies, I must admit that it is in agreement with the almost unanimous feeling of the country, so far as I am able to judge. I have not seen a single newspaper article advocating exemplary punishment of the Moorish outrages and a hearty co-operation with France to that end. Nor have I heard any Spaniard supporting such a course. Spanish intervention has been from the first highly unpopular. The opponents of the Government entirely condemn the action taken, and its friends only approve it as a disagreeable necessity, entailed on the country by virtue of its general scheme of alliances, but requiring to be carried out within very strict limitations.

Señor Maura describes the French action as a mixture of imprudence and rashness. To commence the harbour works before the new police force was in existence was extremely unwise, showing ignorance of the feelings by which the tribes were animated.

After the murder of Frenchmen and other Europeans on the 30th July, France should have struck a sharp blow and retired. It might then still have been possible to organize the new police force. But in the present aggravated temper of the tribes, the police contemplated by the Act of Algeciras would be obviously inadequate. By landing an army at Casa Blanca France has taken a step leading almost inevitably, whether France likes it or nor, to a war of conquest. For the present force of 5,000 men will be quite insufficient to cope with a general rising of the tribes. More troops must be sent, and the sphere of their action will inevitably extend far into the interior.

When the equinoctial gales compel the ships of war to leave the roadstead the French force will be in a most awkward predicament. A large force will be difficult to feed, and a small one exposed to overwhelming attacks.

But Señor Maura said these were only his personal views, and he was not really competent to judge what France had done. He could speak with greater authority for Spain, and Spain, he could assure me, would not allow herself to be drawn into warlike operations.

She had no mandate bidding her to go to war. She did not believe in a war policy producing the effects that France apparently expected. She held that the animosity of the Moors, and their tendency to combine against Europeans, would only be strengthened by such a policy. When, therefore, France, without consulting Spain, decided to send ships and soldiers, Señor Maura had instructed the Spanish Ambassador in Paris to express his strong objections to this course. But the events of the 5th August, when a premature landing was effected at Casa Blanca with such deplorable results made it impossible for France to back out of the enterprise on which she had so hastily embarked. The Marquis del Muni was therefore furnished with fresh instructions, explaining that the participation of Spain, which the Spanish Government did not like to refuse in the circumstances, was intended only to prepare the way for the organization of the new police, and that the Spanish troops, limited in number to the police contingent fixed for Casa Blanca, were not to engage in duties other than those appertaining to a police force.

Even this was going beyond her mandate. Spain had never been required at Algeciras to undertake the preservation of order along the coast by military means. It was only her desire to appear at the side of France that induced her to send a few policemen in the guise of troops. They had now been ordered to join the French troops in defending the position taken up outside the walls of Casa Blanca; but Major Santa Olalla was forbidden to take part in any action that was not strictly defensive, and the Spanish force would certainly not follow General Drude away from his base. At the same time, Major Santa Olalla had been enjoined to maintain the most cordial relations with the French, and Señor Maura, in criticising the French proceedings, was at pains to assure me that he desired to keep up the understanding with France to the full, to act in all things after previous agreement with her, and to draw the line only at the point where the joint action undertaken in virtue of the Algeciras Act threatened to change its essential character by merging into actual warfare.

Señor Maura doubted whether the Algeciras Act could be adjusted to present circumstances, and he feared some new arrangements would be necessary. If he was mistaken, he would be very glad, and for his part he intended to persevere as long as possible in the policy of organizing with France a Moorish police force; but if this policy broke down, and new measures had to be devised of a kind not foreseen at Algeciras, he thought the other Powers would have to be consulted, and was glad to think that everything pointed to the probability that neither Germany nor any other Power would object to reasonable measures agreed to by France and Spain, and designed to restore peace, and so to enable trade with Morocco to be resumed.

Two main preoccupations seemed to have possession of Señor Maura's mind, the one being a determination to adhere to the Algeciras Act as long as possible, and the second to keep in view the Secret Agreement with France of October 1904, in virtue of which Spain, when the *status quo* in Morocco is fundamentally altered, will have a claim to something like a Protectorate over the northern portion of Morocco. He spoke repeatedly of the "Spanish sphere," and one of his main objections to following France in her military operations lay in the fact that those operations are being conducted outside the ultimate Spanish sphere, as contemplated by the Agreement with France.

It was no doubt partly on this ground that he was disposed to welcome a suggestion emanating from the French Government, and telegraphed by the Marquis del Muni to Madrid on the 26th August. The proposal was, to give up the attempt to act harmoniously together at Casa Blanca, and to assign to the French and Spanish Governments the duty of keeping order along the coast respectively within the limits of



their own spheres. According to the scheme, Spain would become in a special measure responsible for the coast from a point a little south of Larache, extending northwards and eastwards as far as the French Algerian frontier. Señor Maura had no details before him, but in principle he was quite prepared to consider the suggestion favourably. He would not, however, consent to any Convention with France which would compel Spain to occupy points along the coast by force. She must insist on keeping her discretionary right to act at each point according to circumstances. At one point the presence of a ship might be necessary; at another it might be possible to smooth over difficulties by agreement with the local Moorish authority, whether Imperial or tribal. In other words, Spain declined to join in a scheme for cutting off Morocco from the coast by lining the coast with a chain of fortified positions extending from Mogador on the Atlantic to Melilla on the Mediterranean.

That might be the best military means of bringing Morocco on her knees, but it amounted to war with Morocco, and Spain would not go to war.

Señor Maura entertains the strongest objection to making a military effort which would retard the development of the scheme of internal reforms to which his Government has devoted so much attention, and which, at the present moment, promises so well. He keeps always in view an essential part of that scheme, namely, the project of the reorganization of the navy, previous to the accomplishment of which he does not feel that Spain will be in a position to put forth her armed strength in a manner worthy of her.

The President of the Council spoke also of Melilla. It was only the hesitation of Spain to embarrass the Sultan that had hitherto prevented her from demanding free communication with the interior, and from enforcing the observance of this Treaty obligation by the Moors. If she undertook anything in the nature of an act of war, it would be in that neighbourhood, in enforcement of her undeniable Treaty rights, now suspended owing to the warfare which is being carried on between the Imperial and rebel troops at the very gates of Melilla.

I endeavoured, by my share in the conversation, to point out the impolicy of allowing the Moors to think they can massacre Europeans with impunity; the necessity of maintaining close co-operation with France if the further intervention of Europe, and so perhaps the loss to Spain of her special position in the north of Morocco, were to be prevented, and the evil effects which could but be produced by Spain breaking loose from her policy of acting in Morocco hand in hand with both France and England.

I believe Spain is still faithful to this connection. She dreads, however, being drawn into the vortex of a military expedition, and such force as she may be compelled, against her will, to use, will be more serviceably employed if its operations can be kept distinct from those of the French force, though parallel with them.

Meanwhile the position of the Spanish contingent at Casa Blanca is clearly shown by the last instructions to Major Olalla, a translation of which is transmitted with this despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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Inclosure in No. 310.

*Spanish Minister of State to Spanish Minister at Tangier.*

(Translation.) *August* 26, 1907.

AT a Cabinet Council held yesterday at Madrid it was agreed to define as follows the instructions to Major Santa Olalla. His Mission reduces itself to the exercise of police functions, by virtue of the Sultan's authority, according to the Agreements made at Algeciras and in February last, within the exterior zone fixed by Major Santa Olalla in agreement with General Drude. While the present exceptional circumstances continue, our contingent will direct its efforts towards maintaining order in the said zone and co-operating with French action for its defence, avoiding, however, all participation in expeditions or acts of reprisal which General Drude may propose to undertake, inasmuch as by assuming this character the action of the French troops consequent on the Casa Blanca outrage would exceed the object which we have set before ourselves. While observing strictly the intentions of the Spanish Government Major Santa Oralla should maintain the best relations with General Drude, and express the most cordial sentiments.

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[30191] No. 311.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 131.)

Sir, *San Sebastian, September 4, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a Memorandum concerning the relations between the Spanish authorities at Ceuta and the brigand Valiente which I have communicated to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, as instructed by your despatch No. 141 of the 30th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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Inclosure in No. 311.

*Memorandum.*

THE British Government is informed that the Makhzen has made endeavours from time to time to secure the brigand Valiente, but has met with no success, and has always pleaded as an excuse that when pressed Valiente took refuge within the Spanish lines near Ceuta.

In the earlier part of the present year Valiente is said to have received much support from the Spanish authorities in his conflict with another Chief of his tribe, who had the support of the Makhzen. It was hoped that the present Governor of Ceuta would abandon the policy of favour which had been pursued towards Valiente by his predecessor. But the British Government learns that no change has taken place, and that Valiente is suspected of introducing cartridges into Morocco, which he procures presumably in Ceuta. Recently he took 6,000 cartridges to Raisuli, and this supply has added materially to the difficulties in obtaining the release of Kaïd Maclean.

The British Government believes that, if the above is confirmed on investigation by the Spanish Government, the latter will not fail to issue instructions which will prevent these acts being repeated, and that it will not allow an impression to be produced that the authorities of one of the two Powers charged with the organization of the police in Morocco afford encouragement and protection to one of the principal disturbers of order in the country.

*San Sebastian, September 4, 1907.*

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[30083] No. 312.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 388.)

Sir, *Berlin, September 2, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 364 of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the German press continues to comment very much in the tone indicated in that despatch on the events in Morocco, and especially on the fighting at Casa Blanca.

The "Kölnische Zeitung" publishes, under the heading of "The bombardment of Casa Blanca and German trade in Morocco," an article which gives a pathetic picture of the disastrous effect of recent events upon German enterprise in that country, as compared with the small amount of damage as yet suffered by French trading interests. The writer seems to be making an indirect appeal to English sentiments, from the manner in which he couples English interests with German, and lays stress upon the great injuries both countries have received by the destruction of their chief commercial centre in Morocco. The article gives an account of the rise of German trade with the Arabs, and of the friendly enterprise and assistance rendered by the English and German merchants to one another in Casa Blanca, and notes the absence of all French rivalry there. It deplores the abrupt severing, by the wholesale destruction of the native crops and harvest this year, of the good influence which the English and Germans, by means of their barter with the Moors, had hitherto exercised in this region, acting as a civilizing and quieting power upon the whole district. Now





this power has been broken, the connection between town and country is cut, the merchants' warehouses are plundered, their agents ruined, killed, or driven away, and, worse than all, the action of the foreigners has filled the natives with such sentiments of mistrust as it will be difficult to allay for many years to come. As regards German trade, not only is her capital invested in the soil lost, but she has also at one blow lost the prestige of her commercial position which was based on the investment of this capital, and incalculable also is the loss through discouragement, which must inevitably be felt by all German traders throughout the country. German trade in Casa Blanca is utterly annihilated, and her whole Moroccan trade has suffered a loss of 80 per cent.

Meanwhile France has as yet hardly suffered at all; unlike Germany, she has never made Casa Blanca the centre of her whole Moroccan trade, and there is every prospect in the future of her stepping in between the Germans and their Arab customers, and building up a still more flourishing trade upon the wreckage of German enterprise.

This plaintive tone is at once seized upon by the Clerical "Kölnische Volkszeitung," which seizes the occasion to point out the weakness of the Block journal's complaint. Prince Bülow's Block, it observes, is so well drilled that, though its members can face the facts of the case, they dare not for a moment inquire whether the Imperial Foreign Office have no word of hope or consolation to offer to the ruined German traders in Morocco. The "Volkszeitung" itself would boldly put the question, "What was the use of Algeciras, if to-day the destruction of German interests in Morocco is to be passed over in complete silence?"

I have, &c.
(For Sir Frank Lascelles),
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

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[30284] No. 313.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 9, 1907.*

MULAI HAFID has written to Menebhi appointing him to succeed Cid Torres here as Commissioner. Although he is ordered to secure the removal of the foreign war-ships from the whole coast, the tenor of the letter itself is moderate, but the messenger who brought it will require some sort of an answer from Menebhi, and about this I am taking the opinion of my French colleague.

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[30274] No. 314.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie*

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 9, 1907.*

SPANISH Minister says Spanish Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to make certain proposals to French Government, of the details of which he is ignorant, for the joint occupation of Tangier in case of necessity, and that Spanish Government hope we will support them.

Can you ascertain what these proposals are, and what view is taken of them by the French Government?

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[30274] No. 315.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 9, 1907.*

MY telegram No. 102 of to-day.

In accordance with instructions, the Spanish Ambassador, who called here to-day, stated that his Government are ready to dispatch troops to protect Tangier, as they wish to bear their share of the charge which France and Spain have undertaken in



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Morocco. But an understanding must be given that their troops will not be placed in a position of inferiority.

Señor de Villa Urrutia reminded me that the Spanish sphere of influence, by the terms of the Convention of 1904, includes Tangier, but the Spanish Government, since they would prefer that this Agreement should remain secret, raise no objection to French troops policing Tangier, according to the Algeciras Act, just as Spanish troops are at present policing Casa Blanca, always provided that the Spanish troops should have a position at least equal to that of the French. If French influence predominated at Tangier, in the event of the occupation becoming permanent, the Treaty of 1904 would be valueless.

Señor de Villa Urrutia said that his Government anxiously desired the support of His Majesty's Government in bringing the French Government to look favourably upon this view.

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[29889] No. 316.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 154.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1907.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 309 of the 21st ultimo, and I approve your supporting the action of your French colleague in accepting the proposal that the snuff, kiff, and opium monopolies shall be included in the tobacco monopoly, and that the minimum yearly payment shall be increased to 1,250,000 fr.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[30362] No. 317.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 10.)

(No. 346.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 3, 1907.

I RECENTLY asked my Spanish colleague whether, in the event of sudden disturbances which might necessitate foreign subjects taking refuge in their respective Legations and Consulates, he would, with such sailors as he had at his command, undertake to protect the British Consulate, which is within fifty yards of the Spanish Legation.

M. Llaberia has now sent me a private letter stating that he has received an official instruction from his Government directing him not only to take measures to defend the Consulate, but also all British interests in Tangier, and he adds that he is prepared to do so to the best of his ability.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30297] No. 318.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 10.)

(No. 438.)

Sir, *Pais, September* 9, 1907.

IN continuance of my despatch No. 410 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to report that the "Journal Officiel" of the 7th instant has published the names of four additional officers and of two non-commissioned officers who have been placed at the disposal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for employment in the Morocco police.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[30298] No. 319.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 10.)

(No. 439. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, September* 9, 1907.

THE President of the Council told me this morning that matters as regarded Morocco were as satisfactory as could well be expected. A landing at Mazagan had happily been avoided, and the communications between General Drude and the tribes round Casa Blanca might, his Excellency thought, lead to a cessation of fighting. The General had proved himself an excellent officer, and could be relied on not to go beyond his instructions. As to the destruction of property at Casa Blanca, regarding which Germany was already beginning to talk, the mode of settlement might be founded on the precedent of the bombardment of Alexandria. The German Government were on the look-out for the first good opportunity for questioning the measures of the French Government, but so long as he remained in power he would take good care not to do anything to offer such an opportunity to Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[30306] No. 320.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 10.)

(No. 132. Confidential.)

Sir, *San Sebastian, September* 5, 1907.

IN explaining to me at Madrid his views on the Morocco crisis on the 28th ultimo, as reported in my telegram No. 44 of the same date, and in my Confidential despatch No. 129 of the 30th ultimo, Señor Maura, Spanish Prime Minister, ascribed great importance to a French proposal which had reached him the day before, through the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, to the effect that it might be well to proceed in the work of maintaining order on the Morocco coast, by dividing the coast line into a French strip and a Spanish strip. It would thus become the duty of Spain alone to adopt such measures as the varying circumstances might appear to her to require along the coast from below Larache to the French Algerian frontier. France would similarly act quite independently along the coast to the south of Larache. This idea appeared to Señor Maura to present considerable advantages, and he explained to me the conditions under which he would be prepared to adopt it. It was with some surprise, therefore, that I learned from M. Révoil, French Ambassador to Spain, with whom I am now enjoying the advantage of daily conferences at San Sebastian, that the French Government were not the authors of this suggestion.

M. Révoil thinks it must have emanated from the mind of the Marquis del Muni, who may possibly have talked over the question with M. Pichon in general terms, but who was certainly not charged with any definite communication to the Spanish Government proposing a partition of operations into spheres of influence. The idea in itself is one which offers at this moment a good deal of attraction to the Spanish Government. They have taken part under pressure and very unwillingly in the proceedings at Casa Blanca, and the attempt to combine the distinctly defensive action of a so-called police force of 400 men with the serious military operations of the French regiments outside the town has not conduced to the glory of the Spanish army.

Señor Allendesalazar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointed out to me on the 3rd instant, in conversation, that in interfering in the affairs of Morocco far down the Atlantic coast, Spain felt that she was allowing herself to be drawn into an enterprise which lay beyond the natural radius of her interests. It was true that her engagements compelled her to take a hand in the matter, and she meant to act up to her engagements; but it was sorely against the grain.

The coast, on the other hand, which lay on the opposite side of the straits and actually in sight of the Spanish coast, was naturally an object of intense concern to every Spaniard. The critical point seemed now to be Tangier. There Spain felt that it would be in accordance with the nature of things that she should take the lead in the event of an occupation in force, for the protection of the European population, becoming necessary. If this contingency occurred, the General Drude of the situation should be

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a Spanish General, commanding the larger of the two contingents and practically directing the joint operations. Last February the two Governments had arrived at an agreement concerning the strength and distribution, in the town and suburbs of Tangier, of their respective Moorish police contingents under the provisions of the Algeciras Act. Spain was to occupy the town with 200 police, and France the outside district with 400. In May the numbers were increased to 250 and 500 respectively.

These arrangements the Spanish Government did not think could be held to apply to the serious business of holding Tangier against an armed insurrection. There must be, Señor Allendesalazar thought, a reconsideration both of the zones and numbers, which were fixed with a view to setting up a mere native police force, under European inspectors. This, of course, must be a matter of negotiation with France. In the meantime, it was necessary to be prepared for events. France had already sent the "Desaix" to join the "Jeanne d'Arc" at Tangier. Spain was sending her largest cruiser, the "Carlos V" to join the "Numancia." The "Carlos V" was expected to arrive at Tangier to-day, bringing up the possible Spanish landing force to 700, as compared with 300, which the French would be able to land from their two ships. Spain had more men in readiness at Cadiz and Ceuta, should circumstances require a still larger force.

The Spanish Foreign Minister desired in short that the relative positions and importance of the French and Spanish contingents should be at Tangier, the reverse of what they are at Casa Blanca.

I have spoken to M. Révoil on this point, and ascertained that his Excellency does not personally attach much importance to the strength of the Spanish landing force at Tangier, provided it be made to occupy the town zone agreed upon in February for the Spanish police, leaving the outside zone to the French contingent. It is of course the exterior force that would have to stand the brunt of an attack by the tribes, and for this purpose it would always require to be numerically much stronger than the force holding the town. Señor Allendesalazar allowed me to understand that he was himself much more disposed to co-operate cordially with the French than Señor Maura.

He thinks, however, that the latter is gradually coming round to his views. It was unfortunate, as his Excellency admitted, that Señor Maura should have twice passed through San Sebastian without making any effort to see the French Ambassador, and that he should have spent some weeks in France without visiting M. Pichon. Señor Maura was coming next week to San Sebastian, and a meeting would then be arranged which Señor Allendesalazar thought would clear up the situation. Señor Maura, as I have before pointed out, is more concerned with the internal politics of Spain, which urgently require a period of repose.

Señor Allendesalazar, who is in daily contact with M. Révoil, has been brought to a better comprehension of the duties entailed on Spain by her engagements with France and England.

Both statesmen keep constantly before their minds the Secret Treaty with France, assigning to Spain an eventual Protectorate over Northern Morocco. If action is to be taken, it is in this northern sphere that Spain, with an eye to the future, prefers to assert herself. I have not failed to impress upon the Foreign Minister that it is premature to act as if Morocco had already broken up irretrievably. The proper course I have pointed out, and the Spanish Government have not denied, is to continue to concert operations with France in the spirit of the Algeciras Act, until such time as both Powers and England also are agreed that the time has come to bring the Secret Treaty, or as much of it as can be held to have survived the Algeciras Act into effective operation. M. Révoil believes, as did his predecessor, M. Jules Cambon, that Germany has knowledge of the contents of the Secret Treaty.

However this may be, he considers that it would produce a disastrous effect if Spain, in a moment of pique, were to make it public. The enemies of France would not be slow to accuse the French Government of having acted dishonestly at Algiceras in signing an arrangement inconsistent with its unrepealed engagements with Spain. But I agree with his Excellency in thinking there is no reason to fear that any such disclosure will be made.

Spain is quite aware of the obligation under which she lies to proceed in these matters in concert with France and England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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[30307] No. 321.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)*

(No. 134.)
Sir, *San Sebastian, September 7, 1907.*

M. REGNAULT, French Minister at Tangier, has been at San Sebastian for a few hours on his way to his post after leave of absence. He should reach Tangier on the 9th or 10th instant. In speaking to me of the situation in Morocco he laid stress on the absolute necessity of stopping the contraband in arms and ammunition. So long as these could be obtained by the tribes the attacks would continue. The main source of supply was from the tramp steamers that reaped such a rich harvest from this traffic. The regular liners, he thought, need not be interfered with, beyond carefully examining the goods landed from them at the Moroccan ports, but the tramp steamers should be stopped and searched, and if found to contain contraband, taken to the nearest port where there was a Consul of their country.

He was glad to hear from me that we were quite disposed to agree to arrangements being framed having this end in view, provided other countries also agreed.

I informed him, on the authority of your telegram No. 88 to Sir Gerard Lowther, that the German Government were believed to be ready to consent. I have since learned from Sir Gerard Lowther's telegram No. 111 of the 3rd September, that the German Representative in Tangier is not yet fully instructed on the point.

M. Regnault complained of the tone of the Spanish press, which was not responding to the friendly attitude which, not without difficulty, the French papers had been induced to adopt towards Spain. I told him that I had myself often remarked in my conversations with the Spanish Foreign Minister on the narrow views set forth in the principal Spanish newspapers, and that the answer had always been that it was very difficult to exercise an influence over the Spanish press, and that the Government paid no attention to its utterances. There can be little doubt, however, that the Spanish press has for once reflected public opinion in dealing with the present Morocco crisis, and that the Government, though I hope coming round to sounder views, has been much influenced by the popular sentiment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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[30397] No. 322.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)*

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Sebastian, September 10, 1907.*

THE President of the Spanish Council of Ministers desiring to explain to me his policy in Morocco, Señor Allendesalazar invited me last night to meet him. Señor Maura did not object to the French Government having pressed the Spanish Government to conclude an Agreement defining the manner in which, if by some mischance it becomes necessary to effect an armed occupation of Tangier, the two Powers should proceed. Such an Agreement this Government is most desirous of making. But, in Señor Maura's view, the contemplated occupation could not be described merely as a measure taken for police purposes, nor could the February arrangements as to zones, &c., be made to apply to it. A separation of the town command from the country command would also be impracticable. But Señor Maura's main point was that the chief command of the joint detachments must be in Spanish hands, considering the fact that Tangier is the most important place within the sphere of influence claimed by Spain.

His Excellency added that, if he consented to a French officer taking command of a Spanish landing force, he would fail to carry with him either public opinion or his majority in the Cortes. Though he sees that conflicts must arise if a landing takes place without any previous arrangement having been made, he would rather make no arrangement, and leave it open to each landing party to take whatever measures appear to be required, than consent to the chief command being held by a French officer.

Spain, he said, has the reputation at present in Morocco of not being an aggressive nation. This being so, it would be easier for her than for France to restore tranquillity in Tangier, and then to withdraw. For the Moors regard the French



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with resentment and suspicion, on account of their occupation, even if it be an unwilling occupation, of Ujda, and of the hostile action in which they have become involved.

Señor Maura claims, therefore, for his country the exercise of both the political and military direction of affairs about Tangier, and he does not allow that France should have an equal share in such direction.

While he is ready to admit the propriety of France taking the predominant position in her own sphere of influence, he rejects entirely the idea of Spain assisting France to occupy such a position at Tangier.

The French Ambassador having had the goodness to confide to me that his instructions from Paris directed him to meet the wishes of Spain as far as he possibly could, I mentioned this to the President of the Council, and expressed the hope that he would see his way to accepting the French proposals. The Secret Convention of October 1904 guaranteed, I thought, with sufficient clearness the position of Spain in Northern Morocco. But I reminded Señor Maura that, until the division of Morocco into spheres of influence takes full effect, Spain is bound by the provisions of that Convention to take no action, even in what is to be her own sphere, without obtaining the previous concurrence of France.

Señor Maura, however, holds fast to the views expressed above. He also looks to you to afford him diplomatic support in Paris in inducing the French Government to acknowledge that Spain has a right to take a leading part within the sphere of influence which the 1904 Agreements concede to her. He added that England was in the best position to interpret and define those Agreements, inasmuch as she had given such important assistance to Spain while they were being negotiated.

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[30501] No. 323.

*Memorandum communicated by M. Geoffray, September* 11, 1907.

LES Règlements relatifs à l'organisation et au fonctionnement de la police Marocaine, ainsi que les cahiers des charges pour l'adjudication des effets d'habilement et d'équipement, ayant été approuvés par le Makhzen, les types d'armes (de modèles Français) ayant été choisis également par le Gouvernement Chérifien, enfin les crédits nécessaires pour l'exercice 1907 ayant été ouverts par la Banque d'État, toutes les formalités préliminaires à la création de la nouvelle troupe se trouvent accomplies à l'heure actuelle. Les circonstances présentes rendent particulièrement désirable la prompte exécution des mesures prévues, dans cet ordre d'idées, par l'Acte d'Algésiras. La population étrangère des villes de la côte est, en effet, partout menacée ou inquiétée par les démonstrations des tribus, par l'inaction ou l'impuissance notoire des autorités locales, enfin par l'état d'indiscipline des garnisons Chérifiennes.

Les Gouvernements Français et Espagnol, investis d'un mandat international, l'ont exécuté en assumant, depuis les derniers événements et avec l'assentiment unanime des Puissances, la protection des étrangers établis au Maroc. Ils se préoccupent donc d'installer, dans le plus bref délai possible, des forces de police suffisantes pour garantir efficacement l'existence et les intérêts des résidents de toute nationalité. En conséquence, leurs Représentants à Tanger ont remis au Ministre de la Guerre Chérifien une note par laquelle ils lui demandaient de leur donner l'assurance officielle qu'il avait les pouvoirs nécessaires pour l'organisation immédiate de la police, notamment pour le recrutement des hommes, et de garantir personnellement que les troupes composées par lui seraient fidèles et disciplinées, les instructeurs se trouvant ainsi garantis par sa responsabilité personnelle.

En faisant cette communication au Ministre Marocain, M. de Saint-Aulaire et M. Llaberia lui ont expliqué la portée de la garantie que les deux Gouvernements attendaient de lui : ils voulaient être certains, sous sa caution, que leurs instructeurs ne courraient pas les risques d'être abandonnés et massacrés par leurs soldats.

Si Mohammed-el-Guebbas a répondu qu'il ne lui était pas possible de donner une assurance aussi formelle.

En présence de cette déclaration, les deux Gouvernements, tenus d'assurer la sécurité des étrangers dans les ports, doivent aviser aux moyens de constituer provisoirement, mais sans plus attendre, une police par leurs propres ressources, c'est-à-dire, à l'aide de leurs effectifs. Le Gouvernement de la République va donc se concerter avec le Gouvernement Espagnol en vue de cette organisation qui reste la nécessité la plus pressante du moment. Il reste entendu que cette mesure, imposée par les circonstances,





a un caractère temporaire et que la présence des troupes Franco-Espagnoles dans les villes de la côte où elle sera reconnue nécessaire facilitera la formation des troupes de police Marocaines prévues à Algésiras ; les instructeurs s'efforceront de donner à bref délai au corps Marocain la discipline et la valeur militaires sans lesquelles l'ordre ne peut être assuré.

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[30433] No. 324.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 11.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Sebastian, September* 10, 1907.

M. RÉVOIL'S last interview with Señor Maura, the Spanish Prime Minister, on the subject of Morocco (see my telegram No. 49 of this morning), was more satisfactory than his previous ones, and he now has good hopes of overcoming the difficulties connected with the distribution of troops at Tangier. The basis he is working on is that, though Spain will occupy the interior zone assigned to her in the February Agreement while France occupies the exterior zone, the senior officer will be appointed by Spain.

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[30502] No. 325.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 11.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic). P. *Paris, September* 11, 1907.

AT an interview which I had this afternoon with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in consequence of the receipt of Sir M. de Bunsen's telegrams No. 48 of the 8th and No. 49 of the 10th, concerning Morocco, and your telegrams Nos. 102 and 103 of the 9th instant, his Excellency told me that the difficulties that the Spanish Government make are chiefly due to their desire to treat the Secret Agreement of October 1904, which only comes into force in certain eventualities which have not occurred, as being already in activity. The French Government have neither the intention nor the desire to occupy several ports in force, as feared by the Spanish Government, unless circumstances such as massacres or danger to Europeans force them to do so. Their policy is to endeavour to the best of their ability to avoid such a necessity. They hope to avoid the necessity of a landing of troops at Tangier even as police, but should it, owing to unforeseen circumstances, become unavoidable, they are quite willing that the French force and the Spanish force should be equal in numbers and that the superior command should be entrusted to a Spanish officer as was contemplated in the arrangement of February. In such a case, however, the policing of the town only would be undertaken by the Spanish troops, while that of the outer zone would be carried out by the French force.

M. Pichon's opinion is that the Spanish Government desire to compensate themselves (" se rattraper ") at Tangier for what their dilatoriness and lack of decision sacrificed at Casa Blanca, where the French were consequently obliged to take prompt measures without having previously obtained the Spanish Government's concurrence. The Spanish Ambassador here argues, his Excellency tells me, that Morocco is getting into the state of decomposition contemplated under the Franco-Spanish Secret Agreement of 1904. M. Pichon told the Ambassador that he could not admit the validity of his argument, and he moreover pointed out to his Excellency the danger that acting on such an assumption would cause, not only as concerns the two Powers and Morocco, but also in connection with the other European Powers and especially Germany. The tone of the recent note from Berlin was, he had said, not calculated to encourage the adoption of such a policy as the Ambassador advocated.

M. Pichon has promised to let me have the Spanish proposals in time for dispatch to you by this evening's post.

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[30503] No. 326.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, September* 11, 1907.

MY telegram No. 50 of to-day's date respecting Morocco.

French Ambassador at Madrid had not this afternoon communicated to M. Pichon the information which he gave to Sir M. de Bunsen, as reported in the latter's telegram No. 50 of the 10th September.

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[30509] No. 327.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 12.)

(No. 397.)
Sir, *Berlin, September* 10, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a semi-official note published in last night's "North German Gazette," giving a résumé of the French Memorandum and the German reply on the subject of the proposed institution of French and Spanish police in the harbours of Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. C. LASCELLES.

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Inclosure in No. 327.

*Extract from the "North German Gazette" of September* 10, 1907.

(Translation.)

A MEMORANDUM of the 2nd September from the French Embassy here announced the intention of the French Government to institute a provisional police, in conjunction with the Spanish Government, and from the two Powers' own resources, in those Treaty harbours of Morocco where such a measure should be recognized as necessary, with the object of maintaining order there and of facilitating the formation of the Moorish police provided for by the Algeciras Act.

The German Government have replied that they have noted this communication and the reasons given in the Memorandum. They gather therefrom that the proposed measures will be of a provisional character, and will not prejudice the provisions of the Algeciras Act.

The German Government have recognized the right of France to obtain satisfaction for the proceedings at Casa Blanca, and have no intention of placing difficulties in the way of the action undertaken by France on this account as a result of extraordinary circumstances. But the German Government hope and desire that there may be no repetition of the severe losses of foreign merchants which were suffered at Casa Blanca. They therefore draw attention to the fact that, according to the opinion of the German Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, the institution of foreign police, which is not provided for in the Algeciras Act, might in existing circumstances call forth an attack of the hill tribes on the town, and serious danger to the lives and property of Europeans, especially if such a measure should be taken without the protection of undoubtedly sufficient military forces. The same danger probably exists also in other ports.

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[30506] No. 328.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 12.)

(No. 441.)
Sir, *Paris, September* 11, 1907.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 50 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay, forwarding to me, by direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latest draft of notes for exchange with Spain on the subject of an eventual landing at Tangier.

M. Louis states that from a spirit of conciliation the French Government have





taken as basis the Spanish draft, with some indispensable modifications, but that they have not yet heard of its acceptance.

M. Pichon has not furnished me with a copy of the Spanish proposals.

There is no mention in the French draft of the Superior Command of the Police Force at Tangier (French and Spanish) being entrusted to a Spanish officer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. BERTIE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 328.

*M. Louis to Sir Francis Bertie.*

*Affaires Étrangères, Direction Politique,*
*le* 11 *Septembre*, 1907.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

LE Ministre me charge de vous faire parvenir le dernier projet de note à échanger avec l'Espagne au sujet d'un débarquement éventuel à Tanger. Par esprit de conciliation nous avons pris comme base le projet Espagnol, en y introduisant quelques modifications indispensables. Nous n'avons pas encore été avisés de son acceptation.

Votre, &c.
(Signé) GEORGES LOUIS.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 328.

*Draft Note on the subject of eventual Landing at Tangier.*

EN raison des circonstances les deux Gouvernements ont décidé de maintenir jusqu'à nouvel ordre devant Tanger les navires de guerre qui y ont déjà été envoyés ou des unités de même ordre.

Les Représentants Diplomatiques de Sa Majesté Catholique et de la République Française, préalablement d'accord à cet effet, pourront, après avoir pris l'avis des membres du Corps Diplomatique à Tanger, requérir le débarquement des détachements nécessaires des navires de guerre des deux pays. En cas de danger imminent les deux Représentants Diplomatiques de Sa Majesté Catholique et de la République Française, d'un commun accord, pourront requérir d'urgence ledit débarquement et ils rendront compte à leurs collègues et au Délégué de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Les détachements Espagnol et Français occuperont respectivement les zones prévues et délimitées par l'Arrangement du 23 Février, 1907, et y assureront le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité. Les contingents Français et Espagnol opéreront chacun separément dans la zone qui leur est assignée ; mais leurs commandants devront se tenir informés d'une manière permanente. Le fonctionnement et la juridiction des autorités locales seront autant que possible maintenus.

Les ordonnances et les règlements que les circonstances obligeraient les commandants Espagnol et Français de prendre à titre provisoire concernant la sécurité, la salubrité, la circulation et la voirie seront édictés par eux dans chacune des zones de police, d'un commun accord, et après avis des Ministres de France et d'Espagne.

Ceux-ci donneront communication préalable de ces mesures aux Représentants des Puissances accrédités à Tanger.

Les deux Gouvernements continueront à employer tous leurs efforts afin d'assurer le plus promptement possible l'organisation de la police, prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, et en attendant ils prendront les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l'ordre par leurs propres moyens.

Ils se réservent d'envoyer des renforts à Tanger si ces renforts devenaient indispensables pour l'accomplissement de la tâche qui incombe aux deux pays telle qu'elle vient d'être définie ci-dessus.

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[30584] No. 329.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 12.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *San Sebastian, September* 11, 1907.

GREAT difficulties still surround the question of which Power shall exercise the chief command if it should become necessary to land Spanish and French troops at Tangier A division of the commands is the solution which now seems to commend itself to M. Révoil. Each country would then operate independently of the other within its own particular zone. Señor Maura leaves for Madrid, where he wishes to confer with the Minister of War. Personally he appears to agree to the principle laid down.

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[30607] No. 330.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 12.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 12, 190

A QUANTITY of jewellery has been sent here by the Sultan. On this security His Majesty hopes to raise a loan in this town. It is unlikely that he will get even 100,000*l.*, though he expects to obtain more than double that amount. Further valuables, estimated by His Majesty at 100,000*l.*, are also being sent to London, where they are to be deposited to provide for emergencies.

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[30641] No. 331.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 137. Confidential.)
Sir, *San Sebastian, September* 10, 1907.

I ENDEAVOURED in my telegram No. 49 of to-day to convey as accurately as possible the Spanish conception of the situation in Morocco, as explained to me last night by Señor Maura, President of the Council of Ministers, in the presence of Señor Allendesalazar, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Señor Maura cares very little what the French do in their own sphere south of Laraiche. In that quarter the general and official concurrence of Spain with the French proceedings is faintly, but his Excellency thinks sufficiently, indicated by the presence of the small Spanish contingent in a defensive attitude at Casa Blanca. The Spanish sphere is, on the contrary, a matter of burning interest to the Spanish Government. There they claim to be allowed to act in the manner established by the Secret Agreement with France of October 1904. In February 1907 it is true that an understanding was concluded with France defining the numerical strength of the native police contingents to be organized by French and Spanish Inspectors, and the zones in and about Tangier and Casa Blanca which they were to occupy as soon as the new police force could be set on foot. Under this understanding the police under Spanish inspection were assigned at Tangier the urban and at Casa Blanca the extra-urban zone. But circumstances had rendered the fulfilment of this understanding impossible. In Casa Blanca France had entire control both of the exterior Spanish and the interior French zone. And though the Spanish contingent there had been purposely limited to a number approximately equal to the force of native police which Spain was to organize at Casa Blanca, it was clear that the operations which France was conducting were something quite distinct from police operations.

In short, the February understanding had not proved applicable to the situation at Casa Blanca. Neither would it prove applicable, in Señor Maura's opinion, to the situation at Tangier, in the unfortunate but possible contingency of an armed occupation becoming inevitable. There must then be set on foot at Tangier, as there now was at Casa Blanca, a strong military force of perhaps many thousands of men. This force might be French as well as Spanish, but as France had assumed the lead in her own





sphere, so Spain must assume it in hers. She did not care so much about the relative numerical strength of the two armies, but the supreme command of both, as well as the political direction of events on the spot, must be in Spanish hands.

Señor Maura had no doubt of Spain being able to take up a strong military position at Tangier. She was fully prepared at Ceuta, Algeciras, and Malaga for all contingencies. His Excellency also believed that, when the Powers at Algeciras associated Spain with France in the task of organizing the new native police force, they had in mind, not only the geographical proximity of Spain to Morocco and her traditional interest in its affairs, but also the character which Spain bears of being in Morocco an unaggressive Power, as shown, at least since 1860, by the unexpansive policy which she has pursued at Ceuta, Melilla, and her other possessions along the northern coast. If order has to be restored at Tangier, or an attack by rebel tribes repelled, Señor Maura is persuaded that a force mainly composed of Spanish soldiers, and at all events commanded by a Spanish General, would excite less resentment among the Moors than would a prevailingly French force, or a French Commander, owing to the odium attaching to the French nation in Morocco as a result of recent events.

Turning to the political situation in Spain, Señor Maura assured me that, great as was his majority in the Chamber of Deputies, he could not carry his followers with him if he accepted a position in Tangier subordinate to that of France. Nor would public opinion tolerate such a position of inferiority in a town in which the Spanish residents largely exceeded those of all other European countries put together.

I expressed to Señor Maura my earnest hope that he would make every possible sacrifice to arrive at an understanding with M. Révoil, who had informed me that he had received fresh instructions meeting, as far as possible, the legitimate susceptibilities of Spain as regards Tangier. I pointed out that if Spain exercises patience her future influence at Tangier is guaranteed, as far as it possibly can be, by the text of the 1904 Arrangements, and that, in the meanwhile, that text requires that before taking action in her own sphere Spain must secure the concurrence of France.

I do not know what M. Révoil's precise instructions are, but his Excellency reminded me this morning that, at the end of last year, when the two countries made a joint naval demonstration at Tangier which led to the expulsion of Raisuli from the neighbourhood, it was agreed that if a landing took place France was to exercise the chief command. M. Révoil is much dissatisfied with his first interview with Señor Maura this morning. He suspects his Excellency of seeking to turn events in Morocco to his own political advantage, and to make the self-imposed inferiority of the Spanish position at Casa Blanca the pretext for the assumption at Tangier of a part which Spain is not really competent to play, and which could not but be injurious to French prestige.

It is difficult to discover with certainty the precise and direct motive under which the Spanish Government is acting, but it is, I think, safe to assume that in its origin it is nothing more than the constitutional aversion to lending France a hand in Morocco which is so strongly felt by Spaniards who take an interest in foreign affairs. I feel it to be my duty to oppose this sentiment as far as possible, and I believe that it will still prove possible to make an arrangement on paper to fit the possible course of events at Tangier. But it is to be hoped that, as in last December at the time of the joint naval demonstration, no actual landing may prove to be necessary. At best it would be difficult to avoid a good deal of friction between the two contingents.

Señor Maura relies much on your assistance in Paris to secure an interpretation of the Convention of October 1904, which will secure to Spain a position of preponderance at Tangier, in the event of a display of force being made there.

Since writing the above, I have again seen M. Révoil, who tells me he has had a second and more satisfactory interview with Señor Maura, and now has good hopes of concluding an Agreement concerning Tangier.

France, I gather, will allow Spain to appoint the senior of the two Commanding Officers. Each country would occupy the zone assigned to it in the Agreement of last February with the force which it thinks necessary. If divergencies arise, the Diplomatic Representatives of France and Spain would, it is hoped, be able to compose them.

M. Révoil promises to keep me informed of the further progress of his negotiation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[30728] No. 332.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 13, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean. My telegram No. 110 of the 2nd instant.
Raisuli has now sent me his terms in writing :—

1. His property and that of his family, which he estimates at 112,000*l.*, to be restored to him, also the 350 rifles, with 300,000 rounds of ammunition, which were taken from him.

2. Both the Deputy Commissioner and War Minister here to be dismissed, and an undertaking to be given that they shall never again be employed.

3. Raisuli to be appointed Governor of his former district, with the addition of thirteen tribes.

4. Two of the leading officers who conducted operations against him to be imprisoned here.

5. Prisoners, whose names will follow later, to be released.

No mention is made of British protection.
His terms as stated above are absolutely out of the question, and I am considering whether I should not again request him to send his Secretary to Tangier to discuss the matter with me.

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[30820] No. 333.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 15, 1907.*

SULTAN ABD-UL-AZIZ started the 12th instant from Fez, proceeding direct to Rabat.

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[30914] No. 334.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 347.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 4, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 342 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Fez, in which he reports the details of the journey of the British community and others from Fez to Tangier.

You will observe that Mr. MacLeod lays special stress on the courteous hospitality shown to all by the Commander of the French war-ship "Du Chayla."

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 334.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 87.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 2, 1907.*

ON Saturday, the 24th August, the foreign residents at Fez named in my despatch of that date reached Hajra Shereefa. The Kaïd of our escort expected to be joined there by a number of horsemen from Sherarda, through whose territory we should next pass. They did not come, however, and rumours were current that, to mark their discontent with the Makhzen, the Sherarda tribe would show some hostility to us. The Kaïd therefore left the direct road, and led us through Sheraga





to near Settat, and down the north bank of the Warga to Dar Kaïd Al Fadli, a march of some thirteen hours. The Kaïd refused to make two marches of this stage, as he feared trouble from the mountain people near whose lands we were passing. The heat was excessive, and later in the afternoon a furious sandstorm, followed by heavy rain, thunder, and lightning, burst over the district. About noon we were joined at Warga by the Sherarda mounted tribesmen expected on the previous night, and by the French protégé Buazza Al Miliani, with some ten of his fellow-tribesmen. Although the storm afforded ample opportunity for misconduct towards us, all our escort and these tribesmen showed us every kindness and assistance. The Kaïd of our escort did not tell us, however, of the detour he intended to make, and, the baggage animals having gone on ahead, most of the party suffered considerably from hunger and thirst throughout the day. To rest the caravan no march was made the next morning, but in the afternoon (Monday) we moved on to Ardatz.

Then we learned that the Germans at Fez, accompanied by Dr. Verdon and an American family (Mr. and Mrs. Simpson and two children), had left Fez on the 25th, and were now near Mshra Al Basha, on the Warga River, having come by the direct road under escort of some fifteen Sherarda horsemen.

Next day (Thursday, the 37th August) we moved to Ain Jeriffi, the other caravan (Germans) encamping some 2 miles behind us. The wind having become north-westerly, the weather was pleasantly cool, and remained so for the rest of the journey.

From Ain Jeriffi we marched on the 28th August to Takayut, about 3 miles north-west of El Ksar. The German party took a more westerly route, and encamped about half an hour's march to the west of us.

The German party reached Laraiche at 10 o'clock, and we arrived there about half an hour later.

On nearing the town our escort—some seventy horsemen—were formed up in front, and the Consuls and French officers rode in with the Kaïd of the escort. The Governor of Laraiche and a party of soldiers awaited us at the town, and we were received by the townspeople with every appearance of good-will.

We encamped to the west of the town. Early in the afternoon, accompanied by Vice-Consul Forde, I called upon the Governor, Hadj Buselham Al Mbaj, and thanked him heartily for the attentions he had given us, and he returned my call before sunset.

Early next morning the French cruiser "Du Chayla" arrived at Laraiche, and at noon embarked all foreign residents who wished to go to Tangier.

Mr. Vice-Consul Forde was untiring in assisting us at Laraiche.

The officer commanding the "Du Chayla," Commandant Benoit, was most kind to us all. He postponed the departure of the "Du Chayla" until 1 P.M., so that all who wished might lunch on shore, and, by lighting extra fires, increased the vessel's speed to 18 knots, so that we should reach Tangier by daylight. He entertained the Consuls and their families at his own table, and junior officials were the guests of the officers' mess. The Commandant also desired us to tell all our compatriots that, should any of them have come without provisions, they would be supplied with food (bread, butter, sardines, &c.) from the ship's stores; all were the ship's guests, and no one was to go hungry.

When nearing Tangier the Commandant took the Consuls, officers, and their families to his cabin, where champagne was served. In response to a general wish, and as senior of the Consuls, I invited my colleagues and fellow-travellers to drink the health of the Commandant, his officers, crew, and ship, and thanked them warmly for their great kindness and most valuable assistance to us. The toast was pledged enthusiastically, and the Commandant replied expressing the pleasure it had given himself and his officers to welcome us to their ship—which was a part of France—and complimenting the ladies of our party for the manner in which they had borne the fatigues of the journey.

Our party included an infant of 15 days' old, one boy of 4 years, and thirteen women, three of whom were in weak health The German party included three women and three children under 5 years. The marches averaged about 22 miles a-day, performed in six to seven hours, yet without exception all the party arrived in good health; some, indeed, who were unwell at starting, have gained strength on the road.

No animals or baggage were lost on the road, and the arrangements for the shipment and landing of baggage by the "Du Chayla" were so good that nothing was missing.

We were all landed by boats from the French ships of war at Tangier.



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I know I express the feelings of all the British party from Fez when I say how much we were touched by your Excellency's kindness in coming to meet us at the pier, and by your constant great solicitude for us of late.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[30405] No. 335.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 348.)
Sir, *Tangier, September* 5, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 340 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida relative to the situation at Mazagan.

It will be seen that, according to Mr. Madden's information, the French are not disposed to prevent by force the delivery of the warlike stores to the emissaries of Mulai Hafid, as they fear that such a course would inevitably lead to a repetition of the scenes at Dar-al-Baida.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 335.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 227.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, September* 4, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that last evening the French Consul sent me a note to the effect that news from Mazagan was bad, as Moulai Hafid had sent down to take the rifles and cartridges from the Mazagan Custom-house.

I sent and asked this morning if any further news had been wired from Mazagan, and the French Consul informed Mr. Lomas that Moulai Hafid's emissaries would be allowed to take the rifles and ammunition this morning, as the French landing force being only 150 men, they refused to have a repetition of the scenes at Casa Blanca, and the only course was to let the Moors take over their own property.

Nevertheless, action would be taken at once if any disturbance occurred on shore at Mazagan by reason of the withdrawal of the cartridges, and 400 men have been embarked this morning on the "Gloire" ready to start at a moment's notice if a wireless summoned them to Mazagan.

I understand the "Galilée" left for Mazagan this morning. M. Malpertuy also stated that it is still given out here among the Arabs that Moulai Hafid intends to act as mediator between the French and the Kabyles, but that his Kalifa is coming on this mission and not Moulai Hafid himself.

The funeral of Colonel Provot, of the Foreign Legion, who, with a Lieutenant, was killed in yesterday's fight, took place this morning in the Spanish Roman Catholic Cemetery at 9 A.M., the Last Post was sounded, and after the lowering of the coffin General Drude made an allocution eulogising the devotion to duty of the deceased officer, and of the Foreign Legion, and thanking those present for their sympathy in attending the obsequies.

General Drude stated that after France and Spain had fulfilled the mandate of Europe, he hoped that every one would be able to live in tranquillity and peace in Morocco.

General Drude then shook hands with those of us who were present, but we had not been invited to attend officially.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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No. 336.

[30915]

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 349.) *Tangier, September* 5, 1907.
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, giving an account of an engagement which took place there on the 3rd instant.

This account was based on information supplied by Colonel Lewis, military correspondent of the "Times."

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 336.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 228.) *Dar-al-Baida, September* 4, 1907.
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a short statement of yesterday's engagement between the Arabs and the French, based on information kindly supplied by Colonel Lewis, military correspondent of the "Times" newspaper, to Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Lomas.

Colonel Lewis states that every consideration possible has been shown to him by General Drude and his staff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 336.

*Account of an Engagement on September* 3, 1907, *between Arabs and French.*

THE engagement of the 3rd September was brought on by a strong reconnaissance sent out at 5 A.M. from the French camp under the command of Colonel Blanc, and consisting of one squadron of Spahis, one battery of field artillery of four guns, four companies of Tirailleurs, and about seventy of the "Goumiers" cavalry, about 850 men in all.

The French force took up a position in square on the ridge on which the saint-house of Sidi Mu'men stands, about 6 miles east of the town, with the sea on the left flank, not quite commanding a valley running from the sea away to the Arab camp at Teddert some miles to the right of the French position.

The hill on the opposite side of the valley was soon covered with irregular masses of Arab horsemen, and heavy artillery and rifle fire was opened which lasted from 8 A.M. to 10·30 A.M.; but the range was always very long, rifle fire being at over 1,000 yards. The artillery fired seventy-five shells each gun.

An attack of Arab horsemen, which tried to get behind the square on the left flank between it and the sea, was repulsed by the French cavalry.

The reconnaissance returned to camp at about 1 P.M. having lost one commandant, Major Provost, Officer Commanding the Foreign Legion, one Algerian Lieutenant and six men killed, and twelve non-commissioned officers and men wounded.

At about 11·30 A.M. a dash was made by Arab horsemen directly at the French camp from far on the right of the French reconnaissance; this attack, though some Arabs managed to get to the top of the ridge immediately in front of the camp, and near enough to shoot a few shots into camp, was beaten off by the Chasseurs d'Afrique sent out by General Drude to support the battery which is always stationed out in a position ready for any such sudden dash.

It is impossible at this date to estimate the numbers of the Arab losses, but it seems to be established from both French and native sources that the Arab losses in the action of the 28th ultimo was about 300, and on the 31st about 150 killed and wounded.

(Signed) ERNEST G. LOMAS,
*Acting Vice-Consul.*

*Dar-al-Baida, September* 4, 1907.

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[30406] No. 337.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 350.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 5, 1907.*

RUMOURS have been current here for some days of a large meeting of the mountain tribes being held at the saint house of Moulai Abdelam in the Beni Aros, and letters received by natives from Moorish officials and others at Tetuan state that people who attended the meeting have arrived at Tetuan and report that it was unanimously decided by the tribes represented there to keep all roads open in the district Tangier–Tetuan–Alcazar, and to summarily punish any tribe which may violate this compact. It was also accorded that Tangier and its inhabitants, both European and native, should be treated with the same respect as heretofore, and a solemn vow was made by all present on the tomb of the saint to respect these engagements, and to join in punishing any who might infringe them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30916] No. 338.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 351.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 6, 1907.*

AMONGST other measures taken to secure tranquillity and to check the daily increasing panic in Tangier, the Minister of War and the French Chargé d'Affaires recently agreed upon a system of civilian police for the town and immediate neighbourhood. These were to be selected in different quarters of the town and to be held responsible for order in the respective districts to which they belonged.

As protected persons had necessarily to be also liable for this service, the approval of the foreign Representatives was asked for in the letter of the French Chargé d'Affaires to the Doyen, of which I herewith inclose a copy.

The system is one that fully accords with Moorish ideas, and appeared to me to offer a good chance of success, and I immediately gave it my approval, as did, I believe, all my colleagues except the Spanish Minister, who referred the matter to his Government, and has now received their sanction.

You will observe that this measure is only a temporary one pending the institution of the police provided for by the Act of Algeciras.

Sid Mohammed Guebbas, the Minister of War, to-day informed us that the first steps had been taken for establishing this civilian police.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 338.

*M. Saint Aulaire to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body.*

M. le Doyen, *Tanger, le 30 Août, 1907.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que le Ministre Chérifien de la Guerre et le Pacha de la ville de Tanger ont décidé, sur les conseils de M. Bourgès, Commissaire de Police près cette Légation, l'établissement d'un service de police destiné à assurer la sécurité dans l'intérieur de la ville et dans ses environs immédiats.

Le principe de la réforme projetée consiste à diviser la ville en huit quartiers, dans chacun desquels la police serait exercée par un moquaddem rétribué et responsable. Les cinq moquaddems des douars de la banlieue de Tanger seraient confirmés dans leurs fonctions, mais déclarés responsables du maintien de l'ordre dans leur douar. Un mokhazni rétribué serait adjoint à chaque moquaddem. Une liste nominative des habitants par quartier et par douar serait établie; un roulement serait institué parmi les habitants pour désigner ceux d'entre eux qui prendraient la garde la nuit; le tour de garde reviendrait tous les dix jours au maximum; le remplacement par des mercenaires des veilleurs ainsi désignés ne seraient pas admis. Une permanence serait établie à la Casbah.





Ces mesures qui pourraient être complétées selon les besoins dont l'expérience prouvera la nécessité assureraient évidemment dans une grande mesure la sécurité actuellement si précaire de Tanger et de sa banlieue. Mais elles ne sauraient être effectives que si le principe de l'obligation de la garde de nuit est absolu pour tous les indigènes, protégés ou non, tous étant appelés à bénéficier également de la nouvelle institution. Je vous serais en conséquence très reconnaissant, M. le Doyen, de vouloir bien consulter par voie de circulaire MM. les Chefs de Mission à l'effet de savoir s'ils consentent à engager leurs protégés à se soumettre aux nouvelles obligations qui leur seraient imposées dans l'intérêt général. La Légation de France s'engage volontiers à ne pas soutenir ceux de ses protégés qui essaieraient de s'y soustraire, à l'exception des protégés des Articles II et XVI du Traité de Madrid, qui n'y seraient pas soumis.

Cette organisation aurait l'avantage de pouvoir fonctionner immédiatement, en attendant la mise en train aussi prochaine que possible de la police prévue à l'Acte d'Algésiras. Elle serait appelée à disparaître le jour où l'ordre pourrait être assuré sur des bases plus sérieuses. En attendant, la dépense nécessaire, soit 4,000 fr par mois, serait couverte par une avance de 100,000 fr., que la Compagnie Algérienne a consentie au Makhzen en spécifiant que cette somme sera affectuée à la protection de la ville.

D'autre part, Guebbas est disposé à faciliter, plus que par le passé, au Commandant Fournié et à ses collaborateurs, le contrôle de la solde et du service des troupes Chérifiennes de la région de Tanger.

Je vous serais très reconnaissant de bien vouloir faire connaître aux Représentants des Puissances ces indications et, dans le cas où leur avis y serait favorable, d'écrire à Si Mohammed Torres pour lui en faire part et l'inviter à prescrire aux autorités Marocaines compétentes de s'y conformer dans l'intérêt de tous.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) SAINT AULAIRE.

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[30917] No. 339.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 352.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 7, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 324 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to the doyen of the Corps Diplomatique by the Director of the State Bank here, stating that the first part of the loan of 1,000,000 fr. has just been placed at the disposal of the Makhzen, on the strict condition that the Sultan leaves for Rabat.

The State Bank expresses the hope that this decision will contribute towards improving the situation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 339.

*M. Guiot to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body.*

M. le Doyen, *Tanger, le 6 Septembre, 1907.*

LE Président de l'Administration de la Banque d'État du Maroc a eu l'honneur de vous notifier, le 20 Août, que la banque, prenant en considération les pressantes instances dont elle était l'objet, avait décidé de mettre à la disposition du Sultan une avance de 1,000,000 fr., spécialement affectée aux dépenses à effectuer en vue du voyage de Moulay Abd-el-Aziz à Rabat, et payable, moitié à Fez et moitié à l'arrivée à Rabat.

En me référant à cette communication, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que, sur l'ordre de la banque, la première tranche de cette avance vient d'être mise à la disposition du Makhzen, sous condition absolue du départ du Sultan pour Rabat; les carnets de chèques ont été envoyés hier à Fez.

Nous nous plaisons à espérer que par ce nouveau sacrifice la banque aura contribué, dans la mesure de ses moyens à une amélioration de la situation présente.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) E. GUIOT.



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[30918] No. 340.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received September 16.)*

(No. 353.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 6, 1907.*

MR. MACLEOD, His Majesty's Consul at Fez, who is now here, had yesterday a conversation with Sid Abderrahman-ben-Abdessadok, the Governor of Fez, who was passing through Tangier after having been about three years with the Government forces in the Oujda district. This conversation is recorded in the despatch, of which I inclose a copy herewith.

The estimate of the troops left in the Oujda district is corroborated by the Minister of War, but I think it may be taken that it is greatly exaggerated.

I have confined myself to communicating to the French Chargé d'Affaires the substance of the Governor's statement, but Comte St. Aulaire said that he did not see how money could be found for paying off these arrears, and if the Sultan required these troops he must pay them out of the million francs which are now being advanced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 340.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 88.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 5, 1907.*

THE Basha Abdessadok of Fez, who has been in command of the Mehalla at Melilla, having come here, I called on him this afternoon.

He is about to join the Sultan at Fez. He affirms that, according to the evidence of a Spanish doctor sent from Melilla a few days ago, the Pretender is so badly wounded that it is impossible for him to move anywhere for many weeks.

The Basha affirmed most positively that he left the Melilla Mehalla fully 3,500 strong, of whom 500 were mounted men. Tents, arms, and clothing, &c., were in good condition. They required only supplies of ammunition and 20,000 dollars Hassani arrears of pay. Want of these had lately kept the Mehalla inactive. The Spanish forces at Melilla could, if required, easily make an end of the Pretender. The Basha, however, was careful not to advocate to me their being used. The Basha suggested, and begged me to ask your Excellency to support the following project:—

The Mehalla is encamped at the sea-side near Melilla, and could be easily embarked. The Basha therefore urges that the Makhzen hire sufficient steamers and lighters to embark the whole Mehalla overnight and transfer it to Rabat. If the bar at Rabat were unworkable, the Mehalla might be landed at Mehedia, or elsewhere near Rabat. This would, the Basha urges, do more than anything to encourage the Makhzen to leave Fez, and to secure the northern provinces for the Sultan Abdel Aziz.

The Basha considered that by uniting Ben Bugdadi's Mehalla, Al Amrani's Mehalla, the Melilla Mehalla, some troops from Fez and Mequinez districts, the Sultan might reasonably expect to reassert his authority in Southern Morocco. The Basha observed that the Kaïds of Abda, Shiadma, and Haha had written that, if assured of Mulai Abdel Aziz's coming south, they would have no dealings with Mulai Hafid, and would help to subvert the latter when Mulai Abdel Aziz himself arrived at Rabat.

I took the chance to urge the Basha to advise the Sultan most earnestly to leave Fez at once, as His Majesty's doing so would make it possible for the Powers to help him. Did he fail to make such an effort, Mulai Hafid's position might soon be so strong as to make it more and more difficult for the Powers to assist Mulai Abdel Aziz. The Basha promised he would hurry to Fez and press this view as strongly as he could on the Sultan.

The Basha's statements in regard to the state of the Melilla Mehalla are at such variance with general reports as to require verification before being accepted as facts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. MACLEOD.

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[30919] No. 341.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 354.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 7, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit a Memorandum containing certain items of news from Casa Blanca which may have some interest, and which I have taken from a number of despatches received from Mr. Consul Madden during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 341.

*Memorandum on Events of the Week at Casa Blanca.*

IT is reported from Saffi that the Cadi, having to preach and offer prayers for the Sultan, was placed in a quandary as to which Sultan to name in the prayers. The difficulty was got over by not mentioning names, and praying for the "Commander of the Faithful."

News has reached Saffi from Morocco city to the effect that two Mehallas are preparing, one for Mulai Hafid, and another to go north and pacify Showia and prevent further hostilities on the part of the tribes. Mulai Hafid has, it appears, ridden in a carriage to the mosque, with a brass band playing and a new umbrella spread over him.

There is still considerable doubt as to the attitude of the new Sultan. M. Malpertuy, the French Consul in Dar-al-Baida, regards it as not improbable that Mulai Hafid has allowed himself to be proclaimed as a matter of policy, in order to keep the tribes in hand, and he doubts whether the powerful Kaïd Cundaffi is really a supporter of Mulai Hafid as Sultan. He seems to think it possible that Mulai Hafid may have given his brother at Fez assurances that his action is not a hostile one, but a purely temporary political move to maintain order in the country.

It is not easy to ascertain the exact strength of the French troops at Dar-al-Baida, nor is it possible to form a reliable estimate of the Arab forces, though those in the vicinity of the town are thought to number some 5,000 men. Annexed, however, is a statement of the French forces, kindly supplied to Mr. Consul Madden by a British correspondent who is in a position to know.

It appears, according to information derived from native sources, that after the engagement of the 3rd instant the Arab camp at Taddert was looted, everything the looters could lay hands on being carried off. The Arabs fought fiercely among themselves, firing at each other.

*Tangier, September 8, 1907.*

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Inclosure 2 in No. 341.

*French Army of Casa Blanca.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| In command | .. .. | General Drude. |
| Chief of Staff | .. .. | Captain Tesson. |
| Staff Officers | .. .. | Lieutenant Henri de Kervenoael and Lieutenant Laduc |
| Cavalry .. | .. .. | Squadron Chasseurs d'Afrique. |
| | | " Spahis, Captain Caud. |
| | | 100 Goumiers—native Arabs of Algiers. |
| Artillery .. | .. .. | 12th Field Battery, Captain Lugue. |
| | | 18th " " " Massinet. |
| Infantry .. | .. .. | Foreign Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel Brulard, 2nd Regiment. |
| | | 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, Captain Detaeil, for Provost, killed. |
| | | 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, Commandant Combiere. |
| | | "A" Battalion, 1st Regiment, Commandant Servas. |

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1st Tirailleurs, Colonel Blanc.
Battalion No. , Commandant Passard.
2nd Tirailleurs, Colonel Diou.
2nd Battalion, Commandant Thaviny.
5th „ „ Matthieu.

*Arrangement of Camps.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Camp | .. .. .. .. | Colonel Blanc. |
| Troops | .. .. .. .. | 2 battalions 2nd Tirailleurs. |
| 2nd Camp | .. .. .. .. | Colonel Diou. |
| Troops | .. .. .. .. | 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, Legion. |
| | | „ „ Tirailleurs. |
| 3rd Camp | .. .. .. .. | Colonel Brulard. |
| Troops | .. .. .. .. | 2 battalions 2nd Regiment, Legion. |

*Approximate Strength, in Numbers.*

(At 750 men a battalion.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Cavalry .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 200 |
| Goumiers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 100 |
| Artillery .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 300 |
| Engineers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 50 |
| Administrative .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 200 |
| Infantry (6 battalions) .. .. .. .. .. .. | 4,500 |
| Total .. .. .. .. .. .. | 5,350 |

*September* 5, 1907.

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[30920] No. 342.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 16.)

(No. 355.)
Sir,

*Tangier, September* 8, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting a conversation with the French Consul on the subject of the situation at Mazagan.

M. Malpertuy does not appear to have any precise information in regard to the attitude of Mulai Hafid, and would seem to think that in the end all the Moroccan ports will have to be occupied by the French.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 342.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 230. Confidential.)
Sir,

*Dar-al-Baida, September* 5, 1907.

THE French Consul has informed me confidentially that the latest wireless despatches received by him are to the effect that Mazagan is calm, though the population seems more agitated than before, and it appears that the natives are taking dispositions in readiness to act against the French.

M. Malpertuy said the French did not desire to land at Mazagan, as they feared a repetition of the terrible scenes and the consequent ruin of European interests and ultimate trouble with the tribes which has characterized the Casa Blanca affair. But if a European should be touched a landing will at once be made.

M. Malpertuy further said that Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar has joined Mulai Hafid, and has been appointed his Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He was afraid that all the ports of Morocco would, in the end, require to be occupied by the French. The situation, he said, was a complicated one, as it was not known if Mulai Hafid is for or against the French.



M. Malpertuy said he supposed Mulai Hafid's men have withdrawn the cartridges from the Mazagan custom-house, but the despatches are silent on that point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[30921] No. 343.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 16.)

(No. 356.)
Sir,

*Tangier, September* 8, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Memorandum which I have received from Mr. Spinney, British Consular Agent in Mazagan, relative to the situation in that port.

It will be observed that for the present Mr. Spinney does not anticipate any trouble in that town.

With regard to Mulai Hafid, it appears that his position is daily growing stronger, and that Kaïd Aissa, having tendered his allegiance to the new Sultan, has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have also the honour to inclose extracts from a private letter from Mr. Hunot, British Vice-Consul at Saffi, and Mr. Madden.

Mr. Hunot is always especially well-informed concerning all matters regarding Mulai Hafid and Morocco city.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 343.

*Memorandum by Mr. Spinney.*

MULAI HAFID'S position in the south is daily growing stronger. Si Aissa has now declared for him, has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and is leaving on Monday for Marrakesh.

The Ducalla tribes are sending up their leading men to-morrow. It is reported that the Sraghna tribes have declared against him, but their position between Rahamna and the Atlas lessens the importance of their opposition. I believe there is no doubt about the M'toogi being in Mulai Hafid's favour. Of the intentions of Anflus I have no news.

Ma-el-Aineen arrived in Marrakesh on Monday last. He was received with great ceremony, but most of the gates of the town were closed against his turbulent followers.

Yesterday (Thursday) an emissary from Mulai Hafid, named Hadj Mokhtar, arrived here, escorted by about fifty horsemen. He is said to have brought letters for the Tangier Legations, which are to be forwarded through Mr. Morteo, the son of the Italian Consular Agent. It is also stated that the horsemen are ordered to remain here to guard and police the town. They are armed with flintlocks.

Mulai Hafid is reported to be sending an Emhalla to Showia to restrain the tribes from attacking the French positions at Casa Blanca.

In Mazagan the situation remains much the same. The town is tranquil, and business is proceeding as usual.

Some days ago Mulai Hafid sent a letter to the Ducalla tribe, warning them that any violence against Mazagan would be at the peril of the heads of the offenders. A deputation from the town is to be sent up to Mulai Hafid, but the leading men have not yet been able to agree as to who is to go.

For the present I do not anticipate any trouble here, but an element of danger is the presence in the custom-house of a large store of Government arms and ammunition—about 4,000 Martini-Henry rifles and over 1,000,000 cartridges.

Some days ago Mulai Hafid wrote demanding them, but the authorities, who have been told by the French that the cartridges are not to leave the town, found several excuses for not delivering them.

The Governor wished to send them, but the Administrator in whose charge they are refused. The difficulty, I think, may be tided over if no hasty action is taken; but





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should Mulai Hafid attempt to obtain them by force, the French, as I have reason to know, will land.

This would necessitate the landing of a force of 2,000 men to hold the position against the surrounding tribes, while a much larger force would be necessary should Mulai Hafid himself march upon the town.

It is not believed here, however, that Mulai Hafid has any anti-European intentions, although he has been compelled to make anti-European declarations.

As a rule we have one war-ship here, with a landing force of 150 men; but for the present there are two, who could land together 400.

In case of necessity the 150 should be sufficient to get us on board; but if it came to this point the sequel would be a repetition of Casa Blanca, and the ruin of British and other interests in Mazagan. Then probably Saffi and Mogador would follow.

*Latest News from Saffi just received, dated September 4, 1907.*

Mulai Hafid will be proclaimed at the mosque there on Friday (to-day). Aissa will start for Marrakesh Saturday (to-morrow), being joined at the Khamis market of Hummer by the Kaïds of Hummer, Ducalla, and Shiedma, with their respective tribes, arriving Marrakesh Monday.

Perfect tranquillity at Saffi. Kaïd Bil Ghazzi went to Si Aissa's on Wednesday. Twenty townspeople going from Saffi to Marrakesh.

(Signed) T. G. SPINNEY.

*Mazagan, September 6, 1907.*

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Inclosure 2 in No. 343.

*Vice-Consul Hunot to Consul Madden.*

(Extract.) *Tangier, September 8, 1907.*

WITH regard to Mulai Hafid's accession.

Kaïd Aissa starts for Morocco city on Friday, the 6th, after praying at the mosque. Twenty men of Saffi are accompanying him, and the tribes of Ducalla, Hummer, and all under his district who have horses and mares. Bil Ghazzi has also orders to go up to Morocco city.

As I reported, you may be sure that when Aissa starts the M'toogi Haha Kaïds (including Anfloor), with many others, will all follow immediately and proclaim Mulai Hafid the Sultan; in fact, all these Kaïds were delaying by Aissa's orders. Mulai Hafid has been proclaimed at Mogador, and will be proclaimed there to-morrow (market-day). Orders from Kaïd Aissa have been issued that every man who has a horse or mare is to accompany him. Our Kadi Cid Mohammed-ben-Sliman, a great friend of Mulai Hafid, is going up from here.

Great excitement amongst the tribes, who are preparing hurriedly to start with great glee. Their attention is directed wholly towards Morocco. The Kadi, who visits me, tells me that this "harka" (army) will go to Rabat. Inquiries have been made whether the foreign Representatives would visit him at Rabat or only at Fez.

Here we are quiet—fairly so. Guards are placed at night at the doors of the Consulates. I do not anticipate that there will be trouble. Reference is made in Mulai Hafid's letters to the tribes regarding the duty of upholding the religion, but nothing is said regarding the El Jehad (Holy War).

Mulai Hafid was annoyed at Aissa's delay, and threatened through his friends that he would release his two enemies and appoint them over one half of Abda (now under Aissa's jurisdiction), but on Aissa's arrival all will be arranged to their mutual satisfaction.

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[31448] No. 344*.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. 358.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 9, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting that the negotiations which were opened up with the tribes at their request have failed, and that further fighting is imminent.

Mr. Madden is informed that the warlike stores have been left at Mazagan by Mulai Hafid, on condition that the French forward letters from him to the Legations at Tangier.

M. Malpertuy's idea that Mulai Hafid is secretly on the side of Abdul Aziz is not borne out by the information which reaches me from the south.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 344*.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 235. Confidential.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, September* 7, 1907.

THE French Consul has just called on me and informed me that the negotiations with the tribes have failed, and further fighting is imminent. The French felt obliged to give a hearing to the proposals made by the Arabs through a man named El Maezi, but evidently they did not consider them very valuable.

M. Malpertuy seems to believe that Mulai Hafid is secretly on the side of the Sultan Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, who, he says, has actually left Fez for Rabat.

He stated that the cartridges were left by Mulai Hafid at the custom-house at Mazagan, on the condition that the French allowed the letters for the Legations from Mulai Hafid to be conveyed to Tangier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[30922] No. 344.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 357.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 8, 1907.

ALL Europeans having left Fez, Mr. Consul MacLeod made arrangements to be furnished with a daily report of passing events from a native source, and his despatch, of which I inclose herewith a copy, contains an abstract of the principal items of news from the 26th August to the 4th September.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 344.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 8, 1907.

THE following is the substance of my news from Fez since the 25th August:—

On the 26th August the Basha Abdelkrim Eshirgui left Fez with 200 infantry, 150 horsemen, and 4 guns to punish the Zarhon people for a disturbance in which two of his soldiers had been killed. Up till the 3rd September, at any rate, the Basha had accomplished nothing.

On the 28th August the Ulema and Notables of Fez were summoned to the Palace. It was a very large meeting, and lasted some six hours. They declared Mulai Hafid a rebel, and liable to the death penalty. Copies of the Ulema's judgment were printed for circulation amongst the tribes. Amongst the townspeople, however, Mulai Hafid's action seemed generally popular.

On the 30th August the Sultan opened a correspondence with the Berber Chief Mohammed-u-Hamu, of Zayan, warning him against Mulai Hafid.

Hadj Omar Tazzy, Sheikh Tazzy, and Sid Mehmed Tazzy, and others forming the "Tazzy" group, on the 1st September went to live in houses in the very centre of Old Fez, and removed thither all their valuables of an easily portable kind.

On the 2nd September the two Wazzan Shereefs, who had been there for some months, left Fez and marched westward, probably on a mission from the Sultan to the tribes on or bordering the roads between Fez and Rabat.

On the 4th September Sid Mehmed Tazzy left Fez with a large escort for Tangier on a mission, it was believed, to raise a loan.

On the 3rd September the Sultan apparently made up his mind finally to leave Fez for Rabat within seven days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

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[30913] No. 345.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 360. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 9, 1907.

I HAD this morning a long conversation with the French Minister, who returned here last night from Paris viâ San Sebastian, where he said he had met with a courteous reception at the hands of the Foreign Minister, but he had found it impossible to obtain from his Excellency any definite undertaking in writing regarding the participation and distribution of French and Spanish troops in the event of a disembarkation of troops at Tangier. Although he had not yet had time to appreciate the state of affairs here, he had no reason to think that such a disembarkation would be necessary in the near future. A moderate supply of funds for the payment of the troops here made under proper control, the encouragement of the civilian police, reported to you in my despatch No. 351 of the 6th instant, and the proper institution of the police provided for by the Algeciras Act should be sufficient to make the town quite safe against local disturbances, and he was of opinion that 1,500 men should be the maximum of Moorish troops to be employed. The remainder should be sent off to Fez or elsewhere.

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The safety of Tangier depended, however, in a large measure on the action of Raisuli, and if the latter took it into his head to make trouble a landing of foreign troops might become necessary; but M. Regnault maintained that under these circumstances the old arrangement should be adhered to, namely, that the Spaniards should occupy the town and the French the immediate neighbourhood. The respective zones were clearly defined. As his Government had no intention whatever of undertaking an expedition into the interior, there was no necessity for making any arrangements as to the respective forces which were to take part, and it might only give rise to misunderstandings similar to those that had occurred at Casa Blanca.

The policy of the French Government was to confine the question as much as possible to the neighbourhood of Casa Blanca, where General Drude had been given all the reinforcements for which he had asked. That of itself was a difficult problem enough, for it was useless to make peace with the tribes in the neighbourhood if those immediately in their rear were to remain antagonistic, and he felt convinced that at the termination of the campaign, and when the French forces had to return to Casa Blanca, the tribes would accompany them there and maintain to their co-religionists that they had driven them out. Several attempts had been made by leading men of the tribes to suggest coming to terms both through agents at Casa Blanca and at Rabat, but the French authorities did not consider them very seriously. M. Regnault's reports from the Admiral this morning were that quiet prevailed in all the ports, but he could hardly be sanguine enough to hope that this would continue all the winter, and it might be necessary to occupy one or other of the ports.

The policy of his Government was to support Abd-el-Aziz, and he hoped that His Majesty's move to Rabat might have a good effect throughout the country. But he was unwilling to believe in any earnest desire of His Majesty to leave Fez until he actually heard that it had taken place. I told his Excellency that I had had news this morning that this departure was imminent, and that soldiers had actually been paid there even before the receipt of the advance made by the bank. Every effort, M. Regnault said, must be made to prevent Mulai Hafid from acquiring too much power, and French agents were working to that end. I inquired of M. Regnault whether he had reason to share the opinion of M. Malpertuy, the French Consul at Casa Blanca, namely, that Mulai Hafid was secretly on the side of the Sultan, Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, as stated in Mr. Madden's despatch No. 235, Confidential, of the 7th instant. M. Regnault said he was doubtful, but it was a fact that Mulai Hafid had not committed himself in any way in a friendly spirit towards the French.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30849] No. 346.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 399. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, September 11, 1907.*

THE Spanish Ambassador was good enough to call upon me shortly after my return from Homburg, and spoke at considerable length about the situation caused by recent events in Morocco, and the attitude which the German Government had assumed towards it. It was evident that the necessity under which France and Spain found themselves to send a military force for the purpose of maintaining order in the Moroccan ports was an infringement of the Act of Algeciras, which contemplated the creation of a police force composed of Moors. Both France and Spain had explained that they had been compelled by the force of circumstances to take this action, and that their occupation of the Moorish ports was only temporary, and would cease as soon as it was possible to organize a Moorish police force in accordance with the Act of Algeciras. The German Government had accepted this explanation, and M. Polo de Bernabé was convinced that they had no wish to raise difficulties. He believed that the German Government, or at all events Prince Bülow, had realized the fact that the former somewhat truculent methods of German diplomacy had not only not been of advantage to Germany, but had even reduced her to a position of isolation among the Powers. It would seem, therefore, that he intended to alter his tactics and to assume a friendly aspect towards foreign countries. The improvement of the relations between England and Germany was a step in this direction, and there could be little doubt of his desire to come to a good understanding with France. M. Polo





de Bernabé did not anticipate that the German Government would object to the action of France and Spain in Morocco. He had, however, been struck by a remark which had fallen from Herr von Tschirschky in his conversations on the subject to the effect that, according to the information received by the German Government, the bombardment of Casa Blanca had been an unnecessary operation. Herr von Tschirschky must have known that it was a matter of regret to the Spanish Government to be obliged to take active measures in Morocco, and that it was only the conviction of the necessity of doing so, and their determination to fulfil their obligation towards France, that had induced them to join her in military operations. M. Polo de Bernabé wondered what Herr von Tschirschky's object was in making this observation. Was it for the purpose of sowing distrust between Spain and France, or was it for the purpose of being able to say later that the German Government, although they raised no objection to the action which France and Spain thought it necessary to take, did not see sufficient justification for such extreme measures, the responsibility for which must fall upon them?

I replied that it was evident that the joint action of France and Spain could not be otherwise than distasteful to the German Government, and I could understand that Herr von Tschirschky should wish to make it clear that the German Government had not incurred any responsibility. I had, however, the impression that the German Government sincerely desired to avoid complications, and really wished for the establishment of better relations between themselves and France, and I did not therefore think that they would raise objections to the course which France and Spain might think it necessary to pursue under the stress of circumstances and as a purely provisional measure.

M. Polo de Bernabé said that he was also under the impression that the German Government did not intend to raise difficulties, but he had been somewhat disturbed at Herr von Tschirschky's utterances, which, it was true, he had explained as being the expression of his personal opinion. In conclusion, M. Polo de Bernabé begged me to consider what he had said as strictly confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. C. LASCELLES.

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[30851] No. 347.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 401.)

Sir, *Berlin, September 12, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a semi-official note in last night's "North German Gazette," announcing the decision of the Imperial Government to advance a sum of 250,000 marks (12,500*l.*) to assist the Germans who have suffered heavy losses at Casa Blanca, pending the payment of the compensation considered due to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

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Inclosure in No. 347.

*Extract from the "North German Gazette" of September 12, 1907.*

(Translation.)

WE announced a short time ago that a deputation of the German colony at Casa Blanca had personally reported to the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office on the losses suffered by the Germans in that town. It was then officially considered whether it were possible, as an exceptional case, to assist by the grant of a loan the Germans of Casa Blanca who had suffered losses by the bombardment and its consequences, in consideration of the extraordinary circumstances. The German Representatives at Tangier and Casa Blanca were called upon to report on the position of the sufferers, and they answered that the continued existence of the commercial houses there was in fact endangered unless they received immediate pecuniary assistance.



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ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

The Imperial Chancellor has now decided, under date of the 10th instant, that, under these circumstances, the Imperial Treasury shall advance a sum of 250,000 marks (12,500*l.*), under reservation of its eventual repayment by those liable for it, and also under reservation of the subsequent consent of the Reichstag.

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[30852] No. 348.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 402. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, September* 12, 1907.

SINCE my conversation with the Spanish Ambassador, the substance of which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 399 of yesterday's date, I have had two opportunities of conversing with the French Chargé d'Affaires on the attitude assumed by the German Government with regard to the French and Spanish action in Morocco. M. de Carbonnel referred to the German reply to the French note which had been published in the "North German Gazette," a translation of which I had the honour to inclose in my despatch No. 397 of the 10th instant. He could have wished that this reply had been more explicit, but he regarded it as so far satisfactory, as indicating the intention of the German Government not to object to the action which France and Spain had been compelled to take. The language which Prince Bülow had recently held to M. Cambon at Norderney had been completely satisfactory, and Herr von Tschirschky had given him assurances that the German Government would do nothing to increase the difficulties of France and Spain in Morocco. The language, however, which Herr von Tschirschky had held to the Spanish Ambassador was not quite in accordance with that which his Excellency had held to him. In speaking to M. Polo de Bernabé, Herr von Tschirschky had expressed a doubt as to the necessity for the bombardment of Casa Blanca, and seemed inclined to make reservations as to the future action of the German Government.

I replied that M. Polo de Bernabé had spoken to me in this sense, but it seemed to me that it would be too much to expect that any German Minister should feel pleasure at the action which France and Spain had been compelled to take, and it did not strike me as unnatural that he should criticize it somewhat closely. As regards the reply itself, it might perhaps have been drafted in a more sympathetic form, but the German Government had to consider the effect which its publication would produce in Germany, and as a rule German official communications were not over-courteous. The impression I received on first reading the reply was that it was satisfactory as showing that the German Government did not intend to raise difficulties, although they may not absolutely have bound themselves not to do so. The fact that the German Government called attention to the necessity of sending a sufficient force to maintain order in the Moroccan ports was an indication that they anticipated that a very considerable force would be sent.

M. de Carbonnel said that he understood that the French Government were not dissatisfied with the German note, and that he himself shared the impression that the German Government had no intention of creating difficulties for France and Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. C. LASCELLES.

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[30853] No. 349.

*Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 403. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, September* 12, 1907.

I CALLED the day before yesterday upon Herr von Tschirschky, whom I had not an opportunity of seeing earlier since my return to Berlin. I said that I had read with great pleasure the account which Sir Charles Hardinge had given of the conversations which he had had with the Emperor and Prince Bülow at Wilhelmshöhe, and that I had heard from the Emperor himself that His Majesty had been greatly pleased by the visit which he had received from the King.





The conversation then turned upon the state of affairs in Morocco. Herr von Tschirschky referred to the reply of the German Government to the French note, which I had no doubt seen in the "North German Gazette," as a proof of the desire o the German Government not to raise difficulties. I said that I had understood the note in that sense, and I gathered that it was the wish of the German Government that the events in Morocco should not give rise to any complication with foreign Powers. Herr von Tschirschky replied that this was certainly the case, and that the German Government had the sincere desire of living on good terms with all the Powers. The state of affairs in Morocco was no doubt very complicated, but he did not anticipate that it would give rise to serious complications. He had received information that several of the Moroccan tribes had expressed the desire of entering into negotiations with the French, and this, he hoped, might bring about a satisfactory solution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. C. LASCELLES.

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[30876] No. 350.

*Mr. des Graz to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 144. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, September* 11, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Tittoni alluded very briefly to events in Morocco when I saw him two days ago.

He said that there was always the danger of the Chauvinistic party in France causing embarrassment and difficulty to the French Government, but that the latter were acting, and had expressed the determination of continuing to act, in conformity with the Act of Algeciras.

His information tended to show that, under those circumstances, there need be no reason to apprehend any "chicaneries" from Berlin, and he felt sure of the soundness of any advice which might be given by His Majesty's Government, to which the French Government attached the greatest value.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. DES GRAZ.

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[30728] No. 351.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 117 of the 13th instant: Capture of Sir H. Maclean.

I agree, and think it would be advisable that you should let Raisuli know that his terms are quite impossible, and repeat the request that some one should be sent down to negotiate with you. You might also remind Raisuli, if you think fit, that he must be held responsible for the Kaïd's health and general well-being.

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[31043] No. 352.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 361. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 10, 1907.

THE French Minister has received a communication dated the 1st of this month from Sid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman stating that, in view of the action of the tribes in the neighbourhood of Casa Blanca, the Sultan had decided to leave Fez on the 9th instant for Rabat. He added that instructions had been sent to Sid Mohammed Guebbas, the Minister of War, to leave at once by sea for Rabat with all available troops. The French Minister was invited to obtain from the State Bank the necessary funds to furnish pay for the troops for twenty days, these sums to be supplied either from the 40 per cent. of the customs not required for the service of the loan or from the

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2,000,000 fr. loan about which there has been a question. It is unnecessary to state that neither of these funds is available.

Ben Sliman further added that he trusted that no time would be lost by the French in establishing the police at Tangier and Tetuan. As you are aware, under Article 12 of the Act of Algeciras the police at Tetuan is to be purely Spanish, but no communication similar to the above seems to have been made to the Spanish Minister, and the French Minister said he did not intend to communicate this note to his Spanish colleague.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[31123] No. 353.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)*

(No. 52. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, September 16, 1907.*

THE Spanish Ambassador this afternoon asked me what impression I had gathered as to the views of the French Government in regard to the relative positions of Spain and France at Tangier and Casa Blanca from the interviews I had had with M. Pichon and M. Clemenceau.

I said that I believed that the French Government, having by the force of circumstances been temporarily placed in a predominant position at Casa Blanca, would be willing, if a military force had to be landed at Tangier to act as police, that a Spanish officer should hold the superior command, the French policing the outer zone and the Spaniards doing the police work inside the town.

The Spanish Ambassador said that, as under the terms of the Algeciras Act the command at Tangier appertained to a Frenchman, his Government did not press for the command by a Spanish officer of troops landed there for police work. The desire of the Spanish Government was that a Spanish officer should take the command of the police at Casa Blanca as soon as General Drude and his expeditionary force withdrew. What they feared and wished to avoid was that another General Drude, with an expeditionary force like that of Casa Blanca, should suddenly appear at Tangier. Such an eventuality would give the predominant position opposite Gibraltar and the Spanish coast to France.

In order to avert this the Spanish Government were anxious to come to an understanding with France as to the composition and command of any force which might be sent to Tangier for any purpose beyond that of strictly police work. It was necessary, he said, that the two Powers should bear in mind their Secret Agreement of October 1904, while keeping it out of the view of all other Powers except Great Britain. He was afraid that, contrary to the intention of that Agreement, France meant to make herself preponderant at Tangier.

I asked the Marquis del Muni what M. Pichon had said to him when he placed the matter before him. The Ambassador's reply was that the French Government desired to burke the question by saying that, when the necessity for a military defence of Tangier became really probable, which at present was not at all the case, then it would be time enough to deal with the matter, and that the Secret Agreement was not in force yet.

As the Spanish Ambassador insisted to me several times on the importance of observing as between Spain and France the intentions of the Secret Agreement, I pointed out to him that, as Morocco was not yet in a state of decomposition, there would be a danger of arousing the suspicions of other Powers if the Agreement were to be treated as indicating the conduct to be observed now by France and Spain. I expressed to his Excellency my conviction that France would do everything possible to avoid repeating at Tangier what she had done at Casa Blanca, nor did I think that she would, in opposition to England, Spain, and also other Powers, endeavour to establish herself at Tangier as he seemed to anticipate. France would, I felt sure, be careful to abstain from giving to the German Government any pretext for calling her to order for infringing the Act of Algeciras.

I did not succeed in changing the Spanish Ambassador's view that France has designs at Tangier incompatible with the observance of the Secret Convention of 1904.

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[31226] No. 354.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 520.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 17, 1907.*

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day that the Spanish Minister had asked us to support at Paris the request that the Spaniards should have the superior command at Tangier, the French policing the outside zone and they the inside, but their commanding officer holding the superior rank. I had understood that M. Pichon had agreed to this, and, if so, I did not see where the difficulty lay.

M. Cambon said that M. Pichon had not agreed. He had thought it hopeless to reopen the discussion with Spain upon old arrangements, for it would be endless. What he had proposed was that, in the event of a disembarkation at Tangier becoming necessary, the French and Spanish Governments should come to an understanding as to the command. It was impossible to bring in the old arrangements, for in the case of a crisis the Spaniards would not be ready. It was practically certain that the French would be there first, and would have to take what measures might be necessary.

He asked me to advise Spain to agree to the French proposal. He informed me that Spain, at the same time as she approached us, had approached the German Government on the same subject, which was an unfavourable sign.

I said I would give the Spanish Minister the answer which M. Cambon had given me.

M. Cambon said he expected the tribes round Casa Blanca would accept the French conditions. Great trouble had arisen because General Drude had not been able to take sufficient measures at first, but the strong measures taken since had had a calming effect.

I told M. Cambon that a point which persistently recurred in the conversation of the Spaniards was their anxiety about the Secret Agreement with France respecting Morocco, and I suggested that an assurance from France to Spain, that measures taken in Morocco to meet an emergency would not prejudice the Secret Agreement, if circumstances should in the future bring that Agreement into operation, might have a calming effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

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[31163] No. 355.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)*

(No. 362.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 10, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter addressed by Mulai Hafid to Hadj-el-Mehedi-ben-el-Arbi-el-Menebhi offering him the post of Sultan's Commissioner in the place of Hadj Mohammed Torres. Menebhi belongs to the south, and still has considerable influence with the tribes in that part of Morocco, which has no doubt influenced Mulai Hafid in calling upon him to assist him.

Menebhi immediately sent me the letter, and, declaring that he had no desire to fill the post offered to him, said he would be guided by the advice I gave him as to the reply to be sent.

There are two points of interest in the letter: one, the reference to the Treaties, by which it is suggested his action should be guided; but it is not quite clear from the text whether the intention is to include in these all recent Treaties, &c., such as the Act of Algeciras, or whether reference is only made to the Treaties existing in his father's time. The other point is the withdrawal of the foreign men-of-war.

I would have preferred that Menebhi should only send a verbal answer through the bearer, who is a person of position, but after some conversation with M. Regnault we decided that, in view of the fact that, according to Moorish custom, a written reply was necessary, this should be very short and vague, containing many compliments, followed by the expression of an opinion that the time was inopportune for him to take office, and concluding by observing that, as he (Menebhi) had on one occasion been saved from a great danger by the assistance of a foreign Power, it was impossible for him to take so serious a decision without reference to that Power, but making no mention of Great



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Britain, though naturally Mulai Hafid is fully aware that Menebhi enjoys British protection.

Menebhi undertook to write the above letter, which was done under the supervision of Mr. Irwin, and it has been dispatched.

Menebhi was further advised to give a verbal message to Mulai Hafid through his messenger to the effect that his letter had not been very clear as regards Treaties, and that it was obvious that a country must be bound by all the Treaties in existence, not only by those dating some years back, pointing out that in the Oujda and Casa Blanca affairs it had been found necessary to endeavour to obtain the punishment of the murderers of some foreigners, and that the whole of Europe had been of one mind in approving of this punishment; that the foreign vessels of war were kept in the ports of Morocco owing to the condition of disorder reigning in the country, but that they would be withdrawn directly order was re-established.

We considered it advisable that nothing of an irritating nature should find a place either in the letter or in the message, and that they might both, if Mulai Hafid so wished it, be regarded as not being unfriendly.

It occurred to me that the news of this letter having been sent to Menebhi by Mulai Hafid would inevitably reach the ears of the officials of the reigning Sultan, and that the latter would regard it as further evidence of what he has always stated, namely, that Menebhi was intriguing with the southern tribes against his interests. I consequently decided, and M. Regnault agreed, that a communication should be made to Sid Mohammed Guebbas informing him of the receipt by Menebhi of Mulai Hafid's letter, explaining that, in the Sultan's interest, it appeared to me advisable to get rid of the messenger as soon as possible in the event of his entering into communication with Raisuli or other undesirable persons who are antagonistic to the Sultan, and that consequently a reply had been sent to Mulai Hafid by Menebhi, which reply was not of an encouraging nature.

I communicated to his Excellency the substance of the two communications, but have declined to agree to his request for copies of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 355.

*Mulai Hafid to Hadj-el-Mehedi-ben-el-Arbi-el-Menebhi.*

(Translation.) 20 *Rajab*, 1325 (*August* 30, 1907).

Praise to God alone. . . . . God bless our Lord and Master Mahommed and his family.
(Seal of Abd-el-Hafid.)

Our respected servant Hadj-el-Mehedi-ben-el-Arbi-el-Menebhi. (After compliments.)

WE wrote you a Shereefian letter to inform you of this general joy which God has granted to all Islam, and it is not hidden from you that the most important and urgent of all matters is that fullest consideration be given to the appointment of an intelligent person of sound ideas with a full knowledge of the regulations of foreigners and the manner of dealing with them to the post of Deputy to the Throne of Islam to attend to discussions arising between the foreign Ministers about matters, questions, claims, &c., in conformity with the Treaties made from the time of our sanctified ancestors—may God sanctify them! We have reflected upon whom we should appoint to this important dignity. He must be a man of religious courage and of zeal for his country, and our decision has fallen on you alone, and we shall not be content to appoint any other than you to this post because of the great expectations we have of you, and from the conviction we have of your sound good sense, vigilance, and great experience in discussion with foreigners, and our confidence in your sincerity and marked religious principles, which strengthen an official against committing dishonourable actions. We have therefore, by the strength and power of God, invested you with this important charge, under God's blessing, and delegate you as Deputy of our Shereefian Majesty to attend to its duties, and to hold the same position as was held by the Deputy Torres under our father—may God sanctify him!—so that in all simple matters and claims you are empowered to do what is beneficial and in accordance with regulations. As regards other matters which it is necessary to bring to our Shereefian knowledge, they should be referred to us.





You are aware that the post with which you are intrusted is a matter of great danger, therefore spare no effort in it, and devote yourself to it, make use of your intelligence, and God—may He be exalted!—inspire you to follow the path of uprightness and lead you in the right way, and grant you from Himself assistance, guidance, and favour, and that you may pursue the most straight path.

All the foreign Ministers at that port have been written to to inform them of the foregoing for their guidance, and that they may know that they are to address you in all matters concerning their relations with our Shereefian Majesty so that henceforth they may cease all communications with Torres.

We instruct you on receipt of this to use your best endeavours to call a special meeting to discuss with the foreign Ministers regarding the withdrawal of the men-of-war stationed in the waters of the ports, and you will inform them that, please God, we will not leave a single right of any foreigner unsatisfied, in accordance with the Treaties established from the time of our ancestors. (Compliments.)

It is expected that you will not fail to make use of all means conducive to good order and justice, the result of which will be praiseworthy in this world and the next, and that you will use every endeavour to bring about the removal of those men-of-war stationed at the ports, and spare no effort in this matter.

Justice is a Sultan who is obeyed, and it is most right that he should be followed.

May God lead you aright, &c.

Amen and peace.

(Sultan's pencil mark.)

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[31157] No. 356.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 18.)

(No. 450.) *Paris, September* 17, 1907.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 438 of the 9th instant relating to appointments to the Morocco police, I have the honour to report that this morning's "Journal Officiel" gives the names of further appointments to that force.

They are Captain Bolleli, of the 65th Regiment of Infantry; Lieutenant Sciard, of the 3rd Tirailleurs, and thirteen non-commissioned officers. Of the latter, six, belonging to Spahi regiments, have Arabic names, and are presumably Algerian Mussulmans.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[31232] No. 357.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 18.)

(No. 52.) *San Ildefonso, September* 18, 1907.

(Telegraphic.) P.

I HAD another conversation about Morocco yesterday with Señor Allendesalazar before leaving San Sebastian for San Ildefonso. The unwillingness of Spain to come to an Agreement with France to meet the possible contingency of a landing of their joint forces at Tangier, and the slow course of the negotiation, had caused M. Révoil to complain to me of the attitude of this Government, which his Excellency described as being anything but the attitude of a friendly Power, the more so because every effort had been made by France to meet Spain half-way, by making a formal declaration asserting the strictly defensive character of any operations that might be undertaken.

I told the Foreign Minister that, in my opinion, the course pursued by Spain had given some legitimate ground of complaint to the French Government, and I begged his Excellency to do what he could to remove the impression which had been produced in the French mind.

Señor Allendesalazar was still awaiting Señor Maura's instructions from Madrid, where the latter has been in consultation with the Minister of War, but he assured me that he was honestly endeavouring to work harmoniously with France.

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The possible contingencies I understand to be as follows:—

1. No fresh Agreement in writing is necessary if there is merely to be a landing for police purposes, for in that case the February Agreement assigning zones to the two parties would naturally come into operation.

2. On the other hand, if there is to be a military landing in force as at Casa Blanca, it would be extremely difficult to come to terms, for France cannot accept Spain's positive demand to exercise the chief command in that case. This, however, may happily be regarded as a remote contingency.

3. The French Ambassador thinks it important to come to an understanding with Spain as to the zones to be occupied, and as to the question of the chief command in the event of the force landed on supposition No. 1 proving insufficient and requiring to be supplemented by reinforcements, though not in the shape of a regular army as contemplated by supposition No. 2.

The difficulty with Spain, which the French Ambassador finds it most troublesome to overcome, is with regard to supposition No. 3.

I mentioned to M. Révoil the purport of my conversation with Señor Allendesalazar.

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[31123] No. 358.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*[*]

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 18, 1907.

I HAD some conversation to-day with the French Ambassador respecting the eventuality of a disembarkation of troops at Tangier becoming necessary.

M. Cambon said that the French Government proposed that the question of the command should be settled by an arrangement with Spain when and if the eventuality arises.

In my opinion, this is the only feasible course, since, in the case of an emergency, which alone could render the disembarkation necessary, it would be impossible to wait for the arrival of the Spanish forces, which might not be on the spot. Neither can fixed rules be laid down beforehand. It must be borne in mind that it may be unnecessary after all to land troops.

The Spanish Government, if they are anxious that the Secret Agreement with France should be adhered to, could surely ask for an assurance that the provisions of this Agreement, were it to become operative in the future, should hold good irrespective of any measures which, in view of the present emergencies, it may be found necessary to adopt.

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[31329] No. 359.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 19.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 19, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 101 of yesterday.

As good order is being maintained in town and precincts, it now seems improbable that an emergency disembarkation will be necessary. It is not likely that any attack will be made by tribes under Raisuli while war-ships remain here, but in my opinion dangerous confusion would be caused by a disembarkation, without previous arrangement in regard to command being arrived at between France and Spain.

(Confidential.)

Unless trouble is intentionally brought about by some action taken by the French, I do not now anticipate any disturbance.

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[*] Also to Sir F. Bertie, No. 111, and Sir M. de Bunsen, No. 72.





[31346] No. 360.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 20.)

(No. 453. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, September* 18, 1907.

BY a telegram No. 50, dated the 11th instant, I had the honour of reporting to you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated to me that the French Government hoped that a landing of troops at Tangier, even as police, might not become necessary, but that if circumstances should make it unavoidable they would be quite willing that the Spanish and French forces should be of equal strength, and that they should, as arranged in February, be under the superior command of a Spanish officer, but that in such case the town only would be policed by Spanish troops, and the outer zone by French troops. The President of the Council had unofficially spoken to me to the same effect on the 10th instant, when, M. Pichon being absent from Paris, I had inquired of his Excellency the views of the French Government. By a telegram No. 50 of the 10th September, Sir Maurice de Bunsen had informed you that the French Ambassador at Madrid had had an important conversation with the Spanish President of the Council, and thought that the difficulty was in a fair way of settlement on the basis of Spain appointing the Senior Commander, the Spanish force occupying the Tangier town zone and the French troops taking charge of the exterior zone. I told M. Pichon that you had received this information from Madrid, and he merely observed that it had not yet reached him from the French Ambassador. By a telegram No. 51 of the 12th September, Sir M. de Bunsen informed you that the question of the chief command at Tangier still presented great difficulties, and that the French Ambassador was "now in favour of dividing the commands—each Power to act in its own zone independently of the other."

Yesterday I went to the Quai d'Orsay to see the Political Director on the subject of the Bagdad Railway. The Spanish Ambassador was just going into M. Louis' room, where he remained nearly an hour. When I saw the Director I said that I hoped that the result of so long an interview had been satisfactory. M. Louis replied that matters remained just as they were. The Spanish Ambassador kept harping on the rights of Spain at Tangier and the surrounding country under the Secret Agreement of 1904, and it seemed hopeless to bring his Excellency to realize that negotiations could not be carried on now between the French and Spanish Governments on the basis of an Agreement which was not actually in force.

I asked M. Louis whether the Spanish Government had been inclined to avail themselves of the readiness of the French Government to intrust the superior command of any French and Spanish force landed at Tangier as police to a Spanish officer. M. Louis said that there had never been any question of making such a concession to Spain. It would be contrary to the Act of Algeciras. I replied that M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon had both told me that in view of the position acquired by France at Casa Blanca through the force of circumstances, and the dilatoriness and indecision of the Spanish Government, the French Government would be willing that the superior command at Tangier, which under the Algeciras Act fell to a French officer, should be temporarily intrusted to a Spanish officer. M. Louis observed that there must have been some misunderstanding, for there was nothing in the correspondence indicating any such offer on the part of the French Government. What they desired was the organization of a police force at Tangier as soon as possible. If hostilities at Casa Blanca ceased, and the French troops could be withdrawn, a police force would be organized there under the superior command of a Spanish officer, and at Tangier it would be a French officer who would have the superior command. It would be impossible for the present to enlist Moors, as they would murder their French and Spanish officers. Algerians would have to be employed as police temporarily in the places allotted to France for police organization. I asked whether opposition was anticipated from Germany to the employment of Algerians instead of Moors. M. Louis said no.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[31350] No. 361.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 457. Secret.)

Sir, *Paris, September 19, 1907.*

AFTER the signing of the Commercial Convention between Canada and France I had some conversation with M. Pichon respecting Morocco, and I asked him whether any progress had been made in the discussions with the Spanish Ambassador in regard to the possible landing of troops at Tangier.

M. Pichon said that no progress had been made. The Spanish Government appeared to desire to act at once on the Secret Agreement of 1904, which would be most dangerous, and which the French Government were determined not to do. The Spanish seemed to be suspicious as to the intentions of France in regard to Tangier. Such suspicions were entirely unjustified. How could France, in the face of her written engagements, take advantage of an occupation of Tangier for a special and temporary purpose?

I said that, apart from the question of the written engagements of France, it would be absurd to suppose that she could act on the principle of *j'y suis, j'y reste*, for she would find opposed to her not only Spain, but England, Germany, and other Powers. "Of course," said M. Pichon, "but the Spanish Ambassador does not appreciate the situation." "Why, then," I asked, "do not you offer to give him an assurance that whatever may be done in present circumstances at Tangier by the French Government in regard to the landing of troops, shall in no way be held to affect the Secret Agreement of 1904 between France and Spain?" M. Pichon said that he would be quite ready to give such an assurance, but he did not think that it would satisfy the Spanish Government. He had pointed out to the Spanish Ambassador the danger of negotiating now in regard to a military expedition which might never become necessary. It would give the German Government, who would of course hear of the negotiations, an opportunity of again raising a Morocco question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[31436] No. 362.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, September 20, 1907.*

I HEAR from M. Révoil, who writes from San Sebastian, that Señor Allendesalazar, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has now formally intimated to him that the Spanish Government decline to concert any Agreement with France to meet the possible contingency of a landing of troops being necessary at Tangier, unless such Agreement sets at rest the question of who is to exercise the chief command over the joint forces. Señor Maura's conferences with the Minister of War have led to this decision being taken.

The French Ambassador pointed out to the Spanish Minister that it would now be clearly impossible to make a previous Agreement to meet the supposed contingency. For her part, he told him, France was resolved that, if the necessity declared itself, she would be guided, in landing her forces, by the earlier engagements into which the two Powers had entered, and more especially by that of last February, which gave the command to France, and determined the zones to be occupied respectively by the two detachments.

M. Révoil took advantage of the opportunity offered by this conversation to introduce some frank observations on the results which had attended the efforts of Spain and France to pursue jointly a single line of policy. He considered them very unsatisfactory, and remarked that Spain would do well to follow the example of England and France in this respect.

You have had the goodness to inform me, by your telegram No. 72 of the 18th instant, of the language held by the French Ambassador in London, on the question of the chief command at Tangier. From the report of the same which M. Révoil has received from the French Government, and which agrees with the account contained in your telegram, he is afraid that the situation has not been quite





clearly explained by his colleague in London. According to M. Révoil, it is far from the intentions of the French Government to allow a discussion with Spain concerning the chief command to stand over till the actual landing of troops takes place. His Excellency does not think it would be safe to let Spain think that France has any such intention.

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[31450] No. 363.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 363.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 12, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida reporting an engagement which took place there on the morning of the 11th instant.

The French succeeded in destroying the Arab camp at Teddert, and a large number of tribesmen have fled south.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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**Inclosure in No. 363.**

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 241.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, September 11, 1907.*

HEAVY field artillery firing began this morning at about 5 A.M., the cruiser "Gloire" also continuously using her big guns from 8 A.M. onwards to shell the Arabs appearing from Merchich, on the hills to the left of Casa Blanca. The troops were marching towards Teddert, it appeared afterwards.

I hear from British correspondents who followed the action, and who have just returned to town, that the Arab camp at Teddert was reached at 10 A.M. Before the French troops arrived immense numbers of Arabs were seen fleeing to the south and south-east laden with loot, and running away as hard as they could.

The French were commanded by General Drude himself, and were some 2,000 strong.

The Arabs fighting are said to be far less than in former engagements; their losses are considered to have been small. One report gives them at about 100.

The French losses were 1 Foreign Legionary killed and 7 men wounded.

Teddert was burnt—tents, camp, and everything. This is no doubt a very useful sanitary measure, as I am informed the country was black with flies for a mile round the camp.

Colonel Lewis of the "Times" tells me that a body of 700 Arabs running away south could have been cut off had the cavalry been on the scene to act against them.

The French troops have now returned to camp.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[31451] No. 364.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 364.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 12, 1907.*

I HEAR the following from a source which I believe to be reliable:—

When the news reached Fez that the troops operating agains the tribes protecting Raisuli had been withdrawn, the Makhzen sent for a number of the Ulema, and the Vizier spoke to them as follows:

"You are aware that we have recalled the Mehallas which were acting against Raisuli, and Kaïd Maclean's captivity by Raisuli has become very prolonged, and we are much disturbed by the effect this may have on the British Government, and about what that Government may now do. What do you think of it all?"

The Ulema answered that the Makhzen should send to Raisuli and come to terms with him for the liberation of Kaïd Maclean. The Vizier replied that the Makhzen had no wiser advisers than the Ulema. They should go to Raisuli representing the Makhzen. Sid Al Abbas Tazzi, one of the Ulema, replied at once: "If we went he would, without fail, only capture us too; and if you want us captured we would rather you yourselves capture us."

The Viziers all remained silent, and the meeting broke up.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[31452] No. 365.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 365.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 14, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 341 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that, as I received no answer from Raisuli to the communication I addressed to him through Kaïd Maclean, I requested Mr. Consular Agent Carleton to write to Raisuli and ask him to state his terms. Mr. Carleton is personally acquainted with Raisuli.

I inclose herewith copy of the reply which was yesterday received by Mr. Carleton, as also of a letter from Kaïd Maclean to myself.

It is obvious that the terms put forward by Raisuli are so impossible as to be unworthy of serious consideration. In the present state of the country it is, of course, out of the question for the Makhzen to produce any considerable sum of money, even should they have the wish to do so, and it is difficult to see from what other source so large a sum could be obtained as that claimed by Raisuli in compensation for the alleged losses sustained by him and his family, although the Makhzen could be compelled to return what has actually been taken.

The demand for reinstatement as Governor of the Tangier district, with the addition of twelve other tribes and the town of Arzila, is equally impossible of acceptance, as, if granted, it would entail the re-establishment of Raisuli as Khedive of North-West Morocco. No less out of the question is his demand for the imprisonment of various high-placed officials for their share in the proceedings against him, including the Minister of War and the Deputy Commissioner.

It will be observed that the demand for protection has been dropped, no doubt as the result of the information conveyed to Raisuli by the Kaïd that by international agreement no Moorish official can enjoy foreign protection, and it is to be presumed that Raisuli would not attach much value to that condition once he was reinstalled as Governor of such a large district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 365.

*Raisuli to Mr. Carleton.*

Praise be to God, &c.

(After compliments.)

I RECEIVED a translation of the British Minister's letter to Kaïd Maclean, and I understand and approved its contents, and as the Minister did not write to me, notwithstanding the instruction I gave you on your reaching Tangier to send me at once the information, I delayed replying, and when your scribe, Sid Mohamed-el-Susi, arrived with your friend, Sid Hamed-el-Idiri, with a letter written by instruction of the British Minister in the same sense as the above-mentioned translation, in which you ask me to state the extent of my intentions, and to name a near place for a meeting, to avoid a long journey.

At present I am disinclined to have a meeting, but when you have considered and gone into my affair, should it then be essential, I will name a place near Tangier at about six hours' distance. The extent of my demand is as follows:—

The house with its contents, as I did not take a mosquito, and the houses of my brethren, cousins, my farms, and those of my men in the Charbia and elsewhere, cattle, sheep, mules, mares, the grain and seed taken from my granaries and houses of last





year's crop, this season's ploughing, amounting to 200 yoke, of which 50 yoke were mine and 150 of my brethren, cousins, friends, and farmers; the account of all this I have under my hand so as to obtain the legal satisfaction, and it would be tedious to relate here, and I find at a low estimate it comes to 110,000*l.* If you accept this, well and good; if not, you will receive a note of the contents of my house and those of my brethren and cousins, with the cattle and grain, the ploughing will be estimated by experts, and if it is found that there is 50 per cent. more, it will prove that I am right, and I will forgive the Makhzen all there may be over the amount stated, so that the favour may be from me to them, and not from them to me, because of my having given my word to you as above. Should it turn out to be less, I will settle it.

200 ten-shot rifles (English make).
200,000 cartridges for same.
100 five-shot rifles (Spanish make).
100,000 cartridges for same.

The value of these rifles, one with another, is 4*l.* each, and the cartridges 5*l.* per mille.

The price of all these was paid through Ali Bouznakar, who came with two foreigners as brokers, who brought the articles, both guns and cartridges. The pattern and mark I still hold. I will not accept the value of these, but must have rifles and cartridges in kind:—

50 Menebhi rifles, of which Allal-ben-Taib has 20, Ben Saïd 30.
25,000 cartridges with Ben Saïd.
15,000 cartridges with Ben Taib.

As a sale was effected with them for a larger quantity than this, but some of them were taken over, and this amount still remains due by them, and I will not accept their value, but must have them in kind, as I have received from them and still have.

The dismissal of Mehemmed Guebbas and Benasser Ghannam from Makhzen employ, with a written undertaking from the Makhzen that they shall not be again employed; the arrest of Allal-ben-Taib and Ben Saïd and their imprisonment in Tangier, as they were the men who caused all the disturbances, as the action of the Khalifa Ben Mansour—his not treating foreigners properly, &c.—was done with their consent and that of Benasser Ghannam; because whenever I heard of the absurd actions of Ben Mansour, and wished to arrest him, they interceded for him, Ben Saïd and Ben Taib commending his actions, and I accepted their intercession and sent him back to his post, and I only found out the truth after I left my house. There is nothing but all good between me and the Makhzen, because it has paid much attention to the statement of agitators.

I have experienced ever good from your nation, and it is my intention, by the will of Allah, to increase our relations whilst maintaining neighbourly relations, and by reason of my confidence in you and your kindly relations with us, and the confidence the British Government has in your good actions, I have issued to you a statement of some of the things, and the note of the remainder of the claims will reach you inclosed; and when the affair is settled through your Government, they will only see from me such action as will please them, as also will all foreigners. I will attend to matters personally, and not leave them to others. I will assist the Makhzen, and the roots of disorders will be cut, and the country and the people will have tranquillity. This will be brought about by your nation; and because the Minister's request that someone be sent by me to Tangier to attend to the matter, I had appointed my Secretary because of his ability, but it was not possible to send him, as he is suffering from boils and he cannot ride, but it is essential that he should go. Please speak with the Minister and reply to me about him; when he is better I will send him to you.

(Signed) HAMED BEN MOHD. RAISULI.

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Note of the conditions for which you asked me:—

Value of my property, 110,000*l.*
200 ten-shot English rifles.
100 five-shot Spanish rifles.
200,000 cartridges for ten-shot rifles.
100,000 cartridges for five-shot rifles.
50 Menebhi rifles.
40,000 cartridges for Menebhi rifles.

Losses from the farms of my cousins, the Shereefs Oolad-ben-Raisun, in the provinces of Remiki, which Remiki must pay to the owners 10,000 dollars.

Demolition of the house of my cousin, the Shereef Mulai Sadik, at Sheshowen, and its contents, for which Abdelkrim Lebady, Governor of Tetuan, is responsible, 3,000 dollars.

Dismissal of Ghannam and Guebbas, and the Makhzen's undertaking that they will not be again employed.

The arrest of Allal-ben-Taib and Ben Saïd, and their imprisonment in Tangier prison. No intercession to be made for them.

Arrest of Hassan-el-Rekiouk-el-Mesouri, residing in Tangier, because he owes my nephew Cid Abdslam Kemoan 1,500 dollars, and because he was arrested and released when the attack was made on my house. No excuse will be accepted for not imprisoning him.

The document of the house in Tangier purchased from Oolad Mardoukh Cazes. It was found in the possession of certain soldiers, and was taken from them by the Amin Mustafad.

The slaves who are in Fez, one a man. Nine slaves.

The camels taken from Zowiat Tazroot, still in the possession of Ben Baghdadi. I will not accept their value; the camels must be returned. Four young camels.

The release of prisoners, whose numbers and names will be sent when obtained.

My appointment as Governor over my former district, to which is to be added the tribes of Ahl Serif, Beni Gorfil, Sumata, Beni Issef, Beni Lail, Beni Ider, Anjera, Beni Msour, Amr, Bedowa; the town of Arzila, Sahel, and Gib-el-Habib; and, should the Makhzen wish to attend to the Khamas, Ghomara, and other tribes, I will appoint Governors for them, and I shall be responsible for their work and their good conduct towards the Makhzen, and everything will be well by the power of Allah; the disorders will be extinguished, and all rebellious people be cut off.

My reason for all that I have stated to you, such as the restoring of order in the country and amongst the people, solely because your Government wishes an arrangement to be made with me through their intermediary and the rejection of any other, it is therefore incumbent on me to do my utmost to restore good order, &c., or to come to terms.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 365.

*Kaïd Maclean to Sir G. Lowther.*

My dear Sir Gerard, *September* 11, 1907.

VERY many thanks for your letter dated the 2nd instant, with the inclosed copy in Arabic and the cigars. The courier arrived on Thursday morning, the 5th, but Raisuli did not send me the letters until 4·30 Saturday, the 7th. He sent word he would send me his nephew, Abdselam Karwar, the next day, but this man has lied to me so often I refused to see him. On Monday evening Raisuli and his nephew came to see me and stayed for over an hour, but Raisuli would not listen to any reason, so I told him to write down his demands and to send them to you, and he agreed to do this. Yesterday Carleton's taleb, Omar, arrived; this morning Raisuli and his nephew came again to see me at 6 o'clock, and Raisuli was far more reasonable, and has promised to cut out three of his demands. One, the removal of the French and Spanish police from Tangier and all the coast towns. I told him this had been settled by all the Powers at the Algeciras Conference, and could not be altered, and that it was absurd his talking about it, as it had nothing to do with him; the next was a demand for the imprisonment of Gubbas and Bushtar; the last a demand for you to guarantee his safety. I told him if he wanted Government employ you could not possibly do this or give him any protection, as by international agreement no Moorish official could have any foreign protection, so he said he would drop that at the same time. I am sure his demands will be appalling, and you will have some trouble to get him to cut them down, and I had to promise to tell you to do your best. Please tell his taleb I have done so. Raisuli was very pleased to see Carleton's taleb, and I told Raisuli that Carleton suggested that Raisuli should move nearer to the town, so that it would not take so long to communicate with him, and that if necessary Carleton could come and see him. He says if this is considered by you he will go to one of the three following places, all of which he says are about five hours from Tangier: Jebbel-el-Haberb, Wad Ras, or Beni M'Sawar; if you think this good, please send me a letter, with Arabic copy, I can show Raisuli. He had my tent pitched for me early this morning; has given me my bed--I have slept





on the floor except for one day since the 17th July, and have not been able to wash except my hands, face, and feet since. He has promised to send me back my own men to-day, and to treat me well. He told me when he saw the hole I was in he was ashamed, and asked me forgive him and to say nothing about it. I have been there eighteen days, and spent the whole time on a small carpet on the ground just long enough to lie down on, with an ash and rubbish heap behind my head where the Moors threw everthing. I was, and still am, quite ready to be killed, but to be bullied for eight weeks out of the nearly eleven weeks I have been here was hard. I am sure Raisuli will treat me well now, and that you will do your utmost to obtain my release. I know it will take a long time, as Raisuli's demands are preposterous at first, but as long as I am fairly treated I do not mind, and now that he has told me I can walk about round my tent. The inclosed Arabic letter is Raisuli's. He says the reason he did not go with me to Fez [*sic*] he says the letter was kept and sent after negotiations were going on for him to go to Fez. Of course I cannot tell if this is true, but by the date of the letter it was just before.

I am most grateful to you for all the trouble you have kindly taken, and thank you very much.

(Signed) HARRY MACLEAN.

P.S.—Raisuli has just sent word to tell me his Scribe is ill and cannot go, so he is sending his letter by Carleton's taleb. I am sure it would be good for Raissuli to move nearer to Tangier. His Scribe has boils.

H. M.

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[31453] No. 366.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 366.)

*Tangier, September* 14, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a private letter which I have received from Mr. Hunot, British Vice-Consul at Saffi, reporting the departure of Kaïd Aissa for Morocco city, where he was due to arrive on Wednesday last.

Should the adherence of Kaïd Aissa become an accomplished fact, the position of Mulai Hafid will be considerably strengthened in the south, as the influence of this Kaïd is very great upon the southern tribes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 366.

*Vice-Consul Hunot to Sir G. Lowther.*

Dear Sir Gerard, *Saffi, September* 10, 1907.

ON Friday last the Saffi people offered their prayers in the mosques, substituting the name of Mulai Hafid for that of Mulai Abdel Aziz. The formal document offering their allegiance to the former was duly signed by all the chief residents and Ulema of the town.

On Saturday Kaïd Aissa with twenty of the principal men of the town started *en route* for Morocco city with the Doqualla tribe. They were joined by several other tribes at the second rendezvous in Hummur, near Zima, *i.e.*, the Salt Lake. Yesterday they camped near the Wad Infeese, where there was to be a meeting of the Amtooga Kaïd and several tribes under the latter's jurisdiction, *i.e.*, the "Decara"; it is at this place of meeting that it will be decided whether Mulai Hafid is to be installed as Sultan or not. Of course we know that he has already been proclaimed in Morocco city, but the finale will be irrevocably decided after the entry into the city of these two powerful Kaïds, each of whom have under their jurisdiction and control numerous tribes.

Kaïd Aissa has been in close correspondence with the Amtoogi and Anfloos, and I must add that they have both been procrastinating in tendering their allegiance; in fact, I know Mulai Hafid is furious with them for their protracted delay. To-morrow

(Wednesday) is the day for their entry into Morocco city. Once therein they will be forced to join. I hear they have taken with them large sums of money and several fine horses. I know that Kaïd Aissa is much perplexed as to what he should do.

Our Kaïd Mohammed Ben Sliman is with the Kaïd, and is for Mulai Hafid. Aissa's son is the Kleefa at Saffi, and the Kadi's son is always with Mulai Hafid. We shall know in a day or two particulars of the reception of these two Kaïds, who have with them hosts of tribes.

I know that Mulai Hafid is anxious to come to terms with the French. On the other hand, if the French assist Mulai Abdel Aziz they will have to fight Mulai Hafid and the numerous tribes that have proclaimed him. Already Mulai Abdel Aziz is suspected of having disposed of the country to the French, and if they fight for him and with him that will confirm this opinion, and I believe there will be a Jehad war.

The formal document of Mulai Hafid's Proclamation by the Saffi people is in the hands of Aissa and the Saffi Notables with him, and there is yet room for his altering his allegiance. Until the meeting of the two Kaïds to-morrow (Wednesday) and their entry into the city it cannot be said that Mulai Hafid is fairly seated on the throne.

The Oolama here received peremptory orders to forward the mules and horses purchased for Mulai Abdel Aziz to the city, and they have been sent by Mulai Hafid's soldiers—only fifty or sixty in all.

There is a report here that Mulai Hafid will go with his Mehalla to Boorecky, in Haha, to receive the allegiance of the Soos tribes before proceeding northwards. It was at that place Mulai Hassan was proclaimed.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE HUNOT.

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[31455] No. 367.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 368.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 15, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Consul MacLeod, containing news received by him during this week from the Fez district.

It will be observed that the Sultan left the capital early in the afternoon of the 12th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 367.

*Consul MacLeod to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 90.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 14, 1907.*

I HAVE received the following news during this week from Fez district:—

On the 4th September the Sultan paid his farewell visit to the shrine of Mulai Driss

On the 5th September Abdselam Kahall, the Sultan's Emissary to Mahommed-u-Hamu of Zayan, returned to Fez, having done nothing, and not having been allowed even to enter that Berber's territory.

A meeting of the Ulema at the Palace discussed, but did not advise, who should be Viceroy. The meeting adjudged in effect that, force having failed to procure the release of Kaïd Maclean, the Sultan had better negotiate with Raisuli.

Letters were received from Mulai Hafid by the Umana at Mequinez, ordering accounts to be rendered in future to his Chief, Amin Ben Tait Tazzy, at Marakesh. The letters were merely forwarded to the Chief Amin at Fez.

On the 7th September parties of Beni Warain, Beni Sadin, Ail Yusi, and Ail Tsaroshen, encamped on the south border of Ulad El Hadj, and asked to be allowed to pass to Fez—presumably to threaten the city. So far, however, they have not attempted to force their way thither.



On the 9th September the Sultan prayed at the remaining principal shrines at Fez.

A large number of bills, drawn on their agents at Tangier, which the Makhzen recently cashed, came back to Fez, having been dishonoured, as the agents had no funds.

It was expected that the Sultan would leave Fez on the 12th instant at the latest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—The Sultan left Fez early in the afternoon of the 12th instant.
J. M. MacL.

*September 15, 1907.*

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[31758] No. 368.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)*

(No. 369. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 15, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter addressed to the Portuguese Minister, doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, by Mulai Hafid's Vizier.

You will see that the letter contains a strong protest against the bombardment of Casa Blanca.

This is the first communication from this source which has been received by the Portuguese Minister, or, indeed, as far as I am aware by any foreign Minister, and it seems an original manner of entering into communication with the Diplomatic Body.

The letter was circulated amongst the foreign Representatives, but no observations were made thereon.

It has not been possible to establish whether the document is a genuine one or whether it is a forgery; but every indication points to its being genuine. It was sent by the local German post duly registered.

I also inclose translation of a letter which has come by chance into my hands purporting to be that addressed by the Vizier of Mulai Hafid to each of the foreign Envoys. The original of this letter has not reached me or my colleagues, which is accounted for by the fact that the letters were transmitted by Mulai Hafid through an Italian, M. Mateo, of Mazagan, to the foreign Representatives, and when this fact came to be known to the Italian Minister he forbade his compatriot to have anything to do with the matter, and his action was approved by his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 368.

*Letter addressed by the Vizier of Mulai Hafid to the Portuguese Minister at Tangier.*

Louange à Dieu seul.

(Traduction.) *Le 7 Rajab, sacré, an 1325.*

A l'ami sage et honorable qui cherche le bien et l'amitié entre les deux Puissances, le Ministre, et doyen du Corps Diplomatique à Tanger, et Représentant du Royaume du Portugal. (Compliments d'usage.)

NOTRE Seigneur et Maître le Grand Sultan, et Commandeur du Royaume de l'Islam, notre Seigneur et Maître Abdel Hafid—que Dieu lui accorde la victoire et l'assistance—a reçu du peuple du Maroc l'investiture du Sultanat après destitution de notre Seigneur Abdel Aziz. Cette destitution a eu lieu par une décision de la loi Islamique, et dans l'intérêt du Gouvernement Marocain et de l'intégrité de l'Empire. Mon Maître m'a ordonné de vous écrire, convaincu qu'il est de votre amitié pour Sa Majesté, qu'il proteste contre les événements de Casa Blanca.

Si l'on regardait avec humanité et justice tout ce qui est arrivé au Maroc, notamment à Casa Blanca, dont les habitants furent l'objet de violence et d'agression; 6,000 âmes en ont trouvées la mort. La ville a été bombardée par des explosifs

inflammables, alors que ses habitants se trouvaient sans défense. Ce spectacle, affreux à voir, brûle les cœurs et fait pleurer les choses insensibles. Vous n'ignorez pas que ce grand événement, qui constitue une atteinte aux droits publics, est contraire aux Traités Internationaux, qui interdisent d'attaquer une ville sans défense par des éléments de destruction et de ruine, &c.

Quiconque prétenderait que le grave événement de Casa Blanca s'est produit à la suite d'une utilité, ceci ne saurait être admis pour plusieurs raisons; d'ailleurs jamais pareil événement n'a eu un précédent, et on n'a jamais entendu parler de choses de ce genre. Veuillez prendre note de tout ceci et faire tout ce qui dépend de vous en fait d'observation et de remarque pour maintenir dans la pureté les relations du Maroc avec les Puissances.

D'ailleurs, nul doute qu'on peut compter sur un homme tel que vous, qui possède une si vive intelligence et une sagacité remarquable.

Le Ministre du Sultan, fortifié par la victoire de Dieu,
(Signé) MOHAMMED BEN ABDEL-KEBIR
(Dieu le conserve.)

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Inclosure 2 in No. 368.

*Letter addressed by the Vizier of Mulai Hafid to the Foreign Envoys at Tangier.*

Praise to God.

(Translation.) 18 *Rajab*, 1325 (*August* 28, 1907).

After in the name of God, and to the intelligent, the glorious Envoy of at Tanger, after fullest inquiries as to your health, trusting you may always continue well and in peace, my Master the Sultan, the exalted, the victorious in God, has instructed me to write to your Excellency as follows :—

IT is not hidden from you that, up to the time of the death of Mulai Hassan, security and fullest tranquillity were everywhere enjoyed throughout the Moorish Empire, and it is unnecessary to dwell upon that, it being so well known; but afterwards changes occurred, and security and tranquillity became changed for the reverse, and the governing classes of the country gave themselves over entirely to their pleasures, and took no heed to setting their country in order until affairs reached the state they did, which is sufficiently apparent and known to everybody, and which requires no explanation in details. They were not ashamed, nor did the fear of God reach them to induce them to respect the rights of the people; on the contrary, they continued their evil ways and corrupt policy, which brings about the demolition of the seats of all authority. For a long time the Mohammedans have suffered hardships and burdens, and matters are becoming worse, and this state has become general throughout the country; and when they saw that affairs had reached the pass they have, they at once rose up to attend to them, and to lay the matter before the Shraa of their religion, and those learned in their faith commanded them that it was obligatory to depose those in power and appoint another Sultan who would look after the interests of Islam, whereupon the entire Houz (Marrakesh district of Morocco) towns and tribes, Oolama, distinguished men, Shereefs, &c., agreed to proclaim our Lord and Master the exalted Sultan Mulai Abdel Hafid—may God assist him!—and to tender to him their allegiance. He accepted this, and engaged to attend to the affairs of the kingdom, if God wills. They called for God's help to him, and the victory and assistance, &c. He—may his happiness continue!—hastened to agree and consent to their wishes without reference or words, because the deposition of the former Sultan is based on a foundation of Islamic Shraa, and established on points of sincerity and certainty; and our Lord the exalted Sultan, the victorious, says to you that he informs you of this that you may be pleased and happy that the voice of Islam is united about what is for the good and safety and tranquillity of themselves and those others who are with them throughout the lands of Islamic Morocco, so that people may be tranquil as regards their lives and properties wherever they may be, by the power of God and His strength, and so that you may know that the throne of Islamic Morocco is situated to-day at the capital Morocco City, and is not with him who is in Fez, because the Moslems have agreed to depose him by means of their Shraa and from regard to the interests of their nation, and the Master of the house best knows what is in it, and is wiser as to what to put away and which to prefer, and





so that you may be cognizant thereof, so that you may have no more dealings of any sort with him who is in Fez.

We are sure that, on this being made known to you, you will have relations only with us, and that you will not refer any questions on which it may be necessary to speak to any other than us.

Still, if you think it better to await and be sure until you see to whom authority really is, and to whom the power is, then remain stationary and onlookers, and do not be on the side of either of us. There is no excuse for you in this respect, nor blame. May God give you peace.

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[31859] No. 369.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)*

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 23, 1907.

RELEASE Sir H. Maclean. Your telegram No. 102 of to-day.

Raisuli has not yet been offered British protection. We have been arguing with his representative, who is in Tangier, and who is keeping in communication with Raisuli. I am keeping British protection as an alternative to his larger demands, but I hope that his terms may be modified considerably. Anything the Kaïd might say would have no weight with Raisuli, and he would be sure to increase his large demands if protection were spontaneously offered.

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No. 370.

*Acting Consul-General Dundas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)*

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Algiers, September* 23, 1907.

"SHAMROCK" sailed Oran Casa Blanca with troops and war material.

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[31452] No. 371.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1907.

YOUR despatch No. 365 of the 14th instant.

Has British protection been offered to Raisuli, as authorized in my despatch No. 90 of 2nd September? If not, this had better be done at once, on conditions mentioned therein. In the circumstances, it is unfortunate that he should have been informed by Maclean that no foreign protection could be granted, and you should do what you can to correct this impression.

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[31987] No. 372.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)*

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, September* 24, 1907.

MOROCCO.

President of the Council is convinced that for Spain to join France in searching ships suspected of carrying arms and ammunition to Morocco would lead to complications and irritation without effecting the object desired, and he is strongly opposed to such action. He declares that it is impossible to prevent contraband crossing the Algerian frontier, or in the present stormy season to patrol the coast effectively.

I informed his Excellency that, provided other Powers did the same, His Majesty's Government would not object to British vessels being searched.

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[31125] No. 373.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 170.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1907.

WITH reference to Mr. Rattigan's letter to Mr. Spicer, dated the 9th instant, stating that Messrs. Spinney have inquired whether a decision has yet been reached respecting the presentation to the Moorish Government of their claim on account of the suspension of their business at Marrakesh subsequent to the murder of Dr. Mauchamp, I have to call your attention to the fact that I have received from you no reply to my despatch No. 98 of the 21st June last, inquiring whether similar claims had been put forward by nationals of other Powers, and how such claims had been treated.

I should be glad if you could now supply me with this information, and, in meantime, you should inform Messrs. Spinney that, when a normal state of affai re-established in Morocco, His Majesty's Government will consider whether any claim can be presented to the Makhzen on account of the successive interruptions of their business at Marrakesh, but that they are unable now to pledge themselves as to the course which will be adopted.

The claims in question are not on the same footing as those arising from the recent disturbances at Casa Blanca, and I feel some doubt at present whether they can properly be urged against the Moorish Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[32036] No. 374.

*The Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 25.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to inform him that the French Chargé d'Affaires has presented to the Italian Government a Memorandum notifying the proposal of the French Government that the right of search in the ports and waters of Morocco to prevent contraband of arms, a right which was conferred by Articles XXIV, XXV, LXXX, and XCI of the Act of Algeciras on the Shereefian Government, but which the latter cannot exercise through lack of the means to do so, shall instead be exercised by the French and Spanish war-ships as mandatories of Morocco. The right of search would not be applied in the case of steam-ships belonging to Companies carrying out regular services, but only to small vessels whose nationality is often doubtful.

The Marquis of San Giuliano would be grateful to Sir E. Grey if he would be good enough to inform him, as soon as he conveniently can, what reply the British Government have given or propose to give to the French communication.

*Italian Embassy, London, September* 23, 1907.

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[32114] No. 375.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 26.)

(No. 370.)
Sir, *Tangier, September* 20, 1907.

THE latest news I have received from the south describes Mulai Hafid as having considerably strengthened his position during the past few days. The powerful Governors Kaïd Aisa and Kaïd Mtoogi, who were thought to be wavering, entered Morocco city on the 11th, accompanied by many other Kaïds and tribes. The Minister of War, Cid-el-Madani-el-Glowy is said to have promised to furnish 6,000 horsemen and 4,000 infantry, and the Rahamna Kaïds have also promised 2,000 horsemen. An army under Mulai Raschid, an uncle of the Sultan, was reported to be about to start for Showia, and the Dukala are also stated to be moving in that direction.





It is not clear what is the intention of Mulai Raschid, but it is thought that he does not intend to attack the French, but to come to terms with them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[32185] No. 376.

*Acting Consul-General Graham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Algiers, September* 26, 1907.

"MYTHO" sailed Oran Casa Blanca. Few troops and considerable material.

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[32288] No. 377.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 27.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, September* 27, 1907.

MOROCCO.

It was decided at the Council of Ministers which met the day before yesterday that a Spanish man-of-war should be sent as soon as possible to Tangier, in order to convey the Spanish Minister to Rabat, where he will deliver his credentials to the Sultan. After presenting the usual gifts, the Minister will urge the speedy recruiting of the police for the ports under the Algeciras Act, and at the same time endeavour to settle outstanding questions connected with Melilla and Tetuan.

The Spanish Government trust that the French Minister will also go to Rabat, in order to act there in full harmony with his Spanish colleague.

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[32293] No. 378.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 27.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 27, 1907.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

The agent of Raisuli appears prepared to reduce conditions of release to the following, after communicating with latter:—

Restoration of his house in Tangier.
Liberation of prisoners.
70,000*l.*
Protection for himself, family, and relations.

What do you consider the maximum sum for which we might press the Moorish Government?

I have informed Raisuli that he must reconsider the matter, as the sum demanded is out of the question.

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[31987] No. 379.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 56 of the 24th instant.

You should point out to the President of the Council that any disagreement between France and Spain on the subject of the control of the importation of arms and ammunitions of war to Morocco would be regrettable, and that the best way to keep the full force of their secret Agreement with France unimpaired is to co-operate cordially with France in Morocco.

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[32036] No. 380.

*Sir Edward Grey to the Marquis di San Giuliano.*

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1907.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Memorandum of the 23rd instant, inquiring as to the reply which His Majesty's Government have returned to the proposal of the French Government that the French and Spanish warships in Moorish waters shall be allowed to exercise a right of search over vessels of other nationalities for the purpose of preventing the smuggling of arms and ammunition into Morocco.

Upon the receipt of a Memorandum* from the French Embassy in this capital embodying the proposal in question, His Majesty's Minister at Tangier was informed that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to concede to the French and Spanish naval authorities the right of searching British vessels in Moorish waters provided a similar attitude were adopted by the other Powers concerned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

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[32421] No. 381.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 28.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 28, 1907.

M. REGNAULT, accompanied by Admiral Philibert and General Lyantey, expects to leave for Rabat next week.

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[32507] No. 382.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 30.)

(No. 372.)
Sir, *Tangier, September* 22, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 367 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that I have now received the original of the letter addressed to me by the Vizier of Mulai Hafid.

As the text of the copy which first reached me was not very clear, it was not possible to make more than a rough translation at the time, but I am now forwarding a correct translation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 382.

*Vizier of Mulai Hafid to Sir G. Lowther.*

(Translation.)

18*th Rajab*, 1325 (*August* 28, 1907).

IN the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. And there is no power nor strength save in God the High the Mighty.

To the noble the intelligent respected Envoy of the English nation at Tangier, after fullest inquiries concerning your health, trusting you may always continue well and in peace, my master the Sultan, the exalted, the glorious, the victorious in God, has instructed me to write to your Excellency as follows:—

It is not hidden from you that up to the time of the death of Moulai Hassan (may God sanctify him), security and complete tranquillity were everywhere enjoyed throughout the Moorish Empire, and it is unnecessary to dwell on that it being so well known, but afterwards changes occurred, security and tranquillity became changed for the reverse, and disorder reached its utmost limit, and the governing

* Erroneously described as a Memorandum, really a verbal communication embodied in telegram No. 88 to Sir G. Lowther, September 2, 1907.





classes of the country gave themselves over entirely to their pleasures, and took no heed to setting their country in order until affairs reached the state they did, which is sufficiently apparent and known to everyone and requires no explanation or details. They were not ashamed nor did fear of God reach them, to induce them to respect the rights of the people, but on the contrary, they continued in their evil administration and corrupt policy (though good administration and government) are the means of exalting the seats of all authority. For a long time the Mahommedans have suffered hardships and burdens, and matters are becoming worse, and this state of affairs became general throughout the country. When they saw that affairs had reached the pass they have, they at once took the matter in hand and laid it before the Shraa of their religion, and those learned in their faith commanded them that it was obligatory to depose those in power and appoint another Sultan who would look after the interest of Islam, whereupon the entire Houz (Marrakesh) district of Morocco, towns and tribes, Oolama distinguished men, Shereefs and all classes combined and agreed to proclaim our Lord and Master the exalted Sultan Moulai Abd-el-Hafid—may God assist him—and to tender to him their allegiance. He accepted and engaged to attend to the affairs of the kingdom if God wills. They called for God's help to him and the victory and assistance, &c., and he hastened to consent and meet their wishes without further reference or words, because the deposition of the former Sultan is based on a foundation of Islamic law (Shraa), and established on (points) of sincerity and certainty and our Lord the exalted Sultan, the victorious in God says to you that he informs you of the foregoing that you may be pleased and happy that the voice of Islam is united about what is for the good, safety, and tranquillity of themselves and those others who reside amongst them throughout the lands of Islamic Morocco, so that people may be tranquil as regards their lives and properties, wherever they may be, by the power of God and his strength, and so that you may know that the Throne of Islamic Morocco is to-day situated at the capital, Morocco City, and is no longer with him who is in Fez, because the Moslims have agreed to depose him by means of their Shraa from regard to the interests of their country (the master of the house best knows what is in it, and is wiser as to what to put away and what to prefer), and so that you may be cognizant thereof and there be no more dealings or communication of any sort or kind between you and him who is in Fez.

We are sure that on this being made known to you you will have relations only with us, and that you will not refer any questions on which it may be necessary to speak with the Moorish Government to any other than to us.

Still, if you think it better to await and be sure until you see to whom authority really is, and to whom the power is, then remain stationary and onlookers, and do not bide with one or the other of us until events decide, and there will be no reproach on you in this respect, nor blame.

(Compliments.)

(Signed) MOHAMMED BEN ABDELKRIM,
*Vizier of the Sultan of Morocco—may God grant him the victory.*

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[32508] No. 383.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 30.)

(No. 373.)
Sir, *Tangier, September* 22, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 367 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum containing items of news from Dar-al-Baida and the southern ports, which has been compiled from a number of despatches received from His Majesty's Consular officers during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 383.

*Memorandum of Events which have occurred at Dar-al-Baida and the Southern Ports during the past week.*

VICE-CONSUL SPINNEY reports from Magazan on the 13th instant that Mulai Hafid was again attempting to gain possession of the warlike stores there. The French Vice-Consul had therefore warned the Governor he would be held responsible by the French Government if a single rifle or cartridge were removed from the custom-house.

During the night of the 16th, however, it appears that the Governor smuggled some fifteen or twenty cases of ammunition from the custom-house into his own residence and dispatched the same to Marakesh. Mr. Spinney remonstrated against this proceeding, with the result that no further attempt to smuggle the stores to Marakesh has been made.

On the 14th instant a panic was caused at Mazagan owing to the sound of heavy guns, which gave rise to the belief that a French cruiser was bombarding some place on the coast. The explanation of the firing appears to have been that the "Condé" was carrying out target practice at sea. The danger of such a proceeding at a time of great tension was represented to the French Vice-Consul by his colleagues.

From despatches received from Mr. Consul Madden, it would appear that all the tribes in the neighbourhood of Dar-al-Baida now desire peace, having no doubt suffered considerable loss of life by shell fire from the French war-ships. It is stated that the town is rapidly assuming a more normal state. Mr. Madden learns from a French official that the town police is under the control of Commandant Mangin, who appears to be considered by the French Consulate as the local authority. Many quarters of the town have been cleaned up by the French authorities, and the huts inside and outside Dar-al-Baida are being cleared away. The arrival of M. Regnault was reported on the 15th instant.

General Drude has shown every courtesy and kindness to English newspaper correspondents, but his attitude towards those of his own nationality has been distinguished by less cordiality, presumably owing to the fact that the latter have not always been discreet.

Mr. Madden learns privately from British correspondents, who were present at a reconnaissance caried out on the 16th, that six Arab prisoners who were taken during the course of the operations were, after a short interrogation by a French Captain, at once shot. There does not, however, appear to have been any proclamation made by the French to the effect that they would shoot all prisoners taken.

Vice-Consul Hunot reports from Saffi on the 16th that Mulai Hafid is now supported by all the powerful Chiefs of the south, Kaïds Aissa and Tiggi having entered Marakesh. It is also stated that Kaïd Anflus has definitely decided to join the new Sultan.

His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador has received an Arabic letter from Marakesh stating that Mulai Hafid has a force of 4,000 men, but they are short of ammunition. Mulai Hafid appears to have been hesitating to make a move, but the presence of Kaïds Aissa and Tiggi was expected to lead to some decision.

It is regarded as possible that the Sultan Abdul Aziz may experience some difficulty in passing through the tribes of Beni Hassen and Zini-ul-Shluk on his way to Rabat, as these tribes appear to favour Mulai Hafid. But no doubt the presence of the Sultan will go far towards persuading them to return to their allegiance.

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[32509] No. 384.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)*

(No. 374. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 22, 1907.*

M. REGNAULT having returned from Casa Blanca, I inquired of him the result of his personal observations on the spot. He said that the expedition was surrounded with difficulties, and that General Drude found it impossible to strike an effective blow. His action could best be likened to a dog chasing small birds. The tribes around





Casa Blanca were nomadic, and when attacked merely retreated on to their neighbours' land. The attempts at negotiations so far had been unsuccessful. The Zenata, Woolad Zian, and Mediouna tribes, which were the most vulnerable, had made overtures for peace without, however, sending in any important Kaïds as hostages, and these negotiations usually ended in fights among themselves over local questions. From his inquiries he had come to the conclusion that the enemy the French had met was always a new one, men who came from a distance carried away with confidence in their own valour, and declining to accept as a lesson the defeats inflicted on their co-religionists. These tribes were obtaining large quantities of arms and ammunition landed in the neighbourhood of Mazagan, mostly from Spanish vessels. His idea was that when the Sultan was firmly established at Rabat His Majesty would send an expedition to punish Chaouia.

A move had yesterday been made by General Drude upon Mulai Brahim, about 20 kilom. from Casa Blanca, and this place had been destroyed with considerable loss to the enemy, and the country in the immediate neighbourhood of Casa Blanca might now be considered cleared of belligerents. M. Regnault complained somewhat of the action and attitude of Major Olalla, the Spanish commander, who insisted on keeping his cavalry inside the town, where they were both useless and inconvenient, and also allowed Spanish troops to circulate in the town carrying arms and helping themselves by threats to whatever they required. General Drude, on the other hand, had absolutely forbidden his men to carry arms in the town. Major Olalla had also taken possession, for his own use, of a house which was leased to a foreign club, and declined to move. M. Regnault had mentioned the matter of Major Olalla's attitude to his Spanish colleague, and he hoped it would produce a good effect. I feel bound to add that statements made to me by British merchants are entirely favourable as regards the general behaviour of the Spanish troops at Casa Blanca.

I may mention that the Spanish Minister sent one of his Secretaries to Casa Blanca to remain there during M. Regnault's visit.

The French Minister spoke in terms of appreciation of Mr. Madden, His Majesty's Consul, and of the pleasant relations which existed between him and all the French officials. He also stated that the Spanish Consul's attitude was a very proper one, and that he had done what he could to bring Major Olalla to a sense of his duties. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[32511] No. 385.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)*

(No. 376.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 23, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, giving an account of an attack by the French troops on Arabs at Sidi Brahim on the 21st instant, and of the burning of the Arab camp at that place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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Inclosure in No. 385.

*Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 254.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, September 21, 1907.*

A FRENCH force of some 2,500 men, with two batteries of four guns each, and a "mitrailleuse" under the command of General Drude, left camp at about 3 A.M. this morning to attack the Arabs at Sidi Brahim, a village in Mediuna 11½ miles or thereabouts from here.

Firing, I am informed, commenced about 7 A.M., the early morning being very dark and the march silent; the troops, too, left camp without any noise and in very good order.

The ridges of the undulating country before Sidi Brahim was reached were

cleared by the guns, and then swiftly occupied by the Foreign Légionnaires under Lieutenant-Colonel Boulard.

Sidi Brahim village was shelled at 1,000 yards, and was reached at 9 A.M. At 11 A.M. a village farther on was taken.

On the return to camp the General stopped the force at 2 P.M. to take in hand the continued sniping by the Arabs, which was effectually stopped, and the force reached camp at 4 P.M.

The fighting Arabs were, it is told me, not numerous; the estimate of their killed is placed at fifty, at the most. Though they fought with their usual callousness, they yet seemed to show much less spirit than formerly.

The casualties were stated by General Drude at ten, and consisted of two men killed and eight wounded.

The troops were much fatigued on their way home, and could only be with difficulty restrained from drinking any muddy water they could find.

As regards journalists, Colonel Lewis of the "Times" and M. Kahn of the "Temps" left town at 2 A.M. to go to the camp, while a photographer of the "Daily Mirror," although ordered back by officers, got mixed up in the darkness with the Foreign Legion men, and went out with them on foot.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

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[32512] No. 386.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 378.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 24, 1907.

I HAVE this day received a telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador, viâ Teneriffe, in which he reports that on the 23rd instant letters were received by the Governor of Mogador direct from Mulai Hafid and from Ma-el-Aineen. In these letters, which were brought by a special messenger from Marakesh, his Excellency was ordered to proceed there after having proclaimed Mulai Hafid Sultan at Mogador. Kaïds Gilouli and Anflus then held a meeting to settle whether they should also start for Morocco city with detachments of mounted men. At the special request of the Governor a Consular meeting was then called. His Excellency said he had done his utmost to remain loyal to Abd-el-Aziz, but, since the whole of South Morocco had declared in favour of Mulai Hafid, he considered it advisable for him to join the movement, as he would then be able to guarantee the security of the town. The Consuls informed his Excellency unanimously that they held him responsible for the safety of Europeans, but that they would not assume the responsibility of giving him any advice in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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[32547] No. 387.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 141. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, September* 23, 1907.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 54 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith an extract from a private letter received from San Sebastian, in which the French Ambassador is good enough to give me an account of his last conversation with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the arrangements to be made between the two Governments in view of the possible necessity of landing troops at Tangier.

As stated in my telegram, those arrangements have had to be left in abeyance, owing to the unwillingness of Spain to make any engagement which did not include a settlement of the question of the chief command, which, as you are aware, was claimed by Spain in respect of any military operations in and about Tangier in excess of the mere policing of the district as provided for by the Algeciras Act and by the Agreement of February last.

M. Révoil explains, as you will see, his view of the intentions of his Government





in the event of a military landing having to be effected, and he adverts to the explanations given to you on this point by M. Paul Cambon, which do not entirely agree with his own understanding of what the French Government means to do.

I am continuing to hold to Señor Maura and Señor Allendesalazar the same language as before, assuring them of the belief entertained by His Majesty's Government that France has no desire to extend her military action in Morocco, and urging the importance of continued co-operation between the two Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

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Inclosure in No. 387.

*M. Révoil to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(Extrait.) *Le* 19 *Septembre*, 1907.

ENTENTE avec le Gouvernement Espagnol sur l'intervention à Tanger. Cette entente reste "en l'air." La consultation du Ministre de la Guerre a donné le résultat que nous prévoyions. M. Maura se croit obligé de s'y conformer et, par conséquent, de ne faire aucun arrangement qui ne prévoit et règle la question du commandement unique. En m'apprenant cela, non sans quelque embarras, le Ministre d'Etat a ajouté: "D'ailleurs, les nouvelles très rassurantes que nous recevons de Tanger nous permettent de surseoir." Comme mon Gouvernement considère, de son côté, qu'il n'est pas séant d'éterniser cette discussion, j'ai répondu à M. Allendesalazar que nous étions résolus à ne pas aller au delà de ce que nous avions proposé; que dans ces conditions il n'y avait en effet qu'à surseoir. Je lui ai dit ensuite que si nous étions surpris par les événements, nous réglerions (nous Français) notre intervention d'après les Accords existants, notamment d'après celui de 1907. M. Allendesalazar a paru un peu étonné d'une réplique aussi nette. Il semblait croire que nous nous contenterions que la porte restât ouverte jusqu'au dernier moment à une entente.

En termes très cordiaux, j'ai ajouté que l'épreuve que nous venions de faire d'une politique commune au Maroc était vraiment peu satisfaisante. Ce n'est pas ainsi que nous devons appliquer dans la pratique les Accords et les engagements que nous avons contractés. Si nous n'apportons pas dans nos rapports de chaque jour et dans l'action concertée que ces Arrangements nous imposent plus de confiance et plus de cordiale ouverture que n'en a témoignées le Gouvernement Espagnol depuis les récents événements du Maroc, à quoi sert de s'être unis par tant de liens? Nos adversaires ne peuvent que se réjouir de notre impuissance à mettre nos Accords en pratique. Ils ne manqueront pas de profiter de cette situation, au grand détriment des intérêts des deux pays.

En terminant, j'ai tenu à rappeler, à titre d'exemple, au Ministre d'État, le profit que les deux Gouvernements Anglais et Français tiraient de l'intimité et de la sincérité de leurs rapports depuis qu'ils s'étaient rapprochés dans une cordiale entente.

J'ai eu l'occasion de voir le Roi, Lundi, après lui avoir présenté nos officiers venus pour le Concours Hippique. Je lui ai parlé dans le même sens; à votre retour ici, je vous ferai part de cet entretien.

Peut-être verrez-vous M. Maura pendant votre séjour à Madrid. Vous savez exactement où nous en sommes, et je ne doute pas que vous ne lui marquiez combien est regrettable l'échec, au moins momentané, des négociations laborieuses que nous menons depuis un mois à propos de Tanger.

Au sujet de ces négociations, on me fait part d'une conversation de notre Ambassadeur à Londres (à la date du 16 ou 17), dont vous aurez eu sans doute aussi communication. Je me demande si, au cours de cet entretien, il ne se serait pas produit quelque confusion au sujet de nos propositions concernant l'intervention éventuelle à Tanger.

Si je m'en réfère à ce qu'on me télégraphie, notre Ambassadeur aurait ainsi résumé ces propositions: "Dans le cas improbable d'un débarquement, nous serions disposés à admettre une Conférence entre les deux Gouvernements (Espagnol et Français) sur la question du commandement supérieur." Ce n'est point cela, vous le savez par mes communications de ces temps derniers. Nous avons dit qu'en cas de débarquement à Tanger et même d'envoi de renforts, on s'en tiendrait à l'action séparée des deux contingents dans chacune des zones, pour pourvoir à la situation défensive que nous étions fermement résolus à garder et qui était seule à envisager. Nous ne sommes pas allés au delà.

Il ne faudrait pas faire croire au Gouvernement Espagnol que nous sommes prêts à traiter la question du commandement supérieur dès le débarquement ; ce qui n'est pas dans nos intentions et ce qui serait tout à fait mauvais d'ailleurs.

Voudriez-vous tenir compte de cette rectification au cas où Sir Edward Grey, comme suite à sa conversation avec M. Cambon, vous aurait chargé de faire auprès du Gouvernement Espagnol une démarche qui renouvellerait celles que vous avez eu l'obligeance de faire déjà ici.

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[32581] No. 388.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 128.)

Sir, *Vienna, September* 26, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith text and translation of a Law for the suppression of smuggling by Austrians in Morocco, which has been published in to-day's "Wiener Zeitung."

This Law has been framed for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of the General Act of the Algeciras Conference which deal with the question of the smuggling of arms and of smuggling generally in Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN.

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Inclosure in No. 388.

*Extract from the "Wiener Zeitung" of September* 26, 1907.

(Translation.)

LAW of the 25th February, 1907, for giving effect to the General Act of the Algeciras Conference.

With assent of both Houses of the Imperial Parliament, I decree the following:—

§ 1. The penal provisions contained in the General Act of the International Conference at Algeciras of the 7th April, 1906, for reforms in Morocco, as well as those Regulations for the suppression of the smuggling of arms and of smuggling generally, are applicable in Morocco to Austrian subjects and to Austrian ships.

§ 2. A prosecution cannot be conducted in this country for acts declared to be punishable by the General Act.

§ 3. The Government is empowered to enact, by way of Decree, the provisions necessary for the execution of the measures enumerated in § 1.

§ 4. This Law comes into effect on the day of its promulgation.

The Minister of Justice is intrusted with its execution.

(Signed) FRANZ JOSEPH, *m. p.*

(Signed) BECK, *m. p.*
KLEIN, *m. p.*

*Vienna, February* 25, 1907.

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[32577] No. 389.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received Septembr* 30.)

(No. 472.)

Sir, *Paris, September* 27, 1907.

THE "Temps" of this evening publishes an article on the situation in Morocco somewhat more optimistic in tone than is habitual with this journal, in view of the apparent imminence of an "entente" between France and the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz.

The article begins with a brief résumé of M. Saint-René Taillandier's Mission to Fez in 1905, which was the last occasion on which the Representative of France came into direct contact with the Sultan of Morocco. That visit has not left a very agreeable souvenir in the minds of the French. M. Saint-René Taillandier was the victim of a policy which claimed to have successfully settled the whole Morocco question in Paris, without having taken into consideration any of the actual realities





of the African problem. His Mission was undertaken a year too late, and, in the opinion of many, it was from the outset doomed to failure. His programme was submitted to the Sultan at the very moment when the cannons of Tangier were saluting the German Emperor; almost immediately after the "intolérable" Comte Tattenbach—to quote the words of Prince Radolin—appeared with his rival Mission at the capital of Morocco. M. Saint-René remained there until the conclusion of the Franco-German Arrangements of July and September. His successor, M. Regnault, deferred his visit to Fez, although several other foreign Missions have since made the journey.

Now, however, from the excess of evil good has arisen, and, after the second act of energy shown by the Sultan in his voyage to Rabat, direct relations will again be established between the Governments of the two countries. The events of Casa Blanca have opened the Sultan's eyes to the illusory nature of the German protection to which he had pinned his faith. He had thought that France, after her diplomatic rebuff of 1905, would never again regain the upper hand, but he has now found out that France is capable of using force to protect her rights. Germany has disappointed the Mussulmans of Morocco in the same way as she did those of Turkey and Egypt when Prince Bülow declared in the Reichstag "German policy is Russian in Bulgaria and English in Egypt." They now know that France is stronger than they thought, and this demonstration of force will probably be sufficient for the future. Now is the moment for France, by a policy of intelligence, to take the position of "trusted counsellor," previously held by England, and ceded by her to France by the Agreement of the 3rd April, 1904. Germany held it for several months, with the sole result of increasing anarchy in the country.

Already a week ago, the article continues, the "Temps" declared that the time had come for the Franco-Spanish police to be substituted for General Drude's expeditionary force. This view was opposed by the semi-official press, but the same journals have now come round to it. That is satisfactory, but it must be borne in mind that in this matter the assistance of the Sultan is of the highest importance. The opinion has been expressed, and appears to be shared by the Government, that the matter is not urgent. We would be only too glad to accept this view, but we are far from being convinced. The police is not merely an organ of repression but also of preservation, and Casa Blanca is a standing proof of the rapidity with which a catastrophe may occur. Should loyal collaboration with the Sultan bring the Government to take the initiative in this question of the police, it would not be among the least of the advantages accruing from the "entente" with Abd-el-Aziz.

A copy of the article in question is inclosed herein.*

It is perhaps interesting to note that no mention is made of the British Mission to Fez, under Mr. Lowther, that was sent to support the French Mission, and remained in the capital until after the departure of M. Saint-René Taillandier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[32652] No. 390.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 60.) *Madrid, September* 30, 1907.

(Telegraphic.) P.

YOUR telegram No. 74 of the 27th instant.

I have written to Señor Allendesalazar, in the absence of the President of the Council, with regard to the suppression of the traffic in arms to Morocco, in accordance with the terms of your telegram, and I am assisting the French Chargé d'Affaires as far as possible in the matter. The Spanish Government are still very unwilling to engage in the forcible suppression of contraband on behalf of the Moorish Government, but I trust my communication may not be without effect.

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* Not printed.

[32293] No. 391.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) · R. *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1907.

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean.

Your telegram No. 122 of the 27th instant.

Having regard to the other conditions, more especially the grant of protection, 5,000*l.* should be sufficient, but we are anxious not to wreck negotiations by adhering rigidly to this figure, and you might as an outside figure go to 10,000*l.*

Do you agree?

It must, of course, come from Moorish Government.